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What were your impressions about the various general officers who you saw in East Pakistan as a SSG CO in terms of operational ability, grasp of the situation and decisiveness or the lack of it?

General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Army Staff, had a sharp mind, grasped the situation quickly and gave decisive orders.

Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub, I saw him as the Eastern Command commander before the military action of 1971, he gave me the impression that he had not applied his mind to the problem of inadequacy of troops for the defence of East Pakistan. He seemed to be in complete control of the situation and his refusal to take military action was a total surprise.

Lieutenant General Tikka, I saw him as commander Eastern Command and Governor of East Pakistan. He avoided responsibility, gave orders and then retracted without reason, he always seemed to be looking for guidance from those above him.

Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander Eastern Command who surrendered and brought a big blot on Pakistan. He was out of his depth from the beginning, he never grasped the situation, did not understand how to deal with a rebellion, he had no power of decision and left things to his staff saying “kuch karo”, when I was told to suggest the employment of the SSG in the defence of East Pakistan and I suggested a raid on Calcutta to seize television and radio stations and announce that Calcutta had been seized, Niazi’s comment was that I wanted to become a ‘brigadier’, he did not understand the difference between strategic and tactical military operations at the corps level and covered up his shortcomings with bluster. A jackal who masqueraded as a tiger.

Major General A. O. Mitha, Quartermaster General, he had been my commanding officer in the SSG and GOC in the 1st Armoured Division. With Lieutenant General Tikka as the commander Eastern Command in nominal command, Major General Mitha held the actual command of the initial actions of the military actions to re-establish the writ of the Pakistan Government. He had a good grasp of the situation, went around and briefed the brigade commanders and when the action started he went wherever a crisis occurred and retrieved the situation.

Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, GOC 14 Division, a good officer with a good grasp of the situation, he went wherever there was a crisis and took necessary action.

Major General Rao Farman Ali, I met in connection with arresting Mujib, he knew what the situation in Dacca and around Mujib’s house was and he insisted that I drive to Mujib’s house with one officer and arrest him, the next day he tried his best to get me out of Dacca, later he showed a lot of energy in conveying our surrender message to the UNO, I have wondered whose side was he on?

Major General Abdul Rahim Khan was reputed to have been posted to East Pakistan in response to a special request by Lieutenant General Niazi and was said to be ‘General Niazi’s brains’. He had no tactical common sense and operations started by him usually got stuck and had to be completed by other commander’s troops. The SSG, while I commanded 3 Commando Battalion, was employed three times when he got stuck in his operations, once when his 14 Division got stuck up at the Bhairab Bazaar bridge, once to assist 39 Baluch to clear Bahmanbaria and the third time was when the general undertook an attack with two infantry battalions supported by artillery, under his direct control, to clear the Belonia salient. The attacking infantry went to the ground three hundred yards from the start line and refused to advance. The general applied the ‘DS’ solution, two platoons of SSG were airlifted and they cleared the salient. The next day I admonished the JCOs (the officer in command Major Nadir disappeared when he heard that I had come) because they had failed to establish communications as per my standing orders in the SSG battle drill. For this admonishment after a successful operation, I was removed from command and placed on adverse report. Because of actions in the 1971 war he became known as ‘Bhagora” to differentiate him from other Rahims.

During the period 1947-65 very few (about three) East Pakistani infantry units were raised. While after 1966 suddenly many units were raised. Why was this lopsided and irrational policy adopted and what do you have to say about the assertion that the East Pakistanis would have felt less alienated had more East Pakistani units been raised just like any other infantry unit from 1947-1948?

At partition the manpower that we received was far more than our share of weapons and we could not afford to equip and maintain all the manpower and a lot of it had to be sent home, there was almost no expansion in the army and the infantry except two battalions of a new Pathan Regiment and three battalions of the new East Bengal Regiment. The army, except the infantry, expanded after the American Aid made up our deficiencies in armour, artillery and logistical units, the overall number of divisions remained the same except the 1st Armoured Division and in 1965 14 FF was raised as a motor battalion, the manpower agreement of the US Military Aid limited manpower in each arm and service.

Within the existing limitations, in the expansion beginning in 1955, East Pakistanis had a quota in all arms and services and were recruited but since infantry did not expand they remained limited to three battalions. After the 1965 war the US Aid limitations did not apply and as the infantry expanded more East Bengal units were raised.

The alienation increased as the number of East Pakistani units increased. The mistake was that the East Bengal Regiment did not have a class composition as the rest of the army, two companies of East Pakistani with a company of Biharis and Chakmas etc would have prevented the alienation.

What in your opinion was the solution to the dilemma of defending East Pakistan?

I assume that this question pertains to the situation in 1971 when it became obvious that India would attack.

The dilemma was created by the problems of the distance between West and East Pakistan and Indian territory in between, attitude of the civil population, length of the border that had to be defended, the disparity in the relative strength between the Indian forces and our own.

The problem of the distance between the two wings and the Indian territory in between required a defensive battle in East Pakistan to draw the maximum Indian forces to enable the Pakistan Army in West Pakistan to wrest enough Indian territory to bring the Indians to a rational negotiation. The “fortress” type defence and logistical stockpiling for 45 days were correct actions but Lieutenant General Niazi had his own ideas, Lieutenant General Jilani told me that he visited East Pakistan in early November 1971, the fortress type of defence had not been taken up and when the Eastern Command commander was reminded he told Jilani that he was ready and if the Indians attacked “men goday tor desa” (I will break their knees) and kept his forces spread all over East Pakistan.

The fortress defence would also have reduced the troop requirement due to the length of the border and the difference in relative strength.

A change in the attitude and gaining the co-operation of the people or at least some of the people of East Pakistan was vital for preventing the break up of the country. An effort for getting the support of the local population should have been undertaken immediately after the military action was started. Dialogue should have been sought with the Muslim League and other parties; leaders like Fazlul Quader Choudhry and some others were willing to co-operate and provide manpower which could have been used to reconstitute the East Bengal units, for action across the border and in our own area. In fact Fazlul Quader Choudhry did provide men whom we trained and employed for gathering intelligence and sabotage in the Tripura area.

