Defending Pakistan

Syed Amir Husain
Apr 21, 1998

A research paper detailing the threat is faced with and how can combat it given it's economic and political constraints. It is also argued that the small but assertive group of people who are trying to rally support to 'tie down' the Pakistani establishment are doing so at great risk to the country.

Panee panee kar gaee mujh ko Qalandar ki yeh baat

Too jukha jab ghair kay agay na mun tera na tun


(The words of the sage put me to shame:

When you bow down before another

you have neither your self, nor your body)

-Iqbal

Introduction


In the last decade, not many positive changes have
occurred for the vis-a-vis equipment
acquisitions. For the first time we are faced with a situation in
which not one, but all possible parties from which we can acquire
weapon systems of choice, have decided not to do business with us. In
most instances, such as those of the French company Dassault and the
Russian bureau Sukhoi, this is because the same arms dealers have
negotiated contracts with our neighbour and rival in the
east. These contracts will undoubtedly suffer should be
supplied weaponry by the same parties. The question is how can
combat the threat in the east, and possibly other threats
that could plausibly arise in the next two decades? The answer to this
question can be given in many ways -defence acquisitions, diplomacy,
changing political alignment etc. are all possible solutions. For
instance, one 'solution' could be for to unilaterally sign
the NPT and open its sensitive nuclear sites for IAEA inspectors. In
essence this implies a complete surrender before the powers that be in
an effort to obtain guarantees and assurances of protection from them.
As morally bankrupt and disloyal to the country such a suggestion
may sound, it has unfortunately been made by some 'Pakistanis' in the
past. My concern in this paper is to demonstrate that such advice is
not only ridiculous, but will destroy the morale of the Pakistani
nation by leading to another like situation. Additionally, this
paper will analyze the major threats is faced with and will
hopefully demonstrate how, given 's financial and other
constraints, we can maintain a credible defence and perhaps a
comfortable edge over potential aggressors.

History exposes flawed logic


In the 1950's chose to ally
itself with the Western Bloc by signing the Baghdad pact. At the time,
Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States was still fresh in the
memories of most Pakistanis. The cruelty that accompanied Stalin's
rule in the USSR was also not far in the past, making an alliance with
the Soviet Union a hard sell to the Pakistani people. Also, perhaps,
the inherent conflict between an Islamic and Atheist society caused
to be more naturally inclined toward the Christian
west. Though these are far from a complete list of reasons for
's eventual decision, which unfortunately includes more than a
few instances of our leaders selling out to capitalist lures, yet the
complex background of this alignment is not our primary concern. It
would serve the reader well to refer to a text such as Agha Shahi's
''s Foreign '[1] for further investigation into
's alignment with the United States led Western coalition.

, though enthusiastic about its new alliance with the US, saw
itself as a potential target for Soviet assisted aggression. Given a
Soviet ally and sworn enemy many times its size in the east,
requested its new American friends for equipment that would
guarantee in the region and ensure 's security. A list
of the most important component of that requirement was submitted by
the Air Force on March 1, 1954. The requirement[2] was as
follows:

