Between Musharraf and Mullahs—Who Won?

Victory came swiftly to Musharraf once he had cut a deal with the maulvis and mullahs in Pakistan’s right-wing MMA—a motley collection of religion-based political parties and politicos—about his self-scripted amendments to Pakistan’s heavily abused Constitution.

With the Senate rubber-stamping the 17th amendment to Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution on December 30, 2003, the chapter closed for good on what had been touted for more than a year as a battle royale between Pakistan’s bloated army and pampered maulvis of the MMA.

The battle, no doubt, had started with a bang soon after the October 2002 elections had propelled, in an unprecedented development, the loose alliance of right wing religious parties, to power in two of Pakistan’s 4 provinces. The maulvis and mullahs left no room for doubt that they were opposed to General Musharraf’s shrewd move to eat his cake and have it too: usher in a toohtless parliament with himself retaining all primordial powers in the country through the incorporation of his self-written Legal Framework Order ( LFO ) as an integral part of the Constitution. MMA swore to oppose and resist the general’s diktat.

Their stand had the support of all those in the ARD ( the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy ) who wanted the 1973 Constitution retained in its original form. Musharraf, on the other hand, strived to have his LFO accepted without demur because he was out to stack the deck with constitutional amendments that gave him autocratic powers as president and sought to mutilate the Constituion’s parliamentary system of government.

But now, after 14 months of a see-saw battle between his forces—spear-headed by the notorious ISI—and the maulvis of MMA, he has achieved precisely that—dictatorial powers par excellence, making him the most powerful head of state in Pakistan’s history. What he has achieved in four years as Pakistan’s latest Bonaparte by far exceeds what his three military forbears—Generals Ayub, Yahya and Ziaul Haq—couldn’t achieve between them in much longer tenures.

General Musharraf’s bag of trophies is truly impressive.

He retains the much abused 8th Amendment which hung like the Sword of Damocles over the heads of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif and cut them badly, twice in each case.

He retains the right to name the Services Chiefs—a powerful tool in Pakistan’s military-feudal culture. As a sop to the maulvis, he would only be required to consult the prime minister on these appointments. But consulting is not, per se, binding, especially in the Pakistani context. The PM of the day, whoever he or she is, will dare not cross swords with the general in the ominous presence of the 8th amendment.

Likewise, Musharraf would still name the National Security Council—his innovation and baby. The poor, emasculated, PM would have the vain satisfaction of being ‘consulted’ on the issue.

The most important and notable achievement of the general is the insertion of Article 270 (AA) in the Constitution. This amendment bestows total legitimacy to all that he has done since October 12, 1999, when he imposed himself on Pakistan after overthrowing the duly elected Nawaz Sharif. This amendment is a carbon copy of 270( A ) that Ziaul Haq had wangled out of the 1985 Parliament and which had indemnified all his actions and autocratic decrees and promulgations. This time,too, no court of law in Pakistan will have the right to admit any petition to review this arbitrary amendment. The general’s victory is complete and beyond questioning. He retains all the chips in his hands.

And what have the maulvis gained in return for all their bluff, bluster and bombastics?

The mullahs’ gains are cosmetic and not much more than a mere eye-wash.

Their pyrrhic victory includes the general relenting on the three year extension he had given the judges of the superior courts on age of retirement. But he loses nothing by feeding the judges to the maulvis. He never had any love for the judiciary or the judges; he has treated them with as much contempt as did all his bumbling predecessors. Moreover, bribing the judges with extended tenures was always meant to be a bargaining counter for him in his battle of nerves with the maulvis. They must be naïve to think they have forced the general to bend on this flimsy terrain.

The maulvis might think they have scored points with the general by forcing him to include, in the 8th amendment a clause that whenever a PM is dismissed and the Parliament dissolved, the Supreme Court must review the President’s action within 15 days. But this simply makes the apex court and its judges party to the political equation.

What have the mullahs gained in return for relenting so much? Not much, except the vicarious satisfaction that they have made the general doff his uniform, after all.

But even this could turn out to be a hollow victory that may come back to haunt them.

The general has given only a verbal commitment to dismount from his high horse as the chief of army staff. But if past is any guide, the Pakistani Bonapartes have no strong suit of keeping their verbal undertakings. Ziaul Haq was notoriously slippery, and General Musharraf hasn’t excelled much either on this front.

But even if Musharraf sticks to his commitment he has a full year to manipulate things to his absolute liking in the army and select a puppet to succeed him with the assurance that his own unassailable position as Pakistan’s most powerful President for the next five years will not be challenged.