A number of these leaders, including religious leaders, were hanging around Eastern Command offering the services of their followers, I advocated the acceptance of their offers to Eastern Command but I was on adverse report and not in favour with Niazi. Later some organisations were created but not while I was in East Pakistan. The most valuable service that these men would have provided was anti-Mukthi Bahini intelligence and trans-border intelligence. From Rangamati, without official permission, we were able to establish an intelligence net in the Awami League headquarter in Tripura and another net in the city of Chittagong which reported on the arrival of Mukhti Bahini men. These intelligence nets and trans-border sabotage ended with my removal from the command of 3 Commando Battalion as it had no official authority.

The other manpower available was that of Biharis, Chakmas etc, the East Bengal battalions that had mutinied should have been reconstituted with a class composition from these men. I had about 200 Chakmas enrolled in East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces which replaced the East Pakistan Rifles, these were trained as guards for bridges etc and they performed very well. (They probably became the core of the Chakma rebellion.)

Also thought should have been given to the employment of the Bengali troops who were wandering about lost because their units had disintegrated, I employed some as interpreters. A lesson should have been taken from the 1857 Mutiny, the rebellion should have been suppressed using local manpower.

Eastern Command should have established an ‘internal defence command’ complete with its own intelligence net and troops and left the army to defend the borders against the expected Indian attack. (The internal defence set up was probably created but did not prove effective.)

Apart from the above a surprise of some sort should have been planned, I suggested a commando attack on Calcutta and was ridiculed by the Eastern Command commander.

What do you have to say about the issue of “atrocities” committed by both sides in the Civil War period as you saw it in East Pakistan in 1971?

The Bengalis went berserk with the announcement of the postponement of the National Assembly meeting. The Biharis suffered the most, entire colonies were wiped out, West Pakistanis serving in small cities and rural areas were killed. One ex-SSG officer serving in a East Bengal Regiment was said to have been put in a pot and boiled in the urine of the men of the battalion. A 8 East Bengal Regiment officer, wounded and captured near Kaptai, described how West Pakistani girls were stripped naked and made to serve food in their officers mess and provide other services.

I witnessed the atrocities committed in Chittagong, drums of human blood were collected, we came across four areas where non- Bengalis had been decapitated or shot and left, some in the open, some half buried, photographing of such scenes was forbidden; my book “The Way It Was” has one picture.

The other side of the coin. The troops knew about the atrocities committed by the Bengalis, when the military action started it was not declared an “aid to civil power action” no one cautioned the troops to use minimum force, every commander, from the section commander upwards, used his discretion.

During the initial military action commanders were faced with disarming and holding the disarmed Bengali soldiers, some officers resorted to killing. My wife and other people describe the killing of Bengali officers and men in Comilla cantonment. (17 officers and 915 men according to the Hamoodur Rehman Commission).

In Chittagong the West Pakistani labour followed the army and as an area was cleared, they indiscriminately looted all houses.

Arrival of troops from West Pakistan always was discernible by indiscriminate firing at night because they believed they were being attacked by guerrillas and indiscriminate looting in the day time. I placed a Supply and Transport second lieutenant under arrest for looting in Chittagong with two soldiers. When troops arrived from West Pakistan they considered areas under our control “free for all”. 39 Baluch when it arrived in Comilla cantonment and was housed next door to 3 Commando lines, looted our lines which our men had left in a hurry leaving their belongings in barracks.

Rape occurred, troops detached under NCOs and on patrols were the culprits. The claim that a vast number of women had been raped was disproved by the ‘abortion team’ sent by the sympathetic and gullible British, whose workload involved the termination of only 100 pregnancies.

Atrocities committed by the Bengalis were completely blacked out by the government of Pakistan, atrocities were committed by our troops but they were nothing compared to what the Bengalis had done. The Bengalis exaggerated them to gain the world’s sympathy and assistance.

You raised 38 Cavalry. How was the experience?

I earned an adverse report from Lieutenant General Niazi in June 1971, in mid-August I was attached to Station Headquarters Rawalpindi, pending a decision on the report, in the middle of September the adverse report was expunged entirely and at the end of September I received orders to proceed to Hyderabad to activate 38 TDU to 38 Cavalry. Lieutenant Col Akram Hussain Syed had been posted to 22 Cavalry in the same posting order while I was wearing the badges of 22 Cavalry. I protested to the MS and was told that the CGS, Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan had ordered the posting; I met the CGS who told me that I had been posted to raise 38 Cavalry as it had to be made ready for war in 15 days.

I then met the Director Armoured Corps who told me that 44 overhauled Sherman tanks, 3 tank dozers, one officer and 75 men were in Hyderabad and postings of officers and men had been made. On 1 October 1971, 38 Cavalry was officially raised, the raising posed four problems, the state of the tanks, shortage of all type of equipment, the quality of manpower posted and the training of personnel, most of whom had not served on Shermans.

After taking over the command I moved the tanks one kilometer and one tank engine seized, every time we moved the tanks an engine would seize and the EME took the attitude that this was occurring because the personnel were not trained on Shermans. I had a good knowledge of the Sherman II tank as I had served in 13 Lancers and 23 Cavalry which were equipped with them. I kept protesting that the overhauling of engines was faulty, the GOC arranged a visit for me to 502 Workshop where the engines were overhauled, I saw the whole process and could not find anything wrong as the engines were tested under load for 24 hours before they were issued. I returned and continued to protest, two days before the commencement of hostilities Colonel Saeed Qadir, later lieutenant general, the Inspector EME came to find out the reason why the engines were seizing. In the tank park Colonel Saeed Qadir, CO EME were standing and discussing the problem when an EME JCO who had served in the 72 Armoured Workshop Company, who was listening to the discussion, spoke and told us what the problem was. From the hull of a tank whose engine had been removed, he removed the oil sump and oil filter, opened it showed us that it was completely blocked with a black gooey substance. Since 1953 when the Sherman II tanks were bought by us the sumps and filters had neither been changed or cleaned as they were attached to the body of the tank. It was decided that the EME Workshop would start work on removing engines and cleaning the sumps and filters, but orders came for our move the next day and nothing could be done.

Anticipating that my tank engines would seize, before the visit of Colonel Saeed Qadir, I asked for twelve spare engines and an EME team with a breakdown vehicle to replace engines, these were provided but the breakdown vehicle that the EME brought was ‘Tatra’ with a low ground clearance and it sat on its belly in the desert so my engine change scheme failed.

