Islam as a political weapon in Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

The role of Islam has always been problematic in Pakistan. Pre-partition rhetoric laid fierce claims to the necessity of having a nation for the Muslims, but the question of whether such a nation for the Muslims of the sub-continent would also be an ‘Islamic’ nation has remained unresolved, and is an ongoing debate even today. The distinction has been raised by domestic and international scholarship, and various cases have been made to support the possibility and desirability of having the state of Pakistan as one based on Islamic ideas of secularism, whilst retaining its character as a Muslim state . Having lived through its infancy and now in its 60th year, Pakistan has witnessed varying degrees of importance to the role of Islam in Pakistani politics by a host of leaders, often using the unsettled nature of the debate to support their personal preferences, as well as to target their personal prejudices. This has further aggravated the conflict in both theocratic and secular camps.

This essay is an analysis of the role and relationship with politics of one of the most powerful tools of governance that Pakistan has seen, not to mention the predominant source of law in the country today; Islam. The most crucial developments in this regard took place under the civil and military regimes of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) and General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988); which will henceforth be analysed and juxtaposed in order to understand the inner dynamics of Islam within Pakistani politics, society and legal structures.

Throughout this paper, I will attempt to show that Islam has been used as a systematic tool for furthering political aims and governance authority within the aforementioned regimes. I will seek to highlight this abuse of religion by comparing the two governments, showing the methodical use of Islam and religious rhetoric in Pakistan as a politically charged entity and a mere means to an aim; furthering hidden agendas, forming national and international political alliances, and as an agent for manoeuvring public support by evoking religious sentiment and loyalties. In order to understand the religio-political status of Islam in the given context, to comprehend the reasons and motives behind the shift in the role of Islam as a matter of personal faith to a dangerously powerful state-managed political tool, and to ultimately prove the abuse of religion at the hands of Bhutto and Zia, it is essential to trace the instances from both regimes that not just reveal the shift in the status of religion, but also provide plausible reasons for it. The aim, then, is to shed light on the tactical abuse of religion and the manipulative uses that were exhorted from its use. This paper provides a brief background of the role of Islam pre-1971, and then analyses separately the aforesaid regimes with greater detail by charting the transition of religion in the Pakistani context

CONTEXT

The process of Islamising the state of Pakistan started as early as 1949. It was then that Pakistan’s career as a theocracy began in theory; with Liaquat Ali Khan’s (Prime Minister, 1947-51) move to secure the adoption of the Objectives Resolution by the Constituent Assembly, thereby substituting divine sovereignty for the sovereignty of the people. However, despite the fact that successive constitutions declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic, the use of Islam in politics remained chiefly rhetorical, to the great displeasure of religious organizations who championed the desirability, if not the necessity, of making Pakistan a truly Islamic state.

President Ayub Khan (1958-69) showed clear modernistic tendencies; yet retained a modest complacency towards a degree of pre-existing Islamic ideology legitimized by the Pakistan movement, but took it no further . The trend of predominantly religion-free politics continued with Yahya Khan (1969-71), who similarly showed little sympathy for the religious parties. Till the rise of Pakistan People’s Party in the 1970s, the political stance regarding religious parties had been unsympathetic, as evidenced by the imprisonment and original announcement of death sentence of Maulana Maududi, head of the Jamaat-i-Islami in response to the Punjab disturbances in 1953.

It was only after the fall of Dhaka that the role of religion in politics was drastically altered. Power was handed over to Bhutto, who had won a clear victory in West Pakistan in the 1971 elections. Much to the consternation of the people and despite his liberal-progressive leanings, it was Bhutto who signed the risky merger between religion and politics soon after. It was with his coming to power that Islam became a catalyst for furthering political motives.

BHUTTO’S ERA:

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won the 1971 elections on a heavily leftist map for governance; entrenched as it was in socialist ideals and thereby enjoying massive support. However, it was not long before the tide shifted. “It was not until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power at the end of 1971 following the secession of East Pakistan that any elements of Islamic ideology began to appear in Pakistan’s substantive foreign policy” . Islam came to the forefront of all policy and law-making decisions, and, ultimately, a vast host of issues, economic , policy-related etc. were increasingly dressed in Islamic colours. Religion soon after became the official legitimising strategy for all political manoeuvres.

