Fahd Raza March 8, 2006
#49 Posted by zeemax on March 9, 2006 10:53:47 pm
#39 by stuka
``Cut off Siachen and starve the Indians? Crazy.``
Why? The second option is militarily plausible, the only variable being the extent of the Indian response. It was worth a shot. ``
Yeah. Right. The ONLY variable of the extent of Indian response was obviously not taken into account, because the Indians threatened to cut-off entire Karachi through naval blockade in open waters which Pakistan`s tiny coastal navy could never break. I doubt that the Navy was even consulted by the faujis.
``Cut off Siachen and starve the Indians? Crazy.``
Why? The second option is militarily plausible, the only variable being the extent of the Indian response. It was worth a shot. ``
Yeah. Right. The ONLY variable of the extent of Indian response was obviously not taken into account, because the Indians threatened to cut-off entire Karachi through naval blockade in open waters which Pakistan`s tiny coastal navy could never break. I doubt that the Navy was even consulted by the faujis.
#48 Posted by jang on March 9, 2006 7:41:54 pm
#46
well, wars often gets started by parties who feel insecure (e.g. germany wwI) ..in 1984 perhaps with zia at its helm, PA was far from insecure and very busy. in 99, they were insecure due to excessive ``democracy``.
well, wars often gets started by parties who feel insecure (e.g. germany wwI) ..in 1984 perhaps with zia at its helm, PA was far from insecure and very busy. in 99, they were insecure due to excessive ``democracy``.
#47 Posted by shishapa on March 9, 2006 7:13:30 pm
Re: # 46
There is nothing mystifying here. They simply are idiots. Period.
There is nothing mystifying here. They simply are idiots. Period.
#46 Posted by stuka on March 9, 2006 5:48:06 pm
``If deniability was a tactic..why did Nawaz even go to washington..doesn`t that basically shoot the theory of deniability out of the sky when your forces aren`t in Kargil but your PM is asking for US help for his forces? Deniability wasn`t the goal in and of itself or was it?
``
Well, that poor sod did have to maintain the facade of deniability till the very end and the Americans helped him. The official statement was that Pakistan would ``use its influence with Mujahideen`` or some such.
My point is that they were wrong on deniability being maintained once the infiltration was detected. Sit tight and India would have two options 1. get out of Siachen 2. Expand the fight. The other issue is that Pakistan wanted to have its cake and eat it too as in fight in Kargil and nowhere else. They were not ready for a full blown war. India kinda saw the same writing in 2002 and the whole ``limited war`` plan. Basicallythey would have had to gamble that India would not fight somehwere else, a gamble that they lost in 1965 and one they allowed India to win in 1984.
The question still stands..why would Pakistan not escalate over Siachen in 1984 and yet try a gamble over Siachen in 1999? That is really mystifying.
``
Well, that poor sod did have to maintain the facade of deniability till the very end and the Americans helped him. The official statement was that Pakistan would ``use its influence with Mujahideen`` or some such.
My point is that they were wrong on deniability being maintained once the infiltration was detected. Sit tight and India would have two options 1. get out of Siachen 2. Expand the fight. The other issue is that Pakistan wanted to have its cake and eat it too as in fight in Kargil and nowhere else. They were not ready for a full blown war. India kinda saw the same writing in 2002 and the whole ``limited war`` plan. Basicallythey would have had to gamble that India would not fight somehwere else, a gamble that they lost in 1965 and one they allowed India to win in 1984.
The question still stands..why would Pakistan not escalate over Siachen in 1984 and yet try a gamble over Siachen in 1999? That is really mystifying.
#45 Posted by stuka on March 9, 2006 5:39:49 pm
``So deniability as a tactic/strategy was a huge failure..The tactic/strategy of going to war without using all your capabilities was a huge failure..
``
Erm, but isn`t that what my point was? That it was an institutional failure. A failure of inter-service cooperation, civil-military cooperation, basically a lack of instutional decision-making that hampered the implementation of an otherwise sound military concept.
``
Erm, but isn`t that what my point was? That it was an institutional failure. A failure of inter-service cooperation, civil-military cooperation, basically a lack of instutional decision-making that hampered the implementation of an otherwise sound military concept.
#44 Posted by arjun_m on March 9, 2006 4:35:34 pm
#43 by stuka on March 9, 2006 3:58pm PT
Why did Pakistan not use Airforce?