I showed Colonel Saeed Qadir that the tanks were classified “Class IIB”, fit for battle, the 508/528 main wireless sets and the No 31 Set for communication with infantry were not working, their wiring had become brittle and power supplies were out of order, the guns had vertical and horizontal play, there were no tools for breaking and joining tracks and other essential jobs.

When I went to the GHQ in connection with the tank engines, I had received a “NA” certificate for 508/528 power supplies, I made enquiries and was told 508/528 wireless set spares were stored in particular store, I went to the Ordnance Directorate and told them, they started an enquiry and I did not get the stores.

There was a shortage of all types of equipment, wireless sets were not available so I accepted the No 62 set used by the artillery before the US Aid. Vehicles and weapons were the same story, out of 40 two and a half ton vehicles we received 9, we were lucky to get 10 one ton Dodge Power Wagon, an excellent desert vehicle and some GAZ, the Russian equivalent of the jeep; in personal weapons we were issued some Indian 9 mm Stens but the Ordnance refused to issue 9 mm ammunition as our TO&E did not authorise 9 mm Stens, pistols were not issued, the regiment went into action without personal weapons.

The officers posted to 38 Cavalry were a good cross section and none asked to be reverted to their original regiments. Amongst the JCOs I was lucky to have Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan from 5 Horse, but many JCOs were obvious discards. I interviewed all personnel as they reported arrival, most of the other ranks said that they had not served on tanks in their whole service, some were professional batmen, including one of a retired officer. All NCOs and other ranks who admitted having served on tanks said they had served on M 48s or T 59s. I organised training in driving, wireless operation and gunnery for three weeks using the TDU personnel and some JCOs who had served on Shermans, the training ending in field firing; there were about twenty five people injured in the training.

Thirty days from the date of raising 38 Cavalry moved to its deployment area and after sixty two it took part in the Rajasthan operation of 18 Division.

Please tell us in detail about the Loganewala operation of 1971?

While I was busy raising 38 Cavalry in Hyderabad I was called to Khairpur on October 16, where the 18 Division Headquarters were located. There the GOC Major General B. M. Mustafa explained his concept of forthcoming operations to Lieutenant Colonel Akram Hussain Syed and me, with his Colonel Staff Colonel Wajid Ali Shah present.

The general planned to defensively hold the front south of Rahimyar Khan and outflanking the Indian left flank seize Ramgarh and Jaisalmir; 38 Cavalry was to seize Ramgarh and 22 Cavalry was to neutralise the airfield at Jaisalmir; the GOC asked for our comments about the practicability of the plan from the armour point of view.

Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I said that the plan would succeed if we made an approach march to the border on one night and undertook the cross border operations the next night and air cover was made available on the first day from dawn to dusk till Ramgarh and Jaisalmir had been secured. The general said he would make arrangements for the air cover, he cautioned that the plan was ‘top secret’ and was not to be discussed with anyone.

In the first week of November, 38 Cavalry, less ‘A’ Squadron detached to 55 Brigade at Chor, concentrated at Manthar, about 25 miles on the road Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan. A few days after the regiment concentrated, the COAS and Air Marshal Rahim, the PAF chief came to Rahimyar Khan where the 18 Division plan was discussed and the PAF chief assured the required air support.

A few days after the Rahimyar Khan meeting, the GOC inter-changed the roles of 22 Cavalry and 38 Cavalry because he anticipated a tank battle in the Ramgarh area for which 22 Cavalry was better suited. I considered the operation, Jaisalmir was 120 miles from the rail head at Reti, I expected an engine breakdown every 15 miles and requested that 12 spare engines be provided with an EME team and a breakdown with a crane to change engines, the GOC agreed to make the necessary arrangements.

The officers of 38 Cavalry carried out reconnaissance for counter penetration covering the approaches to Rahimyar Khan and Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and I took our officers along the route that we were to take to the border, Reti-Khenju-Gabbar-Masitwari Bhit-border without telling them that that was the route that we were to follow in the forthcoming operations.

About the middle of November the news indicated that the attack on East Pakistan had begun and Indian aircraft started flying reconnaissance missions over Rahimyar Khan and Sadiqabad.

With war imminent I decided to let my officers and the Risaldar Major know that the mission of 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion and mortar battery was to capture Jaisalmir and neutralise the airfield. I explained how the mission was to be conducted and that each tank was to carry 200 gallons of petrol in drums. At the division headquarters there was no preparations for the very imminent operations, on 1 December Colonel Saeed Qadir came to investigate the seizing of tank engines and ordered the removal of tank engines and cleaning of oil sumps and filters.

On 2nd December I received orders to report to the division headquarters and there the GOC told me that operations would begin that evening, that 38 Cavalry, 1 Punjab and a mortar battery would follow 51 Brigade upto Loganewala and proceed to Jaisalmir to neutralise the airfield. The GOC told me that I was not to attend the division orders but to organise my force.

I telephoned my regiment to stop the work of taking down tank engines and prepare for moving out, I next went to the AA&QMG and told him that I required 16,800 gallons of octane 80 petrol, the AA&QMG told me that he knew nothing about the requirement and had no petrol available, after a discussion with the colonel staff the AA&QMG told me that the required petrol would be made available at Masitwari Bhit, 5 miles short of the border. It was obvious that the logistics of the operation had not been planned.

When the 18 Division ‘O’ group assembled, the PAF liaison officer, a wing commander informed the ‘O’ Group that the PAF would not be able to support the operation because the Jacobabad airfield had not been activated. This announcement led the brigade commanders to ask the GOC to cancel or postpone the operation, the GOC then telephoned the CGS and discussed the lack of air, after the discussion he informed the ‘O’ Group that his orders were to conduct the operation without air support in the ‘national interest’. The brigade commanders then suggested that the GOC refuse to conduct the operation because it was very likely to fail. The GOC told the ‘O’ Group that he would conduct the operation because if did not he would be labelled as a general who had lost his nerve.