The PPP’s view of the role that religion would play in Pakistani politics was an issue controversial from its very inception. Bhutto introduced the term ‘Islamic Socialism’, but was never truly able to define its tenets . The ambiguity was ultimately used to an advantage when the political expediency of religion became evident. “Devotionalism”, however, had never originally been part of the PPP’s strategy to rally the masses for support, and Bhutto had never been seen to portray himself as an observant Muslim; the rightly guided leader of a Muslim nation . For the most part, religion remained distinct from the politics of substantive policy-making. The PPP’s governance policy never encompassed a theocratic Pakistan, merely a socialist state based on principles of Islamic justice – whilst retaining Islam as a personal matter for the individuals of the state. This further supported PPP’s leftist stance as originally envisioned. This strongly leftist and somewhat secularist stance, however, was soon drastically altered.

Dolvie opines that leaders in Bhutto’s time began to find it expedient to “manipulate or placate the religious parties in order to secure their hold on power”. Ahmed supports this claim, and quotes Muhammad Munir, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan: “Unscrupulous politicians manipulated these religious forces for their own ulterior motives. Consequently the fanatical elements became a political force in their own right, and over the years managed to impose their dogmatic ideology in Pakistan. This way the purpose for which Pakistan was created was defeated and with it came the domination of medieval forces” .

How and why, in this environment of powerful socialist leanings, did Islam go from being a personal matter to a political tool for economic and financial gains, to finally to becoming a state commodity used for furthering personal and political motives as a means to rally the masses? What were the reasons, then, for the shift in policy; why did the PPP feel the need to resort to religious rhetoric and appeal to religious justifications as key guiding factors for policy and law-making? “If most of Pakistan’s leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about Islamisation, why did so many take the initiative to bring it about, or at least acquiesce in it” , when the populace has never once opted to vote for religious parties committed to the creation of an Islamic Pakistan? The attempt is to understand why and how religion began to carry this value as a political tool for governance.

Amongst other factors, the events of 1971 are of crucial importance in this regard. Bhutto was handed a country that had only recently been split into two. International politics and external alliances were in complete disarray. Having lost its only significant ethnic and religious minority, the Hindus, Pakistan drew closer to its neighbours in the East . The Governments of Saudi Arab and the United Arab Emirates supported “all kinds of Islamist activities” in Pakistan to save it from falling in the clutches of socialism, and negating its thus-far latent Islamic identity . Bhutto acknowledged this interest, and realised the advantages of building alliances with these oil-rich states. The most powerful alliance Bhutto would seek with the Gulf would be an ideological one; Islamic brotherhood.

This era saw the homogenization of Pakistani and Islamic identities to an extent that one became indistinguishable from the other . As Richter rightfully opines, “The catastrophic events of 1971… sensitized the people of the “new Pakistan” to the appeals of a resurgent Islamic ideology”. At the level of public diplomacy, the Islamic Summit in Lahore was seen as the right political move to further this growing bond. Socialism, the initial guide to policy- and law-making was put aside and international politics began rapidly leading to a change in priorities. The crucial aspects of this dependency were, “economic assistance… temporary migration and employment of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis in the Gulf States.” Bhutto’s commitment to the Gulf-alliances, and the value he attached to them became manifest when the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program was accompanied by deeply Islamic rhetoric, alarming many. It was one of the first in a series of moves to create an ‘Islamic identity’ for Pakistan.
These events relating to external affairs and foreign policy amalgamated to create an environment that led Bhutto to realize the latent power in religious rhetoric, and the crucial role that Islam would play for economic advantages and initiating alliances with these hugely wealthy Gulf monarchies. As Delvoie elucidates, the need for “strengthening ties with these countries… to diversify Pakistan’s sources of financial and political support at a time when he thought the country had become overly dependant on the United States and precisely when the Gulf states were beginning to deploy the wealth accumulated as a result of spectacular increases in the price of oil” had hit the PPP hard.

However, a far more dangerous shift was soon to follow: the use of Islamic rhetoric for internal politics – rallying the masses, seeking legitimacy for controversial policies, and Islam as a means to ensure popular support. The political use of Islam was now evident to the PPP, not just for international alliances and fiscal benefits, but more so for the growing internal threats to power. By the late 1970s, the PPP was facing a substantial threat from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA); an umbrella organization of nine opposition parties that was to contest the upcoming March elections. The primary uniting feature of the resistance was a general dislike for Bhutto’s politics, but given varying and sometimes even contradictory party-agendas (Asghar Khan’s secularism, Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s socialism, and Maududi’s assertive Islamism), an agreement on the necessity of a positive role of Islam in policy-making became the ‘official’ party-agenda for the PNA . This signified the emergence of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) as one of the key players in Pakistani politics.