10 Fighter squadrons x (16 planes/squadron) = 160

5 Night fighter squadrons x (16 planes/squadron) = 80

5 Light bomber squadrons x (20 planes/squadron) = 100

1 PR Light bomber squadrons x (20 planes/squadron) = 20

12 Fighter /recce. squadrons x (20 planes/squadron) = 240

2 twin engine squadrons x (20 planes/squadron) = 40

1 4 engine squadrons x (16 planes/squadron) = 16

2 Maritime recce. squadrons x (20 planes/squadron) = 40

Total of 696

Viewing this requirement in the context of a likely scenario with
, which had unlimited access to the latest Soviet weaponry, it
does not appear very unreasonable. had the unenviable task of
defending two wings of the country separated by thousands of miles,
and also an extensive coastline. As against this request, was
given a mere 112 combat aircraft along with 50 non-combat planes,
giving a total of only 162. This was a gross under-arming of the
PAF. Though did not create a diplomatic rumpus over this
insult, a decade later in 1965, the US proved that not only was it
unwilling to release quantities of arms to ensure , it was also
an incredibly unreliable supplier in times of . An embargo was
imposed on during the . Russia on the other hand was so
quick in re-arming that the squadron of Mig-21s destroyed at
Pathankot[3] was replaced either during, or immediately after the 1965
. Though the was over in a matter of a few weeks, the embargo
lasted over a decade and even Indian defence analysts unanimously
agree that the PAF's starved squadrons were unable to change the
course of the due to lack of equipment[2]. Among the more recent
examples of American indifference to our strategic situation is the
Pressler Amendment, which singles out and victimizes . This
amendment has also resulted in what can only be called the theft of
$658 million of 's foreign currency that was paid for the
release of 28 F-16 aircraft from the US.

We are confronted with an enemy five times larger than ourselves, and
are faced with multi-dimensional threats from the east, south and in a
limited , even from in the west. In light of this,
the pointed US of not only holding back on deliveries of
equipment has paid for, but also pressurizing other
nations such as France, Sweden and to desist from dealing with
should only underline the US' negative role vis-a-vis
more clearly. Many readers would perhaps question my
assertions that the US has not helped in building a credible
defence by claiming that the US is not responsible for the achievement
of our strategic objectives. Yes, this is true and exactly my
point. The US, nor any other nation is responsible for the defence of
. Not only this, but other nations, including the US,
and Israel will even go out of their way to harm our interests because
we have conflicting policies and mutually irreconcilable goals. Thus
by asking our to stand down and declare a unilateral
unconditional '', certain elements are not only refusing to learn
from history but are also creating within and are
unknowingly or otherwise, serving the interests of those by whom we
are threatened. will not be won if disarms, we will
only be bullied further and lose whatever semblance of respectability we
can lay claim to. This is too high a price to pay and certainly a
hodge-podge of self styled '' lovers do not have any right to ask
the Pakistani people to pay such a cost. Neither do they have any
right to undermine our defence by lobbying with questionable elements
within the Pakistani establishment. If these so called Pakistanis have
a problem with their tax money being spent on 's defence they
are free to attempt to acquire an alternate citizenship.

The Threat


is situated at the intersection of three
geo-political regions, and consequently, in extremely unstable
surroundings. There is no questioning the historical truism that a
credible defence ensures stability. There is no alternative to being
able to defend yourself - not a strong industrial , or very
high rates. These are extremely important areas that should
not take a back seat to other equally important areas such as defence,
but the opposite should also hold. Of those who say that in the next
century economic power will be the most potent weapon it could be
asked, why is it that the US continues to maintain an army of 2
million and a nuclear arsenal large enough to blow up the earth
several times over[4] if all it requires is a strong ? Why is
it that despite Japan having a imbalance in its favour of
billions of US dollars[5], it still has to give in to the arm twisting
of its 'junior economic partner'? The answer is that the power of
nations is based on one key resource, their militaries, and all other
manifestations of national power are derived from this most
fundamental one.

To our east lies , a country with 7 times our , nearly
4 times our landmass and a almost 3 times the size of
ours. In addition, it has fought 4 wars with us, one of which still
rages on in the highest battlefield of the world - Siachen. It is a
demonstrated nuclear power with publicly declared designs of globally
projecting its power - be it through a blue water fleet based around
aircraft carriers or through ICBMs such as Surya, with a range of
14,000km. Perhaps the reader does not need to be reminded that it was
this same which was responsible for fuelling Bengali dissent and
arming Mukti Bahini terrorists. Through these acts of subversion, it
contributed to the breakup of . Despite 's more than
significant links with international (, Sikkim, Sri
Lanka, Sindh and Punjab), the west views as a market second only
to and is thus willing to pay almost any price to remain on
friendly terms with it[6].

Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to concentrate on every
aspect of the Indian threat, which includes intelligence activities,
subversion, , propaganda and a conventional tactical threat
from the Indian army, I will instead focus on Indian strategic
weaponry to highlight the multi-dimensional nature of the Indian
threat.