The plan made by Major General B. M. Mustafa required an approach march of about sixty mile to the border, then a forty miles advance to Ramgarh by 51 Brigade of two battalions (the third battalion was a East Bengal battalion and had to be left out of the operations) and 22 Cavalry, by passing Loganewala, to position itself to counter any reaction from the Indian 12 Division which was expected to be deployed facing Rahimyar Khan. I was to command the 38 Cavalry task force consisting 38 Cavalry less squadron, 1 Punjab ex-206 Brigade and a mortar battery, and was to follow 51 Brigade till the metal road to Jaisalmir, 20 miles inside India was reached and then continue to Jaisalmir. 206 Brigade leaving one battalion on the Rahimyar Khan front (this front was held by Hur battalions) was to follow my force and secure Loganewala to form a firm base.

After these orders were issued the 206 Brigade commander objected to 38 Cavalry being sent to Jaisalmir with mechanically unsound tanks, the GOC changed the plan and ordered 28 Baluch the divisional Reconnaissance and Support Battalion less company and a mortar battery to neutralise the airfield and placed 38 Cavalry under command 51 Brigade. I was informed about the change in the plan on the afternoon of 2 December.

The orders received from GHQ differed from the plan that had been suggested, instead of making the approach march of 60 miles to border in one night and going across the border the next night, the GHQ order stated that the approach march was to start at 1530 hours on 3 December and the border had to be crossed at 2130 hours and the advance was to continue to Ramgarh and Jaisalmir, a total march of 120 miles in one night.

On the evening of 2 December I went to the 51 Brigade Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed was already there, he told me that the brigade commander was shaken and had lost his nerve, a little later the brigade commander came to the tent where the ‘O’ Group had assembled, he appeared shaken. The GSO 3 laid out the maps of the operational area, the maps covered our territory, Indian territory was blank squares, the brigade had not collected the maps of the operational area from the division headquarters. I placed my maps, which showed the terrain features on both sides of the border, on the table.

From the ensuing discussion it became apparent that the brigade commander’s mind had stopped working. Nothing was known about the Indian deployment, even the number of the Indian division was incorrectly said to be 11 whereas it was 12. As the brigade commander hesitated I told him that my guess was that an infantry battalion and a tank squadron would be protecting the Indian flank at Loganewala, that 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry with an infantry battalion on tanks to move on the track Masitwari Bhit-Loganewal and by passing Loganewala continue to Ramgarh. 38 Cavalry with an infantry battalion to follow and secure Loganewala or wait the arrival of 206 Brigade; no one objected and the brigade commander accepted the plan.

When the ‘O’ Group dispersed the artillery regiment commander asked me for my map saying that his maps were also without terrain features across the border.

On 3 December at 38 Cavalry tanks were to move on tracks for 25 miles and entrain at Sadiqabad and arrived at Reti railway station about, 30 miles from Sadiqabad at 1800 hours. I went to Reti railway station at about 1730 hours and asked the station master at what time the tank train was to arrive, he surprised me by saying that he had no intimation of any tank train, I realised that the AA&QMG had not informed the railway about the movement. I then spoke to the railway movement controller at Sukkur and after a lot of shouting and threatening the controller agreed to move the train to Reti. At the Reti railway station a goods train was standing at the tank unloading line, there was no ‘power’ available at Reti, we were arguing about this when the station master started going through the procedure of allowing a train to pass through, I made him stop the train and use its locomotive to move the goods train. At about nine o’clock the tank train with 14 tanks whose engines had been hurriedly refitted without cleaning the filters arrived and were unloaded.

We were running well behind the divisional planned schedule, from Reti the tanks drove to Khenju along a canal bank, at Khenju my second in command Major Zia Uddin Javed was waiting with petrol and the tanks were refuelled. From Khenju the desert track started and the tanks in low gear ground their way to Gabbar 19 miles from the border, thirteen out of fourteen tanks arriving at 0100 hours on 4 December. At Gabbar I was surprised to find 22 Cavalry and the GOC who told me that 22 and 38 Cavalry were the only troops which had arrived. At 0400 hours the GOC called off the operation for that day and both regiments dispersed. On the 4 December the Indian Air Force did not show up.

On checking up I found that the lorries carrying the petrol promised by the AA&QMG were stuck in the sand near Dharki, I sent a message to Risaldar Major Mazhar Ali Khan and he commandeered the EME battalion 6x6 vehicles and we refuelled. I looked for the tank that had broken down, it was a few miles from Khenju, the Tatra crane was bellied near Khenju, that put an end to my engine replacement plan.

During the day, on the advice of the brigade commanders the attack on the Jaisalmir airfield was abandoned and 1 Punjab reverted to 206 Brigade. Just before last light a battery of 130 mm guns passed through Gabbar and 38 Baluch joined 22 Cavalry mounted their tanks moved off towards the border.

At about 2100 hours six tanks and the reconnaissance troop of 38 Cavalry reached Masitwari Bhit, 22 Cavalry was refuelling; Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir was behaving very badly and had stated that he had no intention of going beyond Loganewala, I met Brigadier Tariq Mir and he told me that he intended not to go beyond Loganewal. At about 2300 hours 51 Brigade moved off leaving the elements of 38 Cavalry, a platoon of a Punjab battalion of 206 Brigade, one lost FOO at Masitwari Bhit and Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab joined us.

The operation so far was a movement of fiasco, civilian requisitioned 4x2 trucks could not negotiate the loose sand, 20 FF, a battalion of 206 Brigade, marched across the desert ‘to the sound of the guns’ when their vehicles failed to negotiate the desert.

At about 0200 hours on 5 December, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab and I decided that no one else was likely to join us and we decided to follow 51 Brigade. I ordered 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal with the reconnaissance troop to lead followed by the RHQ 38 Cavalry and six tanks under Major Javed Hussain. About two miles after crossing the border I found 2nd Lieutenant Javed Iqbal coming back, when I asked him where he was going he told me that all the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had disappeared, I realised that the NCOs had hidden their vehicles (I court martialled them after the ceasefire). Major Javed Hussain now took the lead and went 18 miles and four tanks broke down leaving two runners and we had to halt, two miles short of Loganewala, luckily on the highest ridge in the area.

At about 0730 hours, explosions were heard from the direction of Loganewala and columns of smoke started rising, I and my adjutant drove towards the smoke columns in my rover and from a ridge overlooking the Loganwala-Jaisalmir metal road we saw five tanks of 22 Cavalry and Indian tank burning, four Hawker Hunters of the IAF were circling and after firing all their rockets etc they flew away. A little later a helicopter took off, later I learnt that the GOC had come to 51 Brigade as it was out of communications with the division headquarters and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed to capture Loganewala.

