Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: A détente?

‘‘The world is very different now, for man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.’’ John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, 1961.

In a recent discussion with an eminent journalist and student of international relations I came across one of the main arguments for a mutual nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. The argument goes as follows, given that both countries have now acquired the means to a mutually assured destruction in the form of ground based (missile) and air borne nuclear delivery capacity, neither state has an incentive to indulge in all out war, in particular a nuclear war.

The gentleman cites empirical evidence for this argument using two sets of actors in the 20th century, namely the United States and the former USSR, and Pakistan and India. We had several instances with these actors, where the world came close to nuclear conflict, the most notable amongst them the Cuban missile crises in 1962 and the Kargil conflict in 1999. In both these instances among other’s, the conflicting nations given imperfect information about each others nuclear triggers or ‘‘red lines’’, drew away from conflict- both conventional and nuclear.

This argument has important policy implication, the most important being that nuclear weapons in South Asia between the competing nations of Pakistan and India is actually a good thing for it has set up an implicit no major war pact in South Asia. But is this really so?

To answer this question we have to examine the theoretical basis of the mutual deterrence argument. The idea of both states possessing nuclear weapons ultimately resulting in military restraint is predicated in game theoretic terms on the concept of a Nash equilibrium (after the Nobel prize winning economist John Nash). The idea of a Nash equilibrium is simply that no player in the game has a unilateral incentive to deviate from current behavior, given the behavior of the competing player. In the context of Pakistan and India this implies that neither state has an incentive to go to major conflict, given that the other has nuclear weapons, for doing so would presumably lead (given the imperfect information regarding each others red lines) to a nuclear exchange.

However, the notion of a Nash equilibrium within this framework is based on a sequential game that is if the game is played over a number of times each side learns or perfectly foresees that going to major conflict can result in an all out nuclear war, something that neither side wants. Given such learning or foresight a nuclear conflict indeed sounds remote. Unfortunately in this instance, the path to equilibrium can be fraught by seemingly irrational behavior by either side, stemming from imperfect vision and or mistakes for it is only through learning or an acquisition of perfect foresight that the good equilibrium result of no war is delivered. The idea of no war is a Nash equilibrium in that neither sides has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the status co by behaving in a way that results in conflict. However, the equilibrium hinges on the idea that is each side is able to appreciate the end result of deviating from the existing peaceful behavioral pattern.

Human beings, as history testifies are prone to making bad choices. The new book by Earnest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow ‘‘The Kennedy tapes’’- (transcripts of actual conversations between Kennedy and his advisors) reveals just how tenuous the path to equilibrium can be. With the generals hell bent on a confrontation with the Soviets over Cuba as General Lemay put it ‘‘the big red dog is digging in our back yard and we are justified in shooting it’’, Kennedy had to struggle making a compromise deal with the Soviets to avoid a conflict. As Kennedy put it, ‘‘if we do what these brass hats want us to do, they’ll be no one left alive to tell them they were wrong.’’

The notion of each side behaving rationally given the probable outcome depends on the decision makers at times of potential warfare foreseeing the eventual result, and given human history good judgment depends on the individual few. If things go wrong human beings under pressure can make bad decisions resulting in disaster, and if the Kennedys’ of this world aren’t there at the right time human civilization can go awry vis a vis protecting itself. The case of the Cuban missile crisis illustrates just how close the world came to self destructing. Given nuclear weapons on both sides, if individuals had not prevailed in the face of intense institutional pressure not to, the world would have actually experienced a nuclear conflict engulfing the entire planet and effectively ending life on the planet.

There are even more absurd instances when the world gave to the brink of nuclear oblivion, when geese flying over the Pacific sent the Americans into a tizzy as they anticipated the launch of Soviet nuclear missiles.

In the case of India and Pakistan the lead time to nuclear launch and delivery is less than five minutes, as opposed to fifteen minutes for the U.S and the USSR. This makes aborting accidental nuclear launches improbable and adds credence to the Western media’s portrayal of the subcontinent, as ‘‘the most dangerous place in the world.’’ With a million men primed for action along the border, as during 2002-3 after the attacks on the Indian parliament, accidental or seemingly irrational war based on erroneous information regarding each others activities cannot be ruled out. In terms of game theory the path to equilibrium of no war can be fatally disrupted by poor judgment in times of intense pressure. In other words the path to a stable equilibrium can be disrupted by political flare ups like Kargil and terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan, where knee jerk behavior can actually result in a nuclear conflict.

A recent simulation study by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) puts the total causality toll at close to seven million for a limited nuclear exchange between the two nuclear foes. Can we then credibly cling to the deterrence argument? This analysis would suggest that we cannot.

Furthermore, basing our cushy deterrence theory on empirical evidence drawn from an extremely limited time period (even a hundred years) is misleading and can be very dangerous. We simply do not have enough observations (in a statistical sense) to conclude that we can rest on our laurels of creating a nuclear bomb.

The policy implications of this analysis are three fold.

Firstly, an environment with nuclear weapons in South Asia is worse than one where there were no nuclear weapons. Preventing other states from acquiring nuclear weapons is thus a priority for the international community.

Secondly, given that India and Pakistan now have nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear regulatory treaty is all the more important.

Thirdly, the recent peace process is extremely important, for it can lead us towards setting up an environment where political and military flare ups are contained, thus allowing us to actually maintain the desired equilibrium of no war. I have argued in a previous letter to the editor in the Daily Times that there are diminishing returns to acts of political compromise, that is there is a decline in flexibility of response through means other than overt aggression in a state of continued tension, implying that it is all the important that we invest in political buffers that lower the risk of a military conflict. These buffers can include seemingly trivial acts such as increasing the number of Embassy staff and renewing sporting links. Such buffers can allow both sides the breathing space to take stock and withdraw from potentially explosive situations in the future and thus smooth the path to the good equilibrium of no war in pressure situations.

Let me re-state that I believe that there is no nuclear deterrent given the idiosyncratic nature of decision making at time of extreme pressure. The equilibrium I discussed means that both sides accept that going to war is unacceptable given each party has nuclear weapons. However, as I have tried to show this argument depends on assigning good judgment and foresight to decision makers on both sides of the border at times of crises. A historical over view pinned on the Cuban missile crisis illustrates how good judgment can be replaced by seemingly irrational pressure to violate the conditions that govern the no war equilibrium. The fact that the human race escaped nuclear annihilation in 1962 due to the vision of the few makes our future in the absence of a nuclear scale down treaty extremely tenuous.

John F. Kennedy said, ‘‘we all inhabit this small planet, we all breath the same air, we all cherish our children’s future, and we are all mortal.’’ This could not be truer. In the context of Pakistan and India the peace and prosperity of over two thirds of the world’s population is at stake. Can we credibly rely on deterrence? I believe we cannot.