Farzana Versey January 8, 2006
#112 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 10:59:19 am
#89, ahmadzai {``In most countries, women slightly outnumber men, but separate research for the year 2001 showed that for every 1,000 male babies born in India, there were just 933 girls.``}
Ahmadzai,
If you take into account that 14%-15% of the births in India are Muslim and that female infanticide is a modern Hindu and Sikh phenomenon, then the ratio becomes even more critical. I am just worried about the 67 boys and their 134 hands - assuming my math is correct. :)
Ahmadzai,
If you take into account that 14%-15% of the births in India are Muslim and that female infanticide is a modern Hindu and Sikh phenomenon, then the ratio becomes even more critical. I am just worried about the 67 boys and their 134 hands - assuming my math is correct. :)
#113 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:04:29 am
You guys are not fair. Mushy is the first Dilliwalla since Mullaji do Pyaze to make it to the big league and you guys are not giving him any doubt of the benefit. Please support Mushy in his quest to keep Delhi as the capital of the reunited Hindustan. Long live Mushy.
Woh Dilli woh Dilli ki galiyaaN kahaaN.
Woh Dilli woh Dilli ki galiyaaN kahaaN.
#114 Posted by HP on January 9, 2006 11:12:36 am
#110 by arjun_m
Wow! Mushy interview is a rehash of my article.
Right here on Chowk
Obviously, he has been briefed by my friends in the Pak foreign office who had read the article.
Like any army general uncouth in diplomacy, Mushy just made two mistakes. He could not figure out what Self governance is and then he talked about the Joint Control.
“Self-governance falls in between autonomy and independence.”
That is a very simplistic explanation of Self governance. In Kashmir’s case it should always refer to article 370 in Indian constitution.
Joint control is what I mentioned in my article as opening the borders and allowing Kashmiris to cooperate with each other in business and trade. The joint control would be a state where both India and Pakistan maintain their areas of influence but allow Kashmiris to mingle and do business with each other without any restrictions on borders.
Imo, the transparent/invisible border can be the Line of control. Both countries should sign a NO war pact in Kashmir (allow couple of years to cool things up before pushing the No war pact thing.)
#115 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:13:36 am
Hindu Extremists hold Training Camps to Fight Christian Missionaries

Bajrang Dal and VHP are organizing `Trishul Diksha` ceremonies to equip their activists with weapons.
Bajrang Dal activists have vowed to rid India of Christian missionaries and churches.
A VHP-organised `Trishul Diksha` ceremony in progress
India – Hindu extremist outfits have vowed to fight Christian missionaries and stop forcible ‘conversions’ by distributing weapons and forming armed anti-Christian squads, Christian Today has confirmed.
Speaking to the media, Suresh Rath, a Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP or World Hindu Council) activist said that over 5,000 youth would be trained to fight missionaries and stop ‘conversion’ activities.
These anti-Christian squads would be formed within the next two years, he said.
Living up to the promise, the VHP and Hindu right-wing militant outfit, the Bajrang Dal recently organised a massive ``Trishul Diksha`` (Trident Initiation or Trident Distribution) ceremony at Keonjhar and other districts in Orissa.
According to news reports, the outfits had distributed swords and sharp tridents to over 500 activists amid anti-Christian slogans and Hindu rituals.
``Christian missionaries will be stopped at all costs…they must leave the country or face dire consequences,`` Sanath Ram, a Bajrang Dal activist said. ``The poor people in Orissa that were converted to Christianity will be reconverted back soon.``
The ``Trishul Diksha`` ceremonies began taking place soon after news spread that the Orissa High Court had commuted the death sentence of Dara Singh, the prime accused in the Graham Staines murder case, and had acquitted 11 other co-accuseds.
Several Christian advocacy groups fear that the shocking verdict of the Orissa High Court will embolden Hindu extremists to unleash a fresh terror against Christian missionaries and churches in Orissa and elsewhere.
Their fears are not unfounded, however, when Govardhan, a prime suspect who had owned up to the brutal killings of Pastor Raju and Pastor Daniel last May in Andhra Pradesh, boldly proclaimed that he was motivated by the act of Dara Singh who he ``respected greatly.``
But Hindu extremists are not the only ones who are venting their anger against the Christians. Police and local government officials appear to sympathise with them too.
Recently, in two separate incidents, the Gujarat High Court and the Orissa High Court directed a probe into acts of police brutality upon Christian missionaries.
``I support the revolutionary attitude of Dara Singh,`` said Nibedita Pradhan, mayor of Cuttack, Orissa, and a local Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader. ``I will support him always because of his courage.``
``Christian missionaries are creating law and order problems in the state and engaged in the conversion of Hindus into Christians,`` she said. ``That should be stopped…otherwise more numbers of Dara Singh will be created and attacks on missionaries will be repeated.``
Pradhan is apparently not the only influential Hindu supporting violence against missionaries in Orissa. Other local BJP officials, Baidhar Mallik and Pratap Sarangi also expressed support for attacks against active Christians and missionaries.
Besides the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has also vowed to put an end to ‘conversion’ activities carried out by the Christian missionaries.