I and my adjutant drove to the 51 Brigade headquarters, I asked the brigade commander what the situation was and he said he did not know, I then drove to the base of the hill on which Loganwala was located, two companies of 38 Baluch and a squadron of 22 Cavalry were formed up to attack.

22 Cavalry reached the rear of the Indian Loganewala defences at about 0200 hours, in the absence of the brigade commander 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch decided to attack and clear Loganewala before advancing to Ramgarh. At 0700 hours a squadron and two companies of infantry attacked and were engaged by anti-tank guns, machine guns and AMX tanks, one AMX was knocked out then 6 Hawker Hunters appeared, knocked out 5 tanks of 22 Cavalry and the Baluchis went to the ground due to straffing. Half an hour later 22 Cavalry formed up again to attack and the IAF knocked out six tanks, at about 0900 hours 22 Cavalry formed up again but after a vehement and abusive argument the brigade commander overruled the attack. 22 Cavalry had cut off the roads Loganewal-Ramgarh, Loganewala-Tanot and the road to Jaisalmir. The brigade commander ordered the concentration of the regiment around the brigade headquarters re-opening the Indian communications to Loganewala. In subsequent air attacks 22 Cavalry lost six more tanks bringing the day’s losses to 17 tanks, 10 killed and 17 wounded.

Four Hawker Hunters of the Indian Air Force circled Loganewala from 0700 hours to sunset and prevented any ground movement. 22 Cavalry fired all their 12.7 mm anti-aircraft ammunition and also tried their 100 mm in the anti-aircraft role but could not hit any aircraft that were releasing rockets and firing their guns from about five thousand metres.

After witnessing the pull back by 22 Cavalry I returned to where my tanks were, there I found Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, I told him of the affairs at Loganelwala and he asked me to accompany him to Loganewala. We found 51 Brigade deployed astride the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road out of contact with the Indian troops. The 51 Brigade commander told us that an Indian brigade had linked up with Loganewala.

While we were at the 51 Brigade headquarters a helicopter, flown by Captain ‘Mac’ Maqbool of 12 Cavalry, later lieutenant general, landed with orders from the GOC ordering 51 Brigade to capture Loganewal and Ghotaru, a place about ten miles on the road to Jaisalmir; on receiving the orders Brig Tariq Mir announced that he would not comply with the orders as the Indians were too strong for brigade to attack.

While we were witnessing the brigade commander’s refusal to obey the division commander’s orders, Indian aircraft again attacked and we all went into trenches, Brigadier Jahanzeb and I went to the same trench, there we discussed what we had seen and I told Brigadier Jahanzeb that it would be a shame to withdraw after coming 20 miles and convinced him to assume command as the senior brigadier; he hesitated and said I was creating trouble, but he agreed to assume control.

After the Indian aircraft departed Brigadier Jahanzeb informed Brigadier Tariq Mir that 206 Brigade would attack Loganwala and he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Shah, the CO 28 Baluch, the Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, to advance along the road Loganewala-Jaisalmir and capture Ghotaru. The CO 28 Baluch disappeared and explained after the ceasefire that he understood that he was to make a wide outflanking movement to Ghotaru by withdrawing to the Sadiqabad-Sukkur road.

Brigadier Jahanzeb returned to the point where my tanks had stopped, his brigade had concentrated there; he made an attack plan setting the H-hour at 0300 hrs 6 December, he gave out his orders and told me to go and explain the plan to Brigadier Tariq Mir and ask him to mark the “FUP” and provide a squadron of 22 Cavalry to support the attack. I reached the 51 Brigade area at about 1800 hours, I met Lieutenant Colonel Akram Syed and explained the plan, he told me that Brigadier Tariq Mir had decided to withdraw across the border. I then went to 51 Brigade headquarter and gave the requirements of 206 Brigade to the brigade commander who said that he was withdrawing across the border and remained adamant about it; at about 1900 hours the brigade started moving back.

The withdrawing 51 Brigade and advancing 206 Brigade crossed each other on Kharo Tar a high ridge line slightly ahead of where my tanks had stopped, Brigadier Jahanzeb decided to take up a defensive position on the ridge, at about 1130 hours the next day the Indians made contact with tanks and infantry. The GOC came and ordered 206 Brigade to regain the Loganewala-Jaisalmir road and 51 Brigade to prepare a depth position.

Later the GOC ordered a general withdrawal across the border and all ranks to fire small arms at the enemy aircraft. When I heard about this order, I drove to the division headquarters at Gabbar and met the GOC who confirmed his order, I told him that if there was a general withdrawal troops would not stop east of the Indus and if the order to fire small arms at the aircraft was not cancelled the troops would fire all their ammunition and run away. I asked the GOC to cancel both orders and order a fighting withdrawal with the two brigades withdrawing through each other, the GOC cancelled both his previous orders and adopted my suggestion. My motive in making the suggestion was to recover my broken down tanks lying between Kharo Tar and Gabbar and asked the GOC for recovery assistance, he arranged for WAPDA tractors which towed back most of the tanks.

While driving to the divisional headquarters I found the divisional Supply and Transport Battalion vehicles abandoned on the track on which the division had advanced, I ordered my driver to check the state of a vehicle and found that radiators had been drained and when my driver got into the driving compartment the driver of the vehicle came running, he was hiding in a bush.

By the morning of 7 December 206 Brigade was firmly established on Kharo Tar, my Quartermaster, Captain Bhatti, kept us supplied with food “meethi roti” and water from Sadiqabad and when a cry went up that 206 Brigade units were running out of ammunition, I made my Dodge Power Wagons available and ammunition was brought from Sadiqabad.

38 Cavalry squadron left at Manthar because their engines could not be refitted when the division started its movement, moved into counter-penetration positions on the approaches to Rahimyar Khan.

The GOC had complained that he was having a communication problem with 51 Brigade since the beginning of the operation, I told him I would see what the problem was. I sent my command vehicle with my adjutant to 51 Brigade Headquarters to establish communications between the brigade and the division and when my command vehicle would move the communication would break; my signal JCO could not find the reason; after the ceasefire an NCO disclosed that the brigade had kept its wireless set meant to communicate with division headquarters, switched off.

