Love Ya, Dubya

re: ``For a better South Asia``

http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/06/op.htm
(By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

EXACTLY seven months ago, I argued in this space that it was not open to Pakistan to seek a fundamental review of Washington’s strategic decision to build India into a major global player at the expense of the India-Pakistan balance of power. It was, similarly, extremely unlikely that the United States would extend comparable nuclear-related technology and equipment to Pakistan.

This realistic, if somewhat pessimistic, assessment was based primarily on two inter-related factors: the evolving configuration of allied power as the US unfolds itself as a virtual overarching global empire and, secondly, a close study of the dialogue initiated by Strobe Talbot with New Delhi and Islamabad in the wake of the nuclear tests of 1998.

Ostensibly related to identical nuclear events in the two subcontinental states, the dialogue comprised diverging trajectories. It was rather myopic to see it in narrow nuclear terms; it was a subtle process of conceptual and political differentiation that pre-dated it, got deepened during it and gathered momentum after that particular round of negotiations.

The story of this historic shift in the US policy towards South Asia can be told in many variants. One can describe it in the language of historical inevitability, a development that could, perhaps, be delayed by factors intrinsic to the protagonists — the United States and India in this case — but certainly not denied. The deterministic factor in power alignments, rooted in compelling strategic and geo-economic considerations, has the advantage of absolving individual and collective actors — governments and nation states — of their share of responsibility for profit and loss inherent in these periodic transformations.

Alternatively, the narrative may focus on the quality of leadership, its vision, and equally significantly, the robustness of its institutions that analyse the drift of history and devise strategies to harness it to national advantage. Yet another perspective is the one that a triumphalist Indian establishment is highlighting at the moment — the comparative advantage of democracies vindicated time and again by history. “India’s democracy and the institutions that go with it,” writes the renowned Indian economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, “give her the edge in long-term stability and sustainable growth, relative to authoritarian China.”

In one form or another, this inter-relationship of development and democracy has been the matrix of President Bush’s present effort to restructure power alignments in Asia with India as a major element of it.

President Bush’s long-awaited visits to India, Pakistan, and shall we add, Kabul, doubtless herald the advent of a new hierarchy of power in the region. It is premature to arrive at a precise measure of what such occasions project as a tectonic shift. But the initial images have their value, particularly as they reveal the degree of satisfaction shown by the concerned parties. From India, in a torrent of early comments, comes a succinct judgment from the astute C. Raja Mohan. India, he says, “debuts as a new world power with new responsibilities.” Bush, in his evaluation, “has in one stroke torn up the long-standing premises about this region.” When a nation becomes a great power, he reflects, it is among those who maintain stability and order.

Many Indians and Americans may prefer to locate their planned shared global governance in the highly effusive references made to India’s democracy by President Bush in the Old Fort speech of March 3, 2006. He went beyond partnership to brotherhood, anchoring the idea of cooperative management of world affairs in a near-mystical relationship between the oldest and the largest democracies in the world.

Consider the challenging agenda. India would have felt flattered that this major address contained little direct or indirect reference to Kashmir and virtually invited India to play an enhanced role in creating a democratic Afghan state. But it is doubtful if the menacing reference to Iran would have been heard with equal equanimity by all segments of the Indian population. The new order for South Asia is problematic insofar as some of the pillars on which it is erected may not be as solid as President Bush wants the world to believe. In fact, it carries the risk of greater disorder.

Washington knows that India lacks many attributes of a global power and that an extravagant declaration about it by President Bush is not sufficient to attain it. So it has put together a comprehensive, multi-dimensional programme for India’s rapid development. It was, however, inherent in the nature of nuclear technology that it would stand out in bold relief. India has long since considered it as the passport to the status of a great power.

It would be churlish not to admire the sheer quality of India’s nuclear diplomacy spread over at least three successive Indian governments. Its latest achievement is the degree of success in retaining sovereign initiative in fulfilling the most important pre-condition of the nuclear deal struck between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush on July 18, 2005, namely the separation of civil and military facilities fundamental to the design of a regime of inspection and monitoring.

