Low Intensity Conflict

Low intensity conflict is a political –military confrontation between states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized generally in the third world, but contain regional and global security implications.

Among the dynamic forces that contribute to low intensity conflict are change, discontent, poverty, violence, instability, religious extremism, Social imbalance, deprivation, exploitation and injustice. All these interact to cater to an environment conducive to LIC. Change can cause great distress in a society and often produces discontent. Governments and social systems must accommodate innovation or the sudden impact of external social influences. When people sense injustice they become discontented. Groups may form around specific issues of discontent. People may support or join groups committed to achieving social or political change through violent means. The intensity of their sense of injustice often determines the degree to which they participate in violence.

Change brought about by violence may produce instability. Pakistan itself is a product of change through revolution. The two-nation theory, the very foundation of Pakistan was a revolutionary and radical theory during the period of low intensity conflict with the British Raj and the Hindu vested interests. After independence Pakistan unfortunately has failed to develop a form of government which allows social and occupational mobility through individual achievement and growth. Democratic institutions have not taken root and Pakistan’s long term interests are at grave risk with political, ethnic and sectarian groups exploiting the environment of political, social and economic instability.

Pakistan’s search for security is an unrelenting process. Security cannot be conceived of as a condition, when it can be deemed to have been accomplished for good. Thus, it is that when a nation commits the folly of taking peace and security for granted that it invites upon itself the verdict of fate in the form of military defeats and debacles. The security and stability of Pakistan depends as much upon the viability of its social political institutions, as upon the strength and vitality of its armed forces. Pakistan cannot be secure with out a strong and determined fighting force and this is not possible with out a just, equitable, and benevolent polity, in tandem with a vibrant and strong economy.

Recent technological advances have also created an environment favorable to LIC. Pakistani society has become more vulnerable because technology has made more advanced; automatic lethal weapons easily and cheaply available to insurgent or terrorist groups. The fall out of the long war in Afghanistan has also contributed to the easy availability of modern weapons. Large urban industrial and commercial areas are now attractive and soft targets. The spate of bomb explosions in urban centers of Pakistan are a case in point. Ethnic and sectarian groups are now armed to the teeth with automatic weapons, and sometimes better armed and trained than the opposing police force or law enforcing agencies. They depend on support and sustenance from across the border. They are dependent on facilities such as telecommunications, finance, and safe havens outside the borders of Pakistan. In addition advanced electronic communications media brings the full impact of political violence into homes world wide, the result is instant recognition of formerly unknown or little known insurgent or terrorist groups. The recent attack on the World Trade Center in the USA catapulted the AL-QUAEDA to the status of the most wanted terrorist group in human history. Propaganda is a major weapon in LIC. The insurgent and radical groups, ethnic or sectarian, realize the power of this weapon. The possible use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBC) is also a grave and serious potential threat in Pakistan’s arena of LIC. The proliferation of NBC weapons and the possible threat of their use has greatly increased the subversive and terror potential of a nation or group with this capability. It is no secret that quite a large number of ethnic, sectarian and fundamentalist groups in the country are funded and supported by India who is in a position to provide NBC capability to some favorite group in Pakistan. Sources of external support to Pakistani radical groups are not restricted to India only. Many countries including some friendly and fraternal Muslim countries provide active or passive material and moral support to these radical and violent groups.

On the eve of partition Kashmir was among the 500 “Princely States” that had the choice of joining with India or Pakistan. Three days before the great divide the Hindu Maharaja of Muslim majority Kashmir, Hari Singh, announced his intention of signing a “Standstill” agreement with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted but India remained non-committal. In an attempt to force Hari Singh’s hand Pakistan gave tacit consent to a tribal invasion of Kashmir which proved counter productive and prompted the Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession with India. War erupted between the two newly independent states. India took the issue to the UNO that enforced a cease- fire on January 1st 1949 leaving India in control of two thirds of Kashmir and Pakistan occupying the rest. The UN proposed that both armies leave Kashmir. With India maintaining on its side only a minimum number of troops required to hold a plebiscite. The UNO promised to oversee a referendum once the two conditions were met. Fifty-three years down the road none of those conditions have been met. Today Kashmir remains a thorn in the side of both countries and the very foundation of LIC. It is the smoldering volcano that could erupt into a nuclear holocaust. Kashmir is the root cause of tensions and LIC between the two Asian nuclear powers. Kashmir is symbolically and materially at the core of India-Pakistan antagonism. There is a third party to the conflict, the people of Kashmir whose rights are being denied. Both India and Pakistan exclude the independence option. India claims that Pakistan is fighting a proxy war in Kashmir, Pakistan justifies its policies and actions of supporting a home grown legitimate Kashmiri freedom struggle.

