A Line Runs Through It

In 1947, barely months after the partition of British India into newly created states of India and Pakistan, a small armed rebellion flared up in the princely kingdom of Kashmir. The British, given their sense of fair play, had given the princely states of India the option to join either India or Pakistan. In the case of Kashmir, its Hindu ruler Sir Hari Singh presided over a population that was mostly Muslim and consequently, he was vexed over the question of whether to join India or Pakistan. Unable to decide, his choice in the matter was decided by the irregular forces of Pathan tribesmen, which started to flood into the Vale of Kashmir to fight against the forces of Sir Hari Singh on the behalf of their Muslim brothers in Kashmir. In order to seek assistance against these invaders, Sir Hari agreed to join India in return for Indian military aid in repelling the Pathan tribesmen. Accordingly, Sir Hari Singh signed the instrument of confederation with India and the first Indian military units began to disembark even before the ink was dry on the document.

This Indian gambit caught Pakistan unaware, because Pakistan was still waiting for the results of a plebiscite, which would have decided the fate of Kashmir. The conventional wisdom of the day believed that despite Lord Louis Mountbatten’s dabbling into the work of Redcliff Boundary Commission, the majority of Kashmiris would opt for Pakistan. When the news reached Pakistan about Indian deployment in the valley, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohmmad Ali Jinnah, ordered the Pakistani Army to take action and resist the Indian attempts to annex the valley. Immediately, there was dissension in the ranks of Pakistani Army as its British commander-in-chief, General Gracey, refused to sanction the movement of Pakistani troops, because he did not want to risk an inter-dominion war between two Commonwealth nations and hence, refused to implement Jinnah’s directive.

When the word of his insubordination reached General Frank Muadie, Gracey’s immediate superior, he was incensed. Confronting Gracey, Maudi was verbally abusive towards him for refusing to carry out Jinnah’s orders. General Maudi chastised General Gracey and reminded him that in the British Army, to which both of them still belonged, officers did not question the orders of their civilian superiors and that they were supposed to obey orders and not make policy decisions. Within hours of that meeting, the first elements of the Pakistani Army were entering Kashmir and would soon be engaged in combat with the Indian troops in places with names like Gilit, Parachinar, Muzaffrabad, Chitral and Skrudu.

The intervention of Pakistani Army, into what would be known as the First Indo-Pakistan War, was delayed and by the time it was fully deployed in the field, it could not aid the Pathan tribesmen who instead of pressing their attacks had resorted to plundering and burning of villages. Pakistan’s belated rush to forestall the Indian deployment was undertaken as a preventive measure to stop the Indian Army from reversing the gains made by the Pathans. From a military point of view, the Pakistani Army’s operations in Kashmir were of a defensive nature and were not intended, as claimed later, to secure the whole of Kashmir for Pakistan. Given the fact that Indians troops were already established in Kashmir suggests that the best Pakistan could hope for was to create a status quo ante, which would give it some bargaining influence with the Indians on the issue. Also, from a logistical standpoint, the Pakistani Army, which took the field against the Indians was numerically weaker and it was in no condition to fight Indians, for the control of Kashmir, in a mountainous terrain, which favored the defense. This lesson would be taught to the Pakistani Army in 1984, when it contested the heights on Siachen and is being presently taught to the Indians in Kargil.

This allowed the Indian Army an opportunity to consolidate its gains and secure its interior lines of communications and in doing so, the advantage of attack shifted to the defenders: the Indians. In the process there emerged a line of control, which divided Kashmir into an Indian and a Pakistani occupied zone of influence. In the United Nations’ brokered truce, which ended the fighting, this line of control (LoC) was transformed into a defacto frontier pending the final results of a United Nations’ plebiscite that would decide the issue of Kashmir. In demarcating this line, a small area, near a glacier called Siachen-Boltoro, was left undesignated, because given its inaccessibility and remoteness it was thought that no one could ever fight there. To supervise the United Nations’ plebiscite, Chester Nimitz, an American admiral, was to come to Kashmir, but before he could arrive, the Indians and Pakistanis started to quibble over the terms of their troop withdrawals. Given the intractability of both sides, the atmosphere for a plebiscite was considered as being unlikely and Admiral Nimitz was thanked for his services and promptly forgotten.

Since then, the Line of Control has been an unofficial international boundary between India and Pakistan and had remained unaltered till the Simla Accords of 1972, ending the third Indo-Pakistan War. It became a focus of tensions again, when the Indians occupied the strategic heights on the Siachen Glacier, a military move which created what the Germans call, “ein kreigpermanez”, – a state of permanent war amongst the two nations since 1984. On the eve of the first anniversary of Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the Indians claiming that heights were occupied by militants initiated a military operation to remove them from those heights and in doing so, it almost ignited a fourth war with Pakistan. The Battle for Siachen is war dominated by the control for strategic heights and given the vagaries of weather, it is a seasonal war, which is fought mostly in the summer months. Both armies vacate the heights during the months of winter and re-occupy those heights when the snows melt in the mountain passes, in spring, allowing for easy deployments. In the case of the present crisis, in the Kargil, the Indian soldiers who went back to take up their positions were surprised to find them occupied by militants, who had moved into those positions even before the first snow had melted.

The task confronting the Indian Army, to re-occupy those heights, is a daunting logistical nightmare. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Pakistani artillery fire destroyed an Indian munitions depot depriving the Indians of supplies needed to conduct operations in the region. Since then the Indians have to re-assemble their war supplies, in the region, by ferrying them to the forward edge of the battlefield piece by piece and this has seriously impeded their ability to sustain offensive operations for long periods. The question of whether the destruction of the Indian munitions depot was accidental or it was a case of a malice aforethought on the part of Pakistanis will never be known. This is even more speculative, because the militants hold the high ground, the sine qua non of tactical advantage, and have secure interior lines for the purposes of re-supply and communications with their rear staging areas. Common sense, in hindsight, would suggest that destruction of the Indian munitions depot was a carefully orchestrated attempt by the Pakistani Army to hinder and delay an Indian armed response to the loss of their observation posts. If this is case, then the Pakistani denials of aiding the militants ring hollow, because the destruction of that depot has indirectly contributed to the militants’ ability to resist Indian attacks. This way, the Pakistanis might have hoped to gain time for the militants, which they could use to consolidate their gains and assume a defensive posture against the inevitable Indian counter-attacks.

The Indians soldiers who are clambering up the razor edge defiles under constant small arms, mortar and artillery fire have earned the admiration of all professional soldiers world wide for their tenacity. The bravery and the skill of the Indian officers and soldiers, in advancing along exposed slopes vulnerable to interdiction by Pakistani Army’s artillery situated on opposing heights, is a tale of cold blooded endurance in face of over whelming odds. As far as the Pakistani Army is concerned, it is only too happy to pay the Indians back for 1984, when it was made to pay dearly by the Indians for advancing against it in the scramble for Siachen. The Indian infantry will, sooner or later, finish the job of clearing those heights. It will suffer awful losses in such an action, because the nature of the fighting will involve close hand to hand combat after, which the Indians will have to physically hold the ground they have won back from the militants.

The Indians thought, mistakenly, that they could tilt the balance of power in their favor by reducing the defender to attacker ratio, in a topography that favors defense, via air power. However, with the loss of two fighter planes and a helicopter within days of undertaking air operations that intention has proved to be a tactical nightmare. Since then the Indian Air Force pilots have re-learned the old adage that discretion is the better part of valor. Air operations in the region are a headache, because not only do the Indians have to avoid Pakistani anti-aircraft fire and surface to air missile batteries, but they have to avoid crossing the LoC during their sorties while being weary of Pakistani Air Force’s combat air patrols. Hence, the Indian Air Force’s air operations are restricted by political and tactical considerations and Indian Air Force is unable to provide effective ground support to the Indian infantry attacking the militants.

