Damming Kalabagh

Is the state acting wisely in its insistence upon building Kalabagh
Dam? The Council of Common Interests met about a month ago, only to
shelve the proposal. Instead, it set up a committee to persuade the
other provinces to agree to what is essentially Panjab's case for
the dam. The subsequent crisis over nuclear tests apparently
side-tracked the committee's functioning. With unseemly haste,
Islamabad then took cover of its suspension of fundamental rights to
unilaterally announce the damming of Kalabagh. With the fervour of
evangelists, some spokesmen in Islamabad and Lahore preach endlessly
about the benefits of Kalabagh, while others mindlessly belittle the
fears of severe and sustained adverse impacts. Following the elitist
manner in which development agendas are formulated and implemented
in Pakistan, the state has now deigned to renew consultations and
debates between provinces, i.e. the political establishment, rather
than to negotiate consent from the people of affected communities.

WATER

Proponents of Kalabagh, as the dam lobby usually does, paint a grim
picture of future unmet food and energy needs for a rapidly growing
population (closer to 3%, despite wishes to the contrary). By all
indications, it would be cheaper to invest in reducing population
growth rather than build endless dams to feed and electrify a largely
illiterate nation of muslim men and women. Its not as if Islam is a
hindrance to smaller families - both Indonesia and Iran have brought
their fertility rates down to less than 3 children as compared to
more than 5 in Pakistan. Why cannot we begin by damming the floods of
illiteracy and ill-health among our mothers, and the sisters and
daughters that are mothers-to-be?

Kalabagh dam is supposed to function on the basis of "water that runs
wasted into the sea." A seemingly sensible statement, which is a
favourite of the WAPDA Chairman amongst others of the mountains and
plains. Regrettably, this is a fantasy that runs counter to the known
facts. First, there is no such thing as waste in natural ecological
systems. Fresh water flows support the entire coastal ecology, and
any further reduction will simply add to the enormous damage to the
Indus delta imposed by previously constructed dams. Its not just the
mangrove forests and the fishes that are affected, but the millions
of peasants and fisherfolk of the coastal districts whose livelihoods
will be destroyed. All reliable estimates suggest that fresh water
flows are already much, much below what is required to sustain the
present ecological system, and things will get worse when an
impecunious Karachi increases its intakes from the Indus. A bad Water
Accord does not mean that we should worsen matters further, anymore
than thrusting an inequitable National Finance Award implies that
Islamabad can further fiscally devastate Sindh without protest and
resistance.

Yet another variant of the "wasted water" fantasy is that there is
more water available up North than has been allocated by the Water
Accord. WAPDA is a past master at fudging data, and this is precisely
what has been done. Using selective data, Kalabagh is shown by WAPDA
to have enough water to fill up the reservoir in most years. As
established by Abdul Majid Kazi and A. N. G. Abbasi, among others,
the actual case is the opposite: there will be enough water in only
one of every five years. Unless Kalabagh is provided water that is
diverted from the shares of other provinces, in violation of the
Water Accord. If this is not to happen, Kalabagh will lie under-
utilised. It is more likely that the presence of Kalabagh dam will
provide incentives to divert water in tight years, with or without
the connivance of the Centre, as is evident from the many years of
Chashma releases in violation of the Accord. Discord and
fragmentation is surely likely to follow.

Federal Ministers defend the dam as a compensation for rapid
sedimentation which reduces the amount of storage at Tarbela. One
does know what to make of their convenient ignorance of, or
indifference to, a recent international study. From what has been
summarised about it by the consultants in DFID's WATER, the
sedimentation problem can be resolved at 10 percent of the cost of
building a new dam for an equivalent additional water storage
capacity. Official spokesmen also fail to tell us why it is
infeasible or more costly to increase Tarbela storage capacity by
raising the height of the reservoir, an option built into the design
of Tarbela.

Consider also the reluctance of Islamabad to examine the most
appealing alternative to Kalabagh and all major dams. At present,
only a third of irrigation water is actually utilised by crops
themselves. Among those who have studied the issue, such as Ayub
Qutub of PIEDAR, a nation-wide program of investments in water
conservation is estimated to cost a trivial sum in comparison to any
dam. As with the Tarbela sedimentation solution, there will be no
dislocation or displacement of tens of thousands of people.

An outstanding advantage of this decentralised, people-friendly
solution is that it is also very favourable to the land and soils
that sustain our lives. Water conservation will reduce water-logging
and salinity, quite the opposite of Kalabagh dam which will not only
render large areas infertile in the neighbourhood of the dam but also
accelerate soil degradation throughout the newly irrigated areas. If
Kalabagh gets built, it will demand even greater resources for
drainage than the billions already envisaged under the 25-year
National Drainage Plan. Moreover, this Plan itself can become an
ecological nightmare for the coastal districts which are planned to
receive the entire effluent from Sindh and Panjab.

POWER

The power-hungry of Islamabad and Lahore point to Kalabagh's large
energy output as a major benefit to the nation. The key point in
their argument is that public hydel power has been historically
substantially cheaper than current private thermal power. The flaws
in this argument are many. First, hydel power is cheaper only if the
capital for dam construction is obtained at heavily subsidised
interest rates, and those adversely affected are compelled into
accepting miserably low compensation and wholly inadequate
resettlement (such as in Tarbela). Second, hydel power will not come
cheap if the turbines lie silent for four of every five years. Third,
unless Islamabad reneges on the private power contracts and fails to
complete the Ghazi Barotha Hydropower Project, or launches into an
unlikely hyper growth, there are no realistic scenarios of a power
supply shortage that requires another major dam. Fourth, there is no
likelihood that additional "cheap" hydel power will be distributed
across the country in proportions anywhere close to the widespread
burdens of Kalabagh dam as a "national" project.

ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES

In addition to the adverse consequences we have listed above, there
are the well-known fears of people in areas surrounding Kalabagh
about an increased risk of devastation from floods. Proposed
technical modifications are unconvincing to them, and we were
certainly not convinced by the dammers who spoke at a recent seminar.
As with nuclear war, it is absurd to minimise the scale of
destruction by referring to low probabilities of occurrence in a good
command and control system.

Kalabagh dam will result in the direct dislocation of about a hundred
thousand men, women, and children whose homes and lands will be
submerged by the reservoir. Spokesmen for the dam are singing
rhapsodies of houses, hospitals, schools and colleges for the
displaced. Priests of a fake order, they ignore the record of
resettlement. After nearly three decades, the victims of Tarbela
still await restitution by an uncaring State, a greedy nation, and
selfish provincial leadership. Chotiari resettlement promises to be
yet another mess, and the people of Ghazi Barotha are faced with
empty promises and endless delays. Federal and provincial governments
and agencies, local and international consultants, aid donors of all
hues - all get handsomely paid to endlessly plan, implement, and
supervise the agonies of our people.

FUNDING

Proponents expect to get international funding at highly
concessional rates for building Kalabagh dam. Even if there were no
sanctions against our nuclear ambitions, it is most unlikely that
either the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank would offer such
funding. The reasons for rejecting Kalabagh would at the very least
include their support to full utilisation of private thermal
capacity, and their reluctance to get embroiled in a project with
such major negative environmental and resettlement outcomes. In
fact, when the World Bank gets around to recalling its own
covenants, Ghazi Barotha should face suspension of funding because
of the failure of the government to resolve outstanding claims of
Tarbela resettlement.

Private infrastructure funding does not come cheap, as we all
painfully know from the thermal projects. Such funding will
therefore render Kalabagh dam unattractive, specially if those
adversely affected across the nation are compensated fairly.
Moreover, it is not obvious that the proponents of Kalabagh are
indeed ready for the complete privatisation of irrigation water that
this step would necessarily entail.

What of a national infrastructure fund that diverts tax resources to
this project? As long as dam benefits and costs are distributed so
unfairly, it would be a travesty of a federation to use federal
resources for this purpose. It would be far more equitable to borrow
only from areas that will benefit directly and appreciably, and
impose user charges on the same areas to retire the special debt.

CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding Kalabagh is intense and
wide-ranging: from the very need for any large-scale dam to the
ability of effective mitigation and fair compensation for adverse
environmental and social impacts. In consequence, opposition to
the dam is both intensive and extensive, and is highly likely to
come under international scrutiny. In fact, if the government is up
to the challenge, the Kalabagh dam proposal should be sent for
scrutiny by the World Dams Commission. Information gaps remain an
obstacle to informed debate and discussion, in part because of the
very low credibility of government and its agencies, both federal and
provincial.

We believe that the Centre has taken a most unwise step in proposing
the construction of Kalabagh Dam. All the information now publicly
available establishes that the proposal suffers from a series of
shortcomings which render irrigation and power benefits extremely
dubious. If these benefits are increased to become more certainly
sizeable for a small section of capitalist farmers and industrialists
in a limited part of the country, their adverse consequences will
impoverish the livelihoods of a substantially larger mass of ordinary
citizens across the country.

There is an urgent need for broad-based, public consultations on
crucial issues of moral and legal rights to life and livelihood that
surround claims to water. Any prior interventions by the state and
its donors which affect historic claims to the Indus waters will be
largely viewed as arrogant and oppressive repudiation by State and
Centre of such fundamental rights in a democratic federation of
communities and citizens. Only in recognising this can we seriously
begin work towards forging a national consensus on whether or not to
build Kalabagh or any other dam. Meetings of the Council of Common
Interests will remain a poor substitute for responsible and
responsive governance.

If they are sincere, what should dam proponents do about a better
understanding of their case? First, government and its agencies need
to come clean with all documentation about Kalabagh. Second, prepare
additional documentation to publicly disseminate realistic estimates
of dam benefits, damages, and both direct and indirect costs -- not
just their scale and probability but also to which groups in what
areas of the country. Third, dam lobbyists should not be content with
discussing this information with political elites in federal and
provincial legislatures with whom they can always strike deals on the
basis of class and cultural affinity and interests. The real
developmental challenge to the state is to transparently negotiate
with the millions of ordinary citizens in the thousands of
communities in the federation of provinces. Is civil society upto the
task of supporting citizens in these negotiations? Its hard work for
all, but why should good governance be thought of as a mandate for
any kind of laziness?

When the Centre in Lahore and Islamabad defends the construction of
Kalabagh with public resources of the federation, it can do so only
on the basis of a socially abstract calculus of national development,
and the ideology of a majoritarian state -- which alone can justify
greater inequity and poverty among its peoples, devalue community
rights over resources, and blatantly promote territorial expansion by
the Centre. All of these are ominous portents for Pakistan as a just,
equitable, and democratic federation. We must therefore actively
support all local voices for resistance against the greed and
callousness that threatens to devastate life and livelihoods of vast
numbers of poor across our country.