On the night 8/9 December 206 Brigade withdrew from Kharo Tar through the position prepared by 51 Brigade, 38 Cavalry after firing all the HE ammunition destroyed its two broken down tanks and moved to Masitwari Bhit. On 9 December after taking over the front, Brigadier Tariq Mir reported that two enemy tank regiments were turning his flanks to cut off the brigade, 22 Cavalry was moved from Gabbar and were attacked by the IAF and lost another tank; the two Indian tank regiments were a figment of the brigade commander’s imagination.

A little distance from my regimental headquarters the divisional gun area was located, the IAF attacked gun area and my headquarters, a cannon shot made a hole in my leather jacket and a rocket hit the open cupola flap of my tank and broke the hinge. The gun area was defended with training guns of the Anti-Aircraft School which fired single shots but kept the IAF away.

On the night 11/12 December the remnants of 38 Cavalry withdrew to Gabbar, on the morning of 12 December when I with my second in command went to find out where the ‘forward defended localities’ were, I found Major General B. M. Mustafa standing there, someone whispered that the general had been sacked and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan was in command of 18 Division.

I met the general and asked his GSO 2 (Intelligence) where the FDLs were, the general heard me and indicating the GSO 2 and himself he said that they were the FDLs and there was nothing forward of them. Major General Abdul Hamid Khan, the new GOC, on assuming command the previous day ordered a ‘general withdrawal’, both brigades took off in the ‘Gabbar Gallop’ and some men were rounded up and brought back from the Punjab Regimental Centre at Mardan.

On the night 12/13 December I established my headquarters at Khenju and collected all my broken down tanks and started engine replacement. On 16 December ‘Tiger’ Niazi surrendered, two days later, to everyone’s surprise, we ceased fire.

After the operation ‘Labbaik’ ended in fiasco everyone claimed that they were not privy to the operation though 206 Brigade commander was removed from command for objecting to the operation. The mission assigned to 18 Division was “Defend the area of responsibility in order to ensure the security of the main line of communications Karachi-Multan and be prepared to carry out the war into the enemy territory under favourable conditions.” This implied the guarding of 600 miles road and rail communications close to the border, 18 Division successfully carried out its mission. It was a classical spoiling attack which put the Indians off balance, the division’s mission was achieved.

If your allegations about the Gabbar gallop are true, why is it that no officer was taken to task?

Because the GOC Major General Abdul Hamid Khan did not allow the general withdrawal to be disclosed to the Awan Committee.

As an armour officer how would you analyse the reasons for the Bara Pind fiasco?

The first reason was good terrain analysis by the Indians and very poor terrain analysis by 8 Armoured Brigade. I visited the Bara Pind area with the CO 13 Lancers, he showed me the battlefield, a horse shoe covered area with the inside of the horse shoe of open ground providing an excellent field of fire; a part of the horse shoe was close to our main defensive minefield. The Indians very correctly selected the place for breaching the minefield, the breaching point was close to cover on our side of the minefield for a brigade size force, with a good field of fire to receive our counterattack according to our tactical doctrine. Terrain analysis off the map by shading in various colours, cover of various types, fields of fire, important ground, a job that should be done by intelligence staff is neither taught nor done.

The second reason was a wrong estimate of the enemy in the bridgehead. The enemy was reported to have breached the minefield at about 2230 hours on 16 December at a front lightly held by a R&S company or weak battalion (the R&S was not very famous for holding fronts), and had the rest of the night to build up, the 8 Armoured Brigade attack was launched at about 0730 hours the next morning, the enemy strength was estimated as one infantry battalion and one squadron of tanks at 0630 hours on 17 December, this estimate was by 8 Division, confirmed by 24 Brigade and accepted by 8 Armoured Brigade. I visited the Bara Pind battlefield after the ceasefire and was conducted by the CO 13 Lancers, he showed me the horse shoe and asked me to estimate the enemy strength that would hold the horse shoe, I estimated 6 tank squadrons, he told me that nine were identified, the enemy strength was about an infantry brigade and an armoured brigade.

The third reason was that in our armour tactical training ‘the tank versus tank’ battle is not taught, the Pakistan Armoured Corps is trained to ‘charge’ in the attack, tracks are used not the tank guns, one 13 Lancers tank was knocked out fifty yards from the Indian positions. The brigade commander in his report on the attack stated “tanks must not attack enemy tanks in good defensive positions”, put another way the areas which provide the enemy with good fields of fire and cover should be avoided and tank attacks should use covered approaches and when attacking over open ground methods should be used to neutralise the enemy’s fire power.

How would you rate the various committee reports which studied the 1971 war like the Awan Committee, Akbar Committee and the Hamood Commission?

I was present when the Awan Committee investigated the 18 Division fiasco, the commanding officers and brigade commanders were divided into those who were allowed to speak and those who were ordered not to speak, I was in the ‘not’ category. The effort was to cover up the shortcomings of Brigadier Tariq Mir and Major General Abdul Hamid Khan’s ‘Gabbar gallop’ with GHQ and Major General B. M. Mustafa as handy scapegoats. I have not seen the report but it must have been a farce.

The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report was prejudicial, showed a lack of understanding of tactics and seemed to deliberately malign the performance of the army by its criticism of corps, division commanders and some brigade commnders, examples are the criticism of Lieutenant General Irshad and Major General Zahid for tactical withdrawal and Major General Mustafa for his spoiling attack

I am not aware of the contents of the Akbar Committee.

How would you rate the chances of success of the projected II Corps offensive in case it had been launched?

The success or failure would have primarily depended on the maintenance of local air superiority over the battlefield by the PAF and the ability of 3rd Armoured Brigade to protect the left flank.

Please tell us something of your service profile from 1971 till retirement?

In 1971 I was commanding 3 Commando Battalion in East Pakistan. When the military action started and the CO 2 Commando Battalion was killed, I commanded both battalions. In June 1971 I was removed from the command of 3 Commando Battalion and placed on adverse report by Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi. In August I was attached to Station Headquarters Rawalpindi, in September the adverse report was squashed in toto.