Indian Air Force


The recent Gulf has shown that the outcome of any
future conflict will rest heavily on control of the skies and the
ability to deny the enemy of the same. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is
the 4th largest in the world and growing rapidly. It justifies its
size by pointing to the Chinese PLAAF (Peoples Liberation Army Air
Force). This is an old ploy to avoid being chastised by other nations
on what is really a buildup to ensure regional hegemony. Indeed, in
the 1962 Indo- conflict, had assured her Canadian and US
allies that 'donated' equipment would only be used against
Communist . It took her only 3 years to do an about-turn on this
undertaking by using the same equipment against during the
1965 over .

The Indian Air Force consists of nearly 1000 aircraft. Of these,
nearly 770 are front line fighters whereas 140 are second line
fighters and combat capable trainers[2]. Among its ranks the IAF
contains 40 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, 40 SU-30MKI aircraft[7], 93 Mig-29
interceptors and 88 Anglo-French Jaguar deep-strike attack
aircraft. Especially with the recent acquisition of the SU-30MKIs, the
IAF has at-least on paper, tremendously improved its qualitative
standing. With the force listed above, the IAF is capable of using the
latest 'smart' weaponry, stand-off weapons, extremely long range
air-air missiles such as the AA-10 Alamo[8] and countless other lethal
stores. It is also capable of delivering NBC (Nuclear Biological or
Chemical) weapons deep inside Pakistani territory, though this is a
role for which it will most likely not be used given its long-range
missile holdings.

Qualitative enhancements in IAF aircraft include 'BVR' or Beyond
Visual Range capability. This allows a fighter pilot to track, lock
and destroy a target while it is far away. The IAF has recently
acquired AA-10 Alamo missiles which will allow such attacks to be made
against Pakistani aircraft at a range of more than 100km. This
greatly reduces the chances of aerial combat coming down to dogfights,
where pilot skill is the deciding factor and an area in which the
Air Force undeniably has the qualitative edge. All SU-30MKIs
and Mig-29s have BVR capability whereas currently no aircraft in the
PAF inventory does. In addition, the longest-range air-air missiles in
the Air Force is the AIM-7 Sparrow which has barely 1/3rd the
range of an Alamo[9].

Clearly, with only 32 F-16 aircraft and a combat strength of a little
over 400 fighter aircraft, the PAF is again facing a like
situation of being grossly under-armed. The PAF does have an edge in
that it is able to fly most aircraft in the Indian inventory due to
its alliances with many Muslim Air Forces which possess Russian and
French aircraft. However, defence planners should not count on
superior PAF pilot skill to overwhelm an air force two and a half
times PAF's size. The of September 1965 can be cited as an example
of when this actually happened, but it is hardly prudent to plan for
the future based on 34-year-old laurels.

Indian Missiles


In the development and deployment of missiles, with
Russian and French assistance, has made tremendous headway. It
has the demonstrated capability to launch satellites into orbit[10]
and is thus de-facto, in possession of a potential ICBM with a range
of greater than 15,000km. Though these designs are, and should be,
alarming for all countries in the region, for the Prithvi and
Agni missile programs present a greater danger.

Prithvi has been labeled to be specific by several Pakistani
leaders[11]. It is an MRBM with a range of 300km and a CEP (circular
error probability) of 250m. It is capable of delivering an NBC or
conventional warhead of up to 500kg. This missile allows to
target 's capital city and most of the defence establishments
in close proximity thereof. Last year, a minor crisis was sparked when
news of Prithvi's deployment on the Pakistani border was leaked in the
US press. Recently, the Indian Army has deployed up to 38 Prithvi
missiles and is yet to receive an additional batch of 62 missiles
against its order of 100 missiles[12]. Once this order is met, the
Indian Air Force will deploy additional missiles and a navalised
version of the Prithvi is rumoured to be in development. It is
disturbing to imagine what intends to accomplish with such a
large force of nuclear capable SSMs.

