The Quest for Power

In a logical and inevitable sequel to the military coup of October 12, 1999, according with the time-honoured tradition of military rulers in Pakistan, the June 20 assumption of the Presidency by General Parvez Musharraf is surprising only for its timing and manner.

However, ironies abound in this situation. For one, the General, who claimed to be different than his military predecessors ostensibly eschewing any political ambitions, has finally followed in their political footsteps, in a decision said to be taken in “the supreme national interest”. It took General Zia 14 months after the July 1977 coup to assume the Presidency, while General Musharraf waited 20 months to do the same.

It is probably on this count that General Musharraf was candid enough to admit “personal embarrassment” on the day of taking his Presidential oath. Ever since the October coup, the military regime had been lamenting that concentration of power in one person was the major malady of Pakistani politics, and now one person wears no less than 5 hats concurrently!

In another irony, the West that, by and large, endorsed the coup while India had maintained its distance from the military regime till May, have swapped positions on General Musharraf’s assumption of the Presidency. Western Ambassadors stayed away from the oath-taking ceremony, with the United States coming out with a harsh critique. Prime Minister Vajpayee eagerly felicitated the General even before he formally took over, calling him “Mr President” when they had a telephonic talk a few hours prior to the event. He joined Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar and Burma junta chief senior General Than Shwae as the first foreign leaders to felicitate General Musharraf. American umbrage over the event is said to be on account of not being informed in advance, but this logic is inexplicable given the fact the US accepted the October coup, despite the apparent absence of an advance notice! Unless, it has more to do with their concern over concentration of all power in one person heading a Muslim state with nuclear weapons.



The biggest irony is that those who applauded the “original sin”, i.e., the military coup of October 12, are now, 20 months down the line, suddenly lamenting the “loss of democracy” terming the June 20 take over of the top civilian slot as “extra-constitutional”. It has taken the civil society wallahs, the ‘democratic’ political forces and the religious political forces a long time to understand the basic home-truth that once the armed forces are ‘invited’ in to oust an elected government, then, after taking over, the men in khaki promote their own political agenda, their own policies and priorities, most of these at variance with those who initially welcomed the coup-makers.

It has happened in the past as well: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto thought after the March 25, 1971, military action against Mujib, which he had welcomed, General Yahya Khan would hand over to him, the PNA thought the same way about General Zia after Bhutto’s hanging and so did the GDA after the October coup. Political allies of the khaki can be ‘used’ to achieve common political goals, but they do not and cannot have shared interests.

The June 20 event ends the fiction of a ‘suspended’ parliament which was basically being dangled to maintain deliberate ambiguity, frees the military regime from political vestiges of the past and formalises the power structure, since the real source of authority is now vested with the trappings of office and protocol. What of the future?

Just as the Referendum of December 1984 which ‘elected’ General Zia as President made it easier for him to hold an election in March 1985, similarly, by assuming the Presidency now and having an elected ‘constituency’ of 225,000 ‘grassroots’ politicians at his beck and call, ensures that General Musharraf will now probably feel confident enough to oversee the elections within the Supreme Court-stipulated timeframe.

A brief survey of the patterns of power in Pakistan is instructive:

· The political system is reduced to a ‘one man show’ run by and for the ruler without any checks and balances or any accountability;

· Sooner rather than later, the ruler, not the government or the institution he represents, comes to personify in the popular mind all that is wrong in the country;

· No military ruler has ever won or risked a popular election – a doctored electoral exercise in the case of Ayub Khan in 1960 and 1965 or a rigged Referendum as was the case with Ziaul Haq, is what they end up doing. When Yahya Khan presided over a fair poll, its result took him and his colleagues with such surprise that they decided to repeal the election itself;

· There is no tradition of a normal or honourable exit from high office, the only exception being President Fazal Ilahi who departed quietly on the expiry of his 5 year Presidential term;

· The more powerful a person, the less authority he is able to exercise. A simple check on how many of the Chief Executive or Prime Ministerial directives were ever implemented would confirm the veracity of this statement.



In the last 20 months, the military regime’s task has been made somewhat easier by a combination of actions and circumstances. The fact that the top political leaders are out of the country has helped the military regime politically, because there is an absence of serious resistance to its plans.



Then, despite criticism, all the political forces have shown a willingness to play on the military regime’s wicket, helping to bring about a large turnout in the local government elections, thereby, inadvertently strengthening the regime in its resolve to build a new political order.

There has been talk of ‘continuity’ with General Musharraf’s perpetuating himself in power beyond October 2002. That is a fallacy since continuity is assured through policy not a person. Italy and Japan have had over 50 and 80 Prime Ministers respectively after World War II, but there is continuity in policy despite change of person at the top, hence, both are part of the G-7 and influential members of the international community.



Pakistan’s history teaches us when a ruler perceives himself at the peak of power, in apparent total control, lord and master of all that he surveys, unchecked by any ‘checks and balances’, that’s when the problem arises. How will all this power be used for the good of the people? How will General Musharraf make a difference that will be felt in Pakistan? There are three areas where a ruler with the requisite political will can make a difference.

First, by restoring the Quaid-e-Azam’s enlightened vision of a democratic and tolerant society where the rule of the gun is replaced by rule of law. This is not just linked to containing terrorism or curbing ethnic and sectarian strife, it also means reining in the institution that the General heads since the Armed Forces are perceived as being above the law, even above the Constitution. The Quaid-e-Azam’s vision of a just democratic society based on due process of law is not just rhetoric; this is what modern civilised states are all about. This goal is vital since it pertains to altering the character of the state, away from bigotry, intolerance and diktat of the powerful to a country where the rule of law, not rule of men, is supreme.

Second, by putting education on top of the priority list, even if it means slashing the defence budget. This area concerns not just the future generation of Pakistanis, but education will also be pivotal in determining Pakistan’s role in the comity of nations.

Third, by strengthening the Federation through bridging the divide between Islamabad and the smaller provinces, which feel a greater sense of deprivation under military regimes given their perception of “Punjabi hegemony” being synonymous with military rule. This issue is important since it concerns the country’s unity and integrity.



General Musharraf’s real test has now begun. What will he do with accumulation of such absolute, unchecked power? His challenge will be to show whether he can change the country’s direction by making a difference, otherwise the quest for power as a means for self-perpetuation and its consequences is something that Pakistanis are quite familiar with.