Change of the Praetorian Guard

The much expected change of the Praetorian Guard has taken place. The president Gen Pervez Musharraf has appointed a new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), new vice chief of army staff (VCOAS) and new director-general (DG) of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). And he has also promoted seven major generals to lieutenant generals as part of a broader, scheduled shuffling of the military’s top brass.

The changes come at a sensitive time for Musharraf, who has already laid the groundwork to renege on his agreement to resign his military post by the end of the year. Indeed by not nominating a Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and appointing a VCOAS is a clear marker, that Musharraf is not going to relinquish the post of COAS, held by him since 1998.

It is germane to note here, that this change has been announced after Musharraf’s visit to the US; where he was pandered to and praised lavishly by the Bush administration for his assistance in the so-called “war on terror”. Two other factors could also be a source of renewed confidence to him: polls indicating fair chances of Bush’s re-election and apparently “successful” breaking of ice and rapprochement with the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.

Musharraf is balancing between several, often conflicting, pressures -- ranging from civilian calls to resign as Chief of Army Staff to attempts on his life by al- Qaeda and related Islamist militants, to increasing U.S. pressure to capture or kill al-Qaeda militants and leaders.

Since 9/11 Musharraf has walked a fine line, carefully balancing between such pressures. Along the way, one key area of concern has been ensuring loyalty from within the ranks of the military and the intelligence service. While he has been able to co-opt enough civilian politicians to back his less-than-democratic regime, he has kept a wary eye on a military establishment in which vested interests are often challenged by his moves in the counterterrorism war.

The changing of the guard in the military, then, is a very delicate manoeuvre for Musharraf to carry out. Both the CJCSC and the VCOAS are set to retire on Oct 7, and Musharraf has been carefully weighing his options for replacing them. On Oct 2, he finally announced his decision -- promoting Lt.-Gen. Ehsan ul Haq, the director-general of the ISI, and Karachi Corps commander Lt.-Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat to the rank of four-star general and appointing them CJCSC VCOAS respectively. A day later, Musharraf announced that Rawalpindi Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani would replace Ehsan at the helm of the ISI.

Interestingly, both Ehsan and Hayat superceded six more senior generals in taking their new posts -- five of the six are expected to take early retirement -- thus clearing the military ranks of several lieutenant generals at once. Hayat survived an assassination attempt earlier this year, and Kiyani has been leading the investigation into the recent attempts against Musharraf’s life.

While the potential for instability is high at times of shake-up in the military, Musharraf has actually used the scheduled retirements to his advantage. The current leadership shuffle leaves none of the key players who assisted Musharraf with his 1999 coup, meaning that there is no person in a high military position to whom Musharraf might feel -- or be expected to feel -- beholden. Instead, all top positions are now held by people whom Musharraf has promoted (and often above their fellow generals), placing them even more in Musharraf’s debt.

It appears that once the full reordering of the military’s top brass is far enough along -- several other generals are due to retire by April 2005 -- Musharraf might at some point finally decide to shed his uniform and continue as a civilian commander-in-chief. To streamline this process, Musharraf has named personal friends and trusted loyalists to the military’s top echelon.
Haq and Hayat, for example, were appointed to choice spots despite being outranked by six lieutenant generals: Hamid Javed, the president’s Chief of Staff (COS); Javed Hasan, commander of the 30th Corps (Gujranwala); Munir Hafiz, chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB); Tariq W. Ghazi, commandant of the National Defense College (NDC); Muhammad Akram, commander of the 2nd Corps (Multan); and Syed Parvez Shahid, commander of the 31st Corps (Bahawalpur).

In military parlance, the above manoeuvre is known as securing the base. In effect, Musharraf, having stabilized his political base by streamlining the “professional” politicians and inducting an apolitical Shaukat Aziz as the prime minister, is now ensuring that there is no single potential competitor from within the ranks of the military, and the likelihood of further change within the top ranks will offer further opportunities to weed out entrenched powers and build a younger and more loyal military establishment. Ultimately, if successful in this endeavour, Musharraf might consider actually making his long-delayed transition from a military leader to a civilian President -- but only if he is sure the threat from the military is eliminated, and that may still take some time.

Musharraf has built a team of close personal friends and trusted loyalists that will help him stay in power -- whichever way he chooses. Whether he exits the military and/or politics voluntarily or is forced to do so, he has installed like-minded individuals who will continue his policies -- which is what Washington would want to see as well.

With the latest reshuffle, Musharraf will accelerate operations to capture or kill al-Qaeda and other Islamist militants, both to protect his own life and to placate Washington. And as more and more members of the military head for early retirement, those with the longstanding ties to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Islamist militants will be slowly weeded out -- raising the chances for success in the counterterrorism fight. This prospect, of course, is likely only to spur the militants to redouble their efforts to undermine the Musharraf regime.