The crux of the negotiations between the two countries was the safeguards for the fast breeder reactors insisted upon by the anti-proliferation lobby in the United States. It cited the example of no concessions made even to Japan, a natural exponent of the non-proliferation ethos. One heard from some of the best known nuclear experts that India would have to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder reactor at Kalpakkam and the older Fast Breeder Test Reactor. But Manmohan Singh was willing to separate civilian and military facilities only on the basis of India having “the same responsibilities and practices and (acquiring) the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.”

India, a non-signatory to the NPT, has achieved a singular success in persuading President Bush to drop the insistence on safeguards for the breeders. Estimates of the existing Indian stockpile of plutonium P239 vary but even the lowest can translate into a formidable arsenal.

India read the international situation with an impressive mix of accuracy, intelligence and imagination. Its objectives vis-à-vis the United States were anything but modest and it employed multiple approaches. By contrast, the Pakistani negotiators were burdened with a baggage of past policies that had become anachronistic and, therefore, costly. The occasional effort made by them to broaden the scope of the new post 9/11 relationship was constrained almost equally by Washington’s new dispensation for the region that now enmeshes South and Central Asia, and by the linear nature of a Pakistani regime particularly vulnerable to US pressure.

An exaggerated emphasis on the role of a so-called front line state in President Bush’s war against terror played an important role in shaping the Pakistan-US agenda. Fundamentally, President Bush arrived in South Asia with his mind concentrated on two aspects. First, Pakistan should continue to participate in the struggle against radical Islam with unflagging zeal. Secondly, Pakistan should receive assistance conducive to pervasive societal changes away from what was rather uncritically assumed to be its fundamentalist, Islamist legacy. Pakistan’s needs in the political, economic and defence-related domains, within that overall policy framework, had been assessed in minimal terms; it is considered necessary to curb undue Pakistani ambitions.

The visits were designed to be asymmetrical and, therefore, there is no surprise that the Indian part of it overshadowed the encounter with Pakistan. It does not, however, detract from Islamabad’s natural geo-strategic salience. A combination of circumstances, some of which like the cartoon protests are entirely fortuitous, made an unfavourable impact on it. An almost total elimination of a popular dimension from it added to its projection as a working review of their joint enterprises by two leaders beset with problems in pursuing them. While it provides a renewal of their entente within their preferred, if restrictive, parameters, it may end up by sharpening President Musharraf’s own dilemma.

He has been trying to nuance the war against terrorism by making valid distinctions between terrorism and extremism and by seeking a clearer focus on the causes of the present disorder. Bush prefers simplistic constructs and, more recently, has relied on ‘radical Islam’ as an almost permanent casus belli. President Musharraf has gained much from it for the perpetuation of his rule in uniform but from now, it may be a diminishing asset as he simply would not measure up to the ever-increasing demands on him to do more.

This is particularly so because in an example of classic disregard for Pakistan’s sensitivities, its armed forces are expected to make sacrifices even as Bush publicly transfers the responsibility of a democratic stabilization of Afghanistan to the brotherly democracy of India. The reiteration of this encouragement to India in the Old Fort speech was even stronger than in the Asia Society speech. The irony of the situation would not be lost on the people of Pakistan.

Pakistani efforts to balance the visits by hyping up the Kashmir issue have floundered as Bush began with tentative remarks in Washington and, faced with Indian pressure to get Pakistan to dismantle the alleged infrastructure of terror, withdrew into the safety of minimal public acknowledgment of any significant mediatory role.

A bilateral investment treaty and progress towards free trading arrangements, as between United States and Jordan or Morocco, represent welcome spikes in the curve of economic cooperation. Despite Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s stress on them, negotiations in this context have been marked by a lack of purpose, at least in the public domain. Noting that progress here “is receiving little pressure from Mr Musharraf” — one thing that would bind America to Pakistan — an editorial in The New York Times of March 3 regrets that “the Bush-Musharraf summit meeting is one between two leaders far more interested in guns than butter.”

