Different Eagles, Same Genus

“Pakistan has one of the best, most combat ready airforces in the world….. For the Indian war planners, the Pakistan Air Force is their

worst fear. Pakistani pilots are respected throughout the world, ……because they know how to fly and fight.” - Lieutenant-General Charles Horner, USAF (retd.), the chief architect of, and the mastermind behind, the air campaign against Iraq during the Gulf War. Quoted from his biography, “Every Man A Tiger”

General Chuck Yeager, considered by many as the only person ever to be blessed with “the right stuff”, once remarked that it was the

man in the cockpit and his experience, which mattered the most in an air combat situation, and not the aircraft being flown. Yeager

should know, because he had, at one time or another, flown with American, British, German, Israeli and Pakistani pilots. His experience

taught him that an aircraft was simply the extension of the man flying it and it was the man who would be responsible for the ultimate

victories in air combat and not the plane, which was being flown. If a simple calculus were done on the relative strengths of the Indian

and Pakistani air forces on the terms of their aircraft, the Indians would enjoy an obvious advantage over the Pakistanis.

A few years ago, I had read Fizaya: The Psyche of Pakistan Air Force by Pushpinder Singh, Ravi Rikhye and Peter Steinemann who

had contributed pictures, but the main analysis of the book was done by the two Indians. Recently, I had penned an article for Chowk on

the nature of the Pakistani military mind, which fostered the conditions that ushered in the present Indo-Pakistan crisis along the Line of

Control in occupied Kashmir. The resulting discussion, which followed focused on the merit and demerits of the two respective air forces

and how they would fare in a war. These series of interacts rekindled my interest in the topic and I began to search for my misplaced

volume of Fizaya.

Another outcome of the Chowk interacts was that I was beginning to spend too much time on my computer playing Jane’s air combat

simulations. I have two main air combat simulators; Falcon 4.0, which stimulates an actual full scale war on the Korean peninsula and

has one of the most advanced mission generators on the market outside of the air combat simulators of the United States Air Force

(USAF). The other air combat simulation I have is of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and has a mission generator that covers possible air

operations in the Middle East that the IDF might be forced to confront. Since IDF operates Falcon F-16D multi-role fighters and the

F-16D is the primary attack fighter of the USAF in South Korea, I have logged over 400 “virtual” hours on the type. (Mission times in

both Falcon 4.0 and Jane’s IDF are in real time; an average of two to four hours depending on the sortie). The F-16D is my one of my

favorite aircraft and it is a sheer joy and a delight to “fly” it. This obsession with flying the “Viper”, an unofficial nom d’guerre used by

the pilots to describe the F-16, seems destined to be more time consuming, because the company that makes it has announced that it will

introduce a campaign generator for the India-Pakistan theater of operations.

However, the slew of replies questioning the comparative strengths of IAF and PAF forced me to re-read Fizaya and I was dully

impressed by how valid its observations were even seven years after it was published. Since then, there is no doubt that most of statistics

used in Fizaya have been rendered obsolete, but tables of statistics can never truly capture the psyche of what motivates a fighter pilot. A

fighter pilot, though a final result of an exhaustive selection process and a rigorous training regime, is more about a state of mind than

anything else. Pakistan’s selection process for its pilots is one of the most demanding in the world and the attrition rate of those who do

not make it as combat pilots in the PAF is appalling. The PAF, each year, has roughly 8,000 applicants to fill about 110 openings in its

combat squadrons and other auxiliaries support squadrons, such as tactical air transport and bomber squadrons. Out of these 110, who

will complete the courses at PAF Academy at Risalpur and graduate from it, only ten percent will be posted for eventual conversion and

training to its front line combat squadrons. Of these ten percent, a few lucky ones will go on to serve in the Mirage squadrons of PAF

and still a rarer elite will join PAF’s F-16 squadrons, notably the “Griffens” and the “Shaheens”.

