In the hoopla and fuss surrounding Chinese Prime Minister Rongji’s state visit to Pakistan, there will be no doubt much written and said about the ‘historic ties’ between the two countries.

But this should not obscure the fact that this relationship is very much in flux. While blinkered Foreign Office mandarins and gushing editorial writers exult in the bonds between Beijing and Islamabad, we should not forget that ultimately, every rational state bases its foreign policy on its perceived self-interest. Although ideological states might allow their guiding dogma to warp policies, they revert to pragmatism and realpolitik as soon as their ideology weakens.

Before the Iron Curtain fell, Communist states tended to help each other irrespective of gains and losses because of the so-called fraternal ties between them. Usually, Moscow called the shots, but there was an element of idealism. Similarly, there have been repeated calls for some kind of Islamic union linking the forty-odd Muslim states. Nothing much has come of this due to the entirely different conditions obtaining in these countries, but this does not prevent appeals for a Pan Islamic confederation in some form or another.

Power in the United States has been seized by an ideologically motivated right-wing party. Despite the narrowness of his victory, Bush and the extremist elements in the Republican Party are bent on reviewing and redirecting foreign policy. For them, Communism is the greatest evil on earth, and they are determined to revive the fervour and rhetoric of the Cold War. However, as the Soviet Union has ceased to exist – a victory for which the Republican Ronald Reagan has been given much credit – the enemy is now China, already dubbed “our strategic rival” by Bush.

Against this backdrop, Washington’s efforts to isolate China and erect a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around it can already be discerned. By agreeing to sell Taiwan a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems, signalling the start of a new military relationship with India, and deciding to embark on an ambitious Nuclear Missile Defence programme, Bush has pushed the United States on a path of confrontation. The recent spy plane episode is the first chapter in what may well turn out to be a new Cold War.

When the world’s only superpower changes direction, smaller states, especially those located on the periphery of potential conflict, have to be nimble in adjusting their policies. Even in Clinton’s second term, the relations between the United States and India had improved beyond recognition. But this change was based on largely economic factors such as the recognition of India as a huge potential market for American products, as well as an exporter of tens of thousands of computer experts and other professionals. While these factors still hold good, there might soon be a military dimension to this relationship. There is every indication that sanctions, applied after Indian nuclear tests conducted three years ago, will soon be repealed. Pakistan, however, will continue to be subjected to a set of sanctions triggered by the military coup. However, sanctions or no sanctions, we are unlikely to be sold advanced weapons systems as Washington will be reluctant to annoy India.

Indeed, India might play the same ‘frontline’ role for the United States against China as Pakistan did in the last century against the Soviet Union. The difference obviously will be that India will be an equal partner in the enterprise while Pakistan was very much a client state. If this scenario unfolds along these lines, then the present military balance – already heavily tilted in India’s favour – will become totally lopsided.

Another factor underlying the logic of such a strategic alliance is the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in both countries. In such an arrangement, Israel is clearly the third partner. As it is, ties between Tel Aviv and New Delhi have been growing closer; the possible acquisition of an advanced military radar system from Israel is probably the first item on a long shopping list.

Thus India is extremely well placed to cash in on both of America’s current phobias: China and Islamic fundamentalists. We, on the other hand, will end up on the wrong side. We already suffer from the burden of a self-defeating Afghan policy where we support the most retrogressive elements in the world. In Kashmir, we are seen as a state that is sponsoring terrorists. It matters little if we call them freedom fighters: for the rest of the world, when innocent civilians are kidnapped and killed, those committing such acts are terrorists. And we have what we are proud to call ‘historic ties’ with China. These factors make Pakistan a very suspect country to Bush’s Washington in its current anti-Communist crusader mode.

But Beijing is no longer the ideology-driven state it was under Mao. It now aspires to become a major power, and does not wish to become embroiled in a cold war with the United States, a country with which it has a trade surplus of billions of dollars every year. It will undoubtedly try and find an accommodation with Washington. The rising generation in China is far more interested in acquiring the good things of life than in engaging in sterile ideological debates and conflicts. Mr Rongji and his colleagues realise – in a way our leaders never have – that in the long run, military and diplomatic power comes only with economic strength. Unless they can match the United States in the technological and financial fields, they will be unable to rival the Americans. They have the example of the Soviet Union before them, and they are too cautious and sensible to repeat those mistakes.

To avoid the encirclement Bush and his cold warriors would like to see in place, the Chinese will certainly use diplomatic means. One of them is to improve ties with India, even if it is at Pakistan’s expense. The Chinese are very pragmatic people, irrespective of their current (and rapidly weakening) ideology. Several times in the recent past, they have advocated dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute rather than sticking to their old position of insisting on the implementation of UN resolutions.

These are thus likely to be testing times for Pakistan, but unfortunately, we have consistently failed to take note of the changes taking places around us. By arrogating all strategic decision-making to itself, the military establishment has not allowed any serious debate on the direction of our foreign policy. Our inability to navigate these turbulent waters is a direct outcome of our helmsmen’s failure to read the winds of change.