A Decision to Regret

Feroz R Khan
Oct 21, 2001



…when you are left dying on the plains of

and the come to cut you up,

roll to your rifle and blow out your brains

and go to your like a soldier…

Rudyard Kipling

One month after the attacks on Washington and New York, the United States attacked in retaliation to the attacks of September 11, 2001. October 7, 2001 marked the day, when the sitzkreig, or the sitting , ended and the on assumed a character. The intentions of the United States, in attacking , was to destroy the terrorist empire of Osama bin Ladin and his hosts, the Taliban, in an effort to replace the existing political infrastructure with one more pliable to the American interests. With the beginning of the American attacks, the Fifth Afghan (and the first one of this century, but not necessarily the last) started and though it is still in its early phases, its end is obscured in doubts and apprehensions.

As the United States undertakes it campaign to destroy the terrorist network of Osama bin Ladin, and the Taliban, the United States needs to clarify its intentions in the . The United States needs to ask itself what is the primary focus of the American in the , and more importantly, what will be the American , which will deal with the vacuum left in the Afghan politics once the Taliban are defeated and removed from power. The problem confronting the United States, in its aims in , is not the scale or the objectives of the – those have been articulated clearly by the Bush administration, but what to do once the is over and what level of political engagement is the United States capable of maintaining as it seeks to influence the realities in a post-Taliban .

The “ Question”, which is mystifying the makers in Washington, is just how to create a political situation in , in the post-Taliban scenario, which can be sustained and agreed upon by the neighboring countries of . In realistic terms, the final solution to the “ Question” will be a politically based answer and a not a response, because the problem which the United States wants to resolve in is a political one.

In order to resolve this crisis, the United States needs to pay attention to the political aspects of the crisis. The consideration, which the United States must try to understand, is not the application of power, but a political consensus, which can hopefully prevent a similar situation from arising, that led to the rise of the Taliban as a political phenomenon in the first place. The political consideration, which the United States hopes to realize by its actions, is to see the emergence of a responsive and a stable political administration, which can help the Americans in eradicating bin Ladin and his network in .

Therein lies the threat to the United States, because in the rationalization of the American objectives, the United States has to, an extent, get involved in an attempt at nation-building, because of its primary purpose of having a friendly replace the Taliban in . The United States needs a friendly to facilitate its intentions, because though the Taliban can be militarily defeated and removed, bin Ladin has to be dealt with on a political level simply because the philosophy, which he advocating is politically motivated and can only be politically neutralized.

The basic contentions, which bin Ladin has against the United States and for whose attainment he encourages reprisals against the Americans, is the removal of the American presence from Saudi Arabia. Even though bin Ladin uses means against the United States, he is a political phenomena; a creation of the west, the United States and its Pakistani protégés during the Afghan-Soviet of 1979-89. It was the radicalization of , tailored to suit the interests of the west in the the Cold against the Soviet Union, which energized as a political movement and introduced the concept of a , or a holy , to attain objectives in contemporary politics.

The radicalization of , as a political movement, was the brainchild of the Pakistani ruler General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia, who seemed to be harboring dreams of leading a revival of pan-Islamism, hoped to emerge as a messiah of an Islamic political revival in the world. In this, he was charitably aided by Saudi Arabia and its intelligence services, which provided vast sums of money to ’s intelligence services to funnel into Central Asia and resurrect within the Soviet Union itself. The Americans, who were aware of this, turned a blind eye towards the actions of the Pakistanis and the Saudis in hopes of further weakening the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union and seeking the demise of Moscow’s political influence.

Due to this Realpolitik of the cold , which exploited as a political tool to gain an advantage, became the center of gravity; where there was a revival of the concept of and Muslims from all over the world flocked there. After the end of Afghan and withdrawal of the Soviets, the interests, which had created a militant got disinterested, and the situation was allowed to fester and no steps were attempted to close the Pandora’s Box, which had been deliberately opened by the Americans, the Pakistanis and the Saudis to attain their political objectives. The United States’ lack of interest in formulating a political regime, in the post-Soviet , encouraged a civil bitterly contested by the various Afghan commanders, who had previously fought under one banner to rid the country of Russian troops. From 1989 to 1994, when the Taliban ended up in the political control, the country was in turmoil and there was an acute anarchy prevailing within .