What absolutely astounded me, upon reading Fizaya, was not the stringent requirements for a combat pilot in PAF, but how much

similarity there exists between the PAF and IDF in its combat doctrines and the emphasis both air forces put on the training of their pilots

for air combat operations. As the Jane’s IDF simulation came with a detailed explanation of IDF air combat tactics and war doctrine, I

was amazed to discover how similar is the IDF to the way PAF conducts its own air combat operations. To give reader a little insight of

this similarity, it should be noted that in a military sense, both Israel and Pakistan lack what can be termed as, “a strategic depth”. The

main operational air bases of IDF and PAF are well within 400 kms of their historic adversaries’ major air bases. In case of a war, this

distance can easily be covered within less than fifteen minutes flying time.

Consequently, the concept of a tactical retreat does not exist in the mind-set of IDF and PAF pilots, because it would mean the loss of

their air bases and the complete loss of air superiority, which would force the tide of battle to turn against their respective nations. Like

the IDF, the PAF is the first and the last line of defense for Pakistan upon which rests the entire fate of the nation and it is because of

this fact that PAF, like the IDF, trains to fight against superior odds. In another case of similarity, which would amuse both air forces, the

PAF and IDF pilots are trained with what can be called, “the wounded tiger syndrome”. They are always taught to take the offensive in

any air combat situation and always fight as if the odds are against them. This is to say that they are encouraged to exhibit a sense of

aggressiveness in air combat operations and they are repeatedly encouraged to take calculated risks in the air against the enemy. The

adage of Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron of World War One fame, is drilled periodically into the minds of PAF and IDF pilots:

the first person to aggressively initiate air combat will always win.

Also, both the IDF and PAF air combat operations are approached with “a street fight mentality”. In other words, if PAF and IDF pilots

initiate air combat, they are taught to finish it and not to break off the engagement unless the enemy aircraft is destroyed. This has

inoculated a level of self-confidence in both IDF and PAF pilots that when they get into an air combat situation they know that they will

prevail against any odds. It is an astonishing facet of PAF and IDF training that an average IDF and PAF pilot’s training regime is so

brutally realistic and demanding that actual combat operations are referred to as “milk runs”. Most IDF and PAF pilots find combat to be

far easy, and preferable, than their training programs. The IDF and PAF want their combat pilots to be self-confident in their own

abilities as a combat pilot, because it is the self-confidence of the pilot in his training, which in air combat makes the difference between

life and death and not the sophistication of the aircraft being flown.

In a remarkable departure from their American mentors, IDF and PAF are only a handful of air forces in the world, which still place

emphasis on pilot skills over reliance on technology. The USAF, after the Gulf War, has being slowly moving away from pilot skills and

towards “smart weapons” and it seems to be in the danger of forgetting why it instituted its “Top Gun” school at Miramar in the first

place. It was with this in mind that PAF created its Ground Commander’s School (GCS), an advanced fighter weapons school for its

pilots, based on the American Navy’s “Top Gun” program at Miramar and the USAF’s “Red Flag” fighter weapons school at Nellis Air

Force Base, situated in Nevada. The greatest contribution of GCS to PAF training is that not only did it incorporate air combat lessons of

Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971, it also included the lessons of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Arab-Israeli Wars. GCS is

responsible for teaching PAF pilots the skills of Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics (DACT). For the reason of teaching its pilots DACT, PAF

has created aggressor squadrons, which mimic the characteristics of Indian aircraft and PAF instructors fly PAF aircraft as the Indians

might fly their aircraft based on Indian air tactics and war doctrines. The idea is to teach PAF pilots so well about Indian tactics that they

would be able to anticipate Indian moves, in a potential air combat situation, before the Indian pilots can even think of them!

Yes, I know that this sounds like a real stupid thing to say and no, PAF pilots do not have a crystal ball to read the thought of IAF pilots!

