Solving the Afghan Puzzle

By all measures, the Bush administration’s strategy in Afghanistan has been an abject failure. Taliban insurgents are moving from strength to strength, they have seized control of the Swat valley, imposed their austere version of Islamic law and thrown open challenge to the writ of the Pakistani state.

President Obama’s grand plan to stabilize the troubled region hinges largely on a ‘troop surge’ that will presumably boost the US military presence by three brigades – roughly fifteen thousand men. Yes, a surge might bring a reduction in civilian casualties and collateral damage from air strikes, but there are several important factors that threaten this strategy:

(i) Increasing the number of troops on the ground will heighten the prevailing sense of occupation among the notoriously resistant Pashtun population. Creating enemies among the Afghan masses will only reverse whatever progress we register.
(ii) Military supply routes are a serious concern. Just recently, militants essentially cut supply lines to Afghanistan by bombing a bridge in Pakistan’s Khyber Agency. It is difficult to see how a troop surge can work if supply routes are going to be constantly under threat.
(iii) In fear of public reprisals at home, most NATO partners have been careful to keep their troops away from conflict-ridden Taliban areas. It is likely that a troop surge will be filled largely by the United States. But more troops in troubled areas will necessarily result in an increased human cost. And the American public’s support will evaporate with much higher fatalities. Is President Obama prepared to go in deeper, and risk public disapproval?

In light of these challenges, some analysts have suggested recruiting Afghan tribes to the battle, and using them to secure Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds. This would be a dangerous mistake.

In a society of multiple clans and sub-clans whose various allegiances and blood feuds have been running for centuries, arming local militias will only encourage warlordism, worsen the security situation and undermine the writ of the Afghan government.

The strategy of using local actors may have worked well to quell a sectarian insurgency in Iraq’s Anbar province, but its effectiveness with a religiously-inspired Taliban is doubtful at best. Different theatres of war require different approaches.

The Obama administration needs a clean break with the failed policies of their predecessors in the White House. Authorizing covert drone attacks and incursions across the Durand Line, which separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, has only succeeded in creating an unprecedented backlash in the region. It has enraged the masses, fuelled anti-American sentiment and brought greater sympathy for the Taliban in these areas.

If the region is to be stabilized, it is imperative that we strategically rethink policy on Afghanistan and formulate a more creative and counter-intuitive approach. To that end, it can only be beneficial if we encouraged talks with the Taliban.

Yes, the basic pre-conditions of the United States government and the Taliban do not meet. President Obama wants more international forces in Afghanistan, while the Taliban’s primary condition is that these forces must leave Afghan soil. It’s a stalemate.

But with American blessing, we can pursue talks on a local Afghan setting. The Afghan government, with the assistance of special envoy George Mitchell, can work to negotiate significant power-sharing deals with senior Taliban figures on the condition that they lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution. For the flexible opportunists among them, the incentives are clear.

The challenge will be to identify and separate the Taliban’s hard-line ideologues from its cadre of ‘less-militant, more-opportunist’ elements. After all, the Taliban is a mix of several different regional actors who harbor multiple motivations. Fatigued by battle, their unity is, arguably, not what is once was. Manipulating this framework can hold the key to solving the Afghan puzzle.

The ‘Iftar meeting’ that was held between various Afghan parties, including Taliban representatives, under Saudi hospitality in Mecca is a positive sign. Although it is difficult to imagine the negotiating stalemate being broken, but progress on this front is not entirely impossible. It will be challenging, but this avenue must be encouraged and explored - in conjunction with the deterrent of a harsh military option.

The United States and its allies cannot afford to rely solely on aggressive military operations. They will have to engage both Afghanistan and Pakistan and create the military and diplomatic framework that can enable them to secure their stability.

The idea is not to impose a solution in Afghanistan, but to create the opportunities that allow for an Afghan solution.