Given 's lack of strategic depth, it is reported[13] that in
the event of an Indian missile strike, would have but 3
minutes worth of warning time. Clearly this is much less time than the
15 minutes PADS ( Air Defence System) provides incase of an
attack by enemy aircraft[14]. The short time of missiles to target
implies that fixed assets such as air bases, nuclear installations and
weapon factories whose defence has been modeled on the assumption of a
conventional air attack, will have to be protected with the missile
threat in mind. Given the fact that there are a total of 10 PAF
forward air bases and 9 additional combat capable airbases versus 100
such bases in , it follows that to keep the enemy on the
defensive, the armed forces require similar or better strike
capability against such targets. Also, early warning for is
becoming more and more crucial. Of-course, the ideal solution of
obtaining a number of AWACS (E3-A Sentry) aircraft from the US has
been ruled out due to immediate hindrances such as the Pressler
amendment as well as the US's long term untrustworthiness as a
supplier of equipment. There are still however, a few options
available to the Pakistani which are highlighted in the
following sections of this paper.

Indian Navy


Another development that has been mentioned previously, is
the Prithvi's conversion to a naval missile. This would mean that
Indian destroyers could attack the Pakistani naval bases in ,
Port Qasim and Ormara while still in International waters. A squadron
of Mirage 5 aircraft based in 's Masrur air base was equipped
with the Exocet anti-ship missile to prevent such attacks or a
blockade of the port in the event of . However, the range
of these aircraft is less than 500km and they would be stretched to
their limits if Indian destroyers using a lighter warhead on the
Prithvi, fired SSMs on and Ormara from more than 500km
away. If decides to further enhance the propulsion system of the
Prithvi, or adapt the Agni for launch from one of its two aircraft
carriers, then the Mirage squadron will essentially no longer remain
potent. This scenario should be avoided by planning counters to such a
threat. Details of one of the perhaps many solutions are discussed
later.

Indian aircraft carriers are also a problem will have to deal
with in the event of a . Recently, there has been much news about
Indian plans to acquire a newer Russian carrier to replace its smaller
British ship, the 'Vikrant'. Currently, the air strike potential of
the Indian Navy rests on the British VTOL capable Sea Harrier as well
as numerous Soviet helicopters and maritime patrol and attack
aircraft. Carriers are essentially mobile air bases and in this, are
extremely difficult to target with missiles. If they stay far enough
from the Pakistani coastline while using mid-air refueling aircraft
taking off from the Indian land bases to extend the range of their
attack aircraft, it would be difficult for Pakistani aircraft to
attack these ships.

is also about to receive its first nuclear submarine. Though
this development does not have particular importance in the context of
an Indo-Pak , it does underline 's intention to acquire the
capability of projecting its power throughout the Indian
Ocean. must counter such designs of regional hegemony.

's Options


In this section, I will present possible solutions
to some of the problems described above as well as a more general
outline of the kinds of capabilities should acquire sooner
rather than later. I will deal with the threats in the order they were
presented in the sections above.

To counter the IAF expansion, the PAF has been looking at a number of
aircraft including the Russian SU-27, the French Mirage 2000-5 and the
Swedish Grippen. Negotiations with Russia have not gone all that well
due to that country's old ties with and the much larger
orders received from the Indians. The Swedes are not truly capable of
holding their own against American pressure in the event of a and
by going the Grippen route, the PAF would most likely lose all spare
supplies soon after the purchase goes through. The French Mirage
2000-5 is perhaps the aircraft that has generated the most
interest. However, it does not have the same capabilities as the F-16
and also comes with an astronomical price tag of US$ 78 million, which
make it $5 million more expensive than the latest US F-22 fighter
which even the US Air Force has not integrated in its squadrons as
yet.

There are two options that could exercise. One of these is
the purchase of SU-27s through Ukraine instead of Russia. has
recently started receiving T-80UD MBT (Main Battle Tanks) from Ukraine
against an order for 300 such tanks. Though Ukraine was faced with
Russian opposition on this issue, it was probably cosmetic opposition
designed to please . Clearly, Russia is no longer a super-power
and does not have much interest in preventing the sale of a few
fighter aircraft to if it can maintain appearances with
. And certainly, the cash-starved country is entirely justified
in this stance. has also purchased more than 70 SU-27s from
Russia and has obtained to manufacture them locally.
could also opt to go for a stop gap quantitative expansion of its air
force by acquiring a 150-200 additional F-7M/Ps while eventually
obtaining squadrons of upgraded SU-27s (F-11) from . Not enough
information on the Chinese production capabilities and will to supply
such aircraft to their allies is available in the public domain for
any further comments on this option. It is worthwhile to note that
though Russia is going to be a difficult source for SU-30s, it should
by no means be ruled out. In the very recent past, it has provided
with a few helicopters for purposes. can
demonstrate to Russia that it is not presently, nor does it desire to
be, in any kind of conflict with Russian interests. Additionally, if
it can also be demonstrated that SU-30s or SU-35s are a must to
restore the regional balance of power and hence provide stability in
, the Russians may very well oblige, or at-least channel the
aircraft through Ukraine to .

