Yaqoob Bangash June 19, 2005

Tags: history , Pak-US , foreign-policy

href="/tag/Afghanistan">Afghanistan, is not actually a new phenomenon. As the Cold War spread outside Europe, to the Middle East and East Asia, the United States became very interested in the two newly independent nations of India and Pakistan in South Asia, as they lay strategically linked to both the Middle East and South East Asia. Initially the United States considered India, as the biggest and potentially most powerful regional nation, as its almost natural ally. However, Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, hoping to remain non-aligned, was not much interested in aligning his country with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Afterwards, fear of Nehru’s left-leanings and leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, brought the United States closer to Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan, since late 1947 had exhibited an interest to align itself with the West, so that it could have allies against India, with which Pakistan had embarked on a costly and long standoff in Kashmir.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan over the next few decades was one characterised by phases of extreme cooperation, disenchantment, and times of disagreement and even enmity. This high volatility in US-Pakistan relations resulted from the lack of understanding on both sides of the motives each had for the creation of an alliance. In the current War on Terrorism, where Pakistan and the United States are again close allies, an appreciation of the motives of both sides are essential because historical understanding of past weaknesses in the US-Pakistani relationship can shed important light on the future of the present alliance.

A study of the early years of United States-Pakistan relations will not only allow us to better understand the disenchantment of Pakistan with the United States in the late 1960s but will also shed some new light on how policies and concerns should be dealt with these days in the region by the United States.

This paper discusses how the bipolarities of the Cold War increased US interest in South Asia, and led the United States to prefer Pakistan over India and how the United States’ failing to develop any clear policy towards the region led to a deterioration of the US-Pakistani relationship in later years. As a global struggle for spheres of influence began between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1940s, South Asia became an arena of strategic manoeuvring for both the super powers. The scope of United States—Pakistan relations developed so rapidly in the 1950s that by the end of the decade Pakistan was being referred to as the ‘most allied ally in Asia,’ of the United States. This close military, and then economic cooperation between Washington and Karachi concerned and upset India, which responded by increasing its cooperation with the Soviet Union together with leading the newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia into the Non-Aligned Movement camp. But, in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, in which a shaken Nehru had to ask for help from Washington and London, United States’ interests shifted to India as New Delhi started to receive significant amounts of military aid from the United States and the Commonwealth, over Pakistani protests that these supplies would eventually be used against it. This gradual tilt towards India in United States South Asian policy saw Pakistan reconsider its treaty commitments to the United States and the Western world, with the fear that now perhaps the West would not come to its aid during a conflict with India. As a result, Pakistan started to mend fences with the People’s Republic of China, beginning in December 1962 with a border agreement. Therefore, not only did the United States lose a close friend in the 1960s but it also did not gain India’s friendship. The lack of a coherent and balanced US policy towards South Asia further increased Pakistani uneasiness with the alliance, instilled in Pakistan a sense of betrayal, and brought Pakistan close to the perceived US enemy, China.
Historians give less importance to the early phase of US-Pakistani relations, choosing instead to focus on the rupture between the two countries as a result of the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. Such an approach, however, overlooks how unrealistic expectations were on both the US and Pakistani sides from the start. They also overlook the importance Pakistan attached to its alignment with the United States and how it worked for the detriment of US-Indian relations and the warming up of Indo-Soviet relations. The effect of the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its position as a watershed incident in both US-Pakistani and US-Indian relations has also not been adequately dealt with by most historians. Serious questions still remain about this period of US—Pakistani relations. Perhaps the most obvious question is whether the United States actually did have a coherent and effective policy towards South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular? Also, how important was South Asia in United States global policy, especially with reference to the containment of the Soviet Union? The Sino-Indian war, the attitude of the United States and Commonwealth to Indian defence, and its effects on Pakistan are also issues that need to be further explored. Important to research is also the solidification of Sino-Pakistan relations, especially in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war and how much it affected Pakistan’s relations with its biggest ally, the United States.
To explore the ways in which the history of US-Pakistani relationship deteriorated, this paper is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the period before 1960, in which the United States developed its relationship with Pakistan. The section studies how the alignment of Pakistan fitted into the US global plan to contain Communism and its effects on the balance of power in South Asia. The second section then examines the relationship’s rapid denouement, focusing on the events leading up to and including the 1962 Sino-Indian War and how it infuriated Pakistan to the brink that Karachi threatened to reassess its participation in the SEATO and CENTO mutual defence pacts. The United States’ evolving policy towards India and its resultant straining of US—Pakistan relations will also be clearly elucidated. Taken together, these sections show that despite the US perception that it did have a coherent and rational policy towards South Asia, it actually never succeeded in constructing an approach that would keep both the main countries of South Asia, Pakistan and India, on friendly terms with the United States. The paper further argues that the United States’ half-hearted attempt to bring some form of rapprochement between India and Pakistan only exacerbated the tensions, leading to Pakistan developing a closer relationship with China and to India becoming more aligned with the Soviet Union. Hence, due to flawed US policy towards South Asia, the Pakistani government felt betrayed by an ally that had a number of treaty relationships with it. As a result, the United States’ ability to maintain peace in the region and its alignment with the West was extremely constrained.