Again, on surface, this may sound like a real dumb thing to say, but on a closer reflection, it makes perfect sense. Air Combat

Maneuvering (ACM), or in lay terms “dog fighting”, is a highly complicated process, which occurs within the rigid parameters of the laws

of physics. ACM might seem to be a freewheeling chaotic situation, but in reality air combat is a highly choreographed ballet, with

pre-determined moves and counter-moves. Like a ballet, it is an art form, which has to be learned, practiced and mastered before one

can excel at it. In an air combat situation environment, to quote Beavis and Butt-Head, “physics rules!” and because of this, each aircraft

has a well defined set of flight characteristics, which creates its own specific “flight profile”. The key to understanding the laws of ACM,

and they can be easily mastered as learning to program one’s VCR , is to learn the aircraft’s “flight profile”, because no matter how

technologically advanced and sophisticated a fighter aircraft might be, it still can not escape the laws of physics.

For example, the vast majority of ACM ideally occurs at speeds of between 300-550 knots, because the aircraft experiences a condition

known as, “air resistance” if it tries to fly faster or slower than the above mentioned speed range during an ACM scenario. If the aircraft

goes too fast, it increases its air resistance and that in turn reduces its turning radius forcing the aircraft to “bleed energy” by reacting too

slowly to flight commands. Therefore, the faster it goes, the air resistance increases forcing the aircraft to slow down and increases the

rate of fuel consumption. Hence, limiting its combat efficiency. If the on the other hand, the aircraft flies too slowly, it risk stalling out,

because of the violent nature of ACM. Every time an aircraft initiates a “violent maneuver”, that is a rapid turn, it loses its forward

momentum to air resistance, which causes the aircraft to “bleed” by losing speed and risking a situation that air force pilots refer to as a,

“critical in-flight systems malfunction”. Since speed is the sine qua non of ACM, no pilot wants to stall his aircraft in the middle of a

fight. Put another way, if you chose to fly slowly during an ACM, the warning panels inside the aircraft will light up like a Christmas tree

and you, as a pilot, will have an excellent chance of buying that much desired farm in the sky!

Also, the structural requirements of the aircraft also limit certain types of “violent maneuvers”, because the laws of physics determine

how an aircraft can optimally operate at certain speeds. ACM is about maximizing the energy rate of your aircraft and thus, there is only

a limited set of variables in an air combat, which can be undertaken without risking the structural integrity of the aircraft. Therefore, if

you know the flight characteristics of your enemy’s aircraft, you can easily predict how he will maneuver in a given situation and by

anticipating his reactions, you can maneuver your aircraft into a position, which offers you the best possible vantage point in an ACM

situation.

Consequently, this is where the utility of DACT becomes apparent, because if the pilot understands the “flight profile” of his adversary’s

aircraft, he will know how that aircraft will operate in a potential air combat situation. By understanding what the weaknesses of his

enemy are and how he can effectively exploit those weaker traits of his opponent’s aircraft, he will likely make a decision, which is right

than wrong and not get killed during an aerial combat engagement. It is the inherent ability of making the right decision at the right time,

which separates combat aces from dead war heroes. In a similar sense, an Indian pilot, in a MiG 21, who is more aggressive and makes

the right choices can get the best of a Pakistani pilot, in a F-16, who hesitates and makes the wrong choice. Vice versa, a Pakistani pilot

in an F-7MP can defeat an Indian pilot in a Mirage 2000 if he understands the flight characteristics of the Mirage and how the Indian

pilot will react. In an ACM environment there are no points for finishing second. ACM experience is something you would like learn

before rather than after you are dead, because it is far more preferable to enjoy your nations’ adulation of your martial achievements

when you are still alive and not a worm feast or as the case maybe, “charbroiled”.

