India-US Nuclear Deal

The Geopolitical Background of the Deal

A few years ago, two Goldman Sachs economists, Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, posited that Brazil, Russia, India and China (together called the BRICs economies) could become a much larger force in the world economy over the next 50 years. Mapping out the GDP growth, per capita income and currency movements in the BRICs economies until 2050, Wislon and Purushothaman predicted that these economies could account for over half the size of the G6 (US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK) by 2025 and could be larger than the G6 (in US dollar terms) in less than 40 years. Although per capita income in the United States and China could be $80,000 and $30,000 respectively by 2050, the Chinese economy could overtake the US economy by 2039.

The United States has already begun to feel uncomfortable with the growing strength of Russia, India and China (RIC). While the US-China relations have always been rather ambiguous, there have been talks of renewed cold war between the United States and Russia. The slow and steady Eastward expansion of the European Union and the US-led NATO has rung alarm bells in Moscow. Given the changing geopolitical alignments of the major powers, a possible alliance of the three adjacent neighbors, Russia, China and India, would be the last thing the United States and the other Northern countries would want.

So it is very important, even crucial, for the United States to rope in the least threatening and the most favorable country as an ally into the 21st century power equation. If that association comes with profiteering opportunities, military gains, political mileage and other significant benefits, it becomes, in fact, irresistible. Consequently, Uncle Sam suddenly finds democracy in India, makes a startling discovery that the United States and India are "natural allies" and starts serenading New Delhi for a new “strategic partnership.”

When the Indian leaders and elites have misgivings about China thanks to the 1962 war, the Chinese involvement in the Kashmir conflict, and longstanding border disputes in the Northeast region, Uncle Sam finds it too important to ignore. Similarly, the lull in the Delhi-Moscow relations after the once strong and comradely solidarity between the Soviet Union and the Socialist India also gives a welcome opening for the superpower to manipulate.

The nuclear issue catches Uncle Sam's attention. While India is losing out to China in nuclear capabilities, Russia is about to reap high profits from setting up nuclear power projects in India. So Washington comes up with the infamous nuclear deal that offers India nuclear technology, fuel, NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Groups) support and an assortment of other such goodies.

What was started by the Clinton presidency and the Vajpayee government in Delhi was continued by the George Bush administration also. As a result of the continued dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbot, the next stage in the "Strategic Partnership" was reached. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party assumed power in Delhi and he signed the joint statement with President Bush in Washington DC on July 18, 2005.

The 123 Agreement (named so as per article 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act) was discussed in the US House of Representatives in July 2006. Following the visit of Nicholas Burns to India in December 2006, the United States passed the Hyde Act to go around the Presler Amendment that bans nuclear technology to any country that produces nuclear weapons. Accordingly, technical cooperation would be banned only if India made new efforts to produce weapons.

The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) opposed the deal first because of four important considerations: viz., the right to produce weapons with the US-supplied fuel; uninterrupted supply of fuel; not submitting to additional US safeguards besides the IAEA safeguards; the US not taking back technology, equipment and fuel following Indian tests. After six months of talks, a new draft was prepared on July 8, 2007. India's National Security adviser M.K. Narayanan, the DAE chief Anil Kakodkar, and the Indian foreign secretary Shivsankar Menon team added Articles 14, 148, 56 to the Agreement. These articles answered the above-mentioned concerns of the DAE. So the 123 Agreement was announced in July 2007 and the sketchy details were released to the public on August 1, 2007.

The deal offers the United States lucrative nuclear commerce and huge military contracts worth of thousands of billions of dollars. The deal also enables Uncle Sam to poke his imperialistic nose into India’s foreign and domestic policies. For instance, the $7.2 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project was stalled by the US government immediately after the joint statement in July 2005.

Most importantly, the deal would also help the superpower to befriend India and isolate it from Beijing and Moscow. According to the Indo-US Joint Statement, President Bush said, “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states.” Keeping Indians dependent was crucial and the above “benefits and advantages” would do just that. Just as the British colonial government broke down the indigenous textile technology in India before rendering the Indians vulnerable to colonial exploitation, Americans thought of thwarting Indians from attaining any self-sufficiency or achieving any major breakthroughs in nuclear technology. For instance, developing thorium-based nuclear power generation would put Indians at a greater advantage as thorium is abundantly available in India.

The nuclear deal would prop Delhi up to the level of Beijing's economic and military might. It would help neutralize the growing Red Dragon's strength in Asia without Uncle Sam getting his hands dirty. The tested Cold War strategy of fighting proxy wars could be twisted to deal with the potential enemy locally by a mercenary force that has had a past with the enemy. Furthermore, the nuclear deal would nullify the big role that the Russians were about to play in India by setting up several nuclear power plants. After all, the Clinton administration had tried in vain to stall the Koodankulam nuclear power project. Hitting all the above three mangoes with one stone is not a bad idea at all. In fact, it cannot get any better in international relations.

The Indian Dealers

If we locate all the different Indian nuclear ‘dealers’ on a continuum, we would find the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu nationalist party, at the far-right. They were the ones who embarked on nuclear adventurism exactly 10 years ago in May 1998, initiated the nuclear dialogue with the Americans and set the “strategic partnership” process in motion. Ironically, they oppose the deal now mainly because they do not want to look like the Left. They have no objection to the 123 agreement provided the fuel supplies continued even if India tested again. Their hollow postures have no ideological clarity whatsoever.

The positions of the Congress Party, the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government and the Indian nukedom could also be right of center on the continuum. Colonized as they are, they all tend to think that the United States, the present master of the universe, is better than Russia and China. For the UPA Government, India’s achieving energy independence and security and becoming an economic power like Japan or Germany looks so appealing. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would like to use the nuclear deal to prop up his failing government that has not managed to contain growing inflation, price rise and deteriorating food security. Singh, who is often credited with the switch to neoliberal economic restructuring as the erstwhile finance minister, would also like to set India off on a hard science and high-tech ‘brave new world’ flight.

The Indian Nukedom, who has had a very lackadaisical performance so far, is enthusiastic about the American deal. Fourteen of the 22 existing reactors will be safeguarded and the rest will be off limits for international inspection. As noted earlier, they have expressed their interests clearly and would like to go their slow way in their own sloppy style if the deal failed to fruition.

Almost all the Indian political parties tend to see the nuclear deal as an essential component of the country’s development and rarely ask any questions about its politics, economics, science, or the strategic considerations. If the 'right of center' parties suffer from colonial hangovers and modern ‘development’ mindset, the 'left of center' parties are quite hypocritical. For these anti-bomb but pro-power enthusiasts, it is the US involvement that prompts their fears and reservations about the high costs, the weapons connection, the militarist dimensions, and other dangers associated with nuclear power. While they oppose the US-India nuclear deal tooth and nail, they hardly raise a finger against India’s nuclear deals with Russia and France.

They rightly point out that the deal should be seen in concurrence with the various defense deals and agreements with the United States, and that the deal would entangle India in the US war machinery. They are quite right in claiming that India’s principled stand on non-proliferation stands compromised, that the deal has strong political, economic and military ramifications in which India’s sovereignty and autonomy could be hurt, and that the Non-aligned foreign policy of India would come to an end.

The UPA government that is sustained by the outside support of the Left parties has constituted an informal UPA-Left Committee to sort out the nuclear deal differences. The Committee met on October 5, 2007 and discussed the Left’s note on the controversial Hyde Act, UPA’s response to the note and their rebuttal. The Hyde Act grants much power to the United States to proceed against India in case of the latter’s violation of the Act or any of its provisions. After all, it is not just the 123 Agreement that reigns supreme in the whole deal but there is the overriding Hyde Act also. There is hardly any clarity among the deal makers both in India and the United States about the anchoring of the 123 Agreement in the Hyde Act. They all have their own interpretations and explanations about the complementary or contradictory aspects of these two instruments.

The UPA-Left Committee met again on October 11 and 14. It has recently met for the eighth time on May 6, 2008 and is scheduled to meet again on May 28 to consider allowing the government to conclude and sign an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The government has already held informal consultations with IAEA on safeguards agreement. While New Delhi wants to clinch the safeguards agreement with the IAEA by June 2008, the Left parties keep reiterating their opposition to the deal that would have serious implications for the country’s strategic interests, security, sovereignty, and independent foreign policy.

Where Do Things Stand Now?

If the Manmohan Singh government thrusts the deal down the throats of the Indian nation following the possible safeguard agreement with the IAEA, the Left may pull out of the alliance and force the country to face general elections with the nuclear deal as a major poll issue. In case the Congress party gained absolute majority, they would dump the Left and sign the deal. If they did not obtain majority in the new Parliament, the Congress might dump the deal and take the Left parties to form a non-BJP government.

Just as there is a hectic internal political process here in India, the US has its own political process going also. On October 4, 2007, a small group of senior US lawmakers introduced a non-binding resolution in the US House of Representatives and sought tough restraints on nuclear trade with India. The United States wants India to approve the deal as soon as possible so that their lawmakers would have enough time to take it up before they go on a break in August 2008. With the presidential elections scheduled for November 2008, there is a great uncertainty about the fate of the deal if it is not passed here and now.

It is so strange that both democracies, the United States and India, chose not to take their respective citizenry into confidence before the deal was designed and its provisions decided. The cunning ‘top down’ process became a bit democratic only after sustained efforts of some sections of the civil and political societies both in India and the United States. Even today both American and Indian citizens are hardly informed, or educated, or empowered about the intricacies of nuclear power and weapons issues, the socioeconomic-political ramifications of the deal, geopolitical fall out at the international level and so forth. It is indeed sad that the “common woman” in the longest and the largest democracies have to rely on external actors and factors to safeguard her interests.

If India wins Western patronage through the nuclear route, next in line may be Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, all of whom are capable of producing nuclear weapons. In fact, China is already willing to sell more nuclear reactors to Pakistan. According to the Christian Science Monitor of April 27, 2005, the Chinese premier talked about enhancing bilateral nuclear cooperation by selling them two more reactors. China has also signed a deal to build a nuclear power plant in Egypt. One MW power generation produces ½ kg plutonium. India that can produce 5-10 bombs now would produce 25-40 bombs with the help of the nuclear deal. The non-proliferation efforts of the humanity could fail miserably and proliferation threat becomes real and immense.

The nuclear expenditure as well as military budgets of countries will increase exponentially giving rise to arms race across the world. Such a development will deprive the citizens of the basics of life and push them all deeper into poverty and misery. There will ensue underdevelopment, insecurity, intolerance and terrorism.

It is high time anti-nuclear activists, Green political workers, “ordinary citizens” and others commit themselves to a democratic struggle against nuclearism, proliferation of WMD, and the over all deterioration of human values and interests in the corporatized and monetized global society.