South Asia and especially Pakistan were considered to be of marginal importance to the United States in the first few years after independence. The United States was interested in the establishment of stable, peaceful and Western-oriented states in the region, but as it had previously been the bastion of the British, American policy makers decided to follow the lead of Britain in their South Asia policy during the early years. Also, South Asia did not have immediate strategic or economic importance for Western policy as concerns about Europe and the Mediterranean were more urgent for American policy makers. American policy in South Asia initially tilted towards India, and is evident by the prompt deputation of an ambassador to New Delhi much before Karachi, and the invitation of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to visit the United States in 1949, nearly a year before the visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan in early 1950. But American perceptions of India and the Indians were not as complementary as this warm beginning of relations shows. Most American commentators saw Indians as passive, servile and cowardly. A survey of 181 prominent Americans, including several foreign policy makers, in the mid-1950s about India offered a host of descriptors: that Indian men were ‘weak,’ ‘servile,’ ‘effete,’ and ‘effeminate.’ In contrast the United States considered India’s neighbour, Pakistan, with better regard as it comprised of the ‘martial races’ of India. Thus, the beginning of United States’ relations with the two new South Asian countries was, at least in the initial few years, marred by their lack of interest in the region and by their mistaken perceptions of each country gleaned through Imperial British eyes.
American strategic and military interests in South Asia, especially Pakistan, were conditioned largely by British perception of the regions’ security issues. The British thought that leaving the region to its own devices especially when it was so close to the oil-fields of the Middle East was leaving room for the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the region. Led by Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Indian Civil Service officer, the British underscored the need for an anti-communist alliance in South Asia to defend Western oil interests in the Middle East. In Caroe’s strategic map, Pakistan was central to the defence of the Middle East. He wrote: ‘a conscious policy for receiving the immense resources around the Persian Gulf and for establishing a group of welfare states to combat communism in South-western Asia might indeed be inspired by Pakistan.’ Caroe’s scheme envisioned an anti-communist pact, led by Pakistan as the foremost Muslim nation, in the Middle East region to be complemented by support from the Commonwealth and Atlantic powers. India’s participation in the plan was only in terms of its membership of the Commonwealth. India was also considered less attractive as neither did it have the strong fraternal and religious links with the Arab countries as Pakistan, and nor did it have a clear philosophical tilt towards the West, as Pakistan had. As noted by diplomat Burke, there seemed to be ‘a certain positive quality’ of the Muslim mind as opposed to the ‘complexity’ and negative attitude of the Hindu mind which stressed non-violence and non-alignment, which brought the Western powers into a close relationship with Pakistan, rather than India
In the late 1940s the clear establishment of Cold War lines in Europe allowed the US to take keen interest in developing a South Asian policy, now centred on Pakistan. As early as 1948 the US military Attache to Karachi, Lt. Colonel Hoskot, had asked his administration to seriously consider military assistance to Pakistan. He said: ‘The strategic importance of Pakistan from an international point of view cannot be overlooked or treated lightly. In a period of emergency, Pakistan can form a base both for military and air operations.’ A Joint Chiefs of Staff study of US military interests in South Asia in March 1949 also stressed the need for a close relationship with Pakistan. It noted that the Karachi-Lahore area of Pakistan ‘might be required as a base for air operations against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil areas.’ Pakistan’s suitability as a staging area for covert US operations against the Soviet Union further increased its importance in American foreign policy and security objectives.
The United States trip of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was, in many ways, a turning point in the still developing relationship. Before that the United States was either occupied elsewhere to give much attention to South Asia or was tilting towards a stronger relationship with India. The Indian Prime Minister’s trip to the US in 1949 was a pivotal moment which made the Truman administration seriously consider alignment with Pakistan as the best option in its South Asian policy. Nehru’s trip was disastrous inasmuch as he made it clear to Truman that India would not, under any circumstances, depart from its neutral position and nor would it support the United States in the Japan Peace Treaty talks. On the other hand, Pakistan even before Liaquat’s trip was clear that it was on the side of the West. A State Department official noted: ‘In the event of war involving the USSR it seems likely that Pakistan would be prepared to assist the UK and the US in every way possible, such as making air bases available.’ So, when Liaquat visited the United States he unequivocally put his weight behind the Western camp. He emphasised that ‘We on our part believe that peace and stability in Asia are essential for peace and stability in the world.’ Liaquat also made clear that all Pakistan sought in return for alignment with the US was American arms. This attitude was firmly in line with the stance Pakistan had adopted soon after its independence with reference to the threat from India. Even in October 1947, the Pakistan Governor-general, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had suggested such an agreement to the Americans, but the proposal had received a cold reception in Washington DC. Now the realisation in the US of the proximity and vulnerability of western Pakistan to the Soviet Union gave importance to such a suggestion. However, it must be noted that from the beginning Pakistan was not much concerned about Soviet threats but was weary of Indian designs, especially in the aftermath of their first War in 1947-8 over the State of Kashmir, which was still a matter of dispute between the two countries. As such, a closer relationship between Washington DC and Karachi distressed New Delhi even more than it raised concerns in Moscow, for by developing a closer relationship with Pakistan the United States was also tilting towards the Pakistani position in the UN Security Council debates on the Kashmir issue.
