The sense of belonging is a heady feeling. It anchors man in a social setting, feeding his vital need of self-recognition, which is a composite of both personal and social identities. There are varied markers of identification, of which, religion has been, ab aeterno, a central one.

Unlike other indices, religion’s potency is not situational, but pervasive; it shapes both the personal and the social identities of an individual. As a belief and value system, religion has tremendous hold over a person’s life. Its mores condition the individual’s conduct in life and his manner of interaction with others. This identification with a community of believers helps a person understand himself and his place in the social environment. This is bedrock of the concept of positive communalism.

Yet, there is in this categorization, the possibility of discrimination. One is favourably disposed to the “in-group” (the group to which he belongs) as compared to the “out-group” (the group of which he is not a member). In situations of heightened emotions engendered by an apparent insult or injustice, this “us” and “they” perceptions become adversarial. This is true of religion that has provided countless instances of acting as the great divider.

Faith, regardless of the adjectives used to qualify it, implies an implicit acceptance of something or someone. When religion is used interchangeably with faith, does it imply an uncritical reception and pursuance of its instructions? If so, therein lies the potential for inter-communal discord, where each community holds itself to be the possessor of truth and trapped in the fog of dogmatism, fails to see or even consider different view-points and respect the right of others to hold them. When taken to the extreme, this attitude may manifest in violent suppression of other creeds that are denounced as heterodoxy. Such religious bigotry has absolutely no place in a mixed society, where tolerance is the decree of existence.

Thus, we come to the concept of secularism in the context of a pluralist state.

The orison of religious communities to bear indicators of their cultural identity and the festering discontent when denied the opportunity to do so by states, which claim to be liberal and tolerant, has highlighted the need to re-evaluate the concept of secularism as applied to state governments. Before going into an empirical reading of the current situation, a conceptual and normative analysis of the constitutive link of secularism with a democratic state is needed.

There is a wide misconception that secularism as enunciated by Western liberal tradition is uncontested, and that an uncomplicated separation of state and religion is an incontrovertible fact in these countries. (Bhargava). As Scanlon puts it, each country in the West has worked out its own peculiar version, where the separation thesis means different things for the USA, France, Britain, etc. There is no trans-cultural ideal and this leads to the question: What values actually configure in the ideal of secularism?

To decouple religion from the policy and practice of the state is a very narrow way of viewing this concept. Secularism is a purposive concept and not just a dialectic outcome of Protestantism and Science. (Madan and Nandy). In its negative sense, it is a means by which the dominance of any one denomination is sought to be countered and religion and state are to be arrogated their own separate spheres of power and operation. In the positive sense, it seeks to promote a free and equal (at least, in the civil and political sense) society.

In India, secularism implies a sense of tolerance and accommodation embodied in the concept of "sarva dharma sambhava". Here the state metes out equal treatment to all religions and embraces and supports all religions. The French laicite or the Turkish laiklik on the other hand, follows the separation theory to the letter and does not favour or support all or any one religion.

In the USA, as Sandel points out, the US Supreme Court, in 1947, upheld secular neutralism. The justification was that it would protect the church and the state and allow for the individual’s right to choose.

In practice, none of the cited examples have shown that the principle of equi-distance works. The head scarf and immigrant issues in France were a match in a tinderbox to the growing feelings of alienation among France’s minority communities. In Turkey, the objective of secularism as formulated by Ataturk had to face innumerable challenges from 1972 onwards with the rise of the Islamic parties, which had the support of many who considered secularism as an elite objective. India too, with its great pluralist tradition, has seen a rise in negative communal feelings.

As a shibboleth of the Libertarians, secularism has been hyphenated with democracy and pluralism. Even the Communitarians like Taylor and Sandel, have found common grounds here. Secularism is seen as a condition of democracy and a decree of existence for a pluralist society. But how do Western liberal democratic states interpret secularism? The cases of the two women in Britain, one wanting to wear a cross and the other a burkha; instances of Sikhs being targeted for wearing turbans in the USA; Muslim men being discriminated because of their names itself; Netherlands banning the burkha, etc. show the low threshold of tolerance in these countries. Forget about it then being imposed in countries where the societies are in the grip of the theologians!

Vestigial dissent (for e.g., many young Muslim girls in the West wearing the hijab) is a visible manifestation of resentment. More and more youngsters are finding succour in their religion, an essential constituent of their self-identity and when it is denigrated, there is tremendous anger that simmers just below the surface and needs slight provocation to erupt and rip apart the fabric of the soi-disant multicultural society and state.

As for secularism’s relationship with democracy, only when the society (this is in reference to a pluralist society) is democratic, can the state become so. It means that in this context, no single ethnic or religious group can claim power and the individual has unmediated access to the polity.

I agree that a democratic state provides the most favourable environment for the growth of a secular (tolerant) outlook. Next is the purpose of secularism. If it is to foster social cohesion, then the complete separation thesis is otiose. Religion is configured in the human psyche and to relegate it to a matter of personal preference that has no influence in the public domain is impractical, as one cannot ask of an individual to efface the one aspect of his mental make-up that evokes such a strong a sense of attachment.

Thus, we come to the crux of the issue: What form of secularism works in a pluralist state? Is it the one that bases itself in inclusiveness or that which is premised on insularity of state from religion? Bhargava makes an interesting suggestion. Instead of Political secularism, which has no conception of community, what might work is Ethical Secularism. It allows for different communities to reach an understanding that incommensurable objectives cannot always be realized in the same space and be tolerant of the limitations.

Today secularism has been transformed into an ideological instrument of the West, which spins the impression that its presence will automatically create a modern and more tolerant state. This is the version being peddled in Iraq. When a society is divided along religious lines and each follows its own agenda, the democratic polity that has been envisaged will be tenuous since it is imported and will negate any secularization of the society. So here the groundwork has to be done by generating an inclusive mentality that fosters feelings of accommodation and tolerance. The religious and political leaders have to be in accord regarding the basic framework of their state and how best to bring it out of the current crisis and make it a part of growth process that all countries of the world are going through.

In a heterogeneous society, secularism must fulfil the following conditions so that there is social cohesion and very little space for feelings of discrimination or appeasement:

(a) Procedural secularism
(b)Equitable resource allocation to all communities
(c) Prevent negative stereo-typing and bigotry
(d)Allow each community to promote its own culture as a "public good" where its promotion does not affect another community’s practice of its own culture and religion
(e) Encourage and strengthen areas of cooperation between different faiths

What is needed is not an abdication of secular practice by the state, but a re-evaluation and if needed, a re-formulation of secularism that fits the needs of the state within which it operates and also the need of the individual to belong to a community. This is its true test.