Towards this end, it is busy training hundreds of Hindu militants including some foreign nationals from Sri Lanka and Malaysia, Christian Today has confirmed.
The special training camps are situated in Tamil Nadu and Orissa and ``all the activists of RSS have to complete three year training courses in these training camps,`` The Organiser, a weekly magazine published by the Hindu fundamentalist organisation, said.
The first-year training camps of Orissa were organised at two places in which a total of 622 trainees participated while 137 activists participated at a second-year camp, it said.
Hundreds more are being trained in Tamil Nadu, according to the RSS`s official publication. Twelve activists from nearby Sri Lanka are participating in the first-year camp. In the second year camp, out of seventy-two, one of them is a Malaysian, The Organiser said.
Accusing the Christian missionaries for ``attacks on the Hindu values,`` the RSS publication has also called for a ban on NGOs that are ``missionary-controlled`` for carrying biases against the Hindu culture and religion.
There are unconfirmed reports that over 5,000 militants are participating in different training camps in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana.
Meanwhile, the situation in Orissa continues to remain tense. Various church agencies and independent organisations have recorded hundreds of attacks this year against Christians in the tense state and elsewhere in India. There are about 24 million Christians in India, just over 2 percent of India`s total 1.1 billion population, according to Church estimates.

Bajrang Dal and VHP are organizing `Trishul Diksha` ceremonies to equip their activists with weapons.
Bajrang Dal activists have vowed to rid India of Christian missionaries and churches.
A VHP-organised `Trishul Diksha` ceremony in progress
India – Hindu extremist outfits have vowed to fight Christian missionaries and stop forcible ‘conversions’ by distributing weapons and forming armed anti-Christian squads, Christian Today has confirmed.
Speaking to the media, Suresh Rath, a Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP or World Hindu Council) activist said that over 5,000 youth would be trained to fight missionaries and stop ‘conversion’ activities.
These anti-Christian squads would be formed within the next two years, he said.
Living up to the promise, the VHP and Hindu right-wing militant outfit, the Bajrang Dal recently organised a massive ``Trishul Diksha`` (Trident Initiation or Trident Distribution) ceremony at Keonjhar and other districts in Orissa.
According to news reports, the outfits had distributed swords and sharp tridents to over 500 activists amid anti-Christian slogans and Hindu rituals.
``Christian missionaries will be stopped at all costs…they must leave the country or face dire consequences,`` Sanath Ram, a Bajrang Dal activist said. ``The poor people in Orissa that were converted to Christianity will be reconverted back soon.``
The ``Trishul Diksha`` ceremonies began taking place soon after news spread that the Orissa High Court had commuted the death sentence of Dara Singh, the prime accused in the Graham Staines murder case, and had acquitted 11 other co-accuseds.
Several Christian advocacy groups fear that the shocking verdict of the Orissa High Court will embolden Hindu extremists to unleash a fresh terror against Christian missionaries and churches in Orissa and elsewhere.
Their fears are not unfounded, however, when Govardhan, a prime suspect who had owned up to the brutal killings of Pastor Raju and Pastor Daniel last May in Andhra Pradesh, boldly proclaimed that he was motivated by the act of Dara Singh who he ``respected greatly.``
But Hindu extremists are not the only ones who are venting their anger against the Christians. Police and local government officials appear to sympathise with them too.
Recently, in two separate incidents, the Gujarat High Court and the Orissa High Court directed a probe into acts of police brutality upon Christian missionaries.
``I support the revolutionary attitude of Dara Singh,`` said Nibedita Pradhan, mayor of Cuttack, Orissa, and a local Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader. ``I will support him always because of his courage.``
``Christian missionaries are creating law and order problems in the state and engaged in the conversion of Hindus into Christians,`` she said. ``That should be stopped…otherwise more numbers of Dara Singh will be created and attacks on missionaries will be repeated.``
Pradhan is apparently not the only influential Hindu supporting violence against missionaries in Orissa. Other local BJP officials, Baidhar Mallik and Pratap Sarangi also expressed support for attacks against active Christians and missionaries.
Besides the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has also vowed to put an end to ‘conversion’ activities carried out by the Christian missionaries.
Towards this end, it is busy training hundreds of Hindu militants including some foreign nationals from Sri Lanka and Malaysia, Christian Today has confirmed.
The special training camps are situated in Tamil Nadu and Orissa and ``all the activists of RSS have to complete three year training courses in these training camps,`` The Organiser, a weekly magazine published by the Hindu fundamentalist organisation, said.
The first-year training camps of Orissa were organised at two places in which a total of 622 trainees participated while 137 activists participated at a second-year camp, it said.
Hundreds more are being trained in Tamil Nadu, according to the RSS`s official publication. Twelve activists from nearby Sri Lanka are participating in the first-year camp. In the second year camp, out of seventy-two, one of them is a Malaysian, The Organiser said.
Accusing the Christian missionaries for ``attacks on the Hindu values,`` the RSS publication has also called for a ban on NGOs that are ``missionary-controlled`` for carrying biases against the Hindu culture and religion.
There are unconfirmed reports that over 5,000 militants are participating in different training camps in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana.