The pakis should answer that...Perhaps their AF is incapable of taking action against the IAF? After all, Kashmir runs in their blood or so they tell us..why would they keep their AF out of the game when it comes to a battle for part of their jugular vein? To think that the PAF stayed on the sidelines because of deniability is even more deluded than thinking Nawaz went to DC, uninvited and on the 4th of July, so that Clinton could beg HIM to let India off the hook..
If it coulda, it woulda..
The failure to use the Airforce was a direct consequence of the deniability.
Another question: If deniability was a tactic..why did Nawaz even go to washington..doesn`t that basically shoot the theory of deniability out of the sky when your forces aren`t in Kargil but your PM is asking for US help for his forces? Deniability wasn`t the goal in and of itself or was it?
So deniability as a tactic/strategy was a huge failure..The tactic/strategy of going to war without using all your capabilities was a huge failure..
Again: If their tactical/strategic plan was so great, why aren`t they on Kargil like India is on Siachen? Inquiring minds want to know..
Why did Pakistan not use Airforce?
The pakis should answer that...Perhaps their AF is incapable of taking action against the IAF? After all, Kashmir runs in their blood or so they tell us..why would they keep their AF out of the game when it comes to a battle for part of their jugular vein? To think that the PAF stayed on the sidelines because of deniability is even more deluded than thinking Nawaz went to DC, uninvited and on the 4th of July, so that Clinton could beg HIM to let India off the hook..
If it coulda, it woulda..
The failure to use the Airforce was a direct consequence of the deniability.
Another question: If deniability was a tactic..why did Nawaz even go to washington..doesn`t that basically shoot the theory of deniability out of the sky when your forces aren`t in Kargil but your PM is asking for US help for his forces? Deniability wasn`t the goal in and of itself or was it?
So deniability as a tactic/strategy was a huge failure..The tactic/strategy of going to war without using all your capabilities was a huge failure..
Again: If their tactical/strategic plan was so great, why aren`t they on Kargil like India is on Siachen? Inquiring minds want to know..
#43 Posted by stuka on March 9, 2006 3:58:19 pm
``rather than any strategic weakness in the plan itself.
How was the plan not strategically/tactically weak? they expected the Indian to not retaliate..The expected the Indians to not use the air force....they expected for an intervention to freeze the status quo in their favor...and they expected to win...none of which happened.. ``
True. But then from a conceptual perspective, why did the same not happen when India occupied Siachen? Why did Pakistan not use Airforce?
``Pakis keep telling us that the plan was tactically brilliant? Huh? then why did they have to leave behind the bodies of their soldiers and turn tail and run? ``
The failure to use the Airforce was a direct consequence of the deniability. If they had openly conducted the operation, they would have maintained supply lines longer. Basically, if u flip the Siachen operation, u pretty much get Kargil, but with diametrically opposite results. So, all I am saying is that the concept does work, but bad implementation led to failure.
``
How was the plan not strategically/tactically weak? they expected the Indian to not retaliate..The expected the Indians to not use the air force....they expected for an intervention to freeze the status quo in their favor...and they expected to win...none of which happened.. ``
True. But then from a conceptual perspective, why did the same not happen when India occupied Siachen? Why did Pakistan not use Airforce?
``Pakis keep telling us that the plan was tactically brilliant? Huh? then why did they have to leave behind the bodies of their soldiers and turn tail and run? ``
The failure to use the Airforce was a direct consequence of the deniability. If they had openly conducted the operation, they would have maintained supply lines longer. Basically, if u flip the Siachen operation, u pretty much get Kargil, but with diametrically opposite results. So, all I am saying is that the concept does work, but bad implementation led to failure.
``
#42 Posted by arjun_m on March 9, 2006 3:31:15 pm
Do pakis have a ministry of self-delusion?
COMMENT: Coping with power disparity — Tanvir Ahmad Khan
As media outlets in the United States vied with one another to proclaim India as the “biggest winner” and even the Indian commentators wondered how “high” on India President George Bush had become during his visit, Islamabad fumbled with its official reaction. The political wing of the regime, which was marginal to the great event, sought sanctuary in sangfroid and its important members proceeded to various engagements, many of them, rather happily, abroad. For projecting the long-awaited event, embedded journalists, TV anchors, and assorted analysts received guidance that simply strained credulity.