The Taliban, themselves, were students of studying in various Islamic seminaries that were a version of in . These seminaries, were allowed to be created by Zia to consolidate his own interpretations of within the polity of and by the time the in ended, were scattered across thousands of Pakistanis and Afghans a militant version of . The political growth of the Taliban can be directly credited to the ISI, the inter-service-intelligence of , which hoped to exploit the Taliban to impose its own interests in the Afghan politics. The Afghans, who were tired of the rapine and the civil in their country, welcomed the Taliban, in the early stages. Though they did not agree with the harsh brand of as practiced by the Taliban, the Taliban were tolerated, because they brought a resemblance of a and order situation to . In this sense, the Taliban were a political phenomenon that happened to have a benefited from the prevailing political vacuum in and accidentally ended up in power for a lack of a better alternative.

The consolidation of the Taliban regime in was made possible by the Pakistanis, and Islamabad’s over riding interest to ensure a stable and non-threatening western frontier. For the first time since , had a in Kabul that was friendly to it and this allowed the Pakistani to realize its concept of a “strategic depth”. The doctrine of strategic depth mandated that could use the territory of to deploy its assets beyond the Indian ability to destroy them.

Also, a friendly in Kabul, in the calculations of the Pakistani , would allow it the tactical flexibility of moving two additional army corps, to its eastern border with , to be used as strategic reserves to its two strike corps based in Multan and Mangla. In order to actualize this concept of strategic depth, covertly aided the Taliban in its campaigns. In some instances, Pakistani army officers were detached from their regular service to serve as advisors to the Taliban and direct their campaigns. It was this national imperative, of a secure western border, which led to recognize the Taliban diplomatically and militarily support their perpetuation of power.

’s Afghan , though critiqued by the United States and the west, was insisted by Islamabad in order to maintain a friendly in Kabul. Even though Islamabad was coming under increasing international pressure and was slowly being marginalized in international affairs, the prospect of a non-secure western border was worth the risk, according to the foreign pundits in , to risk an international censure. was operating under the presumption that its influence on Kabul could be used to moderate the extremism of the Taliban. The reality was that after being supported by in their quest for power, the Taliban once they came into the possession of power started to show an independent streak and seemed to be slowly drifting away from Islamabad’s ability to manage them. Though was acutely aware that it was losing its political grip on the Taliban, it still persisted in supporting them due to reasons of its own national security interests.

In this sense, the fatal flaw in ’s Afghan was that Islamabad had severely miscalculated that Taliban, which had started as a religious revival and a political phenomena, could mature into a responsible . There was a sense of anticipation in that the Taliban would smooth their rough edges and could be more attentive to the concerns of Islamabad. Even though the Taliban was becoming more of a liability than an asset to , Islamabad was unable to change its Afghan , because of the influence of ISI, Taliban’s supporters, in conducting and influencing ’s Afghan . The events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing American ultimatum changed the security realities for and Islamabad was confronted with a stark choice: continue aiding the Taliban and be internationally isolated and dealt with at a later time or cooperate with the United States and earn a “get out of jail card” with a promise of economic incentives to help its aid dependent from slipping into bankruptcy.

’s interest in seeking a peaceful and stable western border stems from the fact that Islamabad knows that every time there is a crisis inside , it has to bear the consequences. Afghans usually trek to , when there is a conflict to seek refuge and this influx of refugees creates myriad problems for . The areas of , adjoining with , are a part of the Federal Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) and do not consider themselves as a de jure part of . When there is a crisis in , the inflow of Afghan refugees usually finds a sympathetic audience in the Pushtun areas of . It is in light of ’s own and order concerns that it wants the Durrand Line, the official name of the - frontier, to be peaceful and devoid of any political agitation, which could be used as a pretext to create disturbances against Islamabad.

Secondly, given ’s own internal realities of tribal fragmentation and ethnic dissimilarities, the balance of power within is a very powerful allure for intervention by outside forces. is ethnically divided according to geography and is composed of many different ethnic groups. The most important Afghan ethnic group is the Pushtuns and the Pushtuns themselves are sub-divided into two groups: Durrani and Ghilzai. The Tajiks are the second largest group comprising about 25 percent of the as compared to the Pushtuns, who make up about 38 percent of the Afghan populace. The Hazaras are about 19 percent of the followed by the Uzbeks, who are about 6 percent of the total of . The remaining 12 percent of the is composed of various tribal ethnic groups like the Baluch, Turkmen, Aimaks and non-Muslims like Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists.