On 1 October, I raised 38 Cavalry and commanded it till February 1972 then I was appointed colonel staff 6 Armoured Division; I was promoted brigadier and posted to command 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade in August and commanded it till September 1973 when I was removed from the command and posted to 9 Armoured Brigade in 6 Armoured Division.

On 15 April 1974 I was compulsorily retired ‘due to fault of the officer’ on the recommendation of IV Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan, I was never told the reason of my retirement, my request to be told the reason was refused saying that no reason had to be assigned.

You saw General Zia right from 1960s as an armoured corps officer. How would you describe him as a man and as a professional?

I knew General Zia from 1951 when he was adjutant Armoured Corps School and I was a ‘YO’. As the school adjutant he had a bullying attitude but I suppose we deserved it, some of us were in his office everyday explaining some misdeed.

He was never considered a ‘hot shot’ professional armoured corps officer. He had a good ‘PR’, he was well liked by his subordinates, he was fond of ‘rewarding’ people with unauthorised promotions, cash and chickens and goats, I commanded 22 Cavalry and 9 Armoured Brigade which he had commanded and I paid off the debts left by him, because of his extravagance and unnecessary expenditure but did not make personal use of funds etc. He was religious but did not force religion on others.

His great acumen was the ability to gauge the capabilities and character of every individual above and below him and he always had his superior in his grip.

What was the impact of Zia’s long one man rule on the qualitative efficiency of the Pakistan Army?

He promoted some officers who did not deserve promotion but because of flaws in their character they could be exploited. A lot of money was made by people involved in military purchases.

Who in your opinion (if any) was the finest military commander of the Pakistan Army in the wars fought by the Pakistan Army?

General Abdul Hamid Khan, COAS and Major General Sarfaraz Khan.

How fair or realistic is the system of assessment in the army?

All systems are fair, what matters is the honesty, integrity, fairness and impersonal assessment by the reporting officers which is always lacking.

What were your impressions about Mr. Bhutto as you saw him as the prime minister?

Bhutto, as the prime minister, was a prime disaster for Pakistan. He destroyed whatever discipline the people had by allowing irregularities to be committed by his followers in ‘awami’ interest, he destroyed entrepreneurship by nationalisation of major and minor industry, he destroyed financial responsibility by nationalising banks, insurance and promoting loans from nationalised banks with the backing of politicians etc etc.

Please tell us something about your brothers who served in the armed forces?

We were nine brothers who served in the army, navy and the air force.

Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam Khan was the next oldest to me, he was commissioned in 1953 in the 2nd Battalion, Frontier Force Regiment, later 4 FF (at that time there was the Frontier Force Regiment and the Frontier Force Rifles, later merged into the Frontier Force) he had a good career, served as the GSO 2 (Intelligence) of the 1st Armoured Division in the 1965 war, commanded a battalion, was GSO 1 of 18 Division, then raised 36 FF and commanded it in Chamb during the 1971 war, he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the Imtiaz-i-Sanad, after the war he was posted as ‘colonel GS’ in a corps but was deferred by the promotion board because “his attitude towards senior officers was not correct”, he asked for retirement and left the army.

Squadron Leader Shuaib Alam Khan joined the PAF after doing his Senior Cambridge from Lawrence College. At PAF Academy he failed to qualify as a pilot and was commissioned as a navigator, he served in the PAF transport squadrons, navigation instructor at the PAF Academy and operations directorate at the Air Headquarters. Before the commencement of the 1965 war he was transferred to the bomber squadron of the PAF, flew 18 bombing missions and was awarded the SJ. In 1966 he was grounded on medical grounds and transferred to the administration branch of the PAF. In 1971 when there was shortage of aircrew due to grounding of the East Pakistanis, he volunteered to fly with the bomber squadron and again flew bombing missions. After the war he requested to be transferred back to the navigation branch, the request was refused and he asked for his release. He then joined the PIA as a navigation instructor, became the ‘special assistant’ to Air Marshall Nur Khan, became a general manager, then served with PIA, a hotel in Abu Dhabi, retired with the status of a director on reaching the age limit.

General Shamim Alam Khan joined the army after passing his Senior Cambridge from Lawrence College and FSc from the Government College, Lahore. He was commissioned in 20th Lancers, commanded a SSG company in the 1965 war and was awarded the SJ. He attended the Staff College at Camberlay, served with 28 Cavalry in the 1971 war in Chamb and took over the command of the regiment after the war. He served as GSO 1 in I Corps, attended the War Course and was retained as an instructor in the National Defence College. He commanded an independent armoured brigade, the 1st Armoured Division, served as VCGS and then commanded an infantry division and II Corps then he became the CGS and then a corps in Bahawalpur, finally he was appointed the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and retired after completing his tenure.

Vice Admiral Shamoon Alam Khan joined the Pakistan Navy after leaving school, from his course he was selected for training at the British Naval Academy at Dartmouth. After completing his training he served in various posts on the ships of the Navy. In the 1965 war he served on a ship, in 1971 he was with the ISI in East Pakistan but during the 1971 war he served on a ship, was mentioned in despatches and was awarded the Imtiaz-i-Sanad. After the 1971 war he commanded the Navy’s frogmen and a destroyer, he attended the War Course at the National Defence College, served as the Naval Attache’ in China, as a captain he commanded the Naval Academy and the cruiser PNS Babar, as a commodore he attended the Royal College of Defence Studies in London and commanded the Joint Services Staff College at Chaklala, as rear admiral he served in the Naval Headquarters in Islamabad and as a vice admiral he commanded the Pakistan Naval Fleet. After retirement he served as ambassador to Tunisia and is now serving as an ambassador to Ukraine.

Wing Commander Aftab Alam Khan is the only one of us who went to Lawrence College for one year and got the rest of his schooling at the PAF Public School at Sargodha. He joined the PAF and was selected for training in USA, where he graduated as “Top Gun” and “Outstanding Student”, after his training he flew F-86 fighters and then was selected to fly the F-104 super sonic Starfighter. In the 1965 war, on 6 September, he shot down an Indian Mystere IV flying a F-104; this is recorded as the first combat kill by mach-2 aircraft and first air to air missile kill by the PAF. For shooting down the Indian aircraft he was awarded the SJ which he refused to accept stating that he was paid and trained to shoot down enemy aircraft; later he was awarded the TBt. In 1971, flying a Mirage, he led the first raid on Indian territory. He attended the air force staff college in USA in 1972. In the 1973 Conspiracy Case he was arrested and dismissed from service but later he was reinstated, promoted wing commander and sent to Syria as ‘chief instructor’ in the Syrian Air Combat School, he asked for his release and was finally released in 1975. He then joined the PIA as a pilot and retired as a ‘captain’ on reaching super-annuation. He is now an instructor with Boeing.