PAF is, thus, dedicated to the proposition that since it is heavily out numbered by the Indians in the terms of quantity of aircraft it can

off-set the Indian numerical advantage through the superior training of its pilots. It is for this reason that PAF refuses to compromise on

its pilot selection methods and its emphasis on realistic training regimes. Another lesson, which the PAF has learned well from the IDF is

in the efficient utilization of cockpit to pilot ratios. A cockpit to pilot ratio simply means the number of pilots divided by the number of

available aircraft. At the present, PAF has a 3:1 cockpit to pilot ratio over the IAF’s 1:1 cockpit to pilot ratio. In other terms, it means

that PAF has three pilots to fly each plane in its inventory and in reality, even though it has a frontline strength of about 476 fighters, it

has nearly 1, 428 pilots to fly them. In comparison, the Indian Air Force has nearly 1,300 pilots to fly its 1,300 combat planes. In purely

combat terms, it means that PAF can generate a higher rate of sorties and it can sustain more combat operations within a given time.

Also, given PAF’s superior cockpit to pilot ratios, it can operate its aircraft in “multiple mission shifts”, which means that it can allow its

pilots to rest between sorties and still have fresh pilots to fly successive combat missions. In other words, a PAF pilot has to fly only

combat sortie per day and he can still have eight to ten hours of rest before his next sortie and thus, he will always be mentally alert and

freshly rested for combat missions.

In contrast, the Indian pilots, because of their 1:1 ratio, will be forced to fly combat sorties with out respite and this will eventually cause

a serious degradation in the IAF’s ability to sustain a high rate of combat sorties. Over a period of time, the continued air combat

operations with out rest will cause the Indian pilots to be tired and as a result the overall mission performance of Indian pilots will suffer.

Furthermore, this presents the Indian air operations planners with a nightmare, because they can institute a similar cockpit to pilot ratio as

PAF or even a better one by taking other pilots from other aircraft and assigning them to a single aircraft. The net result of this would be

that it would reduce the Indians’ numerical advantage over the PAF and force the Indians to fight PAF on terms of near equal parity. It is

highly questionable if the Indian Air Force operations’ staff would be willing to risk, “dancing” with PAF on near equal terms in a

potential air combat scenario.

It is truly amazing to discover just how well the PAF and IDF compliment each and how they seem learn and even seek inspiration from

each other’s efforts. Another interesting salient of this forbidden, but mutual admiration is what might be actually be happening in the

skies over Turkey. Turkey, like Pakistan and Israel, also operates F-16s and PAF pilots have been known to have deployed to Turkey in

the past to teach the Turks F-16 combat tactics. By a twist of fate, Israel has a defensive treaty with Turkey, which allows it to train its

aircrews in the vast aerial expanses of Turkey and IDF pilots are always training and learning air combat skills with their Turkish friends.

Since both the Israeli and Pakistani “Viper drivers” can be found in Turkey, it is not too difficult to imagine them finding ways to “fight”

each other in the skies over Turkey! There is no possible way either country will admit to such a joint training, but fighter pilots are

basically little boys with gigantic egos and those egos need to be flattered. Consequently, when the pilots from two of the world’s most

elite combat air forces find themselves together, its safe to conclude that each pilot, whether Pakistani or Israeli, worth his salt will want

to know who is, “best of the best” and who is “on top of the pyramid” .

Who would have thought that a computer game could foster such an admiration, understanding and yes, even a sense of respect for a

traditional adversary? I had always respected the IDF as a formidable fighting force, but never realized how much in common PAF

would have its with favorite nemesis. Despite our religious differences, we have so much in common and historically both Israelis and

Pakistanis have more in common than they seem to realize. Both nations were born into this world in great hardships and both were

thought to have perished at childbirth, but managed to grow up into a determined adulthood. We can learn so much from our past

experiences of a common resiliency against overwhelming odds that it is infuriating to realize that bigotry and blind hate is the only thing

still separating us.

Maybe, if everyone plays these simulations they will find more in common with each other than mere differences and would that not be

a great way to start the new millennium?