By early 1951 the United States was becoming keenly interested in an alliance with Pakistan, due to concerns about defending the Middle East amidst the Korean War. Pakistan helped the situation by condemning North Korean aggression and by supporting the US stance, whereas India further estranged the United States by remaining neutral in the conflict. A meeting of United States State Department officials in Ceylon in February 1951 concluded that with regards to the security of the Middle East ‘the most effective military defence…would be provided by strong flanks on the west which would include Pakistan…Pakistan can provide important ground forces now, either directly in or to the Middle East flank…’ India’s unwillingness to align herself with the West strengthened Pakistan’s position especially regarding arms supply, for now the US concluded that ‘Pakistan was a better bet than India’ and that Pakistan’s contribution ‘would probably be the decisive factor ensuring defence of the area.’ The Americans, still trying to follow British lead in South Asian polices, immediately sought the advice of the British Foreign Office regarding some sort of a military agreement with Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the Foreign Office, concerned about its repercussions on the still tense Indo-Pak border situation and the ambivalent attitude of Egypt towards a joint Middle East defence agreement, prevailed upon Washington DC to shelf the idea till the take over of the next administration.
With the coming in of the Eisenhower administration and the brewing Suez base tussle between Britain and Egypt, concerns about the proposed Middle East Defence Organisation came to the fore. But before anything concrete could arise from Pak-US consultations, the rumours that Pakistan was close to an alliance with the United States fuelled anger in India. Nehru angrily informed the US Ambassador, Chester Bowles, that any US arms in Pakistani hands would ultimately be used against India, rather than the Soviet Union and that he could not stand the Cold War being brought to the Sub-continent. Bowles, who had always been very sympathetic to India’s cause, flooded Washington DC with warnings against such an alignment, but to little avail. Even though other people had been thinking about cementing the US-Pakistani relationship through an alliance agreement, it was the US Secretary of State Dulles’ 1 June 1953 National Security Council report that finally spelled out the form in which Pakistan was to take part in Middle East defence. According to the document, after the intransigent attitude of Egypt concerning Suez, it was better to keep it out of a defence arrangement and to centre the agreement on the so-called northern tier states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. The creation of such an alliance was beneficial for the United States for not only did it check the neutralist tendencies of Pakistan, but it also shored up the defences of a country considered so strategic for the defence of the Middle East. Thus, keeping in mind these advantages of signing a defense agreement with Pakistan for Middle East defense, the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan on 19 May 1954, which was shortly preceded by a Turkish-Pakistan defence agreement on 2 April 1954. Thereafter, in quick succession Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 as a founding member, and the following year also joined the Baghdad Pact (later renamed Central Treaty Organisation [CENTO]) in 1955. Pakistan also signed two other mutual security agreements with the United States in 1955 and 1959, which further facilitated military and economic aid to Pakistan.
By 1960 Pakistan had become the only nation in Asia to be so closely allied with the Western powers. Though, SEATO explicitly (Article 4, para.1), and the other agreements implicitly, were against only Communist aggression, Pakistan understood them as against any kind of foreign aggression, on the pattern of the NATO agreements. Many scholars have since commented that either the United States was not aware of Pakistan’s security concerns with regard to India, or that it just chose to ignore them. While the United States considered Pakistan’s interest in a military agreement out of fear of Soviet invasion, Pakistan’s main concern throughout had been to protect itself against India. Together with this difference of motives behind the alliance between the US and Pakistan, such agreements also led to a further estrangement of India. Even though Eisenhower assured Nehru that US-Pakistani agreements would not be used to the detriment of India, the forging of such alliances alienated New Delhi and led to a warming of relations between India and the Soviet Union. India feared that Pakistan, armed with state-of-the-art American arms, would now seek to solve the Kashmir dispute with force and that considering its alliance with Western powers, the result of such a conflict being against India would be the likely outcome. Some Indian commentators noted the effect of the US-Pakistan alliance and questioned: ‘Could it be that the United States, seeking to attain certain goals dictated by immediate military considerations, decided to establish a military relationship with Pakistan even if such a course involved, for the time being, a scuttling of the Kashmir negotiations, greater discord between India and Pakistan, and a deterioration of Indo-American relations?’ In terms of global policy also, an alliance with Pakistan was ill-advised. Dulles held that securing Pakistan’s support was critical to the defense of the Middle East, but he never clearly elucidated how such a defense would work. After the falling through of some sort of a joint command structure proposal put forth by Iran and Pakistan for CENTO, the actual working of such an alliance in time of a Soviet attack was at best an intelligent guess: the likelihood of a Soviet attack was also never a cause of immediate concern. However, still, as political scientist Sayeed noted the main US considerations for coming into an alliance with Pakistan were geo-political concerns. He wrote:
At the time the Baghdad Pact and SEATO came into being, the United States believed that there was a real threat of Communist attack and subversion both the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the Middle East there was the possibility of Soviet penetration and in Southeast Asia the French had suffered a disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Thus, the United States must have felt that Pakistan, because of its unique geographical position, could become one end of the northern tier opposing the Soviet Union in the Middle East and could provide protection to Southeast Asia on its western bank.
Thus, by the end of the 1950s the Cold War had effectively entered South Asia with Pakistan firmly in the Western camp, for different reasons than those touted, and under several imaginary Soviet threats and notions of Asian vulnerability. This led to closer ties between India and the Soviet Union, much due to America’s close cooperation with Pakistan.


