The Importance of a Dictator’s Failure

May 28, 2007

Pakistanis in general refrain from identifying benchmarks to measure success and failure. The preference for discourse that left an escape route from the indictment of failure had become integrated with the national psyche. Absolved of responsibility, leaders could comfortably permit the of a tedious vision or promise knowing that there was nothing to hold them against. Thus ’s history is littered with disowned failures. While failures are natural consequences, often resulting from well-intentioned actions, not acknowledging them is a recipe for imminent destruction.

was a direct consequence of the refusal to grant constitutional to the majority community. Yet, throughout the years preceding the rejection of by most Pakistanis, leaders were singing praises of their successes, of the high growth rates, of the bright future. Till date, there is no one held responsible, and more importantly punished, for the dismemberment of the state. Many accusations are traded. But the leadership of those times as well as their supporters maintain its innocence, sincerity and patriotism.

While more than likely the current leader will also escape responsibility, he did lay out a clear 7 point agenda on that fateful October of 1999 after committing high treason and throwing out an elected .

These are the seven points he promised to make do on:

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale
2. Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion
3. Revive the and restore investor confidence
4. Ensure and order and dispense speedy
5. Depoliticize state institutions
6. Devolution of power to the grass-root level
7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability

How then has he fared on his seven points?

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale

Since , ’s internal units have never been so split across the board as they are today. The rot of fragmentation exists across religious, ideological, tribal and ethnic lines. National confidence has been brutalized by uncertainty and inconclusiveness on all vital issues – , the tribal areas, persistent sectarian flare-ups, and as happens due to ‘party-less’ polls, an embrace of tribal and parochial affiliations over larger, national issues. By actively and methodically side-lining the that had a presence outside of just one province, national building was turned into national fragmentation.

2. Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion:

Provincial disharmony is at its peak. Punjabis in Baluchistan have made preparations to leave the province if the situation becomes worse. The Tribal Areas are Talibanized and the virus is spreading into the adjoining areas of the federation. Every nationalist leader – Sindhi, Baluchi, Pusthuun, Seraiki – all and sundry reject any form of rule. The poison built up against Pakistani federal rule – rightly perceived as an extension of Punajbi rule - is immense.

3. Revive the and restore investor confidence

The has performed well in certain sectors. Like every conceivable place in the planet, the telecom sector has witnessed phenomenal growth. Electronic received a big boost. Banking reforms, though initiated by the previous have gone a long way establishing vibrant financial institutions. The influx of plentiful capital thanks largely to the post-9/11 dynamics helped Musharaf’s overcome the dismal performance of its first three years’ average growth rate of a measly 3.5% [Country Economic Review]. However, eight years on, unprecedented deficits, depleting export options, and frightening losses in market share of the main Pakistani produce – textiles - reflects fatally incompetent planning. Due to the gross incompetence not only are Pakistani businesses being deprived of the most fundamental ingredient – electricity – as this literally forgot to formulate an – there is little indication that Musharaf and his have something to offer other than the diminishing returns from the West’s gift-wrapped bonanza in the form of debt-rescheduling, favorable -terms and increase in quotas as a reward for post-9/11 national shifts.

Adding to the crippling absence of vision, the ensuing political uncertainty renders the possibility of sustainable growth a distant dream.

4. Ensure and order and dispense with speedy

All governments normally fail in this regard. Be it democratic or dictatorial. But May 12, 2007 was an eye-opener reflecting the extent to which Musharaf and his allies are willing to manufacture and order nightmares at the expense of freedom. However, May 12th was merely a bloody manifestation of Musharaf’s version of ‘realpolitik’ in effect for the past 7 years. Namely, striking deals with criminals and mafia elements in return for supporting Musharaf’s dictatorial rule. and order had for a long time taken a backseat.

5. Depoliticize state institutions

During Musharaf’s rule, all state institutions have not only become politicized – they have been militarized! Reeling from their unproductive lives as uniformed officers, upon retiring the decorated men in khakis went on a rampage striking terror into the hearts of incompetent bureaucrats (rendering them even more incompetent) and placing nails into the coffins of every crumbling national institution.

6. Devolution of power to the grass-root level

Devolution is always a good concept. Centralized power is bad. Period. But Musharafian devolution, which includes Town Nazims tasked to bring a quota of 800 people to rallies in support of the are a carry-over of the colonial divide-and-rule tactics. Much like how the British installed feudal land-lords to oversee and maintain ‘order’, the Musharafian devolution has ended up nothing short of a successful attempt to side-line and clip the powers of the legislature – both federal and provincial – and prop up a parallel albeit inherently subservient system to aid and perpetuate dictatorial rule.

7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability

While in all fairness, no can be expected to carry out impartial accountability – that can only be done by independent courts – the current has the honor of keeping the worst criminals (including making a man on the run for multiple murders and popularly known to enjoy drilling holes in knee-caps, a governor of a province), corrupt and crooked politicians in its ranks in return for their support of the . Based on Pew polls of 2007, has never been so corrupt. In a humiliating indictment, according to Transparency International’s 2006 report, is as corrupt as another failed state, Sierra Leone.

So where does all this leave Pakistanis? Right here in the summer of 2007, in the midst of a deservedly deepening power crisis (not just of the WAPDA kind) where the failures of an insincere regime lead by an extremely insincere Musharaf are starkly visible.

While General Pervaiz Musharaf has failed on all seven promises and the country can rightly hold him accountable on just the failures of the 7 promises – rather than follow the and attempt to make an example of him for committing high treason – amidst the gloom two unaccountable X factors have emerged that were an inadvertent result of Musharaf’s own doing.

One is the relative freedom granted to the – an action that will haunt Musharaf for the rest of his life. In a series of subsequent knee-jerk reactions, attempts to bring the in line were made, such as making journalists disappear, to violently attacking offices of channels, to shutting them down outright. The move back-fired and Musharaf had to follow a strategy he learned in the hills of Kargil, then became well-versed in with the attempts to change the blasphemy , taking on the fascist Mullahs and finally (and thankfully) the operation in Waziristan. Musharaf applied the strategy of retreat.

Secondly, probably learning from the regretful mistake of allowing the to grow, Musharaf tried to kill the nascent spirit of independence emerging from the corridors of the Supreme Court. The near unanimous reaction to this move is still gloriously playing itself out in the national landscape.

However, both these actions have emboldened not just the journalists, lawyers and the judges, but contributed to laying new foundations that are set to finally become two deserving pillars of a more resilient Pakistani state - the and the judiciary.

Much rests on the political opposition and how it embraces and supports the new pillars. Back doors to power, a celebrated method of cowards seemed enchanting not long ago and some opposition members may still seek that easy route. However the rubble of failures of Musharaf’s regime coupled with a spirited and extremely disciplined constitutional movement reminiscent of Qaid-e-Azam’s call for are gradually eliminating the possibility for the continuation of a status-quo where , rule of and the parameters of a federal set-up are perpetually subverted by conveniently undercutting the institutions that make a state.

With the black coats, the and the nation fighting to establish the independence of the judiciary, Pakistanis can finally bank on holding leaders accountable to their promises and actions. No longer will it be as easy to escape responsibility for breaking laws. The yard sticks to measure success and failure will not be muddied by infamous doctrines of necessity.