The mishandling of power by the PPP had disillusioned the masses, particularly the poor, who had hopes for a better life under Bhutto’s socialist agenda. This led to a stronger support for the PNA and its powerful religious rhetoric. PNA primarily championed Islamic values and realised that this was the most convenient means though which the opposition could attack the sitting Government. A disappointed citizenry was easily provoked when it was not political preferences but loyalty to religion that was being questioned .

This internal political threat to power became the key factor leading Bhutto’s socialist government to revert to religious sentiments, if only to clutch onto and hope to save its fading popularity. As a result, the legal structures began to be heavily influenced by this process of Islamisation, if simply as a means to prove the Government’s loyalty to Islam by infiltrating it into the Constitution. Subsequent amendments to the Constitution followed; making Islam the state religion and setting pre-requisites for the head of state to be Muslim. In a frenzy to break the momentum of the PNA-led movement, numerous Islamisation measures erupted. Shariat laws were introduced; gambling, horse racing, and alcohol were banned. The PPP manifesto was duly amended, making Friday the weekly holiday, introducing Quranic studies as mandatory for all students, establishing Ulema (clerical) academies and so forth . A new newspaper “Musawat” was founded to propagate Islamic justification for the PPP rule. These steps were of course accompanied with the appropriate rhetoric seeking to allow Bhutto to gain electoral support from the more religiously inclined quarters of society. ‘Socialism’ was accordingly replaced in party literature for “Musawat-i-Mohammadi” (‘Equality of Mohammad’), i.e. Islamic egalitarianism . These moves established the PPP’s dedication to the cause of Islam, which became Bhutto’s most powerful defence to fight the PNA in their own battlefield. One of Bhutto’s last desperate bids to buy off religious parties agitating for his overthrow with U.S. backing was to declare the Ahmadiyya Community non-Muslim in 1974. In 1976, he controversially appointed General Zia-ul-Haq the Chief of Army Staff in another move to appease the JI, of whom Zia was a close compatriot. Ironically, upon the advice and persuasion of Mian Tufail, the militant leader of JI, Zia overthrew Bhutto in 1977 . Later expressing regret for his political tactics, a resigned Bhutto claimed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, “I appointed a Chief of Army Staff belonging to Jaamat-i-Islami, and the result is before us all” .

The shift in policy came as a surprise to many. As Joshi notes, “It was strange that a democratic and western educated political leader like Bhutto succumbed to pressure tactics of fundamentalist forces for his political survival” . As a result of this political manoeuvring, by the late 1970s, Islam was at the very forefront of the entire political scene. This was portrayed by the 1977 election campaign, which ultimately emerged as a struggle between contesting parties to prove their superior loyalty to Islam , whose desirability and necessity in Pakistani politics was by now firmly established.

Islam had thus evolved into the most predominant political factor to facilitate in both external and internal scenarios, by the end of Bhutto’s regime and as a result thereof. Although his insistence upon the role of Islam in Pakistani politics during his final days in power could not save his fading popularity, it did serve to reinforce the centrality of Islam for the military regime that followed. The dangerous alliance between military might and religious pressure thus found its seeds in Bhutto’s policy shifts, only to find renewed force under the approaching military rule.

THE ZIA REGIME:

The military regime under Zia-ul-Haq entered the political arena in 1977 as a “caretaker” ninety-day government whose “sole aim” was “to organize free and fair elections” . The “directionless drama” eventually spanned over the course of eleven years, having been granted a legal license to persist by the Supreme Court of Pakistan . It soon experienced a remarkable shift in policies, with religious reform becoming a top priority before long . A. K. Brohi, General Zia’s Law and Religious Affairs Advisor, claimed in less than a year after Zia’s take over that the “main concern” of the military coup had been “to put the country on the Islamic system” .

The process of Islamisation started almost immediately, and soon emerged strongly in the shape of legal amendments. Just five days after coming to power, new Martial Law regulations with strict Quranic penalties for a series of crimes were announced. Zia persistently advocated his support for complete Nizam-e-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) in Pakistan. Over the years, innumerable promises over a starkly broad range of issues to Islamize the legal and social dynamics of the country were made, but much of it remained un-implemented . This led to an increasing sense of superficiality associated with the selective process of Islamisation, appearing to be a matter more concerned with state convenience, impression-building, and political tactics as opposed to genuine motives to find the right place for Islam within Pakistan’s political structures.

Given the fact that a previously socialist regime had reverted to using religion as a panacea, the latent force behind religious rhetoric could not be overlooked by the power-hungry Zia . The nation had witnessed the PNA’s growing status on their religious agenda after reverting to religious sentiments, not to mention Bhutto’s temporary stability in terms of winning back lost popularity. Islam became the formula that could not fail, and Zia was quick to fathom this reality. As Ali rightly states, “Whatever Islamisation Zia had been enforcing was more to consolidate his own personal power than to establish a genuine Islamic order” .

