The nuclear nightmare has come true. Taunted, jeered, and threatened by
BJP India until it could resist no more, Pakistan too has gone nuclear.
Understandably, as of the time of this writing, joyous crowds are still
dancing in Islamabad over its stunning response to Shakti '98. They, like
the crowds which had celebrated in Delhi just a while ago, are quite
oblivious to the real meaning of what has really happened. But as the
nuclear cycle advances to the next notch, and harsh economic realities
start to bite, the real gravity of the situation will inevitably sink in.
Meanwhile the cabal of neo-fascists and RSS fanatics in Delhi -- the same
that had planned the May 11 tests -- is pondering its next move.

Let us face facts. Our world changed irreversibly and totally just 3 weeks
ago; it is now a world where nuclear annihilation henceforth shall always
be just around the corner. Generations to come -- if they come -- in both
Pakistan and India will agonize over how it all really happened. But it is
fruitless to ask for history to be undone. Instead pragmatism demands that
we look towards what is next and delineate what needs to be done for
mutual survival. With the primal, bestial, and instinctual responses of
the two huge nations in the present state of strong arousal, the ongoing
cycle of action and reaction desperately needs interruption. Unless
moderated and cooled, this lethal competition has an obvious end point.

The immediate formulation of effective war-avoidance measures is crucial.
This means devising a set of technically sound procedures and devices that
will make difficult the unauthorized, unintentional, or accidental use of
nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is highly probable that should nuclear war
ever take place, it will not be by the conscious design of Pakistani and
Indian leaders but, instead, through miscalculation or unintended use of
the weapons in some form. These horrific possibilities will remain as long
as nuclear weapons remain. But one can -- and absolutely must -- work
towards reducing probabilities. Otherwise India and Pakistan may provide
to the world the first proof of failure of nuclear deterrence.

Consider first the issue of launch authority. In Pakistan there already
exists a nuclear coordinating authority consisting of the president, prime
minister, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the chief of army
staff, and the airforce and navy chiefs. In India there is certain to be a
corresponding body. Among other things, one hopes that the rules for the
two nuclear bodies have been written so that complete unanimity is
required of all available members as a condition for launching a nuclear
strike; the disagreement of even one member should be sufficient to halt a
strike.

Even more importantly, the weapons should be configured so that local
commanders, missile operating crews, or pilots, are not able to conspire
into launching a nuclear strike on their own initiative. Failing this, a
small group of wrongly informed or zealot officers from either the
Pakistani or Indian side could start a full-scale nuclear war if they are
in possession of the necessary codes and keys. Pakistan, in particular,
has a long history of coups and extremist officers who have defied
authority and tried to seize power. One should not dismiss the nuclear
dangers that this poses.

Recognizing that unauthorised use was a dangerous possibility, much effort
was devoted by the US in the late 1960's onwards towards developing
technical devices known as Permissive Action Links (PALs). These highly
sophisticated computer-chip based safety devices prevent an assembled
nuclear weapon from being armed unless all pre-programmed requirements are
satisfied. This includes the final launch permission received from the
proper authority, possibly received directly by the weapon through radio
contact.

Now that nuclear weapons are here to stay on the subcontinent, one hopes
that the advanced nuclear weapons states will share PAL technology with
Pakistan and India. It is a virtual certainty that the first generation of
the Indian and Pakistani weapons do not possess adequate safeguards. The
one natural objection to sharing PAL technology is that it also reveals
details of weapons design. However, it cannot hurt to make known the
general principles of PAL design in sufficient detail so that Indian and
Pakistani bomb designers could adapt it for their own weapons.

While unauthorized launch is a chilling possibility, there are certainly
other dangers as well. In fact there are numerous examples where
miscalculations by military leaders in Pakistan and India have provoked
wars and near catastrophes. In 1965, President Field Marshal Ayub Khan,
father of Pakistan's hawkish minister of defence, had sent paratroopers to
Kashmir in the hope of stimulating the local population to rise up in arms
against unpopular Indian rule. While he expected an Indian response in
Kashmir, to his surprise India attacked across the international border
and a full-scale war ensued. In 1987, General Sunderji's infamous
Operation Brasstacks nearly provoked a war with Pakistan, a war which no
one really wanted at that time.

Can future miscalculations or conflict escalation be avoided? Unless the
two armies are separated from each other along the Line of Control in
Kashmir, this will be very difficult. It is therefore in the mutual
interest of both countries to agree to a large presence of United Nations
troops in Kashmir. By doing so, Pakistan will have succeeded in further
internationalizing the Kashmir issue, and India will have gained in having
slowed the flow of Pakistani supported militants across the border. Will
India agree? Even if it does not, it has been pointed out by international
relation experts that the Security Council could request an urgent
Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice without the
consent of either government.

To conclude: it is absolutely imperative for Pakistan and India to have
the best possible command and control systems, working hotlines, and
satellite data gathering systems. This diminishes the chances of
accidental war, as well as preemptive strikes motivated by unfounded or
imaginary fears. But there will be no margin of safety left if Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapons are stored in assembled form rather than as
separated components, and if the delivery of nuclear weapons is by
missiles rather than aircraft. A 2-5 minute flight time, almost zero
chances of interception, and the impossibility of recall make
nuclear-tipped missiles the most fearsome and dangerous element in the
nuclear game. If either country deploys its missiles, or keeps
ready-to-use bombs, life shall then dangle from a single strand of hair.