Muslim League’s Politics (1937-1947)

" I must record my own belief , that any attempt to establish the reign of Hindu numerical majority in India will never be achieved without a civil war... The muslims numbering 90 million.. the word ’minority has no relevance or sense when applied to masses of human beings numbered in many scores of millions’

(Winston Churchill, December 13th 1946 at House of Commons)


’Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. It cannot be justified historically, economically, geographically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century’

(M.A. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, Mid May 1947, in a letter to Lord Mountbatten)


1: Background of Partition

1.1 The origins of the Two nation theory

On the Muslim side the first articulation of the two nation theory came from the famous Muslim modernist, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who decided after the experience of Urdu-Hindi controversy of 1867 that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations, and were like two eyes of India, who should have sovereign parity. When Congress was founded by A O Hume (1885), Sir Syed Ahmed Khan persuaded most of the Muslims not to join the Congress Party because he felt the Muslims were not ready educationally socially, and politically to face the Hindu community in the mainstream of politics yet. He was supported in these views by other Muslim modernists of the time like Syed Ameer Ali.

The two nation theory finally reached a culmination in the form of the separate electorates which were demanded by a delegation of the Muslim elite, and intelligentsia in their meeting with Viceroy Minto. Lord Curzon’s partition of Bengal was also on the same lines. Partition of Bengal was annulled due to Swadeshi movement.

1.2 A Brief History of the All India Muslim League

The All India Muslim League was founded in 1906 with the express purpose of safeguarding Muslim interests in a united India. Like the Congress Party, it started off as a party loyal to British Government. By 1913, the League was persuaded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah of the Congress Party to abandon its pro-British stance and assume a stance which was more in line with the Congress. He was unable however to budge the league on its stance on separate electorates. In 1916 Mohammed Ali Jinnah managed to bring together the League and the Congress on one platform working together for the Independence of India. During the Khilafat Movement and the non-cooperation movement, the League became sidelined when Gandhi led Congress went over the league and made alliances with the Khilafat Conference and Jamiat-e-ulema-Hind, two radically Islamic organizations agitating for the safeguard of the Islamic institution of Khilafat.

By 1928 there were two factions of the Muslim League... Pro-British faction lead by Sir Muhammad Shafi and the Pro-Congress faction led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. After Jinnah’s brief exit from all India politics in 1931, the League virtually ceased to exist. By 1935 the beleaguered leaguers were clamouring for Jinnah to come back. In 1935 Jinnah emerged out of his self-imposed exile to reorganize the league. With the exit of Shafi, Jinnah had a free hand, and from 1935-1937 Jinnah and the League were the staunchest supporters of the efforts of the Congress Party inside and outside the central legislative body.

1.3 A Brief History of the Pakistan idea

1930 in Allahabad, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal presiding over the league session, first gave the idea of a Muslim state in the northwest of India within or without the British India. He was clearly talking about an autonomous Muslim Province within the union. This idea had hitherto been unarticulated, but it was already there in many different forms. The demand for autonomy had always been there in the North West, and Iqbal was only giving it a more concrete picture. Iqbal’s concern was clearly the Muslim Majority areas, and not the muslims in Hindu majority areas. Hence Iqbal’s view was in contradiction to the officially stated League position.

By 1933 Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge University, came out with an eccentric scheme which he called ’Pakistan : Our Fatherland’. Later that year he tried to enlist Mohammed Ali Jinnah, then in England, for this cause. Jinnah dismissed this idea as a mere dream, earning forever the wrath of Ch. Rahmat Ali.

2. League’s transformation

2.1 The elections of 1937

The first elections held under the Government of India act 1935 saw Congress emerging as the majority party. It won 711 out of total of 1585 seats, and could form government in 5/11 provinces without the support of any party. Out of these 711 seats only 26 seats were Muslim seats, thereby increasing Congress’s reliance on local Hindu leaders, which allowed for their agenda to be imposed on the Congress.

Muslim League on the other hand did well on the Muslim seats in the Hindu Majority provinces winning 29 out of 35 seats in the UP. The league however couldn’t do well against the regional parties in Muslim Majority areas.

2.2 Congress and the League

The Congress refused to come to an arrangement with the Muslim League, choosing instead Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind for partnership through Azad. This was a death blow to the League and its leadership who were at this point decidedly pro-Congress. On 22nd December 1939, League and its allies, the Scheduled Caste Federation and Justice Party of the Tamil Nadu, celebrated the day of deliverance from Congress rule.

Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence is especially vital in this regard. Nehru had mocked the League as an elitist organization and asked Jinnah to ’depend on the league’s inherent strength’. Jinnah had responded in kind informing Nehru that from now on he would only depend on his inherent strength. As a Historian rightly observed:

"More than Iqbal, it was Nehru who charted a new mass strategy for the League, prodding and challenging Jinnah to leave the drawing rooms of politics to reach down to the hundred million muslims... There was ofcourse only one possible way for the league to stir that mass, to awaken it and lure it to march behind Muslim leadership"

2.3 Muslim League and the Muslim Majority Areas

The League leadership had realized through experience with Congress, that in order to make good on its claim of representation of South Asian Muslims, it would need to rally the Muslim Majority areas behind it. In order to do that it required a slogan which would be vague enough to bring an overwhelming mass of the Muslim majority areas behind the league. Jinnah started by luring the regional politicians into his fold. First came Sikandar Hayat of Punjab, and soon to follow him was FazlulHaq of Bengal. Soon the regional parties who had defeated the league in the elections were ready to come under the league’s banner.