With the coming in of the Kennedy administration relations between the United States and Pakistan cooled down a bit, as Kennedy was intent on courting India rather than Pakistan. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted, the Soviet Union seemed to have gained the initiative in the Cold War and so the United States had to balance the scales through an aggressive campaign to lure the newly independent or neutral countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He noted: ‘the battles for Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, [and] Asia are now joined, not on a military plain in the first instance, but for influence, prestige, loyalty, and so forth, and the stakes there are very high.’

Stemming from such considerations, Kennedy’s interest in India, which was the biggest and most important of the still no-aligned world, was quite natural. White House adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted: ‘Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had along regarded as “the key area” in Asia.’ Even before formally assuming the presidency, Kennedy had appointed a special task-force for India which recommended $500 million for India’s five year plan (1961-66), and also advocated granting another $500 million per annum in commodity assistance under the PL 480 programme.

India’s importance in US Cold War strategy also derived from the fact that now the US considered China, rather than the Soviet Union, as its main threat in Asia. US policy makers feared that in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing might become more aggressive and try to assert its hegemony in Asia, something Washington was not prepared to let happen. As such, the Kennedy administration saw India, as the next biggest nation in Asia, as China’s possible regional counterweight. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles noted ‘The foundation of a politically stable Asia, capable of balancing the power and weight of China, would I believed, be provided only when the non-Communist nations of Asia, in their own interests, began to work together. This would depend largely on the willingness and ability of Japan, India and Indonesia, where most non-Communist Asians live…to assume far broader political and economic responsibilities.’

