Indian Troop Reduction in Kashmir: Merely Symbolic?

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Nov. 11 called for a reduction in Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir this winter as the first troop reduction since the 1999 Kargil attack. He cited a general increase in economic activity and security as the reasons for his decision, although no figures were given regarding the number of troops to be reduced. There are approximately 200,000 Indian troops currently operating in the region, much to Pakistan’s and the Kashmiri separatists’ disapproval. Following Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf’s repeated attempts to move forward in resolving the Kashmir dispute, Singh realized that the ball was back in India’s court. He used the opportunity to delay negotiations and enhance India’s image in the international spotlight, without giving up major concessions in the peace process.

In October 2004, when Musharraf publicly revealed a list of radical ideas to resolve Kashmir, India turned a cold shoulder and stated that Kashmir is not a "subject on which discussions can be held through the media." Now it is India’s turn to make a bold public move to show that New Delhi is serious about reaching a solution in Kashmir. The idea is to create a stable atmosphere across the Line of Control by reducing troops prior to Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s scheduled visit to India on Nov. 22. In the same Nov 11 statement, Singh also acknowledged that an "infrastructure of terrorism" still exists in the Pakistani-controlled region of Kashmir and that insurgents continue to infiltrate the border. In addition, Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil reported Nov. 12 that increasing numbers of militants have been crossing the Himalayas from Azad Kashmir into Indian-controlled Kashmir. The reason India is able to reduce forces in the face of an increasing insurgent threat is simply because India has nothing to lose in scaling down its forces.

Before the 1999 Kargil battle, India regularly rotated troops out of Kashmir because of the harsh weather conditions in the high Himalayan peaks during the winter. When Pakistan mounted an offensive against Indian troops at Kargil, just as the soldiers were returning to their positions, India responded to the brief but bloody battle by stepping up its defenses and maintaining a constant presence in the region. India no longer faces another Kargil-scale attack from Pakistan and can now afford to reduce its troop presence to avoid the physical costs of the freezing mountain winters.

While Pakistan has urged India to keep the momentum of the peace talks going, New Delhi has been reluctant to negotiate with Islamabad over Kashmir and will employ every method to buy time and slow down the negotiations while maintaining a favorable image in the eyes of Washington and the rest of the world. A good public image is especially important to India right now as it allegedly struggles to conceal suspected human rights violations committed by Indian soldiers in Kashmir. Separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani was arrested by Indian police Nov. 12 -- prior to carrying out his plans for a protest against Indian forces in Kashmir -- for the alleged rape of a woman and her 10-year-old daughter. Geelani, along with other separatist leaders in Kashmir, regards the Indian decision to reduce troops as a joke that "will not make any difference." As witnesses to the daily situation in Kashmir, separatist leaders refuse to be blinded by the rhetoric coming from Islamabad and New Delhi and will continue to wait for a tangible concession.

Musharraf is now in a quandary: The olive branches have yet to produce any fruit, and soon he may be forced to enhance his image in the eyes of his opposing constituencies in the military, as well as militants in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Depending on how Islamabad reacts, Singh’s move to reduce the number of troops in Kashmir may be New Delhi’s way of extracting more concessions from Pakistan before official negotiations begin in the coming months. While Singh’s statement to reduce forces in Kashmir may play dramatically in the international press, there is little change occurring in the disputed territory. New Delhi will continue to rally with Islamabad in its confidence-building exercises to display an image of sincere cooperation and willingness to engage in peace talks.

Its concessions, however, will only be symbolic, and they will be offered gradually without India incurring any strategic loss.