Official rhetoric dedicated to Islamisation mounted by the day. Taking advantage of the changing environment of priorities, Zia caused an upheaval in the social, legal, and political atmosphere of Pakistan with lasting effects. In the wake of election-postponement, Zia unveiled a four-tiered priority agenda with Islamisation at the top of the hierarchy . This eleven-year rule dedicated to Islamisation, saw in its very first year the making of a parallel legal system that looked to the Quran and Sunnah for precedents, the performance of which was limited to ‘law-finding’ and not ‘law-making’ .

Various other legal amendments followed in the name of Islam. The controversial Hudood Ordinances were duly approved the next year. The Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-Shahadat) was then amended to severely affect the rights of women , followed by the compulsory deduction of Zakat, and other such changes. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that strict Islamic penalties, as in operation in Saudi Arab, were being legalised. Modifications in Pakistan’s economic system through the establishment of Islamic Banking, abolition of bank interest (riba), mandatory collection of zakat (social welfare tax), introduction of Islamic bank tax (ushr) and establishment of various institutions to study Islamic economics were all contemplated as well. Educational reforms were mandated by setting up the International Islamic University, Shariah Training Institute, and various ulema training institutions. Social reforms were also introduced under the new Nizam-e-Mustafa; re-enforcement of the pre-existing bans on gambling and alcohol, stricter measures to encourage the observance of purdah (veil) and so forth.

Religion also served as the prime justification for the military regime. It allowed the gap between the ‘Islamic’ way of governance and that specified by Western standards to be widened substantially; the un-Islamic nature of democratic forms of governance thus came under question. “The rhetoric of Islam and the inculcation of an Islamic identity have been deployed by the rulers of the state to justify arbitrary and undemocratic practices” . Zia made sporadic comments on the need for a strong presidential form of government, it being more in line with the “thinking and psyche of Muslims”, since they “believed in one God, one Prophet, and one Book, and their mentality is that they should be ruled by one man” . He contended that true Islamic values envisioned a strong presidential system as opposed to the formerly established parliamentary one – another example of the use of Islam to entrench personal power.

Amidst innumerable cases of non-implementation, those implemented resulted in acute social, political upheavals. Resentment followed from various quarters of society, particularly women and the Shia community . State-led Islamisation was in effect being reduced to ‘Sunni’ Islamisation which undermined the universalist claims of the entire process. Academic scholarship of the time clearly saw the weaknesses and superficiality associated with these reforms. ‘Political noise’ regarding Islamisation was at its peak, but the unimplemented reforms showed a lack of genuine interest - Zia’s reform agenda had more force in words and vision than in practical reality. On most occasions, it merely re-enforced Bhutto’s pre-existing reforms (bans on gambling, alcohol etc.) or made cosmetic changes to existing policies, e.g. zakat collection schemes. Most crucially though, many of the policies were simply left unimplemented; e.g. textbook reform, the ban on riba and so forth. Where there was implementation, it constituted a very minor change in existing policies, e.g. general educational reform and introduction of ‘Islamic Banks’. Kennedy cites these examples to illustrate the superficiality associated with Zia’s process of Islamisation, and the severe fickleness behind the entire procedure . Joshi reiterates, “Islamic regulations came to have but one source - the volition of Zia”.

The expediency of the propagation of this Islamisation process with reference to the international arena was a highly important factor for Zia too . Saudi concern in Pakistani politics, their support of adherents and advocates of Saudi Islam (Jamaat-i-Islami) and their vested interests in facilitating socio-religious dominance in Pakistan were key factors acting as catalysts for the Islamisation process. The Saudi interest in promoting their breed of Islam all over the Muslim world has been a constant feature of Pakistani politics, and was at its peak under Zia. Zia forcefully supported Saudi causes in Pakistan . The Afghan war proved another catalyst for this support, “The Afghan war in the 1980s once again raised the prospects of communism reaching the shores of Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf was quick to respond. Generous funding infiltrated the borders of Pakistan, to support and propel Islamic activities, thereby strengthening Pakistan’s Islamic identity.”