The PAF's long term goal should be self-sufficiency in the combat
aircraft arena. Clearly, with the manufacture of the K-8 jet aircraft
and the FC-1 program, the PAF is trying hard to achieve these goals.
However, given 's current situation, perhaps the FC-1 program
in particular should be accelerated and should attempt to
acquire electronic counter measures equipment, smart weaponry and
avionics for these aircraft from sources. The FC-1 is
reported to be '70-80% as capable as an F-16'[15] whereas it costs
half as much and ends Pakistani dependence on other countries for
sufficient supplies in times of . This program is too much of a
good thing to be delayed even slightly.

To improve 's defences against enemy missiles, several things
can be done. Firstly, has defence with several Arab
countries, including Saudi Arabia. An AWACS is available to the Saudis
and agreements could be chalked out providing for Pakistani use of
these aircraft in times of . This will not be a new arrangement; in
all wars in the past, has received assistance in the form of
aircraft from Arab air forces. It has repaid the favour by training
their pilots and deputing its own in all Arab-Israeli wars. In fact,
Pakistanis have served with great distinction securing several Israeli
kills while flying inferior aircraft[16].

In addition, the defence electronics manufacturer, Marconi
has developed radars capable of picking up even low level cruise
missiles at ranges of over 300km. These could be acquired perhaps
without much trouble given their defensive nature and low
cost. Mounting radars such as the AN/TPS-63, which probably
has, on high endurance floating platforms such as helium balloons is
not an incredibly difficult technical feat, but would provide
with a good early warning capability [2].

still lacks an adequate surface-to-air missile force. Though the
shoulder-fired Stinger missiles are excellent for defending troop
concentrations, longer range and higher altitude missiles such as the
Crotale are not present in sufficient numbers in the Pakistani
arsenal. The high cost of such systems could be a justification for
the current situation, but now that has developed its own
shoulder-fired surface-air missile 'Anza', efforts should be made to
extend the system's range or develop more capable air-air missiles
under a new program.

In terms of offensive missile capability, should continue the
development of its Hatf I, II and III missiles, as well as the long
range Ghauri missile which is reputed to have a 1,500km range and for
the first time, provides the capability to strike anywhere in
enemy territory. Reports indicate that currently very small numbers of
the Hatf missiles have been deployed or produced. Perhaps
should remedy this situation to nullify the advantage the Indian's
have obtained by deploying Prithvi in large numbers.

The Navy is already equipped with SSMs capable of carrying
light warheads in an anti-ship role. The Exocet and the Harpoon have
modest ranges but are extremely effective in denying enemy ships the
ability to enforce blockades. However, navy ships lack a
significant offensive capability against land based targets. Remedying
this situation is only a question of modifying the Hatf missiles so
that they can be used in a ship mounted role, much as the Indians are
using Prithvi. Even the mere presence of such a capability will make
it necessary for both the Indian Air Force and the Indian navy to
significantly widen the area under patrol thus contributing to a
sparser Indian defence.

One capability that should have acquired long ago is air-air
refueling. This will allow PAF aircraft to extend their strike radius'
to include most of the Indian coastal cities and naval bases. Air-air
re-fuelling is not an expensive capability to acquire and the PAF
already has 3 B-707 aircraft, at-least 2 of which could be used in the
role of tankers. PAF pilots should be trained for missions that could
last for up to 10 hours. Indeed, British and American pilots routinely
conduct such missions while being re-fuelled in the air several times.

It is worth mentioning that some of the aircraft PIA is retiring, such
as A300s, F-27s and even B-747s, could be used very effectively by
Air Force and Navy to provide extremely long range maritime
operations, capability and air-air refueling. Such
opportunities which can significantly increase the capabilities of
's at minimum cost are not to be missed.

Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) are being used more and more by
countries such as the US, Israel and for battlefield, and
eventually strategic intelligence gathering. These are low cost
pilot-less aircraft with a very low radar signature that allow
deployment in situations where there is no need to risk a human
life. already manufactures Ababeel and Baaz at the PAC
Kamra. These are drones that could be upgraded with more
'intelligence', such as computer vision based navigation, digital
cameras etc. Eventually, there is no reason why these systems could
not be evolved into a short-range cruise missiles.

Given the fact that will have to face enormous political
consequences of actually using its in a future , it
is time to focus attention on possible alternatives that would provide
the functional capability of a nuclear weapon, but at a reduced
political risk. Fuel Air Explosives, or FAEs are one such
alternative. These weapon systems rely on a delivery vehicle spreading
a fine spray of highly explosive fuel through the air, dispersing a
large cloud and then igniting it to create a massive suction
effect. The explosion is tremendously violent and creates immense
shock waves but does not have any of the after-effects that nuclear
weapon explosions do, such as radiation etc. Developing a low-speed
cruise missile capable of dispersing fuel in this manner is not an
implausible task. FAEs would be very effective against troop
concentrations and concrete reinforced enemy installations and a
battlefield force multiplier.

The purchase from France of 3 Agosta-90B submarines is a much-needed
addition to the Navy. The Agostas can not only secure
against an Indian attempt to blockade it, but with an endurance of
over 2 months, can also give the Navy the ability to carry
out special missions against Indian coastal installations, akin to the
Dwarka attack during the 1965 .

defence production, much like it did in the US, will
guarantee the employment of our scientists, will create thousands of
jobs and most importantly, will result in a wide range of fringe
benefits that will manifest themselves in all spheres of
society. After all, if Ghauri can be built in , why can't a
satellite launching space rocket be constructed using the same
? If laser can be used to make range finders, why
can't it be put to industrial uses? If the FC-1 can be built at PAC,
why not smaller commercial jets? All the desirable effects of a strong
defence industry will be felt in if the and the
Armed Forces give due importance to what could be the most important
industry in the Pakistani .

Conclusion


In summary, it is possible for to protect its
interests and build a credible defence against plausible threats given
its financial and political constraints. Some novel approaches to
utilizing existing equipment and acquiring hardware
indirectly (for example, through Ukraine) can fill in many of the gaps
in 's defence. However, the long-term goal of an
defence industry is not to be ignored and development in projects such
as Ghauri and FC-1 should continue full steam ahead. Not only would
this result in complete autarchy in defence production, but would also
give the Pakistani a much needed push by creating local
employment and perhaps even a plethora of private firms specializing
in high-tech aspects of defence production.

References


[1] Shahi, Agha., 's security and foreign , , 1988.

[2] Singh, Pushpindar. Rikhye, Ravi. Steinmann, Peter., Fiza'ya: Psyche of the PAF , New , 1991.

[3] Heroes of the PAF , , 1968.

[4] The United States Army.

[5] International Union, UAW, U.S. Balance , Detroit,
July 1997.

[6] The Daily News, US senator says court only place to solve F-16
issue , 3 April, 1998.

[7] FlugRevue, News in Brief , Bonn, July 13 1997.

[8] Australian Aviation, The New Look in Soviet Air Superiority
, Weston Creek, June 1990.

[9] USAF/AIM-7 Sparrow, USAF Fact Sheet/Washington

[10] A. Lawler, Succeeds With Third ASLV Launch
Attempts, Space News, 25-31 May 1992.

[11] The Daily Dawn, COAS hints at measures to counter threat
, , June 5, 1997.

[12] Bharat Rakshak, Prithvi
SRBM.

[13] The Daily Dawn, Bid to counter Prithvi threat , ,
Jan 31 1996.

[14] Institute for Air Defence Studies, Research Database,
, April, 1998

[15] Institute for Air Defence, PAC-CAIC 'FC-1', April, 1998.

[16] Hussaini, S. M. A, Air Warriors of , , 1989.