Last Rites in Kashmir or a New Journey?

This year has so far witnessed some very welcome changes in Indio-Pak relations. There is no doubt that some gentle pokes, persistent and optimistic propositions by the US helped both countries in steadily moving towards a peaceful and meaningful discourse. Several theories are out there to rationalize the US support to the process. Whatever the reasons, the process itself is on the fast track and it seems that the hardliners opposing better relations between the two countries are hard put to float their usual skepticism. The interesting part of the whole saga is that the Pakistan army and its COAS are the strongest supporters of better relations with India and their concessions over Kashmir negotiations though not exactly galvanic revelations still represent a significant departure from the long stated Pakistani position. The army’s biggest spokesperson Gen. Musharaf is not willing to put a timeframe on the process although his civilian spokesperson and a former Kashmir hawk is predicting a reasonable solution by the year 2008.

Going by the nature of the conflict over Kashmir and the long-drawn-out positions that both India and Pakistan have taken over in the past, a solution within the next three years seems like an unreasonable expectation. If the Pakistan army and the Kashmir hawk raise the expectations, then it is fair to assume that they have finally stumbled on some solution acceptable to all parties to the conflict. Over the years, both countries have dug so many deep pits over the Kashmir issue that any overly cheerful statement raises the question: What are the reasons of this optimism?

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy had remained in the Pak Army domain and as the army exerted its control over the civilian structure in Pakistan, the Kashmir issue became its raison d’etre. The political commentators, politicians and the diplomats in and outside the subcontinent have rightfully assumed that the Pakistan army was a major obstacle in resolving the Kashmir issue and improving Indo-Pak relations.

Borrowing the US Vice President Dick Cheney’s mantra, 9/11 changed everything. During the last four years, many myths, truths and assumptions in the international relations have been tripped up. Once the US broke the international Jihadi support network and forced the Pak Army to adjust its policies towards Islamic fundamentalism, the Pak support for Jihadi in Kashmir has also diminished. However, the history of the Kashmir problem goes far back and the Jihadi intrusion was just one aspect of the total Kashmir debate between Pakistan and India.

It would be pointless to discuss the oft-repeated history of conflict now. However, both Pakistan and India never followed a consistence policy in Kashmir. Despite a long fifty years of control, India wasted several opportunities to de-fang this issue and failed to build a majority support in Kashmir thus allowing the proxies to disrupt the status quo at will.

The Indian reluctance to invest-both politically and fiscally- in Kashmir also meant that it could not neutralize the indigenous Kashmiri opposition to its rule. Over the years, Kashmir had remained a thorn on the Indian side; still India mostly managed to keep the issue confined without adversely disturbing economic or social progress in the other parts of the country until 2002, when it multiplied its costs by adding regular armed forces to the borders.

Kashmir affects Pakistan deeply. Removing the Kashmir issue from Pakistan’s defense, would make it hard for the army to justify ever-increasing defense budgets that often exceed acceptable levels of GDP share. In the last 50 odd years, the army had used Kashmir and the defense of Pakistan persistently to undermine any effort to sustain a democratic or civilian set up in Pakistan.

The sudden urge of the army to resolve the Kashmir issue and the change of heart surely appears to have thrown lots of political observations and calculations off the charts.

The Pak-India off again on again dialog started a couple of years ago. Despite hefty nudges and strong support from the US, a strong mistrust of each other held up the process. It was hard for Indian diplomats and politicians to negotiate with the Pak army as the army did not have an exactly impeccable record of good faith negotiation with India. On the Pakistani side, trusting the BJP and its warped sense of history was a hard pill to swallow. Like the Pak army, whose meddling in the civilian affairs in Pakistan depended on anti Indian-ism and the fear of Hindu dominance, the BJP, its allies the RSS, and the whole Sangh Pariwar counted on the anti Pakistan, and Anti Muslims stand to gain political foothold in India. Both the BJP and the army talked about the Confidence Building Measures but the parties to the negotiations were so far apart in trusting each other that the CBMs were long on rhetoric and short on actions.

The new Congress government inherited the BJP skepticism and initially it was slow to move the negotiations with Pakistan forward. The Indian National Congress has a record of good faith negotiations with Pakistan. Pakistani diplomats and public officials feel more comfortable working with the Congress than any other political group in India. However, confidence is a two way street and the Pakistan army still had not proven that any Indian government could easily be convinced of its sincerity in a meaningful dialog or move forward in negotiations hoping that the army would follow through on agreed resolutions. The Pak army, sensing the reluctance and skepticism on the Indian side, provided conclusive goodwill measures to affirm its seriousness and determination to take some risks in moving the dialog with India forward. Gen. Musharaf first suggested working through different sectors of Kashmir. This was a significant concession as it implied that Pakistan is willing to work on some piecemeal solution to the problem. This solution though unique had so many pitfalls that Pakistan could not get its allies in Kashmir to go with that. Then Gen. Musharaf moved a step further by suggesting his most astonishing proposal of not bringing the referendum demand up in negotiations with India. The dropping of the referendum demand, even temporarily, meant that Pakistan would work on a bilateral solution of the issue. Gen. Musharaf’s initiative set the wheels in motion. On the eve of his visit to India during a cricket match, India made an important concessionary proposal with a seven-point action plan to ease the situation for Kashmiris and to provide a symbolic share to Pakistan in a few matters important to the economic well being of Kashmiris. The Indian government showed its dedication to the process when it brought out all its big guns to inaugurate the Bus service between the two Kashmir. The next step for India is to remove the pockets of militants that still operate in Kashmir as quickly as possible and begin to withdraw its army from the populated areas of Kashmir allowing the people to regain control of normal civic functions.