Clearly, this economic space is where diplomatic efforts should be greatly intensified in the months ahead to challenge the newspaper’s description of the trip to Pakistan as “pointless”. The real importance of the visit to Pakistan lies in highlighting the great distance that Pakistan still has to travel in arriving at a durable and mutually profitable long-term relationship. Hard work, rather than premature celebrations, is the need of the hour.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: tanvir.a.khan@gmail.com)
Sridhar

Ref FarzanaVersey #332

[The Asian Age, March 5, 2006

Separate Deal
- By M.J. Akbar

....Here, in sum, is what the spokesmen of Dr Manmohan Singh will be telling us as they take their message to the country:

l This agreement will permit India to produce fissile materials for its nuclear military needs, despite the fact that the recognised nuclear powers have halted, voluntarily, such production.

l The fast-breeder reactors, which can make super-grade plutonium when fully operational, will not be under international inspection or safeguards.

....Listen to the narrative on the American side, some of which has already begun to be articulated, even by the extremely sophisticated and persuasive American negotiator, Nicholas Burns.

l The fast-breeder reactors that India possesses will be isolated, and unable to get new technology, thanks to the inspections regime, ensuring, over time, stagnation or decline. Implication: India has been sold a lemon thanks to a gullible government.]

The fast breeder reactor that India possesses IS isolated right now because you can`t get any nuclear equipment from supplier countries now.

So why does the treaty change it for the worse?

The Man Who Never Dodges a Curved Ball! ``Let me get the hang of it!`` ``Isn`t this thing supposed to be cylindrical?`` ``Where did the ball go?`` ``Do I run to the first base now?``

PS: My offer in #340 still stands.

Farzana dear we are in the same boat and we sail or sink together..........we are already partners in whatever we are doing..........for me Chowk is the place for intellectual action and not grass root political action..........I already have my political space which I can clearly see the conservatives and Islamists trying to invade with their communal stance..........if you would like to help in anything then please do something about the quality of articles that get published on the Chowk...........if anything you should give Salim Chauhan his columns.....turn Hamid mia`s series on Gabby into a Chowk Classic....and tell the M Asadis sell his wares to Ali Sina and persuade Samina Shah to contribute more time as an author on Chowk on contemporary issues................I have done my bit of contributing to the CPM rallies in and around the national capital and I know a lot more about the rallies you have been talking about with such seriousness..........................

wishing you well

EDITORIAL: The ball is in Pakistan’s court

He seemed clearly under pressure. But the pressure has been building up slowly. Weeks ahead of President Bush’s visit, the US struck twice inside Pakistani territory to take out suspected Al Qaeda elements, in both instances also killing civilians. It never apologised for it. In fact, US analysts interpreted the strikes as a signal to Pakistan to get its act together. It was no coincidence that many newspaper reports in the US quoted US military and intelligence officials as saying that electronic traffic picked up by the US showed that the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements communicated freely on the Pakistani side but observed radio silence after crossing over into Afghanistan. As if on cue, Kabul has also been accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban, the most recent row pertaining to Kabul’s insistence that it had given a concrete list of “terrorists” to Pakistan, which Islamabad says is “stale”.

The joint statement on peace and security lists a number of areas of cooperation — defence cooperation, arms and technology transfers, training, joint exercises and so on — but none of this reaches the level at which the US proposes or intends to reach out to India. In any case, given Mr Bush’s emphasis on the war on terrorism, much of this cooperation and weapons procurement would relate to systems that help boost the ability of Pakistani forces to fight insurgencies and conduct extraction operations rather than exclusively confronting India.

