Why Doxiadis Cries for Islamabad

The restless ghost of Constantinos Apostolos Doxiadis looks down on Islamabad every night and sheds a tear. He and his company planned this city in early 1960s. Several old bureaucrats who live in the city must know the reason for choosing him – he was called in as an advisor in Feb 1959 and by the year's end was asked to be the designer. Doxiadis a radical had had a remarkable career in his home country. It would have been interesting to know his feeling working with the head of the Commission for building the capital, Maj Gen Yahya Khan, the man who later failed to respect the democratic sentiment of Pakistan Eastern wing, leading to the country's fissure.



Doxiadis, obtained his doctorate at Berlin in 1936. In 1937 he was appointed Chief Town Planning Officer for Athens and during the war years was Head of Regional and Town Planning in the Ministry of Public Works while also serving as a corporal in the Greek Army. During the Occupation he was Chief of the National Resistance Group, Hephaestus, and published a magazine called "Regional Planning, Town Planning and Ekistics," the only underground technical publication anywhere in occupied territories. For the next six years he held important national and international assignments in connection with the rehabilitation of post-war Greece.

In 1951 he founded Doxiadis Associates, a private firm of consulting engineers, with a small group of architects and planners, many of whom had worked with him on the Greek Recovery Program. The company grew rapidly until it had offices on five continents and projects in 40 countries. He was honored for his national and international services.

This extended information shows that an exceptional man with great experience, knowledge and wisdom formulated the plans for Islamabad. The original Master Plan of Islamabad, covering the urban area of Rawalpindi was unfortunately never put into practice. According to a 2006 paper by Sajida Maria and M. Imran, "Planning of Islamabad and Rawalpindi: what went wrong" (available on the net) the plan was abandoned officially in the 1970s. Two further revision with the help of UN agency experts appeared in 1978 and in 1992. In June this year the CDA put on hold a further revision which "cover[s] all aspects, including new housing sectors, extension in municipal limits, industrial activities, environmental protection, road repairs, new parks and recreational areas and the safety of existing water reservoirs." Most of these involve real estate and construction work, which in turn provide revenue and consequent major leakage of funds in the system, with the approvers of such projects largely benefiting from this. Maria and Imran rightly point out that the failure of the original master plan can be pinned on lack of institutional development to implement the plan. Instead, CDA focused on building physical infrastructure, with the resulting heavy leakage of funds and substandard work.

The sins of the past have multiplied since CDA is flushed with money from sale of plot in newly opened sectors. This has encouraged it to approve many lavish project, e.g. the Centaurus (about which I have written earlier), with little consideration for their impact on the character of the city, or on its existing systems. Holism remains absent their planning. Among the most blatant errors is the continued expansion of the roads to accommodate car traffic with no public transport in place, which itself would remove need for expansion. The insecure water supply has been highlighted in my recent articles. In this article the failure of the city's sewerage system will be described – yet another vital system that shows the effect of corruption, lack of proper planning and monitoring, and incompetence.

Despite criticism from the outset, the CDA opted for the hugely over-priced French sewerage system for Islambad. The top-up on the fair market price has been siphoned off by the local agent of the French (the indenter, earlier the steno of the Director of Procurement in CDA) and other powerful decision-makers in Pakistan according to reliable insiders. Only an independent assessment can clear the doubt that lingers in the corridors of the CDA and outside. However, it is widely known that the CDA chairman and senior officials, including Members of Finance and Engineering, and their families and close relatives had an expense-paid visit to Paris costing
several million rupees, prior to signing of the contract! This sum is, however, paltry compared with the Rs 2.7 B price-tag of which the French arranged a sweetener loan of Rs 1.6 B, the remainder coughed up by the taxpayer.

Even if the new sewerage plant came with no kickbacks, it was poorly timed. Preliminary work needed for its effective use has yet to begin! To understand this sad saga, a brief background of the sewerage system follows..

In the mid-1960s, phases 1 and 2 of the capital's sewage system started operating. Lack of maintenance and poorly trained manpower led to both phases dying in early 1980s. By this time the upstream sewage was already getting choked in the pipes and not getting to the treatment plant, but no attention was paid to correct that. The choke points were largely cleared by breaking the pipes and releasing the sewerage into the rainwater drains thereby polluting a valuable resource. Meanwhile, another plant, phase 3
of the system, was ready in 1980. This failed to operate due to a dispute with the contractor who had built it, and has remained inoperative all these years! There has been no public accounting for these failures.

The French deal, called phase 4, entails the rehabilitation of phases 1, 2 and 3 as well as the construction of a large fourth plant which is to handle 10 M gallons of sewerage daily. The earlier three phases are capable of handling 7 M gallons. Phases 1&2, operational once again, are designed to handle 4 M gallons. Phases 3 and 4 are to come online in a few months. You would think that once more at least one city in Pakistan would have a fully operational sewerage system. No! It won't, and its problem will continue for a long time to come as these relate to the whole network of pipes that carry the effluent to the sewerage treatment plants.

Most of the sewerage lines, the large truck-lines and the tributaries, are almost as old as Islamabad itself – 45 years. Had the pipes been properly maintained and enlarged to handle the increased load due to the high population growth, the newly commissioned plants would have been justified.

Today, only 1.5 M gallons of sewerage arrives at the two operational plants with a capacity for 4 M gallons. The sewerage that does get through is highly diluted, suggesting mixing with fresh water from leaking pipes or general percolation – an indication of another problem. The leaking water pipes have losses of almost 60% as indicated in a Japan Bank of Intl Cooperation report of 2000. This gives Islamabad the dubious distinction of being perhaps the most wasteful of capital cities in terms of water supply.

The chairmanship of the CDA has been regarded by ambitious civil servants as a stepping stone towards become a federal secretary. With so many senior federal bureaucrats and leaders watching what the chairman does, brownie points are awarded on visible projects such as decoration and widening of roads, setting up leisure spots, building monuments and sanctioning large projects with little regard for environmental sustainability. The existing system of rewards does not give credit for instituting solid infrastructure maintenance and development – flashiness is the only thing that counts. Institutional reform within the CDA is also neglected for the same reason. Large contracts are preferred for another reason too: they rake in the money for those who sanction them.

Today, a man as enlightened as Doxiadis wouldn't last very long in the CDA.

The rush for fame and glory through any means has become the norm. One hopes that with the emboldened judiciary and its increased activism one may get it to clean up the mess that its members see daily in the capital, or could if they scratch the surface. An institutional reform in the CDA could become a model for other municipalities. And it would make the ghost of the Greek architect look happily at his old creation.