The Chicken Hawks Of Pakistan

Almost six months have lapsed since India announced its offer of a cease-fire and Pakistan reciprocated that offer to further lower and manage the conflict being waged across the Line of Control (LoC). Whether the original Indian offer for a cessation of hostility was mitigated by a genuine desire for peace or not will decided once and for all, when the winter snows melt in the high mountain passes along LoC and the military activity resumes long the disputed border. On the Pakistani side of the equation, it would seem that Pakistan had no choice but to respond to the Indian offer or risk being further castigated in the forum of international opinion. In a cynical sense, it would seem from the first blush that both India and Pakistan had exhausted themselves in the endless maneuverings of the Kashmiri problem. Both the countries have slowly resigned themselves to the fact that the parameters of the problem had slowly slipped away from their ability to manage it manage it.

Pakistan, for the last 50 years, had sought to adjudicate the Kashmir problem via a military solution and had failed miserably in its attempts. India, for the last 20 years, had increasingly relied upon a military approach to pacify the Kashmiri problem only to be disillusioned, as the Kashmiri problem seemed to defy a solution predicated on a military based logic. Having tried the military option, both India and Pakistan are reluctantly coming to the realization that Kashmir is a politically based problem. Hence, its final solution will be a politically acceptable compromise and not a military solution. It will be in the diplomatic sphere that Kashmir will pose the greatest challenge to the foreign policy mandarins of India and Pakistan. It will be the diplomatic arena, which will prove to be more dangerous and explosive as Islamabad and New Delhi grapple with issue of Kashmir in a serious manner.

As Pakistan and India place more reliance on the usefulness of diplomacy to settle the issue of Kashmir, they will discover that the “Kashmiri Question” will not be easy to solve. This “Kashmiri Question” will increasingly come to dominate the Indian-Pakistani diplomacy on the resolution and it will be instrumental in deciding how both the protagonists deal with the myriad nuances of the Kashmiri problem. The “Kashmiri Question”, in a very simple sense, is basically how to settle the issue of Kashmir by simultaneously satisfying the political demands of both India and Pakistan on the issue.

The problem, which emerges within the above mentioned scenario is that Kashmir is a quad-lateral problem involving Pakistan, India, China and the Kashmiris themselves. Even though Pakistan and India are the pre-dominant actors in the Kashmiri drama, China holds a very critical position of a political-military fulcrum in the Kashmiri problem. The real “wild card” in the Kashmiri crisis are the Kashmiris themselves. Should the Kashmiris opt for independence, the end result would be a fierce power struggle between China, Pakistan and India to politically dominate Kashmir.

Presently Kashmir is locked in a status quo ante between China, India and Pakistan. Should Kashmir declare its independence, there will emerge a political vacuum that has the potential of disrupting the regional politics to a degree not contemplated. The real threat, which radiates outward from Kashmir, is who will replace the vacuum of Kashmiri independence. Pakistan, in its present incarnation, is in no position to politically influence events in Kashmir to appease its political interests.

Pakistan cannot emerge as a major consideration in a post-independence Kashmir unless it manages to reform its ailing economy and gets its domestic political situation under some semblance of control. India and China can opt for a modus vivendi on the issue of Kashmir, but would be wary of the political situation in Pakistan, as it would directly pertain to Kashmir. The biggest unknown question of the Kashmiri independence would be as to what extent will be it dominated by the politics of the Islamic militants/jehadi elements. Whether these elements would be operating on their own or they would be operating on the logic of a Pakistani “wither on the vine” policy towards Kashmir and indirectly at India.

In any case, Kashmir is a hot spot for a future India-Pakistan conflict. As its political dynamics gradually gravitate outside the influence of New Delhi and Islamabad, there will be a sense of desperation in India and Pakistan. This problem will worsen and is not likely to improve, as time will pass. One of the reasons, which prompt nations to wage war, is the perception of a zero-sum reality. Under this rationale, nations opt for war not to win a political advantage, but to prevent the status quo ante from being imbalanced in the favor of their adversary.

Consequently, Indian and Pakistani perceptional realities on Kashmir are motivated by interpretations of emotionalism; an animosity based on a historic sense of treachery; and a domestic political climate, which holds Kashmir as the sina qua non of its national political identity and is extremely disinterested in a political compromise over the issue.