Meanwhile, the situation in Orissa continues to remain tense. Various church agencies and independent organisations have recorded hundreds of attacks this year against Christians in the tense state and elsewhere in India. There are about 24 million Christians in India, just over 2 percent of India`s total 1.1 billion population, according to Church estimates.
#116 Posted by JagdeeshGodbole on January 9, 2006 11:20:24 am
These articles and debates are useless because they are not going to change a single thing on the ground.
#117 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:21:32 am
The Delhi Massacre, 1984
On June 3-6 1984, in Operation Bluestar, Indian forces laid siege to the Golden Temple, Sikhism`s holiest shrine, in the Punjabi city of Amritsar. The temple had been occupied by heavily-armed Sikh militants under the leadership of Sant Bhindranwale. In the massacre, and in dozens of other mass killings that took place simultaneously at religious sites throughout Punjab, thousands of Sikhs were murdered by Indian security personnel. At the Golden Temple, according to Human Rights Watch, ``Indian government forces were guilty of outrageous violations of fundamental human rights -- deliberately attacking the temple at a time they knew thousands of religious pilgrims were inside, not offering an opportunity for surrender, and summarily executing those it captured.`` (``India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir``, September 1994.) Many children and women were killed in the assault, along with a preponderance of Sikh men. ``Civil liberties organisations, such as the Movement Against State Repression, have claimed that the total number killed in Operation Bluestar exceeded ten thousand. Thousands of young men also went missing in the period after Bluestar.`` (Joyce Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence, p. 24 [n. 10].)
Hindu men rampage through the streets of Delhi, November 1984
On October 31, 1984, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, who had ordered Operation Bluestar, was assassinated in a revenge attack by her two Sikh bodyguards. Over the following five days, one of the worst gendercidal massacres of modern times took place in the Indian capital, Delhi. The victims were Sikh males of all ages. At 10 p.m. on the evening following the Prime Minister`s assassination, widespread killings broke out across Delhi, apparently organized by the Hindu extremist parties that have become prominent players in Indian politics. Hindu men roamed the streets, declaring an open season on Sikh males (those who were religiously observant were easily identified by their long hair and turbans). The gendercidal character of the killings was indeed almost total. According to the Indian feminist Madhu Kishwar,
The nature of the attacks confirm[s] that there was a deliberately plan to kill as many Sikh men as possible, hence nothing was left to chance. That also explains why in almost all cases, after hitting or stabbing, the victims were doused with kerosene or petrol and burnt, so as to leave no possibility of their surviving. Between October 31 and November 4, more than 2,500 men were murdered in different parts of Delhi, according to several careful unofficial estimates. There have been very few cases of women being killed except when they got trapped in houses which were set on fire. Almost all the women interviewed described how men and young boys were special targets. They were dragged out of the houses, attacked with stones and rods, and set on fire. ... When women tried to protect the men of their families, they were given a few blows and forcibly separated from the men. Even when they clung to the men, trying to save them, they were hardly ever attacked the way men were. I have not yet heard of a case of a woman being assaulted and then burnt to death by the mob. (Kishwar, ``Delhi: Gangster Rule,`` in Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds., Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation [New Delhi, 1985], pp. 171-78.)
A typical account of the atrocities was provided by a female witness whose ``husband and three sons ... were all killed on 1 November.`` As investigators summarized her testimony:
When a mob first came the Sikhs came out and repulsed them. Three such waves were repulsed, but each time the police came and told them to go home and stay there. The fourth time the mob came in increased strength and started attacking individual homes, driving people out, beating and burning them and setting fire to their homes. The method of killing was invariably the same: a man was hit on the head, sometimes his skull broken, kerosene poured over him and set on fire. Before being burnt, some had their eyes gouged out. Sometimes, when a burning man asked for water, a man urinated on his mouth. Several individuals, including her sister`s son, tried to escape by cutting their hair. Most of them were also killed. Some had their hair forcibly cut but were nevertheless killed thereafter. (Quoted in Khalsa Human Rights, ``Cases of Victims``.)
The estimate of 2,500 dead offered by Kishwar (above) is almost certainly too low. The New York Times in 1996 cited the research of Sikh activist Gurucharan Singh Babbar, who ``has piles of affidavits from victims` families that prove, he says, that 5,015 Sikhs were killed, more than double the official figure ...`` Whatever the exact death toll, it was ``one of the darkest chapters in [India`s] half-century of independence.`` (John F. Burns, ``The Sikhs Get Justice Long After A Massacre,`` The New York Times, September 16, 1996). Throughout the massacre, Indian police and security forces stood by or assisted in disarming Sikhs, rendering them defenceless. An Indian Supreme Court Justice, V.M. Tarkunde, stated in the aftermath of the slaughter that ``Two lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Delhi riots. One is about the extent of criminalisation of our politics and the other about the utter unreliability of our police force in a critical situation.`` (Quoted in Khalsa Human Rights, ``The Delhi Massacre: An Example of Malicious Government``.)
A Sikh woman weeps after her husband was burned to death in the Delhi massacre.