Flying Officer Mushtaq Alam Khan was in Jesus and Mary’s Convent in Murree when he was punished for some misdeed he told the nun that when he grew up he would join the air force and drop a bomb on the school. He joined the PAF after doing his Senior Cambridge from Lawrence College and was selected for training in USA. After completing his training he joined a F-86 squadron but was selected to fly the F-104. Before the 1965 war started he intercepted an Indian Canberra reconnaissance aircraft over Kharian but was ordered not to shoot it down; during the 1965 war, much to his chagrin, he did not make contact with an Indian aircraft, he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the ‘Imtiaz-i-Sanad’. In 1967 he was promoted flight lieutenant and posted to Risalpur as a flying instructor, on the day he was to leave Sargodha he and a friend of his took Mig 19s and were dog fighting at ground level when their aircraft collided and both got killed.

Captain Aijaz Alam Khan did his Senior Cambridge from Lawrence College and his FSc from Forman Christian College, he joined the army in 1966 and was commissioned in 13 Lancers. As a lieutenant he was selected as gunnery instructor at the Armoured Corps School. In 1971 he was serving with his squadron and was killed in the tank battle at Bara Pind.

Lieutenant General Javed Alam Khan, the tail ender of the family, passed his Senior Cambridge and his FSc from Lawrence College and joined the army. When passing out he gave his choice of arm as the armoured corps but his platoon commander, a gunner, had him sent to the artillery and he fought the 1971 war as a battery officer of a field regiment which was commanded by a course mate of mine. After the 1971 war ended he asked for transfer to the armoured corps and was posted to 24 Cavalry, he did the Career Officers’ Course at Fort Knox and the staff course at Camberlay. He commanded 24 Cavalry, was an instructor at the Staff College, then Military Attache’ in London, he then commanded an armoured brigade and later an infantry brigade and an infantry division, and now he is with the ISI.

How would you compare the Pakistan Army of 1965 with that of 1971 and 2002?

The difference between the 1965 and 1971 armies was that after the 1965 war the nine battalion division was restored and in the armoured corps troop leaders became subalterns with three tank troops instead of four tank troops commanded by a JCO. There were no changes in tactical concepts.

I cannot comment on the army of 2002, I am not aware of the changes since I left the army in 1974.

You were retired ‘compulsorily due to fault of the officer’, what do you have to say about it?

As the commander 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade I did not have the disciplinary powers of an independent brigade, the corps commander wielded these powers, and took actions which officers concerned considered harsh and unfair and they represented directly to General Tikka. I was removed from the command of 3rd Armoured Brigade and posted to 9 Armoured Brigade, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik told me that I had instigated officers to represent against Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan which I denied. I later heard that Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had written a letter stating that I had been involved in the conspiracy by Brigadier F.B. Ali and that I had conspired with some of my brigade officers to defame and malign him and therefore I should be retired from service.

On 31March 1974 I received a letter from the Military Secretary’s Branch stating that I was “retired compulsorily due to fault of the officer” and was to be struck off duty on 15 April 1974. On 1 May 1974 I submitted a ‘Representation Amounting to Statutory Complaint’ to the President of Pakistan for examination of my retirement on grounds of “fault of officer”. In reply I received a letter dated 2 August 1974 informing me that my petition had been withheld and not submitted to the President.

The power to recommend administrative action to the extent of retirement without giving a reason gives senior officers extraordinary powers and leaves subordinates with no way of defending themselves. In an environment where senior officers, after making mistakes, shift responsibility and are not truthful, a revision of the rules to the extent of giving officers, against whom charges are levelled which could result in compulsory retirement, a hearing. I had two Lieutenant Generals, A.A.K. Niazi and Abdul Hamid Khan who told lies, the first one I disproved the charges with documentary evidence, in the second case the charges framed by Abdul Hamid Khan were never intimated to me.

What are your post-retirement activities like?

My post-retirement activities were concerned with making ends meet in very difficult times immediately after retirement due to the political situation of time. When General Zia took over he offered me a job but I did not accept it but after I had a heart attack in 1981 I accepted a general manager’s post at Pakistan Steel. After retiring from the Steel Mill I was given a job by Lieutenant General Ahmad Jamal MD Fauji Foundation as Resident Manager Karachi which I held for three years.

After retiring from Fauji Fertilzer I have written two books “The Way It Was” an autobiography which has been read by a lot of serving officers as 20,000 copies were circulated by the Army Book Club paying me one rupee a book and 1,000 copies have been sold through book sellers.

The second book “Weapons and Tactics”, I started writing in 1973 as a basic military history book for cadets and young officers, when I got sacked from the army I had written about the period from 2000 BC to the 16th century, when I finished writing “The Way It Was” I dusted the draft of “Weapons and Tactics” and took about a year to bring it to 2000 AD expecting that it would be accepted as a basic military history book and bought for issue to cadets in the military academy. The Army Libraries bought about sixty copies and about fifteen others sold to the army schools, the Army Book Club wanted to again issue it but at one rupee a book. I did not think it worth anywhere near the trouble I had taken to write it.

What motivated you to write “The Way It Was” and why is it that very few of your generation have left any memoirs for posterity?

The motivation for writing “The Way It Was” was killing boredom on a newly acquired computer, I initially meant to write an article about our journey from Bangalore to Rawalpindi in March 1947 when pre-partition riots had just started but I went on and described my army career.

The reason why, as you say ‘my generation’ did not write was their acceptance that everything their seniors did was correct and not to be criticised. There was also a fear that the army intelligence censor would not permit the printing of facts and criticisms, I know of cases where books submitted for intelligence clearance have disappeared even though they did not have any censorable material. (My guess is that no proper censor organisation exists and material submitted for censor is simply shelved to collect dust.)

My book was turned down by the Oxford University Press with the remark that ‘we do not publish such books’ (they published Niazi’s justification for surrendering). I simply forgot to have it officially censored.