Would Devolution Empower “We the People”?

In his seven-point agenda of October 17, 1999, General Musharraf resolved to: (1) rebuild national confidence and morale; (2) strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion; (3) revive the economy and restore investor confidence; (4) ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice; (5) depoliticize state institutions; (6) devolve power to the grassroots level; and (7) ensure swift and across the board accountability. In declaring good governance as necessary for the successful implementation of his agenda, Musharraf maintained that: "In the past, our governments have ruled the people. It is time now for the governments to serve the people."

Although Musharraf's agenda was well-received by an overwhelming majority of interested people in Pakistan, its actual implementation is likely to generate a host of new tensions because it might disturb the status quo in a society that is economically underdeveloped, ethnically and linguistically fragmented, religiously and emotionally charged, and politically unprepared. Does this mean that no attempt should be made to transform the existing social relations of the state, civil society, and economy? If Pakistan’s difficulties are essentially a product of her corrupt, unresponsive, and highly centralized state, the Pakistani state and its political system need to be restructured in light of a new vision and social contract. Hence, on the 53rd Independence Anniversary of Pakistan, General Musharraf announced his “Local Government Plan 2000" to reshape the administrative and political structure at the grassroots level. This so-called devolution plan appears visionary since it purports to empower the common people through participation in local decision-making and management of local governments.

Musharraf’s devolution plan rests upon four basic principles: (1) vertical political integration, (2) shared responsibility, (3) supremacy of public representatives over public servants, and (4) distribution of power and accountability of its use (Dawn, Editorial, August 16, 2000). It proposes a three-tier administrative structure comprising partyless, directly-elected union councils and indirectly elected tehsil and district councils. Each union council will comprise 18 members (12 men and 6 women; six seats will be reserved for the representatives of the peasants and workers). Each union council will be headed by a nazim, assisted by a deputy nazim who will be elected on the basis of joint candidacy. The union nazim will also be assisted by three administrative secretaries. The union deputy nazims will be members of their respective tehsil council, where they will elect a pair of tehsil council nazim and deputy nazim; while union council nazims will be members of their respective district council, where they will elect a pair of district council nazim and deputy nazim. Each district council will be headed by a (district council) nazim with the assistance of a grade-20 district coordination officer (DCO) who will coordinate the functions of all district departments. The head of police in each district will be directly answerable to the district nazim, though the performance of each district nazim will be monitored by a District Public Safety Commission (DPSC). This three-tiered vertically integrated system of local bodies will have financial autonomy. Finanacial grants for various projects will come through a Provincial Finance Commission and spent at the union council level under the supervision of each union council.

Is this plan going to work? Will it receive adequate support from an overwhelming majority of the people? Is it qualitatively different from all previously implemented local government plans, particularly Ayub Khan’s so-called Basic Democracy System? To provide satisfactory answers to these questions, we may have to wait and see the actual implementation of this plan in the context of Pakistan’s ground realities. Musharraf, however, identifies four requirements for its implementation: (1) make the people masters of their own destiny; (2) put the District Administrative functionaries under the elected people; (3) give financial autonomy to local governments; and (4) ensure speedy justice at the local level. Are these requirements sufficient? Is the direct partyless election of representatives at the lowest (i.e. union council) level sufficient for ensuring public choice and local control? Would all union, tehsil, and district councils be able to provide equal/fair access to various goods and services, particularly under a system of financial autonomy? Would a decentralized system of governance ensure the protection of various citizenship and human rights of all people, irrespective of their class, gender, ethno-linguistic background, religious preference, and other bases of individual and collective identities? What kind of tensions and conflicts are likely to develop before and after the implementation of the devolution plan? Are the answers of these questions provided in the National Reconstruction Bureau’s “Local Government Plan 2000" (available at http://www.nrb.gov.pk/) and other available relevant sources of information?

We need to recognize that good governance at any scale is dependent upon the revival of the economy, payment of existing debt, balancing the budget, and improving the climate for venture capital at both local and supralocal levels. One area that needs particular attention, in this regard, is the peaceful resolution of conflicts between India and Pakistan. As long as adversarial relations remain intact, Pakistan may not be able to allocate sufficient funds for the development and welfare of her people. Can Musharraf’s devolution plan realistically empower the people in each locality without a significant improvement in their overall quality of life?