It is important to note that while few if any Sikh women were intentionally killed, hundreds, if not thousands, were raped -- sometimes repeatedly -- by rampaging Hindu men. Many of the female survivors of the massacre today live in Tilak Vihar, a quarter of Delhi that has become known as the ``Widows` Colony.`` Since 1984, they have pressed for justice in the killings, and finally achieved some success in 1996, when ``a magistrate ... imposed a death sentence on a butcher found guilty of two Sikh murders in the riots. Evidence presented in court indicated he was also involved in at least 150 other killings.`` The justice in question, Shiv Narain Dinghra, has led a ``personal crusade`` of his own, sentencing dozens of rioters to five years` ``harsh imprisonment.`` Nonetheless, official Indian attitudes toward the slaughter reflect a belief that ``the massacre was necessary to teach a lesson`` to the Sikhs, according to Dinghra. (Burns, ``The Sikhs Get Justice.``)
On June 3-6 1984, in Operation Bluestar, Indian forces laid siege to the Golden Temple, Sikhism`s holiest shrine, in the Punjabi city of Amritsar. The temple had been occupied by heavily-armed Sikh militants under the leadership of Sant Bhindranwale. In the massacre, and in dozens of other mass killings that took place simultaneously at religious sites throughout Punjab, thousands of Sikhs were murdered by Indian security personnel. At the Golden Temple, according to Human Rights Watch, ``Indian government forces were guilty of outrageous violations of fundamental human rights -- deliberately attacking the temple at a time they knew thousands of religious pilgrims were inside, not offering an opportunity for surrender, and summarily executing those it captured.`` (``India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir``, September 1994.) Many children and women were killed in the assault, along with a preponderance of Sikh men. ``Civil liberties organisations, such as the Movement Against State Repression, have claimed that the total number killed in Operation Bluestar exceeded ten thousand. Thousands of young men also went missing in the period after Bluestar.`` (Joyce Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence, p. 24 [n. 10].)
Hindu men rampage through the streets of Delhi, November 1984
On October 31, 1984, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, who had ordered Operation Bluestar, was assassinated in a revenge attack by her two Sikh bodyguards. Over the following five days, one of the worst gendercidal massacres of modern times took place in the Indian capital, Delhi. The victims were Sikh males of all ages. At 10 p.m. on the evening following the Prime Minister`s assassination, widespread killings broke out across Delhi, apparently organized by the Hindu extremist parties that have become prominent players in Indian politics. Hindu men roamed the streets, declaring an open season on Sikh males (those who were religiously observant were easily identified by their long hair and turbans). The gendercidal character of the killings was indeed almost total. According to the Indian feminist Madhu Kishwar,
The nature of the attacks confirm[s] that there was a deliberately plan to kill as many Sikh men as possible, hence nothing was left to chance. That also explains why in almost all cases, after hitting or stabbing, the victims were doused with kerosene or petrol and burnt, so as to leave no possibility of their surviving. Between October 31 and November 4, more than 2,500 men were murdered in different parts of Delhi, according to several careful unofficial estimates. There have been very few cases of women being killed except when they got trapped in houses which were set on fire. Almost all the women interviewed described how men and young boys were special targets. They were dragged out of the houses, attacked with stones and rods, and set on fire. ... When women tried to protect the men of their families, they were given a few blows and forcibly separated from the men. Even when they clung to the men, trying to save them, they were hardly ever attacked the way men were. I have not yet heard of a case of a woman being assaulted and then burnt to death by the mob. (Kishwar, ``Delhi: Gangster Rule,`` in Patwant Singh and Harji Malik, eds., Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation [New Delhi, 1985], pp. 171-78.)
A typical account of the atrocities was provided by a female witness whose ``husband and three sons ... were all killed on 1 November.`` As investigators summarized her testimony:
When a mob first came the Sikhs came out and repulsed them. Three such waves were repulsed, but each time the police came and told them to go home and stay there. The fourth time the mob came in increased strength and started attacking individual homes, driving people out, beating and burning them and setting fire to their homes. The method of killing was invariably the same: a man was hit on the head, sometimes his skull broken, kerosene poured over him and set on fire. Before being burnt, some had their eyes gouged out. Sometimes, when a burning man asked for water, a man urinated on his mouth. Several individuals, including her sister`s son, tried to escape by cutting their hair. Most of them were also killed. Some had their hair forcibly cut but were nevertheless killed thereafter. (Quoted in Khalsa Human Rights, ``Cases of Victims``.)
The estimate of 2,500 dead offered by Kishwar (above) is almost certainly too low. The New York Times in 1996 cited the research of Sikh activist Gurucharan Singh Babbar, who ``has piles of affidavits from victims` families that prove, he says, that 5,015 Sikhs were killed, more than double the official figure ...`` Whatever the exact death toll, it was ``one of the darkest chapters in [India`s] half-century of independence.`` (John F. Burns, ``The Sikhs Get Justice Long After A Massacre,`` The New York Times, September 16, 1996). Throughout the massacre, Indian police and security forces stood by or assisted in disarming Sikhs, rendering them defenceless. An Indian Supreme Court Justice, V.M. Tarkunde, stated in the aftermath of the slaughter that ``Two lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Delhi riots. One is about the extent of criminalisation of our politics and the other about the utter unreliability of our police force in a critical situation.`` (Quoted in Khalsa Human Rights, ``The Delhi Massacre: An Example of Malicious Government``.)