The US pressure was the initial motivating factor for India and Pakistan to talk, but now enough enthusiasm is building up in the general population and especially in the valley that the momentum may help the negotiations but there are still thorny issues out there that have to go through some tough negotiations. Concessions, goodwill gesture, and public enthusiasm would not bring the results until there is a clearly defined goal to resolve any issue.

The question remains as to why the army would be willing to accept any solution that would eventually undermine its own position within Pakistani politics. The reality is that in the last twenty odd years, the army has sufficiently discredited and weakened political parties that they cannot currently capitalize on Kashmir to challenge the army for political gains. The army learned a lesson when Zulfiqar Bhutto used the Kashmir issue to mount a campaign against Gen. Ayub Khan and garnered enough public support to destroy all army supported political parties in Pakistan. Now, political parties are not in a position to repeat that feat. The army itself has penetrated Pakistan’s economic and social structure so deeply that political parties can only work with the army to join the power structure.

This still is just one aspect of the story. The US pressure, after the Afghan war, has forced the army to realign its internal political support system. For a long time, the army relied on religious-political parties to play a supporting role. These parties assisted the army in all endeavors. Now the changed international situation demands that these obscurantists are consigned to the dustbin of history. The pressure to liberalize and modernize Pakistan and discourage the fundamentalists and religion inspired conservatives is forcing the army to look for allies in the mainstream and middle of the road parties that can help move the country towards the center. The US has made it clear that Pakistan and the army’s economic future is interwoven with an open, liberal, and a progressively democratic society. While the US wants to help the army with military equipments and supplies, it also wants Pakistan to play a role in overall geo-political maneuvers in the area.

The US needs to maintain a control on human and material resource to continue to dominate the world economic system. While India can provide the largest pool of human resources, Pakistan’s proximity to the material resources ensures predictability in resource management. For the US policy makers, both Pakistan and India also need to develop a working relationship that precludes any chance of a future deadly and possibly nuclear confrontation between the two countries.

India is more or less a centerpiece in the unspoken “restrain China” US policy. To divert investments to India or to some extent Pakistan, both countries need to ensure secure environments for investors. Indian need of foreign investment is far greater. The current flow of Investment will only pick up momentum, if the infrastructure in India is ready to facilitate large-scale manufacturing. There is an immediate need to upgrade decaying railroad, seaports and airports. The need for investments in these areas alone exceeds $150 billion. India also has some legitimate foreign policy goals that are important for its economic growth. The conflict with Pakistan creates an impression that the Indian capitalists and political leaders lack the vision to move beyond their local conflicts.

History serves as a witness that conflict with India works to the benefit of the supporters of dogma in Pakistan. The internal Indian politics is not immune to this rule either. There is really only one problem between India and Pakistan. Once that concern is laid to a rest, there really is nothing that can hold both countries back from making great strides in economic cooperation. With the current international environment favoring the region, all initiative would be of great importance. Nevertheless, the million-dollar question defining a solution to the Kashmir problem remains.

The Kashmir issue really has no solution that can resolve this problem to everyone’s delight. There are so many emotions, national egos, and political survival issues attached with it that neither the Congress nor the army would ink something that could bring an instant political death to one or the both parties.

No matter how people sift through many solutions out there, the probability of a resolution to everyone’s satisfaction is zero. The best course in such a situation is to find a way to dissolve the problem through some mutually agreed steps that would not provide the knives wielding opponents any chance to strike.

Both Indian and Pakistani state machineries excel in dragging their feet, shoving issues under the rug and bringing the decision making process to a crawl in their respective internal systems. They may need to extrapolate those skills and experience to the Kashmir conflict thus eliminating the need of a “quit-claim” clause in any agreement to anyone’s detriment.

The feel good statements, the enthusiasm on both sides and the talk of good news within three years leads to one and only conclusion that the current leaders in both countries may be well advised to dissolve this issue for the benefit of both countries. It is doable and optimistically, we should see the bits and pieces of this process wedged between growing bilateral trade and cultural relations. At the end of three years, we may see a Kashmir, which is open to all with a state government that listens to both countries without undermining anyone’s sovereignty.

The US and China interests would begin to collide in the near future or right after the current terrorism and fundamentalism menace is done with. The world may see a revival of the cold war type confrontations and encirclements between the US and China. Both Pakistan and India will need to work together to be in a position to maneuver the expected escalation in any Sino-US conflict to this region’s favor and achieve the economic stability and prosperity that both countries deserve.