Saudi King Abdullah's reported remarks pertaining to observer status for India at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) appear to have stunned Pakistan's foreign policy establishment. This is not the first time such an option has been put on the table. Indeed, previously too a similar situation had caused Islamabad to threaten to withdraw from the OIC if India were admitted against Pakistan's wishes.

Why is it that Pakistan's foreign policy establishment is outfoxed repeatedly on this issue while the Indians seem to be advancing their agenda forward with great perfection? To begin with, only very infrequently in the past has Pakistan's foreign policy establishment lived up to the challenges posed to them. They have repeatedly fumbled for clear and workable answers to important questions, defendable positions on issues, and realistic strategies to advance Pakistan's interests abroad.

The double irony of the issue is that the makers of our foreign policy cannot even claim to have not seen this coming. In recent years, certain countries with significant Muslim populations have stepped up the pressure on the OIC to admit them as observers — and subsequently as full members — to the organization that boasts a membership of more than 50 countries with majority Muslim populations.

The reason often advanced by countries seeking or having observer status, most notably India and Russia, is that membership in the OIC would enable them to better serve the interests of their large and growing Muslim populations. This logic raises several interesting questions. How can a membership in an organization that has never really achieved anything in the four decades of its existence be of any value to countries like Russia or India?

If the Russian or Indian governments were to do anything positive for Muslim populations in their country or in territories under their control, the first place to start would be to improve the lives and wellbeing of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir and Gujarat rather than attempt to become a member of the OIC. What, if any, are the true motives behind their eagerness to join the OIC?

The more likely seems to be that both Russia (which already has observer status) and India would like to play a more "active" role in the affairs of the OIC. While both these countries have a role behind the scenes in OIC deliberations, primarily through their influence on several Arab countries, formal membership in the organization would make that relationship both legal and permanent. This would further dilute the OIC's already weak position on issues that do not resonate well with Russia and India, namely, Chechnya and Kashmir.

It would probably be difficult for Pakistan or any other member of the OIC to keep the floodgates closed against India for too long. The shifting global geopolitical dynamics since 9/11 and the prevailing mood make it necessary for Islamic countries to show greater transparency in their dealings with the rest of the world. The million dollar question then is whether and how the OIC would be able to safeguard and further the interests of the Muslims around the world. Who would be allowed to come in and who would remain out? What would be the new identity of the OIC?

Once the floodgates are flung wide open would Israel and the United States — as occupiers of large Muslim territories in Palestine and Iraq and hence having legitimate interests to represent the interests of their Muslim minorities, at least in principle — also be allowed to become members of the OIC? The OIC must address these questions in a proactive and definitive manner that is reflective of a confident and effective organization. This is especially true today as the OIC embarks on an effort to reform itself and become more relevant to changing realities in the 21st century.

Consequently, there is a dire need for the Pakistani foreign policy establishment to move away from its fossilized mindset and think out-of-the-box. Only through creative thinking, meticulous execution, and visionary leadership can Pakistan and the OIC transform this potential threat into an opportunity for its members and over one-and-a-half billion Muslims around the world. Wouldn't it have been better if the Pakistani foreign policy establishment, instead of maintaining its usual deafening silence and defensive rhetoric, had responded to the challenge in a more realistic manner?

For example, a message that welcomed the aspirations of India and Russia to do better vis-a-vis the rights of their Muslim populations along with the desire to develop a set of objective criteria to facilitate and ensure that would have gone a long way in making the OIC a more effective platform for Muslims around the world.

Achieving the above objective would have required developing and defending the case for expanding the membership of the OIC (the rationale) beyond the Muslim majority countries that it is currently restricted to, designing an objective mechanism for deciding which countries to include or exclude (the eligibility criteria), and laying out a plan to smoothen the transition to a much larger OIC (the process).

Thankfully, there are examples for such arrangements that may provide some guidance in this endeavour. One of the ways to make the OIC more meaningful to the collective wellbeing of Muslim communities around the world is to use its membership as bait to bring improvements to the lives of minority Muslim populations. For example, the OIC can adopt criteria similar to the very comprehensive accession targets adopted by the European Union. Even before a country's application for admission into the EU is considered, it must fulfil an extensive set of qualitative and quantitative criteria from the economic, social, and political realms.

The OIC too can, in principle, adopt a set of qualifying conditions that every non-Muslim country seeking an observer status must fulfil before its application is entertained by a standing committee on memberships. These conditions might include meeting pre-specified targets on freedom of expression and religion, discrimination and Islamophobia, human rights and the liberty of Muslims, and parity in economic and social conditions of Muslims versus non-Muslim populations.

As the applicant countries begin to fulfil the base-level eligibility criteria, they may be granted an observer status (based on the recommendation of the standing committee and a majority vote of existing members). The observer status would allow these countries to observe the OIC's activities and begin to contribute to certain areas of OIC operations. However, these countries would remain on the watch list for continued progress on the above set of criteria, becoming eligible in five years' time for associate membership which would allow them to contribute more fully to all OIC activities without the right to vote.

In the final stage of the process, associate members, upon fulfilling an even tougher set of criteria and on the unanimous recommendation of existing members, may graduate to full membership with voting rights.

A process like the one suggested above would allow the OIC to objectively evaluate the applications for membership for countries without resorting to any form of favouritism. It would also provide an opportunity to the aspirants to demonstrate their own commitment and sincerity in using the opportunity to participate in the OIC in precisely the manner they claim they would i.e. to advance the interests and improve the lives and wellbeing of their Muslim populations.

Most importantly, however, it would make the OIC a more inclusive and effective group of countries (both Islamic and non-Muslim) and serious in advancing an Islam-friendly foreign policy agenda and providing it with the appropriate leverage and policy influence beyond that of the 50-odd Islamic countries — something that it seriously lacks today. It would also provide the kind of collaborative and consultative platform focused on issues of relevance to Muslims around the world that is necessary to avoid the much-touted clash of civilizations between the Islamic and western worlds.