The recent political and media drama over the Kalabagh Dam issue has once again brought fresh questions about Pakistan’s territorial integrity to public debate. The smaller provinces, notably, Sindh and Baluchistan, are crying foul over their unhappy relationship with the larger province, Punjab, and blaming the Pubjab-dominated Federal Government of taking sides on the issue. The on-going military "non-operation" in Baluchistan is yet another thorne in the country’s side that has the potential of exploding and creating further strain within the horizontal (inter-provincial) and vertical (provinces-federal) relationships in the country.

Repeatedly, provincial politicians--even those who are part of the current establishment--are issuing dire warnings of harm to the territorial integrity of Pakistan if the KBD were to be bulldozed through against the wishes of Sindh, Balunchistan, and NWFP--in essence, hinting at irrepreparable damage to the current geographical reality of Pakistan and giving wind to secesionist sentiments in the provinces. While some of this might just be hype created by opportunist nationalist politicians, there is certainly something amiss in the "unhappy" union called Pakistan.

The ongoing political drama leaves a terrible taste in ones mouth and makes one wonder, why is it that we, in Pakistan, are engaged in a zero-sum game where the federation can only gain at the expense of the provinces and the provinces at the expense of the federation? Why can’t a citizen of Pakistan wear his/her dual indentities, Pakistani and a Sindhi-Baluchi-Pathan-Punjabi, with pride on his/her chest at the same time?

Why learn from American Democracy?
As we begin to ponder over this question and the resultant and emerging threats to Pakistan’s territorial integrity (read as "dismemberment" or "secesion", yet again!), it would not be inappropriate to take a leaf from the history of republicanism in the united states of America. The American democratic experiment, despite all its short-comings--including a civil war after 70-odd years of declaring nationhood--represents one of the most happy if not the perfect union of several states in modern history, if not all human history. It is by far the one and only union of a continental scale that has strengthened with the passage of time while all others ( e.g. the Roman or Islamic empires) have dwindled and evaporated in thin air.

In 1776, when America’s founding fathers declared independence from the English Crown, the American colonies consisted of 13 independent colonies--essentially "nations" with significantly different histories, cultures, and political-economic systems etc. The Articles of Confederation respected these differences and only loosely bound the 13 former colonies into a confederation for the purpose of the revolutionary war. The only thing common between the former colonies was their desire to throw off the British Raj. For everything else, they were independent countries of sorts. The Continental Congress was responsible for a joint foreign and war policy but had very limited say in actual governance or even the conduct of war. For example, while it made and approved plans for the war, it could only request the individual states to raise taxes and contribute their share to the army but had no implementation authority of its own. This, as the Americans learnt over the course of the revolutionary war, was not enough.

One Country or Thirteen -- Who Decides?
After the end of the revolutionary war which was won despite great odds and inspite of the considerable feet-dragging by several individual colonies, the American leaders felt the need to create a "more perfect union" that would closely bind the destinies of the 13 colonies together. In the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, these leaders decided to give their people a new constitution, in effect turning the united states of America into the United States of America. But how could they force a union of the peoples of 13 colonies? Even if they managed to do so, it would have been a nightmare to sustain it in the future.

Respecting every colony’s right to make its own decision, the task before the members of the constitutional convention was to get the proposed revisions ratified at least 9 of the 13 colonies voting for the proposed system of government, there would be no constitution and hence no United States. These ratification debates are curiously reflective of the sort of challenges that the Pakistani union faces today. The question before each of the 13 former colonies was whether or not to join the proposed union. With the republican and state sentiment high among the populations and their politicians, it wasn’t an easy decision.

The state nationalists were deeply skeptical of joining a union that would become as unresponsive and tyrannical to local people and their needs as the British Crown had been. What would happen if the the Federal Government became yet another monarchy? What about the rights of smaller states in a union dominated by interests of the larger states? Would a federal government, acting on behalf of all colonies, be able to make wise and judicious decisions vis-a-vis regulation of continental natural resources ( e.g. exploration and settlement of western lands). These are similar to the questions being raised by the smaller Pakistani Provinces today. Not only can Pakistani people and politicians learn from these debates but also the manner in which continental leaders softly treaded the precarious landscape, making compromises and reaching the desired outcome, while at the same time respecting the soverign rights of the people of each former colony.

Ratification Debate -- Federal or State Rights?
The debate hovered around many facets of the issue. Those, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton (the Federalists), who had experienced first hand the difficulties of marshalling national resources (e.g . in the case of the revolutionary war) from a group of independent and soverign states that were not duty-bound to follow the federal government, argued in the favor of establishing a strong federal government, a national defense system, and a host of other administrative instruments necessary to govern the vast expanse of the continent and fight another war--should England impose one on them. The contrary position was adopted by Thomas Jefferson and later James Madison (the anti-Federalists) who were staunchly in favor of state supremacy and rights and abhorred the notion of a strong federal government.

The "thirteen country" option, the Federalists argued, could result in the same geopolitical dynamic that marred intra-European relationships. What would stop these thirteen countries to start fighting from each other in the same way that European powers have been fighting with each other for centuries? What binds the people of these thirteen colonies with each other except the bond of a shared destiny against a common enemy and there was no reason to believe that it would remain so long after the end of the revolutionary war. Indeed, there were already signs of strong political disagreements and even some military skrimishes between the individual states and there was little reason to believe that unless these states were bound together in a stronger bond, these small disagreements ( e.g. on westward expansion, debts of the revolutionary war, relations with Indian tribes, foreign policy, and future of slavery etc.) would not result in full blown wars between the states.