It is clear that the United States wants to remain “engaged” with Pakistan because the key to US security in many ways lies here. But apparently this also requires a reading of the riot act to Pakistan as and when it becomes essential. It is an unequal and uneasy relationship and both sides know it. The US relationship with India too is unequal but India is in a much better position to deal with the US on the basis of shared interests and an institutional approach than Pakistan, given past history and current political exigencies. Both these factors are largely missing in the case of US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan has had to review its security policies in the region, east and west, because they clashed with US interests after the 9/11 strikes. Events since then show that there are still areas of friction when it comes to handling Afghanistan and radical Islam. The difference between the two relationships springs from the fact that India interests the US; Pakistan worries it. Therein lies the qualitative difference.

Pakistan`s most famous-ever cricketer, former captain-turned-politician Imran Khan, spent Saturday confined to his home where authorities detained him to thwart his plan to lead a march to protest against Bush`s visit.

#362 iron_mask

Dont forget the visit of the chinese dictators to India.

Where was Arundhati Roy when these people came? Where was the progressive left? Where were the JNU jhola-walas? Dont the Chinese have prisons 10x worse that Gitmo? Arent Tibetans being tortured there as we speak?

The response from our insanely anti-US left: silence.

Arjun_m #355 man this is really well put

I think certain people need to answer a few simple questions of those people are going to be taken seriously: Why is it that some people are protesting Dubya when they have no problems with musharraf and the saudi king, both of whom are responsible for killing Indian citizens..


Farzana is a happy woman today. The interacts here have only incresaed her appeal. >300+ you have got to hand it to her. She knows how to gets peoples temperatures up! That is the thing which matters - number of interacts. rest is is incedental.

re:#343 by pmishra2
One hopes u are right. The worrysome thing is that muslims have demonstrated in such large numbers for a cause that is not Indian. Since when have IMs gotten themselves into a knot about the Iraq issue. They may be concerned as many are, but to go out and demonstrate, to burn effigies/flags, all point to a misdirected energy and frustration.
IMs never demonstrate for more seat in educational institution, for women`s rights, etc.
I had always thought democracy insulated IMs from a global jehadic mindset. I was wrong. This is but a small step from jehad.
Sridhar

re:#337 by FarzanaVersey
See what Farzana` coreligionists are doing:
All because they did not like what Bush did in Iraq.
My question is: are they Indians first or do they just see themselves as belonging to Ummah.




Then i get this crappy article from the author about a deal that will change the course of India`s history. I think people like Farzana need to smell the coffee.
M.J.Akbar too has proved he is short sighted.
Nations who have become US allies have fared well. Eg Taiwan, South Korea, Japan etc. India will have to forget the times when she was the leader of third world and feted people like Yasser Arafat while its economy stagnated.
AS somebody put it: if u want to be in the company of big dogs, stop pissing with small ones.
Sridhar

#355 by arjun_m,

Well said! Couldn`t have put in stronger words to drive the point home

Some random thoughts:

ballukhan:

``this is pure communalization which is only going to help the BJP and the RSS.............................``

The joke going around in Lucknow is that both the Samajwadi party and the BJP are happy. Mulayam is certain to garner most of the Muslim votes and he has helped the BJP to consolidate the Hindu vote bank sans his Yadavs. They have likely killed the dream of Sonia-Salman Khurshid to win back the Muslim votes in U.P. The Communists too are happy as they can now confidently count on the Muslim votes in the coming elections in both West Bengal and Kerala. Thus the win-win agreement signed by Manmohan is least likely to help his party. The BJP, of course, cannot believe its good fortune. While I was happy that the BJP lost the last election, the unfortunate part was that it lost the election it fought on its claim of economic achievement and peace with Musharraf. On the other hand, Modi who fought the election on the strident anti-muslim agenda won his election hands down. This means that unless Muslim leadership wakes up and stop supporting the ummah causes, they will be playing right into the hands of the saffronites, who are otherwise in doldrums.

I agree partially with MJ Akbar`s analysis. He has indeed elaborated on what I said in an earlier post that the two sides will interpret the agreement differently to their respective constituencies. As for the Congress is concerned, there are three sections:

1. The hawks: They support the agreement wholeheartedly. They want to see a stronger India as a counterweight to China and would, in fact, encourage India to produce more nuclear weapons. Their thinking is that putting a curb on India would only increase the nuclear disparity between China and India, a useless concept in my opinion.