The Tajiks are located in the northeast around Kabul and up to the Pamir Mountains with a smaller demographic representation sprinkled around Heart in the southwest. The Turkmen are located in the areas near the border with Turkmenistan and the Uzbeks are concentrated near Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. The Hazaras are predominantly located in the Hindu Kush near Bamiyan and are mostly Shias. The Pushtun Durranis occupy the southern areas around Heart, in the west, and the lands near Kandahar through Kabul. The Ghilzais populate the eastern provinces and live in the border areas with . Religiously, ’s is divided between the Pushtuns, who are Sunni and about 85 percent of the and the Shia Harzaras, who are about 15 percent of the . ’s political and tribal loyalties are thus; fractured along ethnic and geographic lines and the internal conflicts of are also based on the ethnic and geographic divides.

It is this fissured and anarchic situation inside country, which tempts outside powers to intervene in hopes of resolving the crisis and in the process, establishing their influence inside . The cycle for foreign intervention in is quite familiar and well established. Traditionally, the Afghans have always fought one another, when they have not been fighting an outside power. Most foreign powers intervene, like the Soviets and the Pakistanis, in order to aid one Afghan faction/group in their perennial civil wars on the pleas of the Afghan themselves and once they intervene, the Afghans stop their infighting and join forces to fight the intervening power. After some time, the intervening power leaves in disgust at being embroiled in its civil wars. Where upon, the Afghans start fighting between themselves to win power and at the same asking another power to intervene and when another power intervenes, the process repeats itself.

In this sense, the Americans have to be extremely wary of intervening in ’s civil on the side of the Northern Alliance, renamed as the United Front, against the Taliban. If the United States intervenes, it is likely to get embroiled in a civil with no end in sight. The United States has to realize that the defeat of the Taliban, will not cure the problems in and they should be under no illusions that the Afghan balance of power can be tilted so easily by simply defeating the Taliban. What the United States has to understand is that the key to a stable does not reside in the fortunes of between the United Front and the Taliban, but in the national security interests of ’s neighboring states and the political considerations they might have as to what happens in a post-Taliban .

is interested in playing a role in the post-Taliban for reasons of securing its western border, making sure that it has a friendly regime in the west and is not encircled by hostile powers on both sides; and . Therefore, has a vested interest not see the United Front march into Kabul, because it knows that it will be hostile to Islamabad. It is for this reason that it wishes to see a broad based comprising all ethnic groups in , but headed by Pushtuns, who have a political affinity with the Pushtuns of . is not comfortable with Zahir Shah either, the former king of , and if it had to choose, it would pick the aging king as the lesser of two evils. Even though realizes that its Taliban has been discredited; it still seeks a role in , which will prevent from being antithetical to the interests of regionally and politically.

Russia is interested in the situation in for its own reasons. Russia hopes to keep the Islamic extremists out of the Central Asian Republics (CAR), which it wants to control. Towards this end, it is eager to support the Tajik and Uzbek armies, in the United Front, fighting the Taliban. Russia wants to lessen the role of the Pushtuns, because it wants to deny a land route to the CARs through . Russia does not wish to allow the CARs a route through , or open up it resources to the outside world, because doing so would lessen Moscow’s authority in the region and might encourage an American presence, indirectly through , to channel the CAR exports away from the west to the south. By keeping the CARs economically dependent on Russia, for access to their exports and imports, Moscow wants to maintain its political influence and have a share in the transit fees associated with facilitating the CAR exports/imports.

Russia does not entirely wish a stable inside . It is interested in exploiting the extremist threat from the south to keep a presence in the CARs to give legitimacy to its ongoing operations in Chechnya. Consequently, Russia has mixed feelings about a post-Taliban on its southern border and is tacitly influencing the policies of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in this crisis, to safe guard its own political interests.

