The Beginning of the End of the Kashmir Problem

The Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee’s latest peace initiative has been met with a lot of scepticism both at home and abroad. Analysts from the venerable The Economist have pronounced a déjà vu verdict on the it; the sub-continental garden-variety pundits, too, have chimed in with their been-there-done-that chorus.

To be fair, given the previous history of negotiations between the two countries, there are very good reasons for being pessimistic about the chances of success of yet another dialogue. The prevailing atmosphere between the two countries is still one of mutual distrust and suspicion. The Vajpayee initiative is widely perceived, at least in Pakistan, as not entirely sincere and undertaken under the U.S pressure. The violence in Kashmir continues unabated and has indeed picked up since the Vajpayee speech in Srinagar. The man who ordered the shooting in Kargil is still calling the shots in Pakistan.

More importantly, there is no softening in the position of the two countries; what one regards as its minimalist position is regarded as the maximalist by the other party. Indians believe that they are entitled to the entire Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts now controlled by Pakistan and any agreement to accept the status quo should be considered as a major compromise; to Pakistan this is merely the starting point at the negotiating table. Its maximalist position is the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to determine whether the state will go to India or Pakistan and it believes that the consideration of any third option is a substantial climb-down on its part.

Despite these limitations, there is reason to believe that the ground realities have changed significantly for all the major players involved in this never-ending deadly game between the two nuclear armed neighbours. There is a unique convergence of forces that could conceivably lead to a more positive result this time than in the previous ill-fated rendezvous between the leaders of the two countries. This article discusses these factors for each of the major players involved in this imbroglio, Kashmiris (a shorthand for the people of Jammu and Kashmir), India, Pakistan, the U.S and China.

KASHMIRIS:
The Kashmiris have been suffering politically for more than half a century and, for the last fourteen years, even their normal lives have been disrupted. Their misfortunes started when an unruly horde of tribal lashkars backed by a number of un-uniformed soldiers disturbed the peace in the valley and tried to force the merger of the state with Pakistan. Since then, they have been used as toys by Indians, Pakistanis as well as their own leaders. The Indians went back on the commitment made to them in the Instrument of Accession; their own leaders indulged in corruption and rigged elections to deprive them of their basic democratic rights; and Pakistanis made sure that the fires of discontent in the valley were supplied with all the fuel they needed. The last fourteen years of insurgency has wreaked havoc in their lives, caught as they are in the crossfire between the jihadis -both local and from across the border- and the various military and paramilitary forces which often presume everyone to be guilty until proven innocent. They are exhausted and tired of losing their sons to either the militants or the army. The assembly elections last year provided them, for the first time in history, an opportunity to elect a government of their choice and they grabbed this opportunity to elect a government which seems to be sensitive to their pain and hurt. Kashmiri militants have also realised that there is very little international support for their violent struggle and they are willing to settle for something less than what they have been fighting for. The only Kashmiris who will lose in a peaceful settlement are the leaders of parties without any grassroots support who have profited handsomely from this insurgency both in terms of wealth and fame.

INDIA:
India is without doubt the party that has paid the biggest price in fighting the insurgency in Kashmir. The cost of holding on to Kashmir in terms of lives lost, maintaining a huge military and paramilitary presence and subsidies of one kind or another are monumental in themselves. The reduction of tension in Kashmir and peace between the two neighbours should lead to a significant diversion of national resources from defense to more productive economic and social causes. A peace on the subcontinent will also make India a more attractive place for doing business, make it a natural hub of the multinationals for their South Asian operations and could propel its growth rate to those elusive double digits. To these must be added the costs in terms of a sullied international reputation of poor human rights record, the rise of communal forces in India and its effect on the national polity and, more importantly, the acceptance by the Indian civil society of human rights abuses as a necessary price to pay for the perceived higher national cause.

On the positive side, India has, in Vajpayee, a leader who commands wide respect and is committed to bringing about peace between India and Pakistan. The urges of a poet, a politician and personal ambition are driving Vajpayee to stake his power and prestige in bringing about a rapprochement between the two hostile neighbours. The poet wants to spread the message of peace and love; the politician hopes to win an election next year on a platform of peace and prosperity; and the personal ambition is hoping for a Nobel peace prize at the end of the day if he can accomplish the impossible.

The political configuration in India is also favourable to a settlement of the Kashmir issue. The party which was likely to prove the greatest obstacle in the way of a compromise is now part of the ruling coalition. The opposition is divided and less hawkish than the ruling coalition. Vajpayee is strong and skilled enough to overrule the more militant part of the Sangh-parivaar.

PAKISTAN:
On the face of it, Pakistan has least to gain from the return of normalcy to Kashmir. The ruling junta there believes that it has successfully waged a low cost war against India and has managed to tie down its hundreds of thousands of soldiers in an inhospitable territory. There is a willing army of potential martyrs willing to lay down their lives for their religious brethren and are prepared to go to Kashmir and beyond for this purpose. A release of the Indian forces from Kashmiri operations will tilt the balance of conventional armies even more in its enemy’s favour. This low cost option also seems to enjoy a broad support among the various sections of the Pakistani society.