Kashmir is, in a sense, the proverbial “Balkan’s powder keg” of the Indian-Pakistani politics. Unless it is resolved, the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan would be limited to a permanent state of war occasionally punctuated by periods of accidental peace. As the political situation unfolds in Kashmir, it will be the localized Kashmiri political aspirations for independence, which has the potential for further deteriorating Pakistani-Indian bi-lateral relations. Even though Kashmir can be considered as a problem affecting India and Pakistan, its regional ramifications are too unsettling, as far as international opinion is concerned, for its fate to be decided just by the whims of Indian or Pakistani political machinations.

As the west, notably the United States, becomes interested in the energy rich nations of Central Asian Republics and as it gears its “new cold war” with China, United States will have a strategic interest to mollify the issue of Kashmir and gain entrance into the central Asian republics. If the United States is to engage China in a political-economic confrontation, it cannot afford to have Kashmir teaming with anti-American motivated Islamic/jehadi militants if it wants to use the region as a stepping-stone into the central Asian republics to restraint Russians interests in the region. In this sense, China, too, would be interested in limiting the exposure of these groups inciting the Chinese Muslim areas against Beijing’s authority. Also, China would be extremely wary of the United States exploiting its domestic woes for Washington’s own political advantage and is desirous in seeking an end to the Islamic jehadi activities in the region.

In this sense, the United States has to co-opt either India or Pakistan to facilitate its political niche into the central Asian republics. As the European Union starts to incorporate the former Eastern Bloc nations into its vision of a European economy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily creeps up to the border of the Russian Federation, Russia will seek a political accommodation with China to balance the European-American sphere of influence against it. Consequently, the United States will need to re-orient its strategic perspective to prevent a Sino-Russian confluence of political influence, which could dominate Asian politics to the annoyance of the United States’ interests in the region.

Therefore, with this in mind, the United States would be more inclined towards fostering ties with India. It would hope to use the traditionally good relations between Moscow and New Delhi to its own advantage against China. Since the over ridding interest of the United States would be to limit the Chinese influence, it would be partial towards an American-Russian-Indian axis against China. Under these circumstances, it would be logically sound to suggest that China would seek a closer relationship with Pakistan, but it would be wrong to suggest such a scenario. Even though China would be inclined towards Pakistan, it would be hesitant in recruiting Pakistan’s help, because of Islamabad’s tacit support to the Islamic/jehadi elements. China would be loathe to give Islamabad a diplomatic patronage, which it could use to pursue its policies in Kashmir, when those policies could have a overall negative impact on China’s own internal security concerns.

With the recent destruction of the Bamyian Buddhist statues by the Taliban the reality that has emerged is that Pakistan’s Afghan policy has failed. By openly resisting pressures from Islamabad to amend their decisions, the Taliban have shown an independent streak, from the concerns of Islamabad. This suggests that the Taliban feel themselves to be politically secure as not to seek Pakistan’s diplomatic patronage to perpetuate their rule in Afghanistan. This must be an exasperating reality for Islamabad to accept. With the failure of its Afghan policy, Islamabad has also proven itself to be incapable of controlling the Islamic militant/jehadi groups within Pakistan that admire the Taliban as their political role models.

The fact is that most of these groups’ political influence and support is located within Pakistan. They use Pakistani territory to export their political ideologies externally implies that these groups would be politically independent from Islamabad’s political interests. In toto, these groups present an obvious danger to the internal security of Pakistan through their creation of defacto political states within the geographic confines of Pakistan. Pakistani Islamic Taliban like minded groups effectively exercise considerable influence in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and with the large Afghan population existing in Baluchistan, most western areas of Pakistan can be accurately described as geographic extensions of Afghanistan. There is no writ of the federal government of Pakistan in these areas. These areas are, for all practical considerations, semi-autonomous political states existing within Pakistan and owning their allegiance to Afghanistan’s Taliban and their interpretations of Islam.

