The Imperatives of Power

A physically injured leader has won hands down against the leader of a psychologically injured nation in the world of diplomacy. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was forced to deliver his speech to the American legislators sitting in a chair due to his injured knee. However, he went home with happy memories, earning laurels from the American and the domestic press. Pervez Musharraf's plane had to return to New York amid a bomb scare. Yet, no one of any standing in American politics bothered to share the General's woes. Such are the changed times!

What does a successful pilgrimage by the adversary's leader to the epicenter of global power politics mean for Islamabad? The establishment in Pakistan has been inculcated to view the gains of India as Pakistan's loss. That further warrants a critical appraisal of the implications of the Vajpayee trip.

Let's re-state some basics. Pakistan is no more a 'spoilt brat' of Americans. What Washington overlooked or encouraged in yesteryear is now termed terrorism. What we were rewarded for earlier brings punishment now. Our economy is in ruins and General Musharraf is, at least, right in saying that 'beggars cannot be choosers' while referring to the conditions imposed by the International Financial Institutions. The results are for all to see.

The General reaches the US attired in a designer suit but is still considered the man in khaki. Two big news items of his trip sum up its failure. One, the print media in Pakistan kept crying about the botched-up PTV efforts to televise Musharraf's seven-minute stint. Two, all that Javed Jabbar and General Rashid Qureshi were asked about was the issue of the defecting band members, allegedly having military background. So much for the agenda of the high-profile trip of our chief executive -- even the title stirs up a corporate and not a national image.

In contrast, red carpets, standing ovations, friendly hugs and supporting

statements awaited Vajpayee wherever he went. Some symbolic gestures and

few substantive comments which should have irked the Americans went

unnoticed. He spoke in Hindi at some official functions and made no bones

about his life-long association with the Rashtrya Swamisevak Sangh. The

Indian prime minister's love for the Hindu extremist organisation is seen

more as his democratic choice than a fundamentalist tendency.

The potential of Indian market, the power of the emerging lobby of

Americans of Indian descent and the possibility of fighting a joint war

against 'international terrorism' put American concerns about nuclear

proliferation on the backburner. The much-touted personal interest that

Bill Clinton promised to take in Kashmir last year was nowhere to be seen

during the Vajpayee trip.

Instead of preaching the virtues of nonproliferation, the Clinton administration officials left it up to the Indians to decide what was in the best interests of their country's security. This amounts to tacit recognition of India as a nuclear power.

Does the Pakistani establishment need to panic in the wake of the newly-found amorous relationship between New Delhi and Washington? Or should it just ignore the whole thing and keep on telling Pakistanis through the Khabarnama that the world can not ignore a nuclear power of 130 million people? Both extremes would be wrong for the following reasons.

For Washington India, by virtue of the size of its economy and middle class, is a preferred partner to Pakistan these days. The sooner Islamabad realises this reality the better. That said, Pakistan still has friends in Washington who would like Pakistan to remain in the international mainstream and not slip into isolation either because of its foreign policy posturing or ruinous economy. Being fully cognizant of the Indo-US cooperation, Islamabad should build on the reservoir of goodwill still left in Washington.

One of the biggest consequences of the Kargil fiasco is Islamabad loss of

credibility. The world at large, and Americans in particular, have yet to be convinced that Pakistan's official words can be matched by deeds. The Indian diplomatic and media onslaught may have sustained that image but Islamabad has done little to mitigate these negative effects.

Being out of favour with Washington is not something that rulers in Pakistan would ideally want. Echoing America on all issues may not be advisable or even important, but as a weaker party in the Pakistan-India-US triangle, Islamabad has to devise ingenious ways of facing the reality and steering the country out of troubled waters. Kenneth Waltz says "states are free to disregard the imperatives of power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so." It can be taken as advice or a warning. Ignoring it may cost too heavy a price.