2. The non-proliferators: These are against any relaxation of nuclear ban on India. They are rightly worried that any concession to India will open a can of nuclear worms and will considerable weaken the U.S moral position in stopping other countries who want to go nuclear.

3. These are the people who share the concerns of non-proliferators but are willing to give India a special deal because they think that it is in the long-term interests of the U.S - both economic and strategic. They would favour a deal but with more stringent conditions than are contained in the signed agreement.

In the end, I think that Congress will pass the deal. As I said in my article on IPI pipeline, when the two banias are agreed on major issues, a deal is eventually struck. The highly effective Indian-American lobby and the powerful multinational corporations salivating at the thought of winning some mega nuclear projects would sway those congressmen sitting on the fence. My guess is that the first to fall in line would be the biggest noise makers against nuclear proliferations, our own Canadians who would love to sell a Candu reactor or two of their own.

#353 by FarzanaVersey

Common sense tells me not to get involved when seasoned veterans (in this case you and Ballukhan) are involved in a ``heart to heart`` chat marathon. Therefore, to keep my record consistent, that`s exactly what I will do.

What you say has some truth in it. The problem has never been of people not knowing where the solutions should originate - it always boils down to the question of ``who will bell the cat?``

I personally would like to think that there is not a rift at the grassroot level between the Hindu versus Muslim communities on such issues as terrorism - when a bomb explodes in a crowded place, it makes no distinction based on religion (or perhaps more accurately for most people based on the religious label) whom it maims and kills - I also agree that Mullahs are not the only ones who have organized such show-biz situations in the past - Advani`s rath yatra also falls in the zone of demagoguery.

But two wrongs never make a right.

I agree that the communalization and its caste-based cousin are terrible scourges. I also agree that the “rage” should be expressed by ALL Indians. (Note: ALL includes you, too.)

Now, if you TRULY believe there is a groundswell of anti-Bush emotions in India - and it is not based on blind religious prejudice perhaps built up by the Mullahs - but more importantly sustained by a whole network - a whole outmoded mindset, with complicity of all segments of the society (including the ``educated`` leaders), then you must try to explain what is that groundswell due to!

When one ``hates`` Bush for what he is ``doing`` in Iraq while ignoring the plain-as-daylight fact that the real perpetrators of the heinous acts are Muslims themselves - that does not jibe.

Reality should be seen for what it is - not reinterpreted to fit preconceived notions!

Signing letters clearly does not end problems - everybody knows that. These are all small efforts - preparations for belling the cat - but is it honest to belittle such efforts or is that a way to purposefully look away from its intentions?

Deconstruct THAT, if you can!

Even more reason for the Indian public to love ya, dubya..what really cracks me up is the paki demand for a payment for their ``services`` are often on the same page as their condemnation of US interrogation methods in gitmo..so on one hand pakis say they want to get paid for putting people in gitmo and on the other hand they condemn what`s happening in gitmo?

Pakistan press ponders Bush visit

The Nation

President Bush`s visit to Pakistan produced no fireworks, and made clear that Pakistan`s importance to the US, while great, should not be exaggerated.

India, with its lure of a vast market for US multinationals, much-trumpeted democratic stature and the China factor has been favoured with a civilian nuclear deal ... [In Pakistan`s case] the US assertion of abiding friendship only applies to innocuous fields.

No one would seriously deny that talks on Kashmir have made no headway, but Mr Bush is not in a position to put pressure on India to appreciate the need for durable peace in the Subcontinent.

The News

As was expected, Pakistan and the United States did not break any new ground in their relationship at the end of a day-long visit to this country by President George Bush.

As compared to his high-profile engagements in India, his sojourn to Pakistan did not involve the finalisation of any glamorous deals... President Pervez Musharraf understandably looked disappointed as he stood beside the American president as they addressed a joint press conference after their meeting in Islamabad.