A Sikh woman weeps after her husband was burned to death in the Delhi massacre.

It is important to note that while few if any Sikh women were intentionally killed, hundreds, if not thousands, were raped -- sometimes repeatedly -- by rampaging Hindu men. Many of the female survivors of the massacre today live in Tilak Vihar, a quarter of Delhi that has become known as the ``Widows` Colony.`` Since 1984, they have pressed for justice in the killings, and finally achieved some success in 1996, when ``a magistrate ... imposed a death sentence on a butcher found guilty of two Sikh murders in the riots. Evidence presented in court indicated he was also involved in at least 150 other killings.`` The justice in question, Shiv Narain Dinghra, has led a ``personal crusade`` of his own, sentencing dozens of rioters to five years` ``harsh imprisonment.`` Nonetheless, official Indian attitudes toward the slaughter reflect a belief that ``the massacre was necessary to teach a lesson`` to the Sikhs, according to Dinghra. (Burns, ``The Sikhs Get Justice.``)
#118 Posted by jang on January 9, 2006 11:23:38 am
salim posting christiantoday.com.. are you ALSO getting lifafa?
#119 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:27:35 am
This is a Muslim killed by Hindu extremists.
#120 Posted by HP on January 9, 2006 11:30:35 am
#110 by arjun_m
Mushy also needed to explain the demilitarization idea clearly.
Indian Army in Kashmir is not a big deal at all and no one should have any problem with that. The real issue is the presence of the Indian army in Kashmir cities as law enforcement or a peace keeping force. That state should end. The Indian army must leave the civilian areas before any political process can start. Mushy mentioned three areas. Now Kashmir groups should pick up on the idea and ask for removing the Indian army from all civilian areas.
The question would be about the cleaning up of jihadi groups. That can be resolved by allowing the Indian army a timeframe to go after the jihadi in Kashmir and clean them out. After that pre-determined date only the regular law enforcement agencies should go in the civilian areas if they suspect a presence of Jihadis in the civilian areas.
While the Indian army is cleaning up the jihadis, Pakistan should hang tight and see if Pakistan can TRUST India or MMS.
Salim no one is interested in Sikhs and 1984 right now.
Stay with the topic please. Thanks.
#121 Posted by arjun_m on January 9, 2006 11:30:49 am
A Najam Sethi Op-ed in the friday times from Jan 2005.
FAQs about Balochistan and the state
Why has the situation in Balochistan in general and in Sui in particular suddenly flared up? Why are Bugti tribesmen attacking Sui gas installations and hurting the country’s national assets? What are the demands of the Baloch Liberation Army? Why is the BLA attacking military targets in Balochistan? Who is funding and arming the BLA? What is the role of the big Sardars in the political economy of Balochistan? Are the Sardars for or against development and progress? Why is there popular resentment in Balochistan against a national development project like Gwadar? Why don’t the Baloch want military cantonments in their province when the other provinces are awash with them? Why is there so much anti-army feeling in the province? How can the situation be controlled? How can genuine Baloch grievances be addressed? Consider.
Between the Bugtis and PPL have been rent asunder by the rape of a lady doctor allegedly by the hated paramilitary personnel which has given an excuse to tribal hardliners to exploit the situation. The second is more problematic. The breakdown of negotiations between the Bugtis and PPL comes in the wider context and background of a resurgent sub-nationalism in the province in which the mainstream secular nationalist parties have been edged out of political power by the state-government regime of General Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad and replaced by the mullahs and religious parties in the provincial government.
This is the point at which the Baloch Liberation Army enters the picture and clouds the issues. This is the point at which the Bugti local feud with PPL enters the simmering and underlying conflict between Baloch nationalists and Islamabad over the issue of effective stake-holding status in Balochistan. This is the point at which Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bux Marri, their offspring and nationalist middle class students join hands with Nawab Akbar Bugti and the Bugtis at Sui to voice their demands and vow to continue armed struggle till death. This is why anti-Islamabad Baloch leaders are not prepared to take responsibility for the actions of the BLA even as they secretly urge it to wage war against the external ‘occupying’ power.
In the 1970s, the Baloch secular nationalists were ousted from power by Z A Bhutto and they launched an armed struggle to reclaim power in the province. In the 1980s and 1990s, they were part of the democratic political landscape of the province. So they shared power and didn’t make trouble. But in the last five years they have been excluded from power in the province by General Musharraf, so they have launched an armed struggle to re-stake their claims.
But there are several major differences between the old and the new. First, in the 70s the Baloch insurgents were largely drawn from the Marri tribe and there was only a smattering of middle class urban elements among them. Now, there appears to be the formation of a tribal confederacy which includes the big Marri and Bugti tribes.
Second, a new generation of middle class Baloch nationalists has cropped up which is readily inclined to join the armed struggle against Islamabad. Third, there were no visible outposts or symbols of occupation in the 70s unlike today when the new port of Gwadar under federal jurisdiction has excluded locals from the fruits of its development.