2.4 The Lahore Resolution

League’s transformation was complete in 1940 when it adopted Iqbal’s slogan of separate Muslim majority state(s). The two men who moved this resolution were the new entrants into the League, Sikandar Hayat and FazlulHaq. The Lahore Resolution presented a vague demand which did not specify the nature of the Muslim majority state(s). No references were made to Islam, and the issue presented was a cultural one instead of a religious one. Needless to say this resolution was in contradiction to the stated objective of the league as it did not aspire to solve the problems of League’s real constituents, the Muslims in Hindu Majority areas.

The name Pakistan was imposed on the League by the Congress press, and the League leadership after initial protestations accepted it.


2.5 League’s Rejection of C R’s formula

C R Gopalachari’s formula which virtually gave Muslim League Pakistan was rejected by the League leadership . This seemed to suggest that League’s interest lay elsewhere, and not in the creation of Pakistan.

3. Endgame Partition


3.1 Elections of 1945-1946

Elections of 1945-1946 saw Muslim League sweep the Muslim vote. The turn around was miracle in the Muslim Majority areas. In Sindh and Bengal the league had enough seats to form ministries of their own. In NWFP and Punjab it still turned out to be the largest single party, but was upstaged in the assembly by coalition ministries of Congress/Khudai khidmatgars in NWFP, and the Unionist Party in Punjab.

Having won 445 out of a total 490 Muslim seats, the League was now able to lay exclusive claim to speaking for the Muslims of India.

3.2 Cabinet Mission Plan

In view of the election results of 1946 the British Government dispatched a high level Cabinet Mission to look into a workable plan which was acceptable to the two major parties of India i.e. Congress and the League. After its deliberations with the League and the Congress it presented a series of proposals which included the ’grouping scheme’. The grouping scheme allowed for a three tiered federation between Hindu and Muslim provinces, with the center only keeping issues of Defence/Foreign, Currency and communication with itself.

This plan was accepted by the Muslim League at Jinnah’s insistence, and provisionally accepted by the Congress Party. However in July of 1946 Nehru dropped a bombshell when he declared that the Congress was not bound by any agreements and that it would decide the fate of India in the constituent assembly itself. This forced Jinnah to back out of his ealier agreement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission plan. Wavell’s letter to Pethick Lawrence is revealing:

"The strong reaction by Gandhi to my suggestion that Congress should make their assurance about the grouping categorical shows how well justified Jinnah was to doubt their previous assurances on the subject. It is to my mind convincing evidence that Congress always meant to use their position in the interim Government to break up the Muslim League and in the constituent assembly to destroy the grouping scheme which was the one effective safeguard for the muslims’

(Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, Mansergh, Transfer of power Page 323)

3.3 Direct Action Day

For the first time in an uncharacteristic move, Jinnah called for a nationwide civil disobedience by the Muslim League. The league had till then never resorted to unconstitutional means, but as Jinnah put it , the British and the Congress had long held the gun to their head, and now they had forged a pistol too. For a law abiding constitutionalist like Jinnah, the civil disobedience was in of itself a pistol as is apparent by his statement which clearly calls for a non-violent peaceful mass civil disobedience movement. Some historians have tried to liken the analogy to physical violence, but their claim is unfounded.

For the most of the cities, especially where Jinnah was physically present, the direct action day on 16th August 1946, remained peaceful, but in Calcutta horrible violence broke out between Hindus and Muslims. The Congress Press tried to blame this on the League and its Bengali leader Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.

Wavell’s letter to Pethick Lawrence suggested that there was ’no satisfactory evidence to that effect’ and that ’appreciably more Muslims were killed than Hindus’ in the Calcutta riots. Had it been organized on purpose by the Muslim league ministry clearly, that wouldn’t have been the case.

3.5 Defeat of Muslim League’s strategy

Muslim League and its leadership had hoped that by keeping the Pakistan demand vague, and by using the veto, the League will be able to bring Congress to accede to their demands at the center, thereby coming to a final settlement with the League with respect to the future of the Muslims within the Indian Union. Muslim League’s hopes were dashed by the Viceroy’s partition June 3rd Plan. Jinnah had initially refused, but Mountbatten made it clear to him that either he accepted the partition plan or picked up his cards and left. The next morning, Jinnah, hesitantly nodded, and what happened afterwards is history.

Pakistan did not fulfill Muslim League’s agenda. Its real constituents were the Indian Muslims, whose problems Pakistan didn’t solve. Hence Muslim League’s strategy failed, and Jinnah was handed a Pakistan he never wanted.