The Kennedy administration still valued the alliance with Pakistan, but now aimed to have good relations with both South Asian powers so as to contain the Chinese threat. But as the NSC aide Robert Komer noted, India had now become the bigger Cold War prize and the US was willing to run into substantial risks in its relationship with Pakistan in an attempt to woo the Indians. He acknowledged: ‘But if we must choose among these countries [Pakistan and India] there is little question that India…is where we must put our chief reliance.’ Thus, with the coming in of the Kennedy administration a new era opened up in US-Pakistan and US-Indian relations where the United States was much keener on developing a working relationship with New Delhi, even if it meant scaling down or even suspending its strong alliance with Karachi.

Instrumental in the United States’ tilt towards India at the expense of Pakistan during the Kennedy administration were Kennedy’s aides, who were forcefully pro-Indian. Robert Komer, who was appointed to Kennedy’s National Security Council, was a proponent of a pro-Indian policy, for he saw America’s reliance on Pakistan the result of short-sightedness in US foreign policy. He noted: ‘we had put too much emphasis on Pakistan at the expense of India, a rebalancing was desirable.’ Together with Komer’s appointment the appointment of Ambassador Galbraith, an ardent pro-India policy advocate, to New Delhi and of Chester Bowles, a former ambassador to New Delhi, as Under Secretary of State brought to the fore an Indian lobby in the Kennedy administration, which was to have far-reaching impact on US-Pakistan relations.

These friendly overtures from the Kennedy administration received warm replies from India and cautious reactions from Pakistan. There were a number of friendly exchanges of letters between Kennedy and Nehru in which both voiced their desire to cement their good relationship even further. In one of them Kennedy noted: ‘I want you to know how much I appreciate your continuing efforts to create a peaceful world community.’ Nehru replied in equally complementary tones and wrote: ‘our task, great as it is, has been made light by the goodwill and generous assistance that has come to us from the United States. To the people of the United States and more especially to you, Mr. President, we feel deeply grateful.’ Nehru’s warm words clearly reflected his gratefulness, as the United States had now pledged over $1 billion to India in economic aid over the next two years as part of the India Aid Consortium, in addition to the $550 million already ear-marked for India in the 1962 budget. Vice President Lyndon Johnson’s India trip of May 1961 further strengthened relations with New Delhi, and Ambassador Galbraith noted that the Johnson entourage left India ‘much happier than when they came.’ Even Johnson noted the friendly attitude of the Indians and wrote in his report to the president that, ‘Nehru, during our visit, was clearly “neutral” in favour of the West. This administration is highly regarded and well received in India.’

This courting of India raised alarm in Pakistan, and president Ayub saw it as the abandonment of allies in favour of neutrals. He underscored his sentiments forcefully when Vice President Johnson visited Pakistan immediately after his India trip in June 1961, emphasising the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute as a prerequisite to normalising relations with India and asking the United States to take a more pro-active role in settling the issue. Johnson, for his part, tried to reassure Ayub that the United States still made a distinction between allies and neutrals and that the US-India relationship would not be used to the detriment of Pakistan. He also insisted that Pakistan was overestimating Washington’s influence in India, but promised to do more for the solution of the Kashmir dispute. However, by this time these reassurances were not enough for a Pakistan increasingly weary of US-Indian cooperation, which if extended to the military field might compromise the security of Pakistan.

The 1961 US visits of Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Nehru exhibited another attempt by the Kennedy administration to develop good relations with both countries, only to result in the estrangement of Pakistan even further. By that time President Ayub had become quite suspicious of US-Indian relations and warned clearly that India would use any assistance from the US ultimately against Pakistan. He wrote:

At the same time, there grew a feeling among the allies of the United States—not in Pakistan only—that, in a variety of ways, they were increasingly being taken for granted. Gradually, as result of this change in American thinking, neutral India became by far the largest recipient of US economic aid, while she continued freely to castigate the United States in the United Nations and outside, whenever the opportunity offered. Pakistan watched this transformation in American foreign policy with increasing perplexity and dismay. Our concern arose from the fact that the Indian military build-up was aimed largely against Pakistan. The pronouncements of Indian leaders and the continuing massing of India’s army on Pakistan’s borders clearly suggested this.