In a political sense, Pakistan has fractured along sectarian and ethnic lines with the provinces of Pakistan unwilling to exist within a federal confederation. The only binding authority, which has managed to keep the provinces of Pakistan in the semblance of a nation-state, are the armed forces of Pakistan. This option itself is not a valid guarantee that Pakistan will exist as a nation-state in the future. There seems to be a distinct polarization in the armed forces of Pakistan, notably in the Pakistan Army, between a liberal segment and an Islamic section. The lower to middle ranks of the Pakistan Army (from general ranks, non-commissioned officers and from lieutenants to colonels) is pre-dominantly Islamic in their political outlooks. Whereas, the higher flag ranks (brigadiers to lieutenant-generals and higher) are western oriented and more secular in their perceptions.

In many ways, the present leadership of the Pakistani army is the last of the western inclined class of officers. After them next tier of general rank officers will be Islamic in their political convictions. These officers, who started their military careers under the fervor of Zia-ul-Haq’s version of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan, are now poised to assume the leadership of the world’s seventh nuclear-armed army with all of its attendant repercussions. Pakistan army was, and still is, the last bastion of a western oriented secular class in Pakistan with political ambitions. With their departure, Pakistan will be increasingly introverted politically in international relations, as other nations will attempt to isolate Pakistan and limit its influence in the region.

Given the political behavior of the Taliban, when confronted by a series of international sanctions and being painfully made to realize their isolation in the world, there is ample reason to expect a similar response from the future Islamic military leadership of Pakistan. One can only hope that the international community has the foresight and the common sense not to push Pakistan to the proverbial wall, because the jehadi spirit of martyrdom does not exactly understand the fine nuances of realpolitik. Since Pakistani politics are likely to remain chaotic, Pakistani army will be the only well organized political party in Pakistan, which can effectively manage the politics of Pakistan in an institutional manner. If Pakistan army’s political ambitions are combined with an Islamic based ideology then the future of Pakistani polity will be increasingly isolationist internationally and intolerant domestically towards the plurality of differing opinions from the national orthodoxy.

Should this situation transform into reality, it will have dire consequences for Pakistan’s future. Presently, Pakistan is internationally isolated. Its return to the fold of the international opinion is contingent upon three considerations: seek a diplomatic solution to the Kashmiri problem with India; limit its nuclear program and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty capping Pakistan’s potential as an exporter of nuclear technology to states like Iraq or Iran; and to rein in and neutralize the Islamic jehadi groups operating from its soil.

Unfortunately, Pakistan will find it very difficult to return to the good graces of the international opinion. Pakistan cannot agree to a mediated settlement on the Kashmiri issue, because the many Islamic/jehadi militant groups that are operating in Kashmir, with the sotto voce blessing of the Pakistan army, have a vested interest in the prolongation of the Kashmir problem. For most of these groups, Kashmir is the cause celebré of their political identities and without the Kashmiri issue; they will have no political reason to justify their existence.

Even if the Pakistan army wants to end the Kashmiri conflict and seek a political understanding with India, it cannot because without Kashmir the Pakistani army will find it impossible to justify its dominant influence on the expenditure of the national budget. Pakistan cannot afford the luxury of a huge defensive drain on its tottering economy and Kashmir is the Pakistani armed forces eternal excuse to delay the diversion of funds into the social spheres of civic life to restructure its crumbing infrastructure. Furthermore, Kashmir is an ideological and not a political issue in Pakistan. Pakistani army has been traditionally considered as the “defenders of the ideological and geographic frontiers of Pakistan”. Thus, Pakistani army will undermine its own arguments to maintain its dominant role in the national political life. Pakistani army cannot justify its existence and continue to be a crippling handicap on the national economy without the issue of Kashmir to act as its raison d’ être.

The other condition for ending Pakistan’s isolation in world affairs would be signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and concurrently with it initialing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Pakistan would be willing to sign the CTBT, because CTBT seeks to limit Pakistan’s nuclear program and not end it. Since India is Pakistan’s “primary target”, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is predicated on the proposition that it can effectively target key Indian civilian and defensive installations to maintain a credible posture vis-à-vis the Indians.

On the other hand, signing CTBT would release the much-needed international donor monies, which the Pakistani economy desperately needs to survive without actually slipping into a real default from its present state of a “technical default”. The international community is fully cognizant of the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear program is a fait accompli and it cannot be rolled back. It still wants Pakistan to abide by the CTBT as a sign of Pakistan’s diplomatic commitment to obey the behavioral norms of the international nuclear restraint regime. Pakistan is coming under a severe international pressure urging it to sign the CTBT. The problem, being confronted by the present government, is that it has to tread a delicate path in deciding the issue by appeasing the domestic political lobby to maintain its political stability domestically and to pacify the international community in order to receive international aid, which the ailing Pakistani economy desperately needs to meet its interest payments on its outstanding foreign debt.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a more pressing concern for Pakistan, because of its economic compulsions. Pakistan, for that matter the defense establishment of Pakistan, i.e. Pakistan Army, is aware that Pakistan must have a source of earning hard foreign currency in the future if the present regime of sanctions against Pakistan, instituted after its May 1998 nuclear tests, continues to in place against Pakistan.

Pakistan needs hard currency not to float its economy, but to maintain and pay for its armed forces and maintain their present “threat postures”. Pakistan is keenly looking abroad to export arms and though it has refused to proliferate nuclear technology, Pakistan would not be averse to the idea if the economic necessity forced it to consider the selling of its nuclear technology for hard cash on the open market. Therefore, the signing of the NPT would be against the interests of the Pakistani armed forces, because it would make it difficult for the Pakistani armed forces to exist and perpetuate their existence, within a regional and a domestic role.

The last stated condition for Pakistan’s return to the international forum would be reining in and stopping the various Islamic/jehadi militant groups from operating from its soil. The irony is that most of these groups are the creation of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and are exploited by ISI to fan the flames of the Kashmiri. Should Pakistan limit its support of these Islamic/jehadi groups, it will risk allowing India to re-consolidate its political authority over Kashmir. Pakistan does not have the means or the capability to fight India for Kashmir and its use of these groups, to fight a proxy war against India, is too make it difficult for the Indians to walk away with the historic price of Kashmir away from Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan does not have any tangible control over these groups, because they have developed, over the course of years, a vested interest of their own in maintaining the conflict in Kashmir. Even if Pakistan were to seek to neutralize their operations, these groups have a considerable base of support in Pakistan that they can pose a credible threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan itself. To rein in these groups is a task for the Pakistani armed forces and given the differing perceptional rifts present in the Pakistan army, between the Islamists and the secularists, there is a real danger of a civil war igniting in Pakistan over this issue.

Even though the Pakistani army might be interested in limiting the operational scope of these groups, it will be hesitant to do so, because it would invite a state of acrimony within its own ranks. Pakistani army realizes that its strength, as the most well organized and powerful political party in the politics of Pakistan, stems from its internal cohesion. Consequently, it will not under take a course of action, which risks its internal unity and thus, jeopardizes its future influence in the politics of Pakistan.

The common theme in all of these conditions for ending Pakistan’s international isolation, by the international community, is the desire on the part of the international opinion to limit the role of Pakistani armed forces. The international community holds Pakistani armed forces, mainly the army, as being chiefly responsible for the nuclear tests of 1998. The sanctions against Pakistan are it attempts to punish the Pakistani armed forces for their act of defiance against the international community. Therefore, the conditions for ending Pakistan’s isolation are designed to limit Pakistan army’s role in domestic and regional politics.

The tacit option given by the international community is that if the Pakistani armed forces want to end Pakistan’s international isolation, they would have to limit their own role/influence in the domestic affairs of Pakistan. The refusal of the Pakistani armed forces to heed the international opinion would imply that the regime of international sanctions against Pakistan would continue with its disastrous results for Pakistan’s future. Under this scenario, the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army, is faced with a cruel choice. It will have to decide if the future of its institutional influence in Pakistani politics is more important the future of Pakistan itself.

The military interregnum in Pakistan wants to end the nation’s international isolation and guarantee its own influence in the Pakistani politics for the near foreseeable future. Its hesitancy in the matter, to take bold decisions to affect the desired result, stems from its own unwillingness to take the required steps. The biggest stumbling block in this matter is Kashmir. One of the international criteria for the ending Pakistan’s international isolation is to seek a negotiated settlement on Kashmir with India. In this sense, Pakistan’s wish of a third party mediation will be realized, but not in the sense it might have hoped for in resolving the issue.

International mediation often follows an economic rationale to harmonize relations. Given the opportunities of the integration of global economies, any third party decision invariably pursues its own national and security interests. The international community is paying a belated response to the Kashmiri problem, because of its geo-political interests in the region. India, with its growing domestic consumer market, has emerged as a “sweet spot” for the western economic interests and if the west is gain a foothold in the Indian market, it will have to reciprocate with a required quid pro quo that will whet the Indian interests in opening up its markets and allowing access to the American and European Union firms into India. In this sense, a possible third party mediation over Kashmir will be dictated by the domestic economic compulsions of the mediating country itself and its decision will be formulated to enhance its own political interests in the region.

Consequently, within the logical parameters of this approach, India has a distinct advantage, over Pakistan, in having a third party mediation favoring its position in Kashmir. By supporting India’s case on the issue, the international community has the potential to gain economically and further its interests in an emerging global market of the future. Pakistan, with its defunct economy and a non-existent and a highly unstable political climate does not have the same economic allure as India. The international community fully realizes that Pakistan is in no position to make political demands over Kashmir and given the precarious nature of its economy, it will be forced to accept any settlement over Kashmir in order to ensure the continuation of international aid to prop up its economy.

Therefore, in a realpolitik sense, Pakistan will have to forego its calls for a third party mediation and directly deal with India if its wants to retain its interests in the matter of Kashmir. India realizes this predicament of Pakistan’s weakness. Hence, it is deliberately delaying discussions with Pakistan on the issue hoping that Pakistan’s problems will further weaken its position on the issue. Pakistani response, in reply to the Indian unwillingness to enter discussions with Pakistan, is ironically forcing Pakistan to renew its calls for third party mediation to settle the problem. What Pakistan does not seem to understand is that its traditional position on Kashmir has been compromised by its own domestic policies of political and economic mismanagement. In realistic terms, Pakistan has no one to blame, but itself because its has repeatedly weakened its Kashmir stance by holding it hostage to the whims of its confrontational style of domestic politics and its rampant culture of corruption and financial misconduct, which has created the present circumstances in which Pakistan has no choice, but to accept a fait accompli on the issue of Kashmir.

Economic growth, under this assumption, takes on an added urgency for Pakistan. Pakistan’s lack of a viable economic development has emerged as its most potent Achilles’ heel. Pakistan needs to restructure economically since in the present international parlance, a nation’s foreign policy is the continuation of its economic interests and a nation’s ability to articulate its foreign policy is directly proportional to its economic strength. In this sense, the resurrection of Pakistan’s failing economy is crucial if Pakistan hopes to exercise some influence on the issue of Kashmir. Pakistan cannot afford to be politically eclipsed on the issue of Kashmir, vis-à-vis India, and to prevent this from happening; Pakistan has to drastically revamp its economic fortunes.

After a decade of tough International Monetary Fund and World Bank guidelines for the prolongation of aid, Pakistan has bitter realized a harsh truth. The lesson, which Pakistan has learned is that the international financial institutions (IFI), in lending monies, are beholden to the donor nations, which exercise considerable influence on their lending patterns. Though the international financial institutions may be motivated by economic considerations, it is the political interests, which guide the policies of the donor nations. Hence, the IFIs are bound to follow the political wisdom of the donor nations. It is the political interests of the donor nations, which influences the macroeconomic policies of the host nations. In other words, if Pakistan wants to receive international aid, it will have to pay a political price for it.

In context of this realization, Pakistan is acutely aware of the fact that if it wants to sustain its Kashmir policy, it will need the periodic infusion of international aid to keep its economy afloat and to prevent a sovereign default on its debt payments. The international community has already spelt out for Pakistan as to what it needs to do in order to insure the flow of aid to its bankrupt coppers. Recently Japan had hinted at the possibility that if Pakistan signed the CTBT, the annual Japanese development aid to Pakistan (amounting some 1 billion dollars) would be resumed.

Many nations, including the European Union nations, have suggested a similar course of action for Pakistan. Given that the Pakistani economy has grown insipid with each passing day, Pakistan’s resistance towards the signing of the CTBT has diminished considerably. Signing of the CTBT is the final “get out of jail card”, which Pakistan has to prevent an economic meltdown. Given that the Pakistani economy will worsen in the days to come, instead of getting better, Pakistan will have no other option, but to capitulate and sign the CTBT.