Should these colonies be independent countries, sometimes at war with each other, and hence maintaining armies on their borders with each other, what would happen if a European power attacked the continental United States once again? Britain’s retreat could have been temporary and, with enemy soldiers still on the soil, there was a likelihood that there would be some resumption in hostilities--a possibility that ultimately did materialize. Wouldn’t better defending the continental borders against a European invasion make more sense than diluting forces to man inter-state borders? Also, if the thirteen countries were to have their independent foreign policies, what would stop one (or more) of the thirteen to side with one of the European powers and provide it with a foothold on the continent from where to launch an attack on the rest of the colonies?

In the end, the arguments for a strong federal government that would have an over-ride on several matters that were, until that time, considered rights of the soverign states won over those that favored strong state governments and a weak federal government. What was more important, however, was that the decision was reached by the peoples of the thirteen states themselves. It is worth noting here that the founders of the American republic thought of this popular consensus as being so important to the long term viability of the republican experiment that they were willing to make extra-ordinary consessions--the most notorious being on the question of slavery that the North abhorred but tolerated to lure the South into the union. While this was beyond doubt a terrible wrong--one that would throw America into a civil war more than half-a-century after formation--it was important in that without it there would have been no America and no federal government to right the wrong of slavery!

The result, after a year of discussions and deliverations, and despite strong nationalist opposition, was that twelve of the thirteen states ratified the constitution within a year of its signing and hence United States of America was born. Once the constitutition came into effect, however, the states lost their soverignty as well as the right to unilaterally secede from the union. By the constitution of the United States, it became an act of treason for the citizens of a state to aid against or undermine the legal and constitutional authority of the federal government.

What is the Relevance to Pakistan?
How does this relate to Pakistan’s current political quagmire and the strained inter-provinicial and federal-province relations? While Pakistan’s situation is clearly more complex today--after having spent 58 years in an unhappy union that resulted in the 1971 debacle--there are some commonalities. Many of the questions that were being raised of the American states in the 1780s are valid for Pakistani provinces today.

The talk of seccesion and liberation on the part of the smaller provinces is especially dangerous and irresponsible because it fails to address the question of what happens after that-- a question that was amply addressed in a democratic and thoughtful debate by peoples of the thirteen American colonies but is strictly forbidden speech for the fear of inciting revolution in Pakistan.

What would happen if Pakistan’s territorial integrity is indeed compromised? Would Sindh or NWFP or Baluchistan survive on its own? Should Sindh take the unthinkable step in protest of Punjab’s high-handedness over KBD, would it be able to guarantee any water for itself coming out of Punjab? Lets assume, hypothetically, that Punjab is indeed on the wrong of side of the KBD issue, would independent Punjab and Sindh be in any better position to sort out the water distribution among themselves and how? Would Punjab have access to the sea port that is as much a lifeline of its economy as it is Sindh’s? If Pakistan is to disintegrate, what would refrain these provinces to engage in "water wars" with each other? What would stop other neighboring countries, India, Iran, or even Afghanistan, from taking advantage of that situation?

When nationalists leaders raise the issue of Pakistan’s territorial integrity, they talk as if nothing would be lost to them if Pakistan disintegrates into separate countries comprising different "nations". Nothing can be far from the truth. Pakistan, despite its shortcomings and defects, is greater than the sum of its parts. Every province gains from the union considerably while at the same time contributing to it. Baluchistan provides natural resources to other three provinces. Sindh provides a port to the rest of the country. Punjab and NWFP contribute with its agriculture. Dividing Pakistan into separate countries would only eliminate these synergies and jeopradize the survival of each of the four provinces. At the very least, independent provinces would find themselves in considerably more hardships than what they currently face. It would expose them to the kinds of dangers that American republican leaders were aware of and worked so hard to avoid in the 1780s.

What is the Solution?
What then is the solution for Pakistan’s interprovincial rivalries? An extra-constitutional option leading to a territorial split is clearly not an solution. Pakistan’s four provinces and the federation must find answers to its problems within the country’s broader constitutional framework. This would require genuine reconciliation, compromise, and sacrifice between provinces. The bigger province, Punjab, must take the lead in sacrifice like the elder brother does for his/her younger siblings. In turn, the smaller provinces must appreciate the sacrifice of the bigger province and make compromises in national interest. Politics is the art of making compromises. We should not let the best be the enemy of the good. If the country cannot reach a compromise (yet) on KBD, lets move forward with the Basha Dam on which all provinces agree upon and, in due course of time, and with greater trust and understanding between provinces, KBD would become a reality as well.

Similarly, the center must not enroch over the rights of the provinces, as ordained in the constitution or even those promised at the time of independence. Whether it is the deadlock on NFC or the issue of federal and provincial subjects, an unhappy union can be worse than no union at all for it stunts the development of the country as a whole. The center must not see itself in a zero-sum game with the provinces and must develop a more confident, rather than insecure, national identity that is complimentary not a substitute for provincial nationalism. Whether we are all Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans before or after being Pakistanis would become immaterial if we all see Pakistan as being something that is greater than the sum of its parts and hence central to our dreams and aspirations as peoples.

What was true of American states in the 1770s and 80s is true for Pakistani provinces today. We must hang together or else we would hang separately. Only by working together and with a spirit of reconciliation and sacrifice can we build a "more perfect union".