According to the capital’s evergreen grapevine, the guidelines included the following: portray India as having got itself trapped by the nuclear deal, attack commentators who compare the outcome in the two capitals as being India-centric, and project the rapport between the two presidents as sufficient guarantee of Pakistan’s national interest.
What was at stake was the degree of binding between the oldest and the biggest democracies. It was basically a measure of the Indian ability to retain sovereign manoeuvrability in areas where India’s own interests demanded a degree of freedom from the United States’ preferences.
The nuclear deal demonstrates that New Delhi has the vision and skills to safeguard that precious sovereign space. As George Perkovich’s book, India’s Nuclear Bomb, documented so ably, India has often been able to secure critical inputs from abroad to strengthen and refine its vast indigenous nuclear programme. Furthermore, its strategic enclave, sensitive to the ambitions of its brilliant scientists and engineers, has maintained a steady influence on decision-making. This enclave has now been remarkably successful in ensuring that the separation of civilian and military facilities corresponds to India’s future military needs.
COMMENT: Coping with power disparity — Tanvir Ahmad Khan
As media outlets in the United States vied with one another to proclaim India as the “biggest winner” and even the Indian commentators wondered how “high” on India President George Bush had become during his visit, Islamabad fumbled with its official reaction. The political wing of the regime, which was marginal to the great event, sought sanctuary in sangfroid and its important members proceeded to various engagements, many of them, rather happily, abroad. For projecting the long-awaited event, embedded journalists, TV anchors, and assorted analysts received guidance that simply strained credulity.
According to the capital’s evergreen grapevine, the guidelines included the following: portray India as having got itself trapped by the nuclear deal, attack commentators who compare the outcome in the two capitals as being India-centric, and project the rapport between the two presidents as sufficient guarantee of Pakistan’s national interest.
What was at stake was the degree of binding between the oldest and the biggest democracies. It was basically a measure of the Indian ability to retain sovereign manoeuvrability in areas where India’s own interests demanded a degree of freedom from the United States’ preferences.
The nuclear deal demonstrates that New Delhi has the vision and skills to safeguard that precious sovereign space. As George Perkovich’s book, India’s Nuclear Bomb, documented so ably, India has often been able to secure critical inputs from abroad to strengthen and refine its vast indigenous nuclear programme. Furthermore, its strategic enclave, sensitive to the ambitions of its brilliant scientists and engineers, has maintained a steady influence on decision-making. This enclave has now been remarkably successful in ensuring that the separation of civilian and military facilities corresponds to India’s future military needs.
#41 Posted by arjun_m on March 9, 2006 3:05:29 pm
#40 by stuka on March 9, 2006 2:41pm PT
I have read about the Indian op in Siachen and it was remarkably similar.
Except for the part where the Indian army won back Kargil and the Pakistani army failed to do so in Siachen..
rather than any strategic weakness in the plan itself.
How was the plan not strategically/tactically weak? they expected the Indian to not retaliate..The expected the Indians to not use the air force....they expected for an intervention to freeze the status quo in their favor...and they expected to win...none of which happened..
Pakis keep telling us that the plan was tactically brilliant? Huh? then why did they have to leave behind the bodies of their soldiers and turn tail and run?
The message from Kargil was clear..For India, every inch of Indian Kashmir is as valuable as a square inch of bombay or delhi..and there ain`t anything the pakis can do to change that..
I have read about the Indian op in Siachen and it was remarkably similar.
Except for the part where the Indian army won back Kargil and the Pakistani army failed to do so in Siachen..
rather than any strategic weakness in the plan itself.
How was the plan not strategically/tactically weak? they expected the Indian to not retaliate..The expected the Indians to not use the air force....they expected for an intervention to freeze the status quo in their favor...and they expected to win...none of which happened..
Pakis keep telling us that the plan was tactically brilliant? Huh? then why did they have to leave behind the bodies of their soldiers and turn tail and run?
The message from Kargil was clear..For India, every inch of Indian Kashmir is as valuable as a square inch of bombay or delhi..and there ain`t anything the pakis can do to change that..
#40 Posted by stuka on March 9, 2006 2:41:19 pm
Just FYI, my previous post...npt being sarcastic at all. I have read about the Indian op in Siachen and it was remarkably similar. The differences are well known..demarcated LOC and Kargil was temporarily vacated whereas Siachen was vacant from the get go. But militarily, it made sense. What did not make sense was the Pakistani deniability. They should have taken ownership and disputed the Indian version of the LOC itself. If tyou have to lie, you might as well lie big. Kargil was more an institutional failure of Pakistan (Army not trusting Civil, lack of credible decision-making process) rather than any strategic weakness in the plan itself.