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) was another principal driving force as the principal adherent of Saudi Islam in Pakistan and the chosen recipient of selective Saudi patronage. Zia was a “closet Jamaati” , sharing JI beliefs and politics. His loyalties to the organization were clear from day one . “The fount of Zia’s Islamic ideology came from Maulana Maudoodi and his Jamaat-i-Islami party” . Zia was heavily reliant upon the Jamaat until his power became entrenched; the Jamaat on the other hand was interested in having an ideological stronghold in Pakistani politics that would outlive Zia’s temporary government. This resulted in a proximity that would heavily influence Zia’s policies and politics; an appeased JI meant a stronger power-foothold. This is, for many academics, one of the key explanations for Zia’s interest and keenness towards religion and religious reform. Joshi opines that, “It is obvious that in the priorities of the Jamaat, Islam was the most decisive consideration. Since Zia’s veneer of Islam fitted in with the Jamaat fanaticism, the two-some forged an alliance of collusive concurrence with a view to holding Pakistan to ransom.”

Mixing the military regimes functions with the ‘duty’ to Islamise the nation, Zia set foot on a long journey in office in the name of Islam. Every future move was to be justified in reference to religion. The question put to the citizenry of Pakistan for the 1984 referendum is indicative of the manipulative use of religion for political gain. The people were asked a single question, the crux of which was whether they supported the Islamisation process and “the Islamic ideology of Pakistan”. A yes vote would automatically serve as a vote of confidence for electing Zia as the president of Pakistan for the next five years. The manipulation was evident in the referendum; for emphasis, the yes column of the ballot was printed in green (symbolic of Islam) and the rest in white.

Thus Zia’s era saw the use of religion has a highly charged entity, loaded with possibilities to justify an unconstitutional regime, entrench power, build external alliances and win domestic support. Islam, originally a matter of individual choice and preference, ultimately evolved into a prime governance tool subject to the heaviest forms of manipulation. Richter calls religion the “major base” upon which Zia “attempted to build a structure of support” . ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ in hindsight, reeking of superficiality, can only logically be understood as a mere political tactic.

CONCLUSION:

One way of understanding the reasons behind such use and abuse of religion under both regimes is to remember that Pakistan has always operated on an ‘Islamic mandate’ , even under its most secular regimes. Bhutto for instance, was “arguably Pakistan’s most secular leader” , but even before he reverted to the politicisation of religion for personal gain, the central PPP credo was, “Islam is our ideology, socialism our economy, and democracy our politics”. Pakistan’s leaders have thus always reckoned the expediency of using Islamic rhetoric to support changes in policies, but what differentiates the two aforementioned regimes in this regard has been the ugly abuse of Islam and religious sentiments to further personal and politically charged agendas. Kennedy has argued that these legal and social changes brought under the name of Islam did not do much damage in practical terms; but many authors have debated that these “islamisation” measures have created an environment of fanaticism and extremism in Pakistan . This is a fact clearly evidenced from the recent outrage staged by the Jamia Hafsa in Pakistan’s capital city. A hostile atmosphere, foul with fanaticism, has emerged and strengthened over time, finding its roots in the events that unfolded under the Bhutto and Zia regimes and the atmosphere of intolerance created therein.

Additionally, legal structures have suffered drastically, most primarily because of the ambiguity that has been created by the absence one standard source of law – the sources now being the Quran, Sunnah and the Constitution, all operating under a wider ambit of ‘Islam’ as the primary source. This ambiguity has facilitated the abuse of religion that has taken place in Pakistan, and has wreaked havoc in the legal system. Religion, by its very essence, allows for numerous interpretations, and thus as a non-standardized source of law, has given rise to drastic vagueness.

The question of why Islam seems to work as a tool for all those willing to use it is pertinent here. Is it by its very nature, as understood, i.e. deen (‘a way of life’) as opposed to simply a madhab (religion) problematic, or is it that people in Pakistan have often looked to it in the hope of filling the void of social justice? The fact that there has been no ‘popular movement’ questioning the wisdom behind these laws is evidence that people are queasy questioning religion. Surely this is not something that places Pakistanis society alone but the way Islam has come to be viewed by many as unarguable. Even attempts to rationalize religion in light of modern day society have often been stomped down by fanatics as heretical advance to foil orthodox religion. Reform is slow, as society is uneasy about challenging anything validated under the guise of Islam.

The solution therefore rests in an intellectual and political struggle that can challenge bigotry head-on without the fear of ramifications. It must be realised that a nation built for the Muslims, to retain Muslim identity, does not necessitate a theocracy. As of now, there is scarce hope for that. Knee-jerk reactions seem to be the remedy rather than rational argument and evidence. In political and legal terms, perhaps the remedy to this environment of bigotry and intolerance is something akin to Islamic secularism: a principle that would allow for dynamic political change whilst affirming positive affiliation with religious values .