Iran, like Russia, has an abiding interest in and that is to prevent from getting access, and facilitating the American right of entry, to the oil deposits of the Caspian Sea. Iran supports the Shia Hazaras and is not happy at the idea of a Sunni in Kabul. However, Iran would not be too displeased if there is continuing instability in , because that would lessen the attraction of an oil pipeline, to the Caspian Sea crude, through and . The other choice would in the west or through Iran and in this sense; Tehran would welcome the petrodollars of the west in transit costs. Iranian interests are purely economical and such; Iran is an interested party and does not wish to be absent from participating in any discussions debating the future of after the Taliban are gone.

The two countries, which are likely to benefit indirectly from the ongoing crisis in , are and . is deeply concerned about the Islamic threat to its northwestern provinces and is suspicious of the Uighars, Chinese Muslims, and wants the United States to solve the problem of Islamic extremism and limit their possible influence from spreading any further regionally, especially in . wants the United States to get involved in the quagmire of and hopes that will be able to distract Washington, while Beijing consolidates in its influence in Asia. is hoping that the present Afghan crisis, and the American involvement, will solve its problems of Islamic militants, without having to risk any political capital with the Arab world had it adopted a direct and confrontational towards the Uighars.

Though the Chinese are hoping that the United States would remain bogged down in and allow it the freedom to pursue its intentions in southeast-Asia, it does not want a permanent American presence in , from where the Americans would be in a position to electronically eves drop into itself.

stands to benefit from this crisis, because would be confronted with hostile neighbors on both sides and would be always unsure strategically in the region. could leverage this Pakistani hesitancy to pursue to a more proactive in and be assured that will not have the options to risk a response to Indian actions in . benefits from this crisis in the shape of the deployment of the two Pakistani army corps to the west and in making feel vulnerable in the east form undertaking any actions, which might result in an Indian response. , if it has the wisdom, can channel this opportunity into seeking a modus vivendi on and make agree to fait accompli on the issue of . The gamble for in this crisis is that it has to balance its advantage over without undermining the domestic situation in , due to its bellicosity, and not risk an unstable , which would not be in the interests of the United States in the present situation or for that matter in the Indian long term interests.

Hence, given all these external considerations and internal realities of the political situation in , the United States risks winning the militarily in , but losing it politically. The key to the American success in is to create a , which will help it in its fight with Taliban and bin Ladin, because though the Taliban will be eventually removed from power, there is no guarantee that they will stop fighting. America has to seek the political cooperation of ’s neighbors in formulating a consensus as to what will replace the Taliban and in this sense, the neighbors of do not agree with the United States as to what is the best to formulate in the post-Taliban . Due to the lack of clear-cut objectives, the United States is entering this crisis without a well-defined strategy and is already exhibiting signs of a “commitment fatigue”; it wants to militarily remove the Taliban and leave the post-Taliban scenario to the to deal with and create a replacement for the Taliban.

The United States has to realize that, traditionally, the Afghans have always resisted a imposed from abroad, because the Afghan system of politics is predicated on their tribal alliances and is a diffused power structure, where decisions are taken by consensus and are not dictated. The traditional Afghan tribal authority resents a centralized structure of power, which is not based on the ethnic tribal loyalties. Therefore, the United States is headed towards a protracted involvement in , which is going to be costly and finally end in the United States having to risk leaving without actualizing its strategic goals. The foreshadowing of the American commitment being doomed arises from the fact that the United States began this in haste and without articulating what it wanted to achieve. In doing so, it entered this without a well-defined exit strategy and with no idea as to what to leave in place after the Taliban; a set of conditions, which have mandated a long American presence in , because if the Americans leave prematurely, they have attained nothing politically and if they stay, they risk being embroiled in ’s internal political struggles, with its dire historic consequences.

It would seem that after the British, the Russians and the Pakistanis, it is the Americans’ turn to realize that every nation, which had a reason to intervene in had to eventually regret its decision, because its Afghan has usually come to haunt it. Whatever the consequences may be for the United States due to its involvement in , the Americans should have paid heed to the warnings contained in the lines of Kipling’s poem, quoted at the beginning of this article. Everyone who enters and tries to solve its problems for their own benefit has two choices: a or a political . The United States has to chose between these two options in dealing with and how it deals with this choice, will influence the events in that forsaken country and the rest of the world for a long time to come.