#39 Posted by stuka on March 9, 2006 2:34:16 pm
Zeemax:
``Cut off Siachen and starve the Indians? Crazy.``
Why? The second option is militarily plausible, the only variable being the extent of the Indian response. It was worth a shot.
Truly, it seems both success and failure are bastards, the former has many claimants of fatherhood and the latter has none. :)
``Cut off Siachen and starve the Indians? Crazy.``
Why? The second option is militarily plausible, the only variable being the extent of the Indian response. It was worth a shot.
Truly, it seems both success and failure are bastards, the former has many claimants of fatherhood and the latter has none. :)
#38 Posted by pmishra2 on March 9, 2006 12:06:57 pm
#33 zeemax
No problem, god knows indians are just a few steps forward. And when it comes to very poor people who are receiving no benefits we are still #1.
I want to say that I am just as disgusted with parts of indian media and indians who say silly stuff like: now the americans will definitely help us and so on. It is sad when people do not realize that helping oneself is the fastest way to progress.
No problem, god knows indians are just a few steps forward. And when it comes to very poor people who are receiving no benefits we are still #1.
I want to say that I am just as disgusted with parts of indian media and indians who say silly stuff like: now the americans will definitely help us and so on. It is sad when people do not realize that helping oneself is the fastest way to progress.
#37 Posted by ijaz_gul on March 9, 2006 11:25:23 am
An excellent illustration and demonstration of the knowledge of history and vision for future, a la the establishment of Pakistan that has held it hostage for over five decades. I am just amused.
Cheerios
Cheerios
#36 Posted by zeemax on March 9, 2006 10:14:56 am
And one more thing. Chinese actually consider black people to be `apes` and are actully scared of them ... like in a subway or something.
#35 Posted by zeemax on March 9, 2006 10:00:38 am
#34 by Raw_Dust
The Chinese as a nation believe themselves to be much much superior than anyone else. Within the Chinese, the Mandarin speaking (Mainland plains, Taiwan, Malaysia and the main diaspora) do indeed believe themselves to be the elite, followed by the commerce minded Shanghainese. Next are the Cantonese who are looked down upon by the Mandarins. The Fukienese (the Singaporeans) and the Northern provinces like Sichuan, Fuzhou, Hangzhou are further lower down in the social stratum. But .... they`re all Chinese first. The social divisions are secondary to their main identity. The Chinese main trait is that they have a deep routed ingrained mistrust of foreigners. They just do not like them.
The Chinese as a nation believe themselves to be much much superior than anyone else. Within the Chinese, the Mandarin speaking (Mainland plains, Taiwan, Malaysia and the main diaspora) do indeed believe themselves to be the elite, followed by the commerce minded Shanghainese. Next are the Cantonese who are looked down upon by the Mandarins. The Fukienese (the Singaporeans) and the Northern provinces like Sichuan, Fuzhou, Hangzhou are further lower down in the social stratum. But .... they`re all Chinese first. The social divisions are secondary to their main identity. The Chinese main trait is that they have a deep routed ingrained mistrust of foreigners. They just do not like them.
#34 Posted by Raw_Dust on March 9, 2006 9:46:09 am
zeemax:
based on observation that seems to be the case. in case of arabs, they have this hierarchy of races where Whites are their masters (atleast, in this world), and they consider themselves racially superior to everyone else with africans and blacks being considered to be the lowest of the low.
chinese seem to be averse to everybody in general and to japanese in particular. i might be wrong, but i have sensed that mandarin speakers are considered to be superior to cantonese speaking darker complexioned chinese. kinda like arabs of saudi variety are supposed to be superior to moroccan arabs.
based on observation that seems to be the case. in case of arabs, they have this hierarchy of races where Whites are their masters (atleast, in this world), and they consider themselves racially superior to everyone else with africans and blacks being considered to be the lowest of the low.
chinese seem to be averse to everybody in general and to japanese in particular. i might be wrong, but i have sensed that mandarin speakers are considered to be superior to cantonese speaking darker complexioned chinese. kinda like arabs of saudi variety are supposed to be superior to moroccan arabs.
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