Ayub made his position clear before embarking on his United States trip. He told an Associated Press reporter that Pakistan was ‘re-examining its membership’ in SEATO and asked rhetorically, ‘Can it be that the US is abandoning its good friends for the people who may not prove such good friends?’ clearly referring to the recent warming of relations between the US and India, which he thought was a threat to Pakistan. He also noted in his interview to The Times of London that the United States was perhaps ‘too shy or too frightened’ of India to impress upon New Delhi the importance of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

In his talks with President Kennedy, Ayub repeatedly emphasised the centrality of the Kashmir dispute in relations with India and urged Kennedy to use his influence in New Delhi to achieve a fair solution of the problem. Kennedy in reply did not make any firm promises but assured Ayub that he would try to talk to Nehru about Kashmir when he visits the US later that year and that he would not give any military assistance to India without first consulting him. While addressing a joint session of Congress Ayub further stressed that Pakistan was a true friend of the US in South Asia and that the US should not abandon its steadfast friends in the region. He said: ‘the only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan…provided you are also prepared to stand by them.’

In contrast to Ayub’s trip in which much of the bad feelings between the United States and Pakistan had been laid to rest, the Nehru visit of 1961 proved to be a disaster. The two leaders clashed over literally everything that was important for the US at that time viz. Vietnam, Berlin, and nuclear testing. Even Kennedy described the meeting with Nehru as ‘the worst head-of-state visit I have had.’ According to Schlesinger, Kennedy remarked that talking to Nehru was like ‘trying to grab something in your hand, only to have it turn out to be fog.’ Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother and attorney general also noted that the President ‘never liked Nehru’ and that he found Nehru’s arrogance and sense of superiority ‘rather offensive.’ In South Asian affairs both leaders clashed bitterly on issues of Kashmir and the recent Indian occupation and annexation of Portuguese Goa, issues on which Nehru refused to compromise. But despite the dismal US trip of Nehru, policy makers in the Kennedy administration still thought that India was too important to be left alone. For India too, despite the rifts during Nehru’s US trip and the Goa occupation, the lurking threat of the Chinese inevitably brought it to realise that closer relations and cooperation with the US were desirable.

The Sino-Indian war in September-October 1962 was a watershed in US-Indian relations, for it brought the two powers extremely close, and was also significant for Pakistan-US relations as they hit their lowest ebb during the conflict. Chinese and Indian tensions along their common border had been continuing for a long time. The Chinese had never accepted the McMahon line established by the British as the international boundary between India and China in the early twentieth century, and had a claim on large parts of territory in the Indian Northeast Frontier Agency and Indian held Kashmir. Small skirmishes between Indian troops and the Chinese Liberation Army had gradually been intensifying so much so that on 20 October 1962 full scale hostilities broke out between the two when the Chinese launched an attack on Indian forward positions in Ladakh, in Indian held Kashmir, and in the Northeast Agency, quickly driving the Indian forces into a haphazard and humiliating retreat. The next few days were full of such reversals with the Chinese occupying large tracks of Indian territory. A shaken Nehru conceded the Indian defeat in his address to the nation noting that ‘we were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.’ Nehru and his cabinet now saw the urgent need for foreign aid. On 26 October 1962 Nehru appealed to all world leaders for ‘support and sympathy.’ He underscored the significance of this conflict and said: ‘This crisis is not only of India but of the world and will have far reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world.’ But in spite of difficulties at the war front Nehru could not make himself formally ask the United States for military help. As the Indian Ambassador to the US noted, ‘…The Prime Minister, after all these years in the neutralist pacifist camp, found it difficult to make a direct request for armaments from the United States. He was hoping, instead, that the President in his reply would offer “support”…instead of an alliance.’ Kennedy, as expected, was very sympathetic to Nehru’s request and immediately wrote back to him ensuring him his ‘support as well as sympathy.’

American policy makers saw this as the prime opportunity to grab their biggest prize in the region, India, by offering her military aid against the Chinese, amidst expected Pakistani protests. Komer immediately recognised the war as ‘potentially one of the most crucial events of the decade…[and] a golden opportunity for a major gain in our relations with India.’ The US also recognised this as a dilemma for the Soviet Union, for Moscow would have to choose between its Communist ally or greatest friend in the non-aligned world, or would have to stay neutral. Either way, members of the Kennedy administration theorised, the situation would end up in favour of the United States. The concern of the administration during the war would thus be to, in the words of Kennedy aide Keysen, to ‘devise means to protect our important special interests in Pakistan…in the face of our new relationship with India.’ As events shaped out, this balancing act proved to be highly difficult.

