US–India Deal and Kashmir

President Bush on his three day honeymoon was visibly ’dazzled by the exciting and vibrant land’ of opportunities -- a market of over 300 million middle class and 700 million almost out-classed human beings. For many Indians, it’s a proverbial rags to riches, how can a country where a vast majority still lives below the poverty line, resist dreams of going to bed with the world’s only super power, with the promise of a new and bright future, a green revolution, unlimited trade and investment opportunities, more high tech jobs and last but not the least a precious security ring in the shape of a ’civilian nuclear pact’. This is more than a Bollywood film could have scripted for them.

Pakistan should not let itself worry about the ’nuclear deal’. Other than teasing Iran in the short term and testing China in the long run, it will only serve to unravel a Pandora’s Box of Nuclear Proliferation debate. If nuclear reactors have not solved US or even tiny Japan’s energy problems, it is highly unlikely that it will solve India’s energy woes.

What Pakistan does need to worry about is the implication of the new Indo-US relationship on its long standing position on Kashmir. To some extent, Islamabad belittled its own self dignity by demanding a matching nuclear energy deal from President Bush, she should have been aware of her needs and of course her ’history’ before putting the respectable guest in a quandary. What Islamabad should and may have indeed focused on was to elicit a stronger and clear commitment on Kashmir from President Bush. Being a real time front line state in the ’war on terror’ and such a faithful friend all these years, Islamabad was within its permissible rights to demand a clear message on Kashmir, particularly at a time when the entire geo-political situation in South Asia was to go under such a drastic transformation as a result of the Indo-US ’nuclear deal’.

A mention of Kashmir before signing the nuclear deal in Delhi would have been crucial to keep Delhi interested in the grinding and lacklustre dialogue process; a stronger commitment on Kashmir from President Bush in Islamabad would have provided President Musharraf a much needed face saving opportunity, who is fighting a sole battle on many fronts, mainly for the Americans. Instead President Bush kept himself to passing remarks like ’a historic opportunity to work towards lasting peace’. He did praise ’President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh for courage and vision’. He encouraged ’all sides to continue to make progress on important issues, including Kashmir’. In short, President Bush left Kashmir to the courage, vision and mercy of the two leaders. During his five days in South Asia, he did not even mention the ’the people living in Kashmir’, which he amazingly did during his pre-visit remarks.

If we look at Washington’s position on Kashmir it is clear that despite ’India being in the Soviet camp’ during the cold war, Washington’s policy on Kashmir has always sought a middle ground. The Dixon Plan, named after its author Sir Owen Dixon, who was the UN representative for India and Pakistan in the 1950s, envisaged a division of Kashmir between India and Pakistan on the basis of the existing divisions of the state.

Later on many US think tanks advocated for a phased implementation of the partition plan whereby in the first phase, the idea of recognizing the Line of Control (LoC) as an international border was mooted, which was again an Indian line since it had been insisting that the only solution to the Kashmir issue lay in recognizing the LoC as the international boundary. In the second phase, the suggested division was of Indian administered Jammu & Kashmir into three administrative entities, meaning the Buddhist dominated Ladakh becoming a centrally administered territory (Union Territory), while Jammu and Kashmir would become two separate states. Jammu would have a regular status of an independent state within the Indian Union, whereby, Kashmir Valley could be given more internal autonomy.

Reportedly, many BJP stalwarts including the former party president and home minister Lal Krishna Advani were supportive of the idea. The Ladakh region is geographically the largest part of Indian administered Kashmir, the region comprises of two districts Kargil and Leh. Leh is a Buddhist majority district where a recent election to the Ladakh Hill Development Council (LDSC), which is an independent local governance system, 25 out of 26 seats in the LHDC were clinched by the Ladakh Territory Front, which is a local nationalist party seeking independence from Srinagar. However, the situation in Muslim dominated Kargil district remains unclear.

The US policy makers have been traditionally less concerned about Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. Population wise Kashmir Valley and Jammu contains the biggest concentration but geographically the Northern Areas (Gilgit – Baltistan) and Ladakh regions constitute about 75 per cent of the territory of the former State of Jammu & Kashmir, when it broke up in 1947. Under a lease agreement Gilgit Agency was under British control months prior to the partitions, while Baltistan was carved out from the Ladakh wizarat. Gilgit and Baltistan border China, India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, since, Indo-US understanding rests on grooming India as a counter balance to China; it is possible that US and Indian interest in the Northern Areas will grow in the years ahead, which of course is not good for Kashmiris seeking a valley centric Kashmir solution.

In the mid 90s India started opening a protective economy for multi-national companies and Indian companies began exploring the global market. Western businesses started sensing new opportunities, and the American corporations started lobbying for more pro-India policies where a strong and emerging middle class presented a ready market. Thus, the engagements for a long term Indo-US ’Strategic Partnership’ was nurtured in a rigorous formulation process over a decade long period. Ambassador Frank Wisner’s appointment in Delhi in 1994 was perhaps a serious step forward towards the new deal. It was thus, foolish on part of Pakistan’s Foreign Office to seek similar candy from President Bush during his short break in Islamabad.

Islamabad should have realized that beyond some public pronouncements concerning popular sentiments of the state subjects, Washington’s policy has demonstrated a broader understanding about the diversity of culture, interest and political aspiration of Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, Ladakhi Buddhists in the Indian side, and Balti, Gilgiti, Shia, Sunni, Ismaili and Noorbukshi divides in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.

It is not clear as to what actually transpired on the issue of Kashmir in behind the scenes discussions and during the one on one interactions. But from whatever President Bush disclosed to the media, it is clear that Kashmir is no more, never will, in fact never was, a priority for Washington. One would hope that ’the new deal’ with the world’s only super power will not get into the heads of people in Delhi, and it will continue to pull the dialogue process forward to a logical conclusion. One would also hope that Islamabad will not succumb to illusions and insecurities created by the Indo-US partnership, and will continue to seek a just, peaceful and realistic solution best suited to the beleaguered Kashmiris and wrongly ’hyphenated’ non-Kashmiris who live on both sides of the divided bits and pieces of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir.