The Gentleman Must Go

The events in Pakistan have taken a life of their own and
have rapidly moved beyond the ability of Nawaz Sharif's government to
control them, let alone attempt to rein them in. The dust had barely
settled in the arid deserts of Baluchistan, made infamous by
Islamabad’s supposed loss of nuclear virginity, when the country found
itself stranded on the crossroads of a national dilemma. In the post
nuclear Pakistan, the government’s decision to declare its nuclear
sovereignty was meet with the imposition of severe economic sanctions
and the gradual isolation of Pakistan in the fora of international
opinion. What was otherwise a difficult situation was made even more
worse by the government’s inept attempts to curtail the inevitable
disaster looming over the horizon. In the nearly five months since the
explosions in Chagai, the only aspect of the Nawaz Sharif's
government, that has remained constant, has been its impartiality in
blundering into more crises.

It is not in the purview of this article to itemize the folly of Nawaz
Sharif's decision making demerits. Those decisions are well known to
all Pakistanis, whether living in Pakistan or abroad, who have seen
the results of his mismanaged policies. The present government has
shown an extremely despairing lack of confidence in its decision
making abilities. The imposition of an emergency rule, immediately
after the nuclear tests, and the sheer lack of coherence in
articulating an economic regimé in the aftermath of the nuclear
explosions, proved that government was out of its depth when it came
to dealing with the consequences of its May 28, 1998 decision. Nawaz
Sharif, it seems, had gambled on the fact that patriotic fervor would
gloss over the harsh realities and would, in fact, mute all criticisms
to his policies. He miscalculated the national mood. Once the euphoria
of the nuclear blasts had worn out and the Pakistani people awoke to
the bitter possibilities awaiting them, they came to the realization
that their future had been mortgaged by Sharif and his nepotic cohorts
to salvage their own imperial interests. Nawaz Sharif in ruling, not
governing, over Pakistan seems to be favoring the old Latin maxim:
divide et imperia - divide and conquor. In his efforts to retain his
power, he has not been shy from formenting provincial rivalaries;
encouraging sectarian violence and spinning a web of lies to prevent
his true nature from being discovered.

That true nature of his is that of a tyrant. Like his much esteemed
mentor, Adolph Hitler, he is using the democracy as a means to
absolute power. In the past, he has engineered constitutional crises
to force the resignation of a president, a chief justice and an
admiral from office and now, the Chief of the Army Staff, General
J. Karamat. It is the undeclared intention of Sharif and those who
support him, to gradually weaken the institutions in the country that
have a say in its political discourse. He already controls the
parliament and representatives in that body have shown a remarkable
lack of will in rubber stamping his dictats. He already has a puppet
president to bid his commands and whose strings he periodicaly pulls
with consumate skills. With the resignation of COAS, General Karamat,
perhaps the most powerful and influential person in the politics of
Pakistan, he has managed to excert his influence into the rarified
realms of internal military policies.

Pakistani army, unlike most of the institutions in the country, is
more democratic than most people give it credit. Though the Pakistani
Army is a part of the nation’s armed forces, it is by far the only
branch of the service that matters. The Pakistani navy and the
Pakistani air force, considered as co-equals in the overall scheme of
things, view the army as primus inter pares, or first amongst
equals. The oligarchy of the Pakistani army, presided over by the Chief
of the Army Staff and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who acts as a sounding board for the other services, consits of the
corps commanders who command the striking power of the Pakistani
army. The decision making process in the Pakistani armed forces,
dominated by the army, revolves around a common consensus as agreed
upon by the corps commanders. The Pakistani military, though it has
ruled Pakistan for nearly half its existence, in its interal policies
is highly democratic. No decision can be reached or implemented
without the consensus and approval of all the three branches of the
service. To do otherwise, would be to risk an internal schism and
fragment the internal unity of the armed forces themselves, a course
of action that is highly verboten and frowened upon by the armed
forces’ high command. Therefore, COAS when he states a position, it is
with the blessings of the other services and has their support. Thus,
the views expressed by COAS are not necessarily his own, but reflects
the collective opinion of an institution that has become weary of
Sharif’s, in the words of General Jehangir Karamat, “insecuirty driven
policies”. In light of this, it should not come as suprise what the
COAS meant in his October 5,1998 remarks. He was openly voicing a
consensus that was emerging within the armed forces themselves towards
Sharif's style of rule.

On that day, General Karamat, as COAS, intoned a creation of a
National Security Council to manage the economic, foreign and domestic
policies of Pakistan. In doing so, the COAS was merely stating what
the corps commanders and chiefs of Pakistani navy and air force were
privately thinking. General Karamat, during his tenor as COAS, was
known to be a man of consensus in decisions involving the armed forces
of Pakistan and he was forced by an internal debate, within the armed
forces themselves, to voice a cautionary note to the Nawaz Sharif’s
government. The Pakistani armed forces encourages its officers to
engage in a healthy debate concerning its future and except for the
Zia-ul-Haq's period, as COAS when some officers were furloughed for
their independent minded views, the Pakistani armed forces is highly
tolerant of its internal critics. During his stay at the Lahore Naval
War College, the COAS General Karamat was asked some serious questions
about Sharif's ability to handle present crisis and was asked why he
had been so restrained in his dismay over the government's
performance.

Ever since the nuclear tests in late May, the military has watched
with a sense of growing apprehension as Nawaz Sharif has lurched the
country from one crisis to another with no end in sight. In the
process, a common consensus appeared within the top elechons of the
armed forces, particulary amongsts the corps commanders, that
implicitily questioned the competence of the present
goverment. General Karamat was aware of this emerging criticism, but
had kept silent, because there was no common unity amongsts the corps
commanders themselves on this issue. Accordingly, a few corps
commanders still opted to give Nawaz Sharif the benefit of doubt and
favored a wait and see approach. Apprently, within the last week or
so, the remaining corps commanders came around to the majority view
and joined in the chorus calling for Nawaz Sharif to justify his
actions. The decision making body of the Pakistani army, comprising of
its corps commanders, does not operate on the principle of a simple
majority, but on the complete concurance of all concerned and will act
only when there is a hundred percent commonlaity of views on any given
topic. That viewpoint was made public by General Karamat’'s comments
and that he had been, “under pressure” from within the military
establishment itself and was resisiting it. As far as Sharif was
concerned, he read the writing on the call and thus, demanded a
retraction from the armed forces for having thought the unthinkable:
his inability to handle the present situation, as created by him for
his own political expediency. Given the tense and acrimonious meeting
between himself and General Karamat, it seems that the latter refused
the demand and opted to accept the blame himself as to preserve the
internal cohesion of the armed forces themselves.

The armed forces’ mistrust of the Nawaz Sharif’s's style of rule stemmed
from his own lies and duplicity. Sharif, according to an article by
Mohammad Malick, lied to General Karamat on the appointment of
President Tarar. He told the general that it was a cabinet desision
and not his own personal choice, even though the cabinet was not even
consulted and was later asked to “approve the appointment”. Sharifif
mislead the military, in the personage of the finance minister, Sartaj
Aziz, when he promised that Pakistan could bear the consequences of
the economic sanctions being imposed on it. In this Sharif found the
perfect scapegoat to blame when the economic fortunes of Pakistan
turned sour, suggesting that it was the military which pushed him to
the fateful decision on May 28, 1998. Hence, the military rightfully
resented being kept out of the decision making loop, comprised of
Nawaz Sharif’s inner family members, even excluding his cabinet, and
being forced to accept the blame for decisions in whose implementation
it was not even involved in. Another thing that rankled the army, and
throughly disgusted General Karamat, was the refusal of the Sharif to
appoint Lt. General Ali Quli Khan, General Karamat’'s own hand picked
succesor to the post of COAS. General Karamat saw this as a personal
betrayal by the very man whose job he had so doggedely defended in
face of overwhemling pressure from the armed forces itself.

Furthermore, the hierarchy of the armed forces are leary that the
Nawaz Sharif in his attempts to stay in power will undermine the
nation’'s position of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty, to name just a few, by making consessions not
in the national interest, but in lieu of his personal interests,
i.e. the ability to stay in power. Also, the military is highly
critical of Sharif’'s paens to Islamic Law and is doubtful about his
reasons behind championing Islamization of Pakistani courts. Given the
text of the Shariat Amendment, the military is concerned that Sharif
will use that as an excuse to weed out from the armed forces’ ranks
officers he finds critical of his policies. The armed forces may
tolerate an ineffective civilian government in the name of democracy,
but it will draw the proverbial line in the sand when it comes to its
own internal functioning. The armed forces of Pakistan, specially the
army, has always prided itself on being independent from being
influenced by politics, but capable of influencing politics, but the
present crisis seems to threaten that very idea. Sharif, by tacitily
becoming the supereme commander of the armed forces, seems to be
willing to politicise the ranks of the armed forces to suit his
political inclinations. This notion seems to threaten the very
existence of the armed forces, because the armed forces have managed,
in the past, to stop the politics from entering the barracks and thus,
maintain their insulurarity from sectarian politics.

This was the very reason which prompted the Pakistani army to leave
Saudi Arabia when the House of Saud complained about the Shia officers
in the army and asked for their removal from their respective
regiments. It had balked at that suggestion and it is certain that it
will resist Nawaz Sharif’'s interference in what it considers to be
matters of internal policies. The army is of the opinion that Nawaz
Sharif is exteremely disdainful of institutions in the country that
seek to curb his power and instead of making them stronger, he is
willing to undermine them for his own political gains. Having done so
to the courts, in the crisis that forced the chief justice of the
supereme court resign, and then doing it again to the institution of
the presidency, the army feels that now Nawaz Sharif is seeking to
undermine the institution of the armed forces itself. To the armed
forces, it seems clear that Nawaz Sharif is using his elected mandate
to amass dictatorial powers and become in the process, not only the
most powerful prime minister in history of Pakistan since
Z. A. Bhutto, but also emerge as der Führer of a Panjabi inspired
reich in Pakistani politics.

Nawaz Sharif wants to accomplish this by weakening the political
institutions that can resist his meglomania for power and the chief
institution that can hurt his aspirations is the military. Therefore,
it was with this reason why he consolidated the power to appoint the
armed forces chiefs himself, away from the president. Sharif, like
Hitler before him, wants to create a military leadership that is loyal
not to the instituion of the armed forces, but to himself
personally. It was this blant agrandization of power that concerned
General Karamat and the leadership of the armed forces, forcing him to
make his statement on October 5 about the creation of a super agency
to check abuses of power in the Pakistani civil-military affairs. He
had merely stated what was the unsaid opinion of the military
leadership that Sharif’'s bid for power had to be checked, because he
was using democracy as means to turn the country into a theocratic
dictatorship and in the process was willing to fragment the national
confederation of provinces for his own advantage. What ever the real
reasons may be, the armed forces can not ignore how Sharif has dealt
with the institutions in the past. The crises with the presidency, the
judicary and now the military have taught the military leadership of
Sharif’'s contempt for all institutions that can curb his power. The
implicit lesson that has emerged since then, within informed circles
in the country, is that Nawaz Sharif is a popularly elected autocratic
determined to by-pass and undermine any set of institutions, or
critics, who have the audacity to challenge his authority.

Thus, given the remarks of the former COAS at Lahore, it is impossible
to believe that those were his personal views. The provinces, other
than Punjab, were registering their concerns at the imperial mandate
emerging in Islamabad and that their autonomy, as under the 1973
Consititution, was being eroaded. The fears of the smaller provinces
forced the armed forces to review the delicate relationship between
the provinces and the imperium in Islamabad and based on that
understanding, the armed forces wanted an intensive debate, involving
the provinces and the center, to resolve the issue by addressing the
provincial claims. This was the crux of the questions, others being
the economy, the possible theocracing of the armed forces, that was
raised at the Navy War College, in Lahore, by the middle and senior
ranks of the armed forces and put to General Karamat. This conference
followed on heels of a meeting on October 1, 1998 in which a consensus
emerged within the provincialists that Sharif was diluting the power
of the provinces and instead of making the senate and other
institutions stronger; instead of encouraging a national participation
in those institutions, he was weakening them and turning them into a
useless façade, to legitimize his autocratic mandate. The fact that
national politicans were invited to address the National Defence
College, on September 26, 1998, like Mumtaz Bhutto and Asfandyar Wali,
amongst others, was clear indication that armed forces were alarmed at
the prospects of Sharif’s insecurity driven policies and wanted an end
to the present climate of politically expedient policies which were
destroying the national confederation, as envisioned in the 1973
Consititution. These two events, on September 26 and on October 1,
following the most recent corps commanders’ conference, created the
atmosphere for the address by General Karamat to Navy War
College. Consequently, the remarks expressed by General Karamat were
the collective opinon of the armed forces of Pakistan and the
provincial leadership questioning the policies of der Führer Nawaz
Sharif.

Since then much has been made in the press, both in Pakistan and in
the west, of the former COAS’'s commitment to democracy and his refusal
to overthrow the government. The fact that he resigned, was explained
as the armed forces acceptance of Sharif’s democratic manadate to rule
Pakistan. Nothing could be further from the truth. The armed forces of
Pakistan, like any other insitutution in the country, is a bureaucracy
that is exteremly possesive of its sphere of influence. The reason why
General Karamat resigned was, because he was considering the internal
solidarity of the armed forces. Nothing would have pleased Sharif more
than to see a witch hunt within the armed services themselves, as the
senior officers questioned each others’ commitment to the insitution
of the armed forces. This would, in fact, have destroyed the unity of
the armed forces and would have rendered them impotent to resist his
dabblings within its internal matters and thus, influence the makeup
of its officer corps to reflect his political aims. It would have
forever destroyed the role of the armed forces as a political power in
Pakistan and ironically, would enabled Sharif to complete his imperial
conquest of Pakistani political landscape. Hence, the real reason why
General Karamat resigned was to limit the influence of Sharif in the
internal matters of the armed forces and to allow the services to
regroup and close their ranks, so to speak, to resist Sharif’'s power
play against the military.

This then raises the salient question whether the armed services have
capitualted to the cult of Sharif’' power, as mouthed by his
syconphants, or instead they have just changed their tactics in
response to the new threats emerging from the Prime Minister’s
sectariat. Already, the minister for propaganda, or in the Orwellian
sense the minister for information, Mr. M. Hussain, is intent on
creating the impression that Sharif’s democractic government has won
the battle and in the process has subjugated the military to the whims
of the civilian form of government. He is correct in assessing that
the leadership of the armed forces, particulary the army, are on the
defensive, but to assume this intra-institutional warfare, between the
centre and the armed forces, is over is a flawed perception. Nawaz
Sharif may have drawn the first blood in the early stages of this
fight, but it is highly unlikely that he will be able to finish what
he has started. Ironically, though he has hoisted his power over the
military and he also has no one, at the present time, to blame for his
lack of performance, but himself. Even though Sharif may have earned a
temporary respite, it will not last long, because the army is in the
middle of a leadership shuffle, as the vacancies created by General
Karamat’s, and his two most senior subordinates’ resignations are
filled. Once the re-shuffle of installing new officers, on the corps
level, is a done deal, the picture will begin to clear as to what the
next moves of the armed forces will be.

As seasoned observors of the Pakistani politics will confirm, the
appointment of a new COAS does not necessarily mean a change in the
institutional thinking of the armed forces. Through the COAS is the
most important and the most influential rank within the armed forces,
it is above all else, still that of an offical spokesperson outlining
the armed forces internal viewpoints on the issues of the
day. According to well informed sources, the Prime Minister’s first
choice for COAS was Lt. General Khalid Nawaz and Lt. General Khwaja
Ziauddin. However, though it is unclear why, but there was a
possibility of a serious rebellion within the army on these two
choices. Since General Karamat’s own nominee, Lt. General Ali Quli
Khan, had been rejected by Sharif, the appointment of Lt. General
Pervez Musharaf, commander of I Corps at Mangla, was a compromise
choice. The fact that the new COAS was third in line of seniority and
his two immediate superiors resigned over his nomination, has enjoyed
an extended play in the Pakistani media, to a lesser extent was even
noted in the western press. There is nothing remarkable in this
development. Senior military commanders throughout the world, when
passed over for a promotion on this level, routinely tender in their
resignations since it goes against the grain of military tradition to
accept orders from their former subordinates. Already much has been
speculated about the new COAS. He is reputed to be a fine officer who
commands professional respect within the army, but whereas the former
COAS was considered, “ a soldier’s soldier”, the present COAS is more
of a technocrat. Prior to his posting to I Corps, he had served as the
Director General of Military Operations and that should be an enough
of a hint as to his capabilities. In what is known of his past
experience, the new COAS is more of a staff officer variety than he is
of a front line soldier.

It will take awhile for the new COAS to settle in his duties and it
will be some time before the army’s new corps leadership emerges in a
more detailed light, till then Sharif has managed to gain some time
for himself. It is also a false premise to indulage in the wishful
thinking that the new COAS will reflect Sharif’s viewpoint within the
high command of the army. In other words, he will be Sharif’s man
within the army. All evidence points to the contary. Being a corps
commander himself, he no doubts is fully aware of the institutional
viewpoint of the armed forces and if the recent criticism of Sharif’s
rule in the corps commanders’ last meeting is any indication, he seems
to be in the majority opinion. According to the picture that his
emerging of his character, he seems to be a man with strong opinions
on issues, military or otherwise. The salient point that needs to
stressed here is that, despite all the rhetoric coming from Islamabad,
and which even the vaunted western press failed to mention, Sharif
has, in real terms, achieved no political victory for the democratic
forces in Pakistan by having an army chief of staff resign. He may
have established the precedent for appointing a COAS, but the ability
of that COAS to function in his office depends on the consensus of the
corps commanders to to keep him there. Therefore, it is crucial in the
coming days to watch what happens within the circle of the corps
commanders themselves and not to press releases coming from the Prime
Minister’s sectariart in Islamabad. The real decisions affecting
Pakistan’s future will be decided in the new makeup of the corps
commanders and not by what Nawaz Sharif thinks.

This is not a comforting thought for the government. The remarks of
the former COAS have ushered in a consitutional crisis which will
decide, for better or for worse, the fate of the representative form
of government in Pakistan. The only sin that General Karamat was
quilty of was thinking aloud what everyone in the country was thinking
sotto voce. He showed a personal courage in saying what he did and
though he paid for his remarks, he atleast pulled the wool off
everyones’ eyes in suggesting that Sharif was building a popularly
mandated dictatorship. More than Nawaz Sharif, he showed his personal
commitment to democracy when, instead of allowing a coup d’ état, he
resigned. His resignation should be seen for what it was: the
strenghtening of insititutions to resist, legally, the unbridled
abuses of power without resorting to extra-legal means to correct the
situation. In doing so, he has done more for representative
institutions in Pakistan than Nawaz Sharif will ever to do. In a
democratic\representative form of government, individuals do not
matter, but what does matter is the independence of those institutions
from unnecessary intimidatation. Democracy is the sum of many parts
and its originality lies in its ability to shape compromises. In a
representative form of government where compromise is replaced with
fiats, it ceases to be a democracy and instead becomes an oppressive
regimé. Democracy should not be construed as the rule by the majority,
but should be seen as the ability of the minority to implement its
viewpoints in the larger forum of public opinion. Otherwise, a
popularly elected government is just another name for tryanny by the
majority.

In his final act, General Jehangir Karamat, the former COAS, lived up
to his oath, taken as a cadet, to defend Pakistan from all forms of
danger, both external and internal. It is too early to speculate on
history’s verdict on his tenure as the eleventh Chief of Army Staff,
but it would not be too amiss to quote Andrew Marvell’'s ode, said
after seeing the beheading of King Charles I, “"he nothing common did
or mean upon that memorable scene”". General Karamat, always the
professional soldier, in opting for the insturment of resignation
showed his successor the right path that needs to be followed if
Pakistan is to become a true democractic country. It was also a
warning to Nawaz Sharif to heed the complaints being voiced against
his imperial mandate. To ignore the lessons imparted by General
Karamat would be the folly of the highest order and an unmitigated
disaster for the proponents of democracy in the country.