Emerging Pakistan-U.S. relations

From President Woodrow Wilson’s slogan to “Make the world safe for democracy� to President George W. Bush’s ‘Democracy campaign’ as a part of the global War on Terror (WoT) the United States has tirelessly sought to promote the cause of democracy across the world. With the re-emergence of democracy in Pakistan, ally in the WoT, the U.S. should be thrilled. The transition from dictatorship to democracy in Pakistan occurred without burdening the U.S. with the need to create and sustain a politico-military campaign for the purpose. On behalf of the population of Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is currently supervising a democracy building process in the two countries. So Pakistan has indeed saved much of the U.S. resources and the U.S. needs to be glad about it. But geo-politics is not simple mathematics and two plus two is not always four. What the U.S. prescribes for Iraq and Afghanistan, may not be the desired objective elsewhere, particularly in Pakistan. Why? Precisely because one of the fundamental features of a democratic regime is sovereignty - the right to make laws and policies guiding the national and international affairs of a state. When the U.S. brings democracy to a nation, they are in a position to regulate the flow of sovereign authority to the new regime; when internal changes lead to democratic transformation, the U.S. gains no leverage for regulating the nation’s exercise of sovereignty. Since Pakistan falls in the latter category, democracy in Pakistan has become a matter of concern for the U.S. (much like its absence in Iraq and Afghanistan).

The fact that militant hideouts are operating in regions of Pakistan is not a recent discovery for the U.S. Since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. intelligence was aware of Al-Qaeda safe haven in areas of Pakistan. But for the purpose of explaining the limited success of the NATO in the Afghan operation, the U.S. is in need of scapegoat. Hence the long realized secret of the existence of militant training camps in Pakistan, has gained a sense of urgency for the U.S. Certain sections in the U.S. administration and military have been suggesting military operations within Pakistan (either unilateral or in partnership with Pakistani forces) for some time. As the U.S. sought to implement its policies, the political situation in Pakistan witnessed a major transformation. The process of democratic revival is underway in Pakistan and Pervez Musharraf, the U.S. point-person in the WoT, has been deprived of any political authority. Under the changed conditions the U.S.-Pakistan relations are taking an interesting course.

On September 4, 2008, the U.S. launched its first ground assault in Pakistan when U.S. troops raided areas of South Waziristan. Almost a week later, five civilians and seven militants were killed in a U.S. missile attack in Miranshah, North Waziristan. According to a report in New York Times, President Bush had authorized the American Special Forces to carry out ground assaults within Pakistan in July 2008 and these attacks are simply the outcome of expanded U.S. WoT.
In a speech at the US National Defense University, President Bush has in a way defined the future terms of engagement with Pakistan by stating that parts of Pakistan pose unique challenges for the U.S. and need to be targeted as a part of the wider WoT. The U.S. authorities have been emphasizing on a host of claims and demands like the inability of Pakistani forces to deal with militants within its territory and the need to reform the ISI- the Pakistani Intelligence Agency.

Pakistan is showing no signs of appeasing its senior partner in the WoT. In a Corps Commander Conference held on September 12, 2008, Army Chief Ashfaq Kiyani sought to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty by authorizing the Army to retaliate to any attempts by ‘foreign troops’ to launch attacks within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. General Kiyani also confronted the U.S. by rejecting the latter’s explanation that rules of engagement gave the coalition forces the right to enter Pakistan for conducting operations against terrorist hideouts. The political leadership expressed solidarity with the Army on the issue and the resolve was put into action immediately. According to reports on September 15, 2008 Pakistan para-military forces fired warring shots when the U.S. troops allegedly attempted to cross over into Waziristan from across the Afghanistan border.

The issue of unilateral use of force by U.S. within the Pakistani territory also figured in a bilateral meeting between Pakistani President Zardari and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown held in London on September 16, 2008.
Pakistan has very tactfully highlighted the issue by discussing it with a NATO member struggling to counter the rising domestic antipathy towards the WoT. This also comes at a time when the NATO has categorically refused to participate in any operations beyond the Afghanistan borders under the current mandate of engagement in the country.

The U.S. strategy in the WoT is being challenged by a close ally in the campaign. The challenge per se is not an issue of concern for the U.S. It is Democratic Pakistan, and not Musharraf’s Pakistan that is challenging the U.S. For the first time since the U.S. launched the WoT, a democratic regime commands political authority in Pakistan. Despite the flaws, the new government of Pakistan will seek to prove its democratic credentials to the domestic population by asserting its sovereignty vis-à-vis the U.S. Has the WoT come to be challenged by its corollary- the democracy campaign? The future course of U.S.-Pakistan relations will provide appropriate answers.