With precisely a year left before a date for general elections is to be announced on July 12, 2002, 90 days before the Supreme Court deadline of October 12, the contours of Pakistan’s emerging political scenario point to the first signs of an uneasy coexistence between the military regime and the political forces which is vital for building a stable democratic system.

Mr Vajpayee’s invitation to General Musharraf has inadvertently provided an opening to the military regime to initiate a dialogue with politicians, a process it had assiduously shunned in the past, while most political parties have been receptive to this opportunity to promote their perspective on the Kashmir issue, which is central to Pakistan’s foreign policy, politics and national security.

But confusion still exists on both sides – the military regime and the political forces – as to their evolving mutual relationship and their respective vision of how Pakistan should reach its democratic destination.

The evolution in the military regime’s policy is evident, starting with the unprecedented invitation, which included special gestures, to the head of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, for a long, detailed meeting with General Musharraf, the first such high-level overt contact between the regime and its principal opposition leader. The Nawabzada, who was also a stalwart of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) during the last military regime, never had opportunity for such an interaction with General Zia. Obviously, if the military regime is now willing to talk with those whom it had earlier dismissed as being “useless” or “unbalanced” this is a healthy sign, showing a much-needed flexibility in dealings on the domestic front.

Then local elections under its flagship operation, the devolution plan, are also proceeding ahead with the active participation of virtually all established political parties, which has helped to enhance the turnout, making it respectable.

However, the fundamental political reality of the last 21 months is that the two-party system, established since 1988 with the PML and the PPP is still very much intact, and other political elements have neither weakened their vote-bank nor diminished their dominance among popular preferences. The cleavage in the PML has politically benefited the PPP, as is evident from the local elections.

Another example of the military regime’s ‘flexibility’ vis-à-vis the political forces is the manner in which the MQM’s cooperation ensured a relatively peaceful poll in Karachi. Notwithstanding the public demonstration of state power with 45,000 uniformed personnel on active duty, it was left to the MQM to provide an assurance, rather a ‘guarantee’ that Karachi’s law and order wouldn’t be disturbed and it wasn’t. This is yet another indicator of the changing nature of the Pakistani state, where, if investment is to be done in Balochistan then cooperation of the tribal sardars is sought, and if Karachi’s law and order is to be preserved, MQM’s cooperation is needed. If the writ of the state may be weaker in certain areas, the reality also is that the state has to rely on non-official actors and no longer can it ride roughshod or ‘go it alone’.

Confusion and contradiction in their posture towards the military regime is evident in the conduct of political parties:

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan readily meets General Musharraf on 'political issues' but rejects his invitation to discuss Kashmir;

MQM boycotts the local bodies election but offers its cooperation to the authorities to ensure a peaceful poll;

PPP as a component of ARD remains committed to its one-point agenda of struggling for restoration of democracy through an alliance with PML, but, concurrently considers the present military regime ‘better’ than the previous political government.



Such contradictions abound in the policies of the military regime as well. Its flip-flops in attitudes towards the politicians apart, the military regime is apparently still confused on the concept of the National Security Council (NSC), its composition, functions and role. 21 months after taking over, the NSC is still a body largely on paper without any ‘mission statement’, as if the regime remains so much enamoured with its concept that it refuses to let go even without knowing what to do with it.

For the third time, the military regime has had to issue notifications regarding the reconstitution of the NSC.

Soon after the military coup, one of its first acts was to announce the NSC with much fanfare as the panacea of all ills, as the institution that would be the linchpin of political stability and an instrument of the long-cherished dream of khaki ‘role in the political system’.

It started off with ‘experts’ plus the brass, but soon it became a victim of ‘rank inflation’ when lesser luminaries suddenly found themselves catapulted to what was supposedly an apex decision-making body. And equally swiftly, with its reconstitution, the supposedly supra-Cabinet body’s members found themselves relegated to ordinary ministerial slots, and the NSC, as reconstituted, became a glorified Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), with an innovation of the Commerce Minister joining the Foreign, Interior and Finance Ministers, as if revival of the economy would be the new NSC’s top task.

The third reconstitution of the NSC, done last week, makes it a virtually all-khaki body (save for Governors of Balochistan and Sind), removes the ministers, and includes offices which are currently not separate from the President, namely, Chief Executive, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff, thereby ensuring it too will remain a paper organisation.

The new notification on the NSC also negates the concept of institution-building, since all its existing and future members would ‘hold office during the pleasure of the President’, who has the authority to ‘call a meeting of the Council at such time and place, as he may deem fit’, and its function is merely to ‘deliberate upon, discuss and tender advice to the President’.

To top it all, as if issues of national security were not grave enough for urgent examination by the NSC, ‘matters relating to Islamic Ideology’ and ‘aims and objectives enshrined in the Objectives Resolution 1949’ will be foremost among the NSC goals. A non-functional body with a hazy objective given an ideological hue, without a defined agenda, function or membership, would be a hotchpotch, contributing to the confusion by combining functions of a think tank, a debating club and a high-level advisory council to the President.

If the military regime is still not clear about its concept of the NSC, as is apparent, then why create more confusion, why duplicate bodies since a Cabinet exists, and a Parliament is to be elected in a year’s time. One problem retarding good governance in Pakistan is the unnecessary proliferation of showpiece bodies with high-sounding nomenclature that end up doing nothing. A case in point is the khaki’s own Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, that has not performed a worthwhile function in 25 years since it was established, save for holding the annual March 23 Pakistan Day parade.

Now that the countdown to the general elections has begun, it would be in the fitness of things if the military regime were to reverse its decision by doing away with the NSC whose composition and role, in any case, is still not clear in the minds of its creators. Additionally, the regime should improve upon its own policy decision of allowing the recent convention of ARD activists in Faisalabad by fulfilling its promise of lifting the ban on political activities which it imposed in March 2000 as a ‘temporary’ measure prior to the Clinton stopover.

Taking such ‘confidence building measures’ would help in creating a conducive political environment in the run-up to next year’s elections, stabilise the situation by lowering the temperature, give political parties the time and space to organise, improve relations between the regime and the political forces, and above all, improve Pakistan’s image.

As the military regime itself would have discovered by now, foreign policy is often an extension of domestic politics and internal support and stability provide strength in the pursuit of external relations.