Fourth, the insurgents were poorly equipped with arms and financially strapped in the 70s unlike today when they are flush with the latest weapons (bought from the Taliban and Afghans) and spilling over with donations collected from migrant Baloch workers in the Middle East. There is also a real possibility of estranged neighbouring states fishing in troubled Baloch waters.
Fifth, the army action in Balochistan in the 1970s was conducted by a largely popular and elected political leader and had a degree of acceptability in mainstream eyes, not least because the Baloch resistance could easily be dubbed as separatist since the Russians were thought to be coveting the “warm waters” of the Arabian sea. But no such conditions attach to the current situation.
Sixth, the regional environment is internally volatile for domestic reasons – as the unravelling of many countries for domestic compulsions demonstrates – but externally calm because there are no separatist-baiting superpowers in the neighbourhood.
Seventh, Musharraf’s military regime doesn’t enjoy the same legitimacy and popularity at home that Z A Bhutto’s government enjoyed in Pakistan at that time. Indeed, all mainstream and nationalist parties in the country are opposed to General Musharraf and even his erstwhile mullah friends are out to create trouble for him. Therefore if any repressive army action is undertaken in Balochistan, it is likely to face stiff opposition from all quarters, including elements of the governing coalitions that Musharraf has built for political survival.
Finally, it may be noted that the Pakistan army was fully focused on quelling the Baloch insurgency in the 70s while today it has its hands full dealing with the violent blowback from South Waziristan and Kashmir.
We are in the era of “internal upheavals”. The Soviet Union, Central, South and South East Asia, Eastern Europe and even the Middle East have fallen victim to this contemporary dialectic. Our own Pakistan’s current “internal upheaval” is very much the result of so-called “national security” policies followed in the decades since the 80s. The prosecution of jihad in Indian-held Kashmir and west in Afghanistan eroded the Pakistani state’s “monopoly of violence” by enabling private parties to acquire the means and rationale for violence. This has undermined the maintenance of the “internal sovereignty” of the country. Balochistan has especially suffered from this loss of sovereignty. Its internal polity has been shaped by an influx of Pakhtuns and Afghans following the war against the Russians in Afghanistan and lately by the influx of militant jihadis, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements. The 2002 elections conducted by General Musharraf in Pakistan solidified the situation by ousting the Baloch nationalists from the power equation and entrenching an alienated Pakhtun votebank.
There are additional external factors. Iran is no longer the friendly country that it was in the 1970s when the Shah was its ruler. Apart from a bitter conflict of interests with Pakistan over Afghanistan during the Taliban era, the Iran of today is suspicious of the Pakistan-US axis, especially in view of Washington’s hostility to Iran’s mullahs and its budding nuclear programme. Similarly, Kabul is still influenced by an anti-Pakistan, anti-Pakhtun component that the Taliban ousted in 1996. Finally, there is an entire underworld of jihad that has vowed to reverse Pakistan’s post-9/11 policy and has resorted to terrorism all over the country. In Balochistan this element is embedded with the Taliban who have been allowed by Islamabad to live comfortably in Quetta. This is the larger backdrop to the rise of the Balochistan Liberation Army.
FAQs about Balochistan and the state
Why has the situation in Balochistan in general and in Sui in particular suddenly flared up? Why are Bugti tribesmen attacking Sui gas installations and hurting the country’s national assets? What are the demands of the Baloch Liberation Army? Why is the BLA attacking military targets in Balochistan? Who is funding and arming the BLA? What is the role of the big Sardars in the political economy of Balochistan? Are the Sardars for or against development and progress? Why is there popular resentment in Balochistan against a national development project like Gwadar? Why don’t the Baloch want military cantonments in their province when the other provinces are awash with them? Why is there so much anti-army feeling in the province? How can the situation be controlled? How can genuine Baloch grievances be addressed? Consider.
Between the Bugtis and PPL have been rent asunder by the rape of a lady doctor allegedly by the hated paramilitary personnel which has given an excuse to tribal hardliners to exploit the situation. The second is more problematic. The breakdown of negotiations between the Bugtis and PPL comes in the wider context and background of a resurgent sub-nationalism in the province in which the mainstream secular nationalist parties have been edged out of political power by the state-government regime of General Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad and replaced by the mullahs and religious parties in the provincial government.
This is the point at which the Baloch Liberation Army enters the picture and clouds the issues. This is the point at which the Bugti local feud with PPL enters the simmering and underlying conflict between Baloch nationalists and Islamabad over the issue of effective stake-holding status in Balochistan. This is the point at which Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bux Marri, their offspring and nationalist middle class students join hands with Nawab Akbar Bugti and the Bugtis at Sui to voice their demands and vow to continue armed struggle till death. This is why anti-Islamabad Baloch leaders are not prepared to take responsibility for the actions of the BLA even as they secretly urge it to wage war against the external ‘occupying’ power.
In the 1970s, the Baloch secular nationalists were ousted from power by Z A Bhutto and they launched an armed struggle to reclaim power in the province. In the 1980s and 1990s, they were part of the democratic political landscape of the province. So they shared power and didn’t make trouble. But in the last five years they have been excluded from power in the province by General Musharraf, so they have launched an armed struggle to re-stake their claims.