If, and when, Pakistan signs the CTBT it would have lost all pretenses to its sovereign independence. Its sovereignty would have been mortgaged to the donor nations and their political interests via the monetary shackles of IFIs. CTBT would only be the beginning of Pakistan’s political schadenfreude. It will have to implement the other western demands to end its international segregation. Presently, in international eyes, Pakistan is a heart beat away from being declared a terrorist sponsoring nation and a rogue state. If Pakistan wants to avoid the fate of other such accursed nations, it will have to agree to a settlement on Kashmir and end the activities of the Islamic/jehadi groups operating from its soil.

All of these actions will entail a severe domestic backlash, specially from the various religious groups that would view Islamabad’s agreement on Kashmir as a betrayal and the capping of Pakistan’s nuclear program as a the final victory of the Indian-Zionist conspiracy against Islam. The military interregnum is capable of resisting such pressures, but it cannot guarantee that its decisions, to end Pakistan’s isolation, will be honored by the next civilian government. Whether that civilian government can withstand the political pressure to reverse the military government’s policy in agreeing to the international wish list in ending Pakistan’s international loneliness, is the greatest cause of concern to the military government. It is, because of this fear that present military regime favors “selection over election” as a pre-condition for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

Therefore, it is with this intention that military regime is toying with the idea of amending the constitution of Pakistan. The military government wants to revive the Eight Amendment, which gives the president of Pakistan the powers to dissolve the parliament and remove the sitting government and it wants to, via a constitutional amendment, seek the incorporation of a national security council in the politics of Pakistan. The real purpose of a national security council would be to monitor Pakistani politics and “advise” the civilian governments in critical foreign policy, defense and economic policy decisions. In other words, the national security council would be the final political authority in Pakistan; it will have the right to “counsel” the president in political matters (telling him to dismiss elected governments) via the presidential right to do so as enshrined in the Eight Amendment of the Pakistani Constitution.

Given all these changes, which Pakistan is currently going through, the tacit realization is that military regime in Pakistan should be prepared for an uncertain political future. The intentions of the present interregnum government and its desires to balance its domestic interests with its international aspirations will not be easily achieved. It will have to undertake some harsh decisions. Some of these decisions include a “donor friendly” policy to appease the IFIs, which are giving large amounts of aid to Islamabad and whose “suggestions” Islamabad cannot afford to ignore.

The down side of this policy is that it will risk alienating the military government from the population and breeding a deep sense of resentment against it. Everyone in Pakistan believes sotto voce that the military is not above the pale of corruption either and because of this, the military is overly concerned about its popularity image in the eyes of its domestic constituency. If the military government plays towards the popular opinion, it will risk angering the IFIs upon whose generosity it is banking to prolong its rule in Pakistan.

Kashmir is another Gordian knot, which this government needs to solve, because Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir has passed beyond the “fail-safe” point and is stating to offer diminishing returns for Islamabad. Kashmir is the raison d’ être of Pakistan military’s justification for its monopoly of the national expenditures. In other words, with the issue of Kashmir resolved, the military becomes accountable for its actions and has to adequately explain its privileged position and influence in Pakistan’s domestic politics.

The government of Pakistan has to decide its options on these critical decisions, which are increasingly becoming vital to Pakistan’s future well being. There is no safe middle ground for it. Neither is there any luxury of time for it to delay and indefinitely postpone this decision. Pakistan’s ailing fortunes demand that the government in Islamabad swallow the bitter pill of reality and take the requisite decisions in the long-term interests of Pakistan. This government is blessed with the opportunity that it has a chance to rectify the past mistakes of Pakistan and set the country on the right path. The military regime in Islamabad should stop playing the façade of a democratic government. It should accept the fact that it is a military dictatorship and act accordingly in the strategic interests of Pakistan.

There is an American military term known as “chicken hawk”, which means an action that is composed of both bravery and cowardice at the same time. Pakistani armed forces, the army in general, are the present chicken hawks of Pakistan, because it wants to desperately implement changes in Pakistan, but is mortified of their consequences. If the military hopes to introduce a new era in Pakistani politics, it can accomplish its intentions, but it will have to be more hawkish than chicken in its actions. The only question is whether it has the courage to over come its fears and take the proper decisions in the long-term interests of Pakistan?