Nehru’s request for help was seen as a key moment to strengthen US-Indian relations by the Kennedy administration. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was the first head of government to immediately dispatch aid to India, which started arriving by 29 October, consisting of ‘a lot of small arms, automatic rifles and ammunition.’ The United States, for its part, started to help India by first recognising the McMahon line as the boundary between China and India. Ambassador Galbriath declared on 27 October 1962: ‘the McMahon line is an accepted international border and is sanctioned by modern usage. Accordingly, we regard it as the northern border of the NEFA area.’ This recognition was a big step for the United States for its ally, Nationalist China (Taiwan), did not recognise the McMahon Line, and so the United States had to reverse its support of Nationalist China, amidst its vehement protest, in order to forge closer relations with India. Finally, as expected, on 29 October, after multiple defeats on the front, Nehru sent a formal request for help to Kennedy via Galbriath, starting a new era in US-Indian relations. By 3 November 1962 the United States had started emergency arms airlifts to India, and by 10 November the US had supplied about two hundred tons of hardware, sixty planeloads of automatic weapons and ammunitions, and hundreds of spare parts for planes to India. On 14 November 1962 US assistance to India was formalised by an exchange of notes between the Indian Ambassador to the US and the US Assistant Secretary of State, Phillips Talbot. The notes elaborated the terms under which the United States was transferring arms to India, which included that the use of these arms could be supervised by US officials and that they be only used against the Chinese.

As expected in Washington, Pakistan reacted sharply to the US supply of arms and ammunition to India. Before actually sending arms to India, but after he had agreed in principle to do so, Kennedy sent a letter to Ayub on 28 October 1962 to allay his fears. Kennedy urged restraint on the part of Ayub, calling on him to play the role of a great statesman and to offer India a no-war pledge so that it could focus all its efforts on the Chinese. He further emphasised that his help to the Indians was only directed against the Chinese and that Pakistan should have no fear of these weapons being used against it. Kennedy noted that the US had to respond favourably to the Indian request as, ‘certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm.’ In his reply to Kennedy on 5 November 1962 Ayub detailed the difference in Pakistani and American approaches to the Sino-Indian conflict. Ayub felt personally betrayed by Kennedy as he had not been consulted before the US decided to give military aid to India and after assurances to this effect had twice been given to him. He blamed the Indians for the war and noted that the Chinese did not have any aggressive designs towards India and that their aim was limited to the occupation of the disputed areas only. He further contended that it was bad Indian foreign policy which had brought this about, especially its tendency to appease communism under the veil of neutrality, its threats against Pakistan, and its abuse of the West, especially the US ‘in season and out of season.’ Popular opinion in Pakistan was also decidedly against US support of India, with a number of anti-American demonstrations and countless spiteful newspaper editorials and parliamentary statements. The Kennedy administration was taken aback by such a violent reaction from Pakistan. Secretary of State Rusk noted: ‘It is clear that the Paks have whipped themselves into near hysterical state and that the next few weeks will be very difficult for all of us.’ Kennedy tried to assuage Pakistani concerns and told a press conference on November 20, that: ‘in providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion…our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan.’ However, these reassurances did little to dispel Pakistani concerns about the likelihood of these American weapons in Indian hands being turned against them and they started to look for friends elsewhere.

Trying not to loose Pakistan’s alliance, Kennedy decided to send a mission under Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman, in coordination with a British delegation under Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys, to both India and Pakistan to try and achieve a breakthrough in the Kashmir dispute. Meanwhile, a successful Chinese defense and counter-attack against Indian troops in the north-east made Nehru panic and ask Kennedy for direct American intervention in the conflict on 19 November 1962. In the two letters Nehru sent to Kennedy that day he described the Indian situation as ‘really desperate.’ However, before Kennedy could reply to Nehru’s desperate request the Chinese issued a unilateral ceasefire on 20 November, pulling back their troops from forward positions. In doing so, the Chinese not only fulfilled their military objectives but also inflicted a humiliating defeat on their arrogant neighbour and embarrassed the Soviet Union, which remained neutral throughout the conflict. In these conditions, with India so beholden to the United States for military assistance, the chances for the success of the Harriman mission were great. Both the Harriman and the Sandys mission stayed in the subcontinent for about ten days in late November 1962, trying to bring both sides on the negotiating table over Kashmir. Talks with Nehru proved difficult at first but Harriman explained to Nehru that he not only had to reassure Pakistan but also had to deal with, in the words of Ambassador Galbriath ‘the long long-run problem of defence of subcontinent; said unless tensions relieved [the] US position [will be] untenable if it was asked to give aid [to] both Pakistan and India with part of [the] aid being used for defence against the other.’ As a result, Nehru grudgingly agreed to the talks.