However, a realisation is gaining ground among the more aware sections of Pakistanis that while India is being made to pay a very heavy price through the proxy war, it has not weakened its resolve to hold on to Kashmir; nor has this cost made a big dent on that country’s economy, which has shown great resilience and continues to record growth rates which are among the best in the world economies. But the support has cost Pakistan dearly. According to the world bank estimates, Pakistan’s per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) income in 1990, i.e., before the start of Pakistan’s support of the insurgents in Kashmir, was $1862 while that of India was $1072, in other words 74% higher; the same figures for 2001 were $1920 and $2450, i.e., 28% lower. The difference in the growth rates in the two countries may not be wholly attributable to the Pakistani support for cross-border jihadis but it would be a brave soul who would deny any direct or indirect causality between the two.

Some Pakistanis have also started to make a connection between the support of cross-border jihadis and the increased violent tendencies in their own country. While the rulers of Pakistan make a distinction between the “freedom fighters” going to Kashmir and those lending support to sectarian violence within the country, the jihadis themselves often do not make any such distinction. Their dedication to the cause is unswerving, whether that cause is on one side of the border or another.

Perhaps the biggest cost to Pakistanis is the image that their country has earned in the international circles. The name of Pakistan has become synonymous with Islamic madrassas, jihad, Al Qaeda and terrorism. The rulers of Pakistan had thought that by assisting the U.S in its hunt for Al Qaeda, they could get away by supporting the insurgency in Kashmir. They have been partially successful in this policy but this success has done nothing to improve Pakistan’s image as a supporter of international terrorism, which is directly tied to its support of the armed militancy in Kashmir.

While India’s compulsions for seeking peace are mostly domestic, the opposite is true for Pakistan. It has been rewarded handsomely for its support of the U.S operations against Al Qaeda operatives, but there are increasing voices in that country doubting Pakistan’s sincerity, or at least of its intelligence agencies. Pakistan’s economy has finally started to show the positive results of some hard but necessary measures taken by the military regime 3 years ago, but the economy is still hostage to the loans and aid packages it receives from the United States and international agencies controlled by it. The gains made by the Pakistani economy will dissipate and the nascent recovery will quickly end if the foreign funds stop pouring in. Until now, Pakistan was able to sustain these inflows by merely abandoning its support of the Taleban and shifting that support to their enemies. This is becoming increasingly insufficient. Nor is the United States the only country which is pressuring Pakistan to end its support of cross-border terrorism. Its all-weather friend, China, too, is now asking Pakistan to do the same, as are Iran and other Muslim countries.

The partial restoration of the political process in Pakistan also makes the present conditions ideal for a change in that country’s posture towards India. There now seems to be a broad consensus in favour of a dialogue with India. The two forces implacably opposed to such a rapprochement, the army and the religious parties, are now part of the ruling establishment. The army is vulnerable to the pressure from the United States and is headed by a realist who believes in a Pakistan-first policy. As this writer had indicated earlier on Chowk, Musharraf will do an about-turn on Kashmir similar to the one in Afghanistan, if and when it becomes necessary in the interest of Pakistan. The army leadership could also argue that the purpose of supporting the militants was to bring India to the negotiating table and, since that purpose has been achieved, there is no point in continuing that support. The leaders of the religious parties, contrary to the opinion in India and elsewhere, are not insane men but politicians who are capable of being flexible and making compromises; the leader of the MMA has already lent his support for holding talks with India.

The political changes in Pakistan have also improved the optics for positive talks. The summit talks, if and when they happen, will involve Prime Minister Jamali who, unlike Musharraf, does not carry the baggage of Kargil and Agra with him. Parenthetically, this will enhance the domestic stature of Jamali and will be a positive factor for the democratic institutions in Pakistan.

UNITED STATES:
South Asia was at the periphery of the United States strategic thinking until 1998. India, especially, was considered merely a self-righteous irritant during the cold war who missed no opportunity to lecture the United States and the West for its neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. This changed radically in May 1998 when India exploded a nuclear bomb in Pokhran, followed by some very irresponsible war-like statements by some leaders in very responsible positions. The Indian nuclear tests forced Pakistan to come out of its nuclear closet in a tit-for-tat explosion. The Kargil episode riveted American attention to the Kashmir dispute as never before as its leaders openly called it the most dangerous place on earth with the potential of a nuclear war.

Other factors also made the United States pay more attention to the subcontinent. India, under a hindutva party, has finally shed its Hindu rate of growth and has emerged as a powerhouse in information technology and has increased its importance to many U.S businesses. The U.S also views India as a willing partner to contain China, its potential long-run adversary and to control the strategic sea-lanes of the Indian ocean. Pakistan, on the other hand, has emerged both as a powerful Muslim ally at a time when the U.S needs to show the support of Muslim countries as well as a source of Islamic terror that it wants to fight. The United States needs Pakistan as an ally and India as a partner; hence the need to avoid a war between its ally and its partner.