In this sense, the Pakistanis have attained a tactical advantage over the Indians, because by negating the Indian air power they have managed to insure that the combat operations will only involve infantry forces and by holding the high ground, they would enjoy a favorable tactical situation over the Indians. In a strategic sense, the Pakistani Army has suffered a reversal, because of the Indian intentions, after clearing the heights of the militants, to hold those positions year around and thus, prevent another lapse from undermining its defensives. This Indian determination to hold their positions throughout the year will elicit a similar response from the Pakistani military. Militarily, it would be a prudent justification, as it would not be in Pakistani interests to give the Indians too much tactical leeway, but in doing so, the nature of the conflict will change from a war of attrition to one of financial imperatives. Both India and Pakistan spend an average of a million dollars a day to sustain their military forces in Siachen-Boltoro and Kargil-Drass sectors and by maintaining their positions and re-supplying them year long will put increased financial burdens on the two combatants.

Pakistan, given its present financial situation will not be able to sustain such a Pyrrric military deployment for a long time. This would put additional strains on its lack of monetary resources, which will have a trickle down effect over a period of time, and could adversely influence its domestic political situation. Unlike India, which has huge foreign exchange reserves and can withstand a financial crunch, Pakistan is almost exclusively dependent on foreign loans to keep its economy solvent, but more importantly than that it needs those monies to pay the interest on its loans to avoid defaulting on them. Pakistan, at the same time, is under tremendous political pressure from its international creditors to re-structure its spending habits and to decrease the percentage, which it spends on defense. Most international aid organizations, when loaning monies to Pakistan, have established strict guidelines, which Pakistan must meet or risk losing its foreign aid. Consequently, Pakistan has to, given its financial constraints, seek a political settlement with India, which secures the territorial gains its has made in the recent crisis with India. It is, because of this realization that Pakistan is eager to hold discussions with India and India knows this fact too, which would explain its luke-warm reception of Pakistani offers of peace. Indian politicians are well aware that they can gain back militarily what they might not be able to regain politically if they stop their military operations and agreed to the Pakistani fait accompli in Kargil.

Even if the Indians, through military force, re-take their positions in the Kargil-Drass region, they would have done little to alter the LoC as it exists and would in fact be simply reinstating the status quo ante as it had existed prior to the onset of the crisis. It is, because of this fact that most of the international opinion, on the crisis, is against Pakistan and for India. India, in this crisis, is seen as simply restating the sanctity of LoC after it was violated. These violations are being blamed on Pakistan given its political and military overtures to the various militant groups resisting Indian occupation of Kashmir. Furthermore, the international opinion on the situational reality of LoC is that it was for all purposes settled in the 1947-48 Indo-Pakistan War as the final demarcating boundary between India and Pakistan. Despite Pakistani attempts in 1965 and Indian attempts in 1984, to influence its final design, it has remained indelible to each political-military crisis and in the present crisis, it has shown a remarkable resiliency to being amended in favor of either India or Pakistan.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s, then Pakistan’s President and military overlord, military instinct was absolutely right when he dismissed idea of resisting the Indians, on Siachen, as an area not worth fighting for. A few days later, bowing to political pressure from the pro-Kashmiri constituency in Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq committed Pakistani troops to repel the Indian aggression on Siachen and in doing so created a state of war, which has outlived him and continually prevents a normalization of relations between the two nations. Contrary to what one might feel about Zia-ul-Haq’s political legacy in Pakistan, his original instincts on Siachen were correct. In his assessment that the Indian gambit will not seriously affect the final disposition of the LoC, Zia-ul-Haq was astute enough to realize that final settlement of LoC would on the basis of a political rational and not on the basis of military moves. In this sense, Zia-ul-Haq, before he capitulated to the pro-Kashmiri lobby in Pakistan, was extremely insightful in the sense that he knew that the war over Kashmir was won and lost in 1947. He understood that the reality, as it emerged from that war, could not be changed again to favor either India or Pakistan and the reality of LoC, on the ground, had to be accepted as the final settlement of the Kashmiri problem in Indo-Pakistan relations.

Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, was slowly coming to the same conclusions. Both of these gentlemen realized that the Kashmiri problem, was ironically solved in the aftermath of the First Indo-Pakistani War. The only thing, which needed to be done, as far Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi were concerned, was to formalize the division of Kashmir, between India and Pakistan, by turning the LoC into an international boundary. The other option was to grant Kashmir independence, but then the question would arose as to, which nation’s political influence it would come under and that suggested an existence of a perpetual conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi. Consequently, the original idea of a plebiscite was dropped also, because after fifty years of staking their national honors on the issue of Kashmir, the stakes were too high to risk on a simple majority vote on Kashmir’s future. The Kashmiris opting for either India or Pakistan was an untenable option also, because there was no guarantee that it would be accepted as the final dejure settlement by either side. Hence, the only solution, which was mutually reassuring and offered the least amount of friction was the formalization of LoC into an international frontier separating India and Pakistan; a reality both nations could co-exist with as a regrettable, but a neccessary compromise with the devil.

Even though India is reaping the fruits of international criticism of Pakistan in the present crisis, it alone shares the onus for creating the precedent, which has periodically undermined the legitimacy of the LoC as mandated in the Simla Accords of 1972. When Indian military forces occupied certain heights in Siachen, they violated their own commitments to Simla Accords and invalidated them. Hence, contrary to the Indian arguments, Pakistan can not be blamed for violating the Simla Accords. The Indian incursions into the Siachen, in 1984, were designed to alter the reality of the LoC via a military fiat and then formalize that fiat through diplomatic discussions. Unfortunately, for the Indians, the Pakistani military response prevented them for doing so. Just as in the case of Kashmir, the Indians have shown a greater willingness to engage in military operations to attain their aims and past Indian historical experience clearly shows that it was the Indians, not Pakistanis, who have resorted to aggression to settle their outstanding disputes. In a similar sense, the present armed rebellion against Indian occupation, was due to Indian manipulation of Kashmiri politics to suit its own ends and through the brutality of its armed forces in quelling anti-Indian sentiment. It did not need too much encouragement from Pakistan to mutate into a full-scale insurgency against the Indian occupation.

There has been a slew of historical speculation, since then, as to what the Pakistani Army might have done if General Gracey had obeyed Jinnah’s orders and whether if it could have changed the final outcome. The singular problem with history is that it can not be re-written no matter how much one might wish it. One of the more interesting lessons of the First Indo-Pakistan War, which seems to have been lost in the rhetoric over Kashmir, is who won and who lost the war. According Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military theorist, wars are a continuation of politics by other means and that a war is fought primarily to attain a political goal. That being the case, then the Indians lost to Pakistan, because Pakistan had entered that war with a political aim of preventing an Indian annexation of Kashmir and it succeeded in accomplishing its political aims. The Indian political aim, in Kashmir, was to incorporate it into the Indian confederation, but that aim was denied to them by the Pakistani armed forces and hence, the Indians failed, because they could not attain their political goals in that war. On the basis of this, Pakistan successfully prosecuted its war aims and the political raison’d état, which had mandated its military intervention in Kashmir was justified by the end result: Kashmir did not join India.

Another interesting caveat of that war was that it was the only time, in the history of Pakistan, that the Pakistani Army fought a war under the direction of a civilian leadership, which was responsible for the direction of the war. The reason that Pakistani Army was so successful in that war was, because it was fighting for a political and not a military end and its strategy in that war was based on political imperatives, which in turn dictated the course of its military operations. Consequently, when the Pakistan prevented India from annexing Kashmir, the issue of Kashmir was settled and it reverted to a status quo, which would become impossible to alter and would come to define the reality as it has existed since then.

Hence, it is a tragedy that both India and Pakistan have refused to accept the lessons of their first war and are still busy wasting their treasure and blood in fighting a war, which was decided more than fifty years ago. The real problem, as it periodically surfaces in Kashmir, is the refusal of India and Pakistan to accept the status quo ante, as it exists. As long as they try to change it, there will be no peace, because realistically the only road to peace in the region lies through accepting division of Kashmir and not in seeking to reverse the status quo of what happened more than half a century ago. The Battle for Kashmir was won and lost fifty years ago and each sides knows who was the victor and who was the loser and no amount of further fighting will change that reality. A reality, which must be accepted if peace is to return to the region.