Talking to Vajpayee

Mushahid Hussain
Jun 18, 2001
Vajpayee has demonstrated that he can be different



Like his historic bus journey to in February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari , in a U-turn, has sprung another surprise by inviting the Pakistani Chief Executive to visit . had earlier insisted that talks with would not resume until "cross-border " ceases.

What prompted 's change in stance, what can be expected in these proposed talks in light of the historical track record and what are the real roadblocks in - relations?

In 1992, the BJP ideologue, K.R. Malkani, a from Sind, visited Islamabad as part of the Track II process, in which retired generals like the late Chief of Army Staff Sundarji also participated. He said quite categorically that without BJP support, no Indian could go for a settlement on , and he added, "Real progress on will only be possible when the BJP is in power". The BJP, which started with 2 seats in the 1984 , finally took over in 1998 heading a 23-party coalition.

This line is a throwback to the 1970s when it was said in the United States that only a conservative anti-Communist Republican like Richard Nixon could make a deal with and the Soviet Union, which he did.

By the same token, it is now being presumed that unless the BJP in supports and the Army in endorses, durable between and is not possible. Civilian governments in were destabilised on charges of a "sell-out" just for trying to talk to on . It is probably for this reason that while announcing his invitation, too covered his flanks, appeasing his hawkish Hindu constituency, by ending the ceasefire in .

The Indian Prime Minister also realised that his of trying to bypass has failed, and 's inclusion is a precondition for settling .

By inviting the Pakistani ruler to , also benefits politically. His has been crisis-prone of late: rocked by the Tehelka scandal, problems with allies in the ruling coalition, losses in the recent state and a ' of words' following a serious border clash with . Then the Congress and the Communists had been attacking the BJP for not resuming the dialogue with . With this one decision, has deflected domestic criticism, regained the political initiative and come across as a 'statesman' before his new found American friends as well, who had been urging him to talk to .

Since is defined as the "enemy" and as the single most important issue in foreign from day one, relations with are the corner stone of 's national security, foreign and domestic politics. In fact, our over-arching security concerns are a major reason why a Sword of Damocles has always dangled over the concept of civilian supremacy in .

General Ziaul Haq was the first Pakistani leader to have a coherent, consistent and clearly-articulated that, for the most part, outsmarted Indian leaders like Indira and Rajiv, and kept them guessing. All through his period in power, he retained the initiative using deft diplomacy, flexibility, and when required, the requisite steel fist, although it remained covered in a velvet glove. He was the architect of Track II diplomacy, initiated way back in 1984, which he used to pressure through a " lobby" of 's leading journalists and columnists, who also served as his "constituency". His legendary public relations skills and his focus on keeping engaged ensured that while the western front was "hot" with in , it remained all quiet on the eastern front, with hardly any reference to in official pronouncements from during this period.

As 's leader, is probably the best bet with which can do business. He is an experienced politician who need not look over his shoulder while talking to (unlike the 'liberal' Punjabi, I.K. Gujral). His track record shows a certain positive attitude towards - as Foreign Minister he came to in 1978 and as Prime Minister, when he journeyed to , he made it a point to pay his respects to the Muslim freedom struggle at the Monument. This was his gesture to the people of , as if he was seeking to bury the hatchet by turning a new page in relations with .

The visit was also substantive, not merely a demonstration of symbolism. During his stay in , he accepted the disputed status of , agreed on an 18-month time frame for its peaceful resolution on the basis of both sides moving beyond their respective stated positions on , and they also agreed to coordinate positions on CTBT since both were then facing similar pressures from the United States.

has a somewhat Nixonian sense of history, springing a surprise by making a grand gesture, as he did in February 1999 and again last week. This would lend credence to the view that 's initiative is a serious move and he wants substantive talks with the current head of the Establishment. Had it been merely a non-serious gesture, he could let his bureaucrats do the talking, say, a meeting of Foreign Secretaries on the sidelines of SAARC, which happens frequently. Even his bus journey was planned outside the normal bureaucratic channels, where it would normally have got bogged down in the usual nitpicking.

has also defined the framework for the discussions with , which are essentially a follow-up to the Nawaz Sharif-Gujral summit at Male in May 1997. This led to the eight point agenda including an unprecedented agreement by to discuss as a disputed issue through a separate Working Group. The 'bus diplomacy' that followed committed both sides "to intensify efforts for a settlement of the issue", as enshrined in the Declaration.

It is good that the regime has finally owned up to the Simla Accord and the Declaration as the basis of the forthcoming Summit. Having made the transition from a subordinate arm of to running the country, the regime would now have had the sobering realisation that civilian governments worked hard to promote and protect the national interest, often in adverse circumstances.



Before the summit, the regime needs to do serious homework, consult the political forces and opinion leaders, formulate its bottom-line and not treat the trip to as just another joyride.

Given their chequered history, - relations have to be seen as a process, not an event, where all issues are thrashed and settled in one summit. Issues left over from history like and Palestine cannot be resolved overnight, as Clinton discovered much to his regret last autumn at Camp David through his abortive bid to force a settlement between Barak and Arafat.

The main issue between and is more of attitude than of on a particular issue. An absence of large-heartedness on the part of manifests itself in petty pursuits at the expense of broader goals. has demonstrated an inability to give, to concede anything, even where it has nothing to lose. Take the example of its ties with : the 1974 Indira-Mujib Treaty has never been ratified by , while 's continued illegal of a Bangladeshi enclave sparked the recent conflict.

has demonstrated that he can be different. Will this difference be reflected in Indian attitudes towards and the question? The answers will be found in the results of the forthcoming summit, undoubtedly the most important for both governments since they assumed office in October 1999.