The United States is also now in a unique position to play an important role in bringing the two countries together. Pakistan has always accepted, indeed sought, American intervention in its dispute with its larger neighbour. India had stoutly resisted any outside mediation and insisted that all disputes between the two countries be resolved bilaterally. This is still India’s formal position. In effect, however, India’s ‘No’ seems less and less convincing and almost sounds like ‘Yes’ now. The change in India’s position can be traced to the Kargil dispute when it accepted American help to oust Pakistan from the areas it had occupied on the Indian side of the Line of Control. This change in attitude is directly related to the fact that India no longer believes that an outside intervention will be against its interests. A lot of polluted water has flown down Yamuna and Potomac rivers since the cold war; American think tanks and policy makers now appear to be favouring a settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is not from the minimum acceptable to India. In addition to business interests, the American political scene has also changed with the formation of a powerful pro-India lobby supported by the well-heeled members of the Indian Diaspora. This Diaspora also holds a good deal of influence on the government policy makers in India. The publication of the U.S maps showing the Indian held Kashmir as a part of India may be an attempt to further nudge Indians into thinking that the U.S. could be regarded as an honest broker in any negotiations between India and Pakistan.

The integration of the vital sectors of the Indian economy with that of the United States also means that the United States now possesses significant leverage over India, a leverage that it always had in dealing with Pakistan. The United States demonstrated that leverage when it issued a travel advisory against India following the mobilization of the Indian forces against Pakistan. Powerful voices in the Indian industry were forced to lobby the Indian government to tone down its rhetoric so that the adverse travel advisory could be lifted.

The United States, finally, is extremely concerned about the weapons of mass destruction in both Indian and Pakistani hands. It is particularly worried about Pakistan in this respect because of the potential of these weapons falling into the hands of its enemies but also because of the repeated threats by the Pakistani leaders to use these weapons against India. Indians do not pose similar threat but the U.S would like to roll-back the Indian program as well to ensure its even-handedness towards the two countries. This is where the interests of the ruling elites of the two countries coincide. Neither of them want to let go of their “precious” assets and it would be in their interest to resolve their disputes bilaterally rather than someone else dictate a solution which is less than the optimum acceptable to the two sides.


CHINA:
China’s role as an all-weather friend has played an important role in shaping Pakistan’s defence policy and military posture towards India. The Sino-Pakistan relationship is based on the age-old principle of my-enemy’s-enemy-is-my-friend. Pakistan has now good reasons to be concerned about the long-term reliability of this relationship. The Chinese leadership is now singularly focussed on economic growth and is prepared to put other interests on the backburner. For this reason, India and China are moving closer to each other because of their growing trade relationship ($4 billion annually) and a shared distrust for a unipolar world. The change in the tenor of their relationship is evidenced by the visit of the most hawkish and pro-Tibetan Indian minister, George Fernandez, to China last month and of Vajpayee’s forthcoming visit to that country next month. China is also concerned about the Islamic separatism in its own Xinjiang province and is not oblivious to the effect a victory of Muslim separatists in neighbouring Kashmir will have on its own separatists. Chinese continue to wield substantial influence in Pakistan, especially at the GHQ in Rawalpindi, and they can be expected to play a moderating role in achieving a peace on the subcontinent.

THE ROADMAP TO PEACE:
This article has not presented any potential solution to the Kashmir imbroglio. Although the problem is long-standing and intractable, there has been no shortage of proposed solutions. For the purpose of this article, it is important to focus on the roadmap rather than a final resolution. Here, then, is a roadmap that can lead to peace in Kashmir as well as the subcontinent:

-End to all hostile statements by Indian and Pakistani spokespersons and all attempts to score points against each other;
-Emphasise the positive in each other’s actions and statements;
-Use of regular and direct communications between the representatives of the two sides at various levels of interaction;
-Normalize, and then intensify, travel and trade contacts between the two countries, starting with the immediate restoration of the situation that existed prior to the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament;
-A sincere commitment by Pakistan to dismantle the jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan aimed against India;
-A recognition by India that Pakistan cannot control all cross-border jihadis and Indians will not automatically blame Pakistani authorities for any terrorist attacks that take place in India (even when Pakistani nationals are involved);
-Simultaneously discuss Kashmir and other problems, realising that a successful resolution of the peripheral irritants will create a positive atmosphere for the resolution of the knottier issues;
-Discard the tired old slogans of ‘atoot-ang’ and ‘inalienable rights’ and work with a practical problem-solving approach;
-Involve the representatives of Kashmiris in the bilateral negotiations at an apropriate stage, at least as part of the negotiating teams of the two countries, if not as a third entity.
-Keep in mind the emotional content of the dispute. Do not underestimate either the love or the hatred that the peoples of the two countries are capable of having towards each other.
-Work with a definite time-line.

I believe that if such a roadmap is followed and if the leaders of India and Pakistan are sincere in ending their age-old enemity, they will earn the undying gratitude of 1.2 billion people and, more importantly, free the future generations of Indians and Pakistanis from the bonds of hatred.