But there are several major differences between the old and the new. First, in the 70s the Baloch insurgents were largely drawn from the Marri tribe and there was only a smattering of middle class urban elements among them. Now, there appears to be the formation of a tribal confederacy which includes the big Marri and Bugti tribes.
Second, a new generation of middle class Baloch nationalists has cropped up which is readily inclined to join the armed struggle against Islamabad. Third, there were no visible outposts or symbols of occupation in the 70s unlike today when the new port of Gwadar under federal jurisdiction has excluded locals from the fruits of its development.
Fourth, the insurgents were poorly equipped with arms and financially strapped in the 70s unlike today when they are flush with the latest weapons (bought from the Taliban and Afghans) and spilling over with donations collected from migrant Baloch workers in the Middle East. There is also a real possibility of estranged neighbouring states fishing in troubled Baloch waters.
Fifth, the army action in Balochistan in the 1970s was conducted by a largely popular and elected political leader and had a degree of acceptability in mainstream eyes, not least because the Baloch resistance could easily be dubbed as separatist since the Russians were thought to be coveting the “warm waters” of the Arabian sea. But no such conditions attach to the current situation.
Sixth, the regional environment is internally volatile for domestic reasons – as the unravelling of many countries for domestic compulsions demonstrates – but externally calm because there are no separatist-baiting superpowers in the neighbourhood.
Seventh, Musharraf’s military regime doesn’t enjoy the same legitimacy and popularity at home that Z A Bhutto’s government enjoyed in Pakistan at that time. Indeed, all mainstream and nationalist parties in the country are opposed to General Musharraf and even his erstwhile mullah friends are out to create trouble for him. Therefore if any repressive army action is undertaken in Balochistan, it is likely to face stiff opposition from all quarters, including elements of the governing coalitions that Musharraf has built for political survival.
Finally, it may be noted that the Pakistan army was fully focused on quelling the Baloch insurgency in the 70s while today it has its hands full dealing with the violent blowback from South Waziristan and Kashmir.
We are in the era of “internal upheavals”. The Soviet Union, Central, South and South East Asia, Eastern Europe and even the Middle East have fallen victim to this contemporary dialectic. Our own Pakistan’s current “internal upheaval” is very much the result of so-called “national security” policies followed in the decades since the 80s. The prosecution of jihad in Indian-held Kashmir and west in Afghanistan eroded the Pakistani state’s “monopoly of violence” by enabling private parties to acquire the means and rationale for violence. This has undermined the maintenance of the “internal sovereignty” of the country. Balochistan has especially suffered from this loss of sovereignty. Its internal polity has been shaped by an influx of Pakhtuns and Afghans following the war against the Russians in Afghanistan and lately by the influx of militant jihadis, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements. The 2002 elections conducted by General Musharraf in Pakistan solidified the situation by ousting the Baloch nationalists from the power equation and entrenching an alienated Pakhtun votebank.
There are additional external factors. Iran is no longer the friendly country that it was in the 1970s when the Shah was its ruler. Apart from a bitter conflict of interests with Pakistan over Afghanistan during the Taliban era, the Iran of today is suspicious of the Pakistan-US axis, especially in view of Washington’s hostility to Iran’s mullahs and its budding nuclear programme. Similarly, Kabul is still influenced by an anti-Pakistan, anti-Pakhtun component that the Taliban ousted in 1996. Finally, there is an entire underworld of jihad that has vowed to reverse Pakistan’s post-9/11 policy and has resorted to terrorism all over the country. In Balochistan this element is embedded with the Taliban who have been allowed by Islamabad to live comfortably in Quetta. This is the larger backdrop to the rise of the Balochistan Liberation Army.
#122 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:34:27 am
#25, {``actually according to an indian newspaper columnist, mms thinks quite highly of mush even comparing him to ataturk. this begs the following question:
i. why does mms think that pak needs an ataturk who certainly was not a democrat?
ii. who will be india`s ataturk? ``}
Please. Mushy, as admirable a job as he is doing under the circumstances, is no ataturk. He has not tackled the tough issues of Pakistan effectively - terrorism, Punjabi hegemony, solid democratic institutions, and genuine peace with India. Ataturk was a visionary and a determined leader. Mushy is a caretaker and maybe a savior, only because Nawaz and Bhutto were so hideously criminal and corrupt.
India`s ataturk was Gandhiji, who was much greater than his contemporary - defeating the mightiest power on earth with his simple determination and will.
i. why does mms think that pak needs an ataturk who certainly was not a democrat?
ii. who will be india`s ataturk? ``}
Please. Mushy, as admirable a job as he is doing under the circumstances, is no ataturk. He has not tackled the tough issues of Pakistan effectively - terrorism, Punjabi hegemony, solid democratic institutions, and genuine peace with India. Ataturk was a visionary and a determined leader. Mushy is a caretaker and maybe a savior, only because Nawaz and Bhutto were so hideously criminal and corrupt.
India`s ataturk was Gandhiji, who was much greater than his contemporary - defeating the mightiest power on earth with his simple determination and will.