For all the services that Pakistan has so far provided to the Americans in their global war against terrorism, all that President Musharraf received from his distinguished guest was a lecture on the need for democracy and refusal for any direct role in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Times

It is clear that the United States wants to remain `engaged` with Pakistan because the key to US security in many ways lies here. But apparently, this also requires the reading of the riot act to Pakistan as and when it becomes essential. It is an unequal and uneasy relationship and both sides know it.

Pakistan has had to review its security policies in the region, east and west, because they clashed with US interests after the 9/11 strikes. Events since then show that there are still areas of friction when it comes to handling Afghanistan and radical Islam.

The difference between the two relationships [of the US with India and Pakistan] springs from the fact that India interests the US, but Pakistan worries it. Therein lies the qualitative difference.

Express

The US priorities in South Asia can be assessed from what President Bush said at his joint press conference. It is clear that America`s strategic partner in this region is India and not Pakistan.

This means that Pakistani policy makers also need to think in new directions. The time for depending too much on the US is perhaps over. Pakistan should turn the focus of its foreign policy to China now. If the US can enter an agreement over civilian nuclear cooperation, Pakistan can do the same with China. Mr Bush has made his priorities clear. We now wait and see how Pakistani policy makers respond.

Khabrain

The whole world knows that Pakistan is a frontline state in the war on terror and has lent the US all possible assistance. Yet the Americans are not satisfied with Pakistan and want more. In this situation, the US is strengthening the hands of India which can only mean weakening Pakistan.

The American demand for more on this front can also be taken as a threat. Mr Bush has said that he is battling political and jihadi Islam whereas politics and jihad are one and the same thing in the true Islamic spirit.

In the light of all this, Pakistan should not be under any illusion. The Americans only know how to use others for their own interests. Pakistan should no turn to a policy of self reliance instead of relying on the US.

Nawa-e-Waqt

The sub-text of whatever was said by Mr Bush has made it obvious that America has a determined a premier role for India in its China containment policy.

Pakistan`s role in the region, as such, has become a secondary one - limited to fighting terrorism and preventing nuclear proliferation. Whatever demands the American president has made of Pakistan and what sort of cooperation he has demanded for its plans to attack Iran remain a secret as yet.

What is clear though is that America is not willing to give the same importance to Pakistan as it is to India. In these circumstances, the only option for Pakistan is to establish a model democratic nation so that a democratic Pakistan competes with a democratic India.

At the same time, Pakistan must make efforts to extricate itself from the American trap.

Pakistan

President Bush alone knows exactly why he visited Pakistan. But Pakistanis generally feel that he has not even given a lollipop to Pakistan.

No resolution of the Kashmir dispute, no road map for democracy, no appreciation of Pakistan`s energy needs and no attempts to cool down tempers over the blasphemous cartoons.

It was being generally thought that President Bush`s visit is aimed at strengthening President Musharraf personally, so that he may continue his fight against terrorism. But only time will tell Mr Bush has ended up strengthening or weakening his friend.

#337 by FarzanaVersey on March 5, 2006 4:01am PT


I think it is shameful that you cannot accept an opinion different from the one prevailing here by someone only because she happens to be from a certain community.
Asking people to ``be kicked out`` when you yourself have chosen not to be here is disgusting.


What`s more shameful and disgusting is your tamasha..Lookie here...poor Farzana..being asked to be kicked out..woe is here..how could they do that to HER!!

WTF exactly happened? you weren`t allowed to go to Azad maidan? Your posts to chowk.com were blocked?

I think certain people need to answer a few simple questions of those people are going to be taken seriously: Why is it that some people are protesting Dubya when they have no problems with musharraf and the saudi king, both of whom are responsible for killing Indian citizens..

you have a right to be wrong in projecting your dislike of Dubya to a majority of the Indian people and other people have the right to question your loyalties and inclinations..if you think the questions about your loyalties are disgusting, other people think your attitude on the kashmiri pundits and the taliban and despotic rulers are disgusting...

Re: # 340

Farzana:

Can you not organize such a group that you have in your mind?

Anil