In a recent interview to an Indian television station General Musharraf stated that Pakistan would ‘give up its claim’ to Kashmir if India would accept ‘self-government’ in Kashmir. The world’s media was understandably excited and policy makers suddenly appeared optimistic about the future of India-Pakistan relations.

What was ignored was the later statement by the Pakistani Foreign office that there “is no change in Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir” and that the “headlines in the media were misleading.”

India-Pakistan relations have a habit of being seesaw like; they move from both sides talking to each other on all issues to refusing to acknowledge each other’s presence. Before the Indian policy makers become too gung-ho about the President’s recent statement, however, it is important to revisit the policy each country has on Kashmir and the future of this conflict.

The official Pakistani view is that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished business of Partition’; it is the missing ‘K’ in the word Pakistan. The basis of Pakistan is the ‘two nation’ theory and the existence of a ‘Muslim majority’ region in India negates this theory. Thus Pakistan insists that in accordance with the United Nations resolutions a plebiscite needs to be held in ‘Indian-controlled’ Kashmir to ascertain the ‘will of the people of Kashmir.’

The official Indian view has been that Jammu and Kashmir ‘lawfully acceded’ to India when the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession to India in 1947. Kashmir provides basis for India’s secular status, a Hindu majority country with a Muslim majority region. In reply to Pakistan’s demands for the plebiscite India maintains that the fact that elections have been held in Kashmir since 1952 is proof that the ‘will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir’ has been ascertained and there is no need for a UN plebiscite.

Then again Pakistan believes that the ‘illegal Indian occupation’ of Kashmir and the violation of human rights by Indian security forces has led to a popular uprising. India claims that Pakistani military and intelligence agencies are providing covert aid to terrorists in Kashmir.

Finally Pakistan claims that the popular uprising in Kashmir has led to a ‘freedom struggle’ which is supported by independent people and groups in Pakistan over which the government has no control. Yet the government does point out that it will always provide ‘moral, diplomatic and other support to the Kashmiri movement.’

The last five years, since the 9/11 tragedies, have seen increasing attempts by India and Pakistan to try to resolve the issue. The reasons are not hard to find. Indian claims to regional power or global power status are useless if it remains embroiled in a conflict that led President Clinton to refer to South Asia as “the most dangerous place on the earth.” India is also facing constant pressure from the United States to resolve its outstanding conflict with Pakistan in order for better bilateral relations with the US.

Pakistan too faces a lot of domestic and international pressure. Domestically the military has been in power for seven years and has not been able to have any political success to boast of or to legitimize its stay in power. General Musharraf does not plan on giving up power anytime soon but needs to do something dramatic to justify his stay in power and to boost the chances of him or his ‘King’s party’ staying in power.

The military has always justified its periods of rule in Pakistan either on the grounds of cleaning up politics or so as to defend the state against an external enemy (read Hindu India) or both. The Kargil conflict did not bring either military success or force India to talk on Kashmir – both reasons visualized by the initiator of the operation, Gen Musharraf. Instead it culminated in international pressure on Pakistan to back off and made the international community more amenable to India’s position on Kashmir.

The last seven years of military rule have brought some economic growth to Pakistan, the actual extent of which is disputed by various economists. Yet what is agreed on is that a large part of this growth is because of the heavy aid and debt cancellation, which the US has done to help its ally in the ‘war on terror.’ This aid will, however, soon come to an end at the end of the five-year period, 2007-2008.

Claims of having a cleaner administration or government than previous civilian administrations have been refuted by the reports of Transparency International. And claims for having a government, which believed in ‘enlightened moderation’, came under heavy fire when the government almost gave into the conservative Islamist views on the Women’s Protection Bill.

General Musharraf is also under tremendous pressure to allow ‘free and fair’ elections in 2007, which means allowing former Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif to participate. The worry that the united opposition might win a large number of seats and that his bete noire Ms Bhutto might become the next Prime Minister means that he needs a miracle to stay in power legitimately.

There is a need to buttress his ‘claim to fame’ as the person who not only ‘saved’ Pakistan in 1999 by also becoming the person who ‘resolved’ the Kashmir dispute. His infrequent statements about the need to ‘think outside the box’ or ‘think of alternatives’ manifest this desire.

Yet is that possible in the present circumstances? For the Pakistani military and bureaucratic establishment Kashmir is the backbone of its India-centric policy. The claim to Kashmir lies at the roots of the ideological state that Pakistan has become over the last few decades.

General Musharraf too is a part of this establishment; he was the initiator of the Kargil conflict and believed that was the only way to win back Kashmir from India. Despite being an ally in the ‘war on terror’ Pakistan, under General Musharraf, has not given up support to the Kashmiri jihadi organizations or the Taliban.

It is possible for the Kashmir dispute to be resolved but for that there is a need for both sides to be more flexible than they are presently. Pakistan needs a civilian leadership, which realizes that covert war against both its neighbors is not a long-term policy and therefore seeks close bilateral relations. For this to happen, however, the military has to back off from involving itself in politics and return to its primary role as the defender of the country from external threats, not internal ones.

India too has to understand that it cannot pretend that there is no dispute in Kashmir and has to take the plunge by offering both dialogue on the outstanding issues (like border disputes and Kashmir) and build close cultural, economic and social ties with Pakistan.

It is very difficult for Indians and Pakistanis to give up their ideal view of what Kashmir should be like but often we need to temper idealism with a touch of reality. The number of people who have died and who are still dying in order for us to hold on to our illusory ideals are not worth the ideals.