#123 Posted by jang on January 9, 2006 11:34:31 am
#120
the indian army has been using a ``paramilitary`` rashtriya-rifles force in kashmir. is that good enough for you or you need bombay type lathi-wielding cops against IED wielding lashkars?
the indian army has been using a ``paramilitary`` rashtriya-rifles force in kashmir. is that good enough for you or you need bombay type lathi-wielding cops against IED wielding lashkars?
#124 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:41:22 am
Jang #118,
I like to look at all sides of an issue. Violence by Hindu extremists, especially when it goes unpunished, nullifies every forceful argument that Indians have against others - even dictatorships that brutally repress their own people, such as in Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Miyanmar, Philippines, and other places.
I like to look at all sides of an issue. Violence by Hindu extremists, especially when it goes unpunished, nullifies every forceful argument that Indians have against others - even dictatorships that brutally repress their own people, such as in Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Miyanmar, Philippines, and other places.
#125 Posted by HP on January 9, 2006 11:46:30 am
#123 jang
“you need bombay type lathi-wielding cops against IED wielding lashkars?”
Follow the Faizabad/Ayudhia example. Just a few IED don’t need the regular army. There is no lashkar even Indian army does not estimate more than 2000 jihadi in whole Kashmir. It is a blot on Indian army that it has failed to deal with such a small number in over ten years time.
The purpose from the very beginning was not to deal with Jihadi but get political control of Kashmir thru the army. Jihadi was and still is a minuscule problem if the Indian army is serious in dealing with that.
“you need bombay type lathi-wielding cops against IED wielding lashkars?”
Follow the Faizabad/Ayudhia example. Just a few IED don’t need the regular army. There is no lashkar even Indian army does not estimate more than 2000 jihadi in whole Kashmir. It is a blot on Indian army that it has failed to deal with such a small number in over ten years time.
The purpose from the very beginning was not to deal with Jihadi but get political control of Kashmir thru the army. Jihadi was and still is a minuscule problem if the Indian army is serious in dealing with that.
#126 Posted by Behram1 on January 9, 2006 11:47:33 am
Obviously a lot has been covered so far. And most of what is being said is nothing new. The paindoos in Islamabad have always usurped the rights of weakest. We have seen that these paindoos have constantly attacked and taken over the assets of the indigenous people. Pakistan is a country that is just a little bigger than Texas, with over 150 million people. Resources from one province is taken and spent in other provinces. Paindoos want to continue their theft, and to a certain extent they have been successful. It is a shame that after 58 years of independence, paindoos have been unable to develop Baluchistan. There is only one train line to Zahedan, Iran, which was built by the British. There is no major university to speak of. The paindoos have been deflecting this conversation to the feudal system existing in Baluchistan. It is not the feudal that have robbed every single inch of Gwadar port.
Pakistan’s bureaucracies have consistently given poor advice to the politicians. The paindoos are as always confused and do not know how to implement a fair and equitable solution. A solution that requires honesty, generosity, and good will. Paindoos have always known goonda-gurdy and badmashi. The Mohajirs understood this paindoos philosophy and took care of it in the streets of Karachi. MQM made Karachi burn and the paindoos got the message. Although Pakistan’s bureaucracies were completely and unequivocally filled with Mohajirs, yet, MQM had to resort to violence to get heard in the corridors of power.
And today they are sharing some power with the paindoos of Islamabad.
So, what should Baluchistan do? They have two examples in front of them. One of them is East Pakistan, where the Bengalis were screwed royally by these paindoos. The Bengalis fought and got their own Bangla Desh. The Mohajirs mad Karachi burn and got a share in the government.
So, should this not be the only legitimate path for the Baluchis?
Pakistan’s bureaucracies have consistently given poor advice to the politicians. The paindoos are as always confused and do not know how to implement a fair and equitable solution. A solution that requires honesty, generosity, and good will. Paindoos have always known goonda-gurdy and badmashi. The Mohajirs understood this paindoos philosophy and took care of it in the streets of Karachi. MQM made Karachi burn and the paindoos got the message. Although Pakistan’s bureaucracies were completely and unequivocally filled with Mohajirs, yet, MQM had to resort to violence to get heard in the corridors of power.
And today they are sharing some power with the paindoos of Islamabad.
So, what should Baluchistan do? They have two examples in front of them. One of them is East Pakistan, where the Bengalis were screwed royally by these paindoos. The Bengalis fought and got their own Bangla Desh. The Mohajirs mad Karachi burn and got a share in the government.
So, should this not be the only legitimate path for the Baluchis?
#127 Posted by Salim_Chauhan on January 9, 2006 11:49:40 am
The killings in India by right-wing Hindu mobs are not related to the terrorist activities of the Kashmiri jihadists. The right-wing Hindu mobs have killed Muslims, Sikhs, and even Christiians, not to mention the Dalits who are supposedly Hindus themselves.
Now, the terror launched by religious fanatic Muslims in Pakistan, in Kashmir, and even in India is totally unrelated to the violence by the right-wing Hindu mobs. What I am saying is that the sick fundos among both Hindus and Muslims do not need each other to justify their existence.
Now, the terror launched by religious fanatic Muslims in Pakistan, in Kashmir, and even in India is totally unrelated to the violence by the right-wing Hindu mobs. What I am saying is that the sick fundos among both Hindus and Muslims do not need each other to justify their existence.
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