The Kashmir dispute and the resultant LIC with India gave birth to the disastrous military adventure code named “Operation Gibraltar” Thousands of trained Pakistani commandos were sent across to Indian occupied Kashmir in 1965. The mistaken notion was that the brave Pakistani guerillas would be able to ignite the flames of a Kashmiri uprising resulting in the eventual accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. This plan was a political and military disaster. It failed to achieve any of its political or strategic objectives. To bolster and salvage “Operation Gibraltar” another campaign named “Operation Grand slam” spear headed by the 12th division, commanded by Major General Akhtar Hussein Malik was hurriedly launched. This campaign came to a grinding halt across the river Tawi when India struck with full fury across the international boundary in the early hours of 6th September 1965 and the rest is history,

Pakistan army has played a heroic role in containing all forms of low intensity conflict internal and external both. It has been in the forefront of fighting ethnic, sectarian and fundamentalist groups with links to RAW and other intelligence agencies such as Mossad, KGB, and the CIA. The most testing and enduring time for the army was during the insurgency in former East Pakistan with the Bengali nationalists and their Mukti Bahni, aided and abetted by the Indian army and the formidable RAW. Pakistan army has stood like the rock of Gibraltar against all forces of subversion. The aim of these anti national forces is to weaken the state from within and keeping it weak is the ultimate goal of these groups so that the state apparatus is unable to function effectively and the Govt. is forced to take repressive and extreme measures which will further subvert the state. From this perspective ethnic and sectarian conflicts are ideal preying grounds for LIC. Ethnic groups can be easily isolated and polarized. Two types of racism have been exploited in Pakistan. One, genuine racism, when a strong sense of racism based on history, culture and language already exists and it is rightly felt that it is not accorded sufficient degree of cultural, social and political recognition, for example the Sindhis and Balochis in the sixties and the Bengalis in the pre-1971 era. Two, racism built on the foundations of neglect, poverty, injustice and deprivation. The case of the MQM with its support of the highly educated Urdu speaking mohajir community fits in this category. Violence has a momentum of its own and this has been demonstrated in the gory and bloody happenings when the roads of Karachi became killing fields. Even when the MQM was a part of the ruling coalition its hard core cadres continued to behave as if they were in the opposition and on the fringe of the political mainstream.

Pakistan army has performed a monumental and historical task in containing and combating low intensity conflict in all its forms and manifestations. In Kashmir, Rann of Kutch, Siachin, Kargil, and most recently as a member of the international coalition against terrorism. Role of the Pakistan army has been lauded and appreciated by the world community and the international media. On the home front it has done a yeoman service by fighting the menace of ethnic and sectarian insurgency and even the drug barons with links to international terrorist groups.

It must however be understood that the success in LIC requires planning and conducting operations based on the following imperatives:




1. Political Dominance

In LIC operations, political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. All commanders and staff officers must understand these objectives and the impact of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action, which legally and morally support these objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what the traditional doctrine had contemplated.

2. Unity of Effort.

Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their efforts contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for inter agency integration and coordination to permit effective action within the framework of governmental system. Commanders may take orders from civilian leadership or may themselves employ resources of civilian agencies.

3. Adaptability.

Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change and modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations. It requires very careful mission analyses, comprehensive intelligence, and regional and ethnic expertise. Adapting is more than just tailoring or flexibility, both of which imply the use of the same techniques or structures in many different situations. Successful military operations in LIC will require the armed forces to use adaptability not only to modify existing methods and structures, but also to develop new ones appropriate to each situation.

4.Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. Legitimacy is not tangible. Nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy for itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties involved in the conflict. It is also important to other parties who may be involved even indirectly.

5. Perseverance.

Low intensity conflicts seldom have a clear beginning or end marked by decisive actions culminating in victory. They are by nature protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters, which do occur, are better assessed in the context of their contribution to long term objectives. Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them. Perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action. However it does require careful informed analyses to select the right time and place for that action. While it is important to succeed, it is equally important to recognize that in the LIC environment success will generally not come easily or quickly. Developing an attitude of disciplined, focussed perseverance will help commanders reject short- term successes in favor of actions which are designed to accomplish long term goals.

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