Harriman’s talks with Ayub went better than expected. Kennedy had emphasised to Harriman before he left for Pakistan that he needed to prevent Ayub from getting closer to the Chinese and that he had to reiterate the Communist threat to both India and Pakistan. Kennedy wrote: ‘…the subcontinent has become a new area of major confrontation between the Free World and the Communists….Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time when we were assisting Indian to confront Communist China…it would cut across deep commitments of the entire free world.’ In Pakistan, Harriman was able to convince Ayub for the need to supply India with modest amount of weapons to fight against any future Chinese aggression, with the promise that the United States would do all it could to help reach a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Thus, Harriman returned with a sense of success in finally bringing both Pakistan and India to the negotiating table, with a hope that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would not only ease tensions in the subcontinent but would make it easier for the US to develop closer relations with India without harming its relations with Pakistan.

Encouraged by the apparent success of the Harriman and Sandys mission, the United States and Great Britain embarked on a long-term plan to help India build up its defense capabilities. A total of $120 million in US and Commonwealth military aid was promised to India following the Nassau meeting on 22 November 1962 between Kennedy and Macmillan. Pakistan reacted sharply to such aid supplies to India without any US or Commonwealth insistence on the solution of the Kashmir dispute. Kennedy still tried to reassure Ayub that the Chinese threat was as grave a threat to Pakistan as to India, and that the ‘supply of arms [to India] for this purpose should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement.’ But these efforts to restore Pakistani confidence did not meet with much success for neither did the Harriman sponsored talks achieve anything substantial on the Kashmir issue, and nor was Pakistan now interested in re-establishing strong relations with the United States. Communist China was increasingly becoming a close friend of Pakistan, and the Pakistan-China border agreement of 26 December 1962 in Kashmir, clearly exhibited the changed stance of an irritated and frustrated Pakistan.


The aftermath of the Sino-Indian war and arms procurement by India from the United States brought increased anti-American and pro-Chinese sentiment to Pakistan, greatly fracturing the once formidable alliance between Pakistan and the United States. During his last days in the White House, Kennedy was aware of this rift in Pakistan-US relations and tried to mend fences with Ayub. Kennedy sent Under Secretary of State George Ball to Ayub in August 1963 with a straightforward task: ‘to arrest the deterioration in US-Pakistan relations so that our major interests in the security and stability of the subcontinent and in the Peshawar facilitates can be protected without at the same time endangering the development of our new relationship with India.’ Needless to say, by that time Ayub had recognised that the United States would never support Pakistan over India, despite the alliances, and had embarked on a policy of limited disengagement from the West while trying to improve relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Ball mission failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Pakistan relations and in preventing Ayub from getting closer to the Chinese, for now Ayub argued that good relations with neighbours were essential for the safety and survival of Pakistan in an era where it could not trust its friends any longer. The state visit of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in February 1964 and the signing of a number of commercial and cultural agreements between China and Pakistan further exhibited a break in US-Pakistan relations.

Why did the US-Pakistan relations, which were at a solid footing during the Eisenhower administration, deteriorate to the point of breaking during Kennedy’s White House days? First, and foremost, this tension resulted because both sides failed to take stock of the reasons the other side had for the alliance. As Bhutto, a minister in Ayub’s cabinet and later Pakistan’s Prime Minister, contended, the break over the Sino-Indian war and American support of India had revealed ‘the irreconcilable contradictions between the different assumptions on which Pakistan and the United States had built their special relations.’ The United States came into agreement with Pakistan based on its fear of Communist aggression in the region and the resulting threat to the Middle East, whereas For example, Rashmi Jain, US-Pak Relations 1947-83 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983).
Syed Mahmood Hasan, “India as a factor in US-Pakistan Relations,” Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, No. 3, 1994.
Clearly evident in the analysis

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