‘Our Liberals’ and Minority Psyche

Majumdar...

I am completely unaware of my appointment.

BJK,

No... I am afraid this is an untrue statement that Khakis love Jinnah... infact Ayub Khan, who imagined himself to be the real Pakistani statesman, displayed at times his utter contempt for Jinnah - because Jinnah had snubbed him and told him that military men were no one to question decisions of civilian leaders... When Fatima Jinnah contested presidential elections on a CMP ticket (and nearly won) Ayub Khan`s hatred for Jinnah and his sister came gushing out... Similarly Zia ul Haq never once visited Jinnah`s mausoleum in his 11 years... But Musharraf seems to be more amenable to having Jinnah`s name and ideas around, if only in name.


Sadna

I am afraid that is no argument.... and you know it. What we are trying to establish is what is the minimum Jinnah, as the lawyer of the Muslims, was willing to settle on. That is the point.

We know what Jinnah`s demands were in their maximum form... take as you will the maximum of claim under a suit... and take the points he was willing to settle on as the settlement amount. Another concept you may want to apply is that of a producer and consumer surplus in Economics.... This is very valid and simple logic which people like H M Seervai and most trained historians understand but to you the world is one of absolutes - where the stated demands are final and there is no room for negotiation and bargaining, even though you have used the phrase ``Politics is the art of the possible`` without understanding what it actually means.


-YLH

Manto mian,

I hear that you have become the Editor in chief of chowk. Congrats.

After Qaid-e-Azam MAJ (pbuh), Qaid-e-Awam (ZAB) now we will have a Qaid-e-Chowk YLH.

Regards

#686 by Mantolives

Dear Yasser…

I understand General Mushy really LIKES the Pakistani liberals. I believe he might be one of them himself.

Or at least in bed with them!

Now that appears to be the only way to survive for Pakistani liberals – pink on the outside but khaki on the inside.

I understand all the khakis LOVE Jinnah!

Have you started practicing saluting yet?

#685
What you are saying is, not only must we reject everything Jinnah said (including in the national assembly)continuously for 7 years about a sovereign Pakistan before his acceptance of CMP and also reject what he said after his acceptance of CMP about a sovereign Pakistan, we must also reject what he said and the Muslim League resolution said about a sovereign Pakistan at the time of acceptance of CMP as well. Er this is a truly unique way of interpreting history

PS: I can just contemplate at the current Doha WTO negotiations - the Indian minister bleating to other nations `sorry I can`t discuss customs and tariffs, it is a Group subject not a part of External Affairs - my constitution says so. The Pakistan Group doesn`t pay for me to discuss customs and tariffs and if I do discuss customs and tariffs with you, I will be proved to be a hegemonic Indian trying to forcibly oppress the Muslim majority provinces of Pakistan by introducing one more Union subject`

PS: Clause 2 of my rebuttal stands amended to this effect:

``2- No matter how you twist and turn the facts, the fact remains that Defence was a Union subject under the CMP and this was accepted by Jinnah and the Muslim League. To go back to where he had given his maximum demand might show what you think he was after but his agreement to accept the CMP with defence as Union subject shows that he was ready to accept a United Indian Army with equal control for Pakistan and Hindustan units``

This is a point (italicised above) that Sadna has already conceded in 675 in the last few lines.

Secondly I`ll be travelling tonight and consequently won`t be able to see your responses - not that there will be anything new in them except a regurgitation of the same old distortions- till Saturday.

Dear BJK..

I must say that your theory does wonders when applied to one gentle soul Martin Luthar King and his alleged fascination with the racist casteist Hindu bigot Gandhi who thought black people were a degree removed from animals...

But its alright... I understand your dilemma now, not to mention your angst at being suggested as a person of lower caste...

Sadna,

1- Nope it does not stand. 1947 was way to too late in the day. The story had ended with Congress in 1946 when it declared that it would be going into the Constituent Assembly unfettered by any agreement... Jinnah was right in not trusting them after that.

2- No matter how you twist and turn the facts, the fact remains that Defence was a Union subject under the CMP and this was accepted by Jinnah and the Muslim League. To go back to where he had given his maximum demand might show what you think he was after but his agreement to accept the CMP with defence as Union subject shows conclusively that he had wanted the Indian Army divided.

3- Your quotation of Muslim League`s resolution is of no real material value given that we are not arguing on the maximum demands but what were indeed the terms of settlement. I am sure that you have come across those minutes of the meeting where Jinnah had said that he wanted a way out of a sovereign Pakistan to accept the CMP and a member of the CMP had suggested that Jinnah was better off presenting the CMP as a compromise. Jinnah had said (this incident is quoted in detail in Ayesha Jalal)

Note by Major Wyatt
25 May 1946

Note of Conversation with Mr. Jinnah, FRIDAY, MAY 24th 1946

1. He is very nervous and I do not think he is much looking forward to his meeting with the Muslim League Working Committee and All India Council.

2. He was very anxious to know if all the comings and goings between the Congress leaders and the Cabinet Mission were having the effect of modifying the Statement in any way. I told him that it was most unlikely that the Statement would be modified.

3. He considered that the Statement was not a practicable proposition. The machinery envisaged would not work and could not work mainly because there was no spirit of co-operation on the Congress side. The Mission had obviously not even fully appreciated the situation in India. What was required was a surgical operation. This Statement would settle nothing. He did not think the British were badly intentioned but they would have to learn by experience. There are only two ways of learning things, either by experience or by taking the advice of someone who knows something about it. If he thought that the Mission would not breach his confidence, he would make them some suggestions as to how they should proceed and put the Statement on one side. But he was not sure that he could have complete confidence in the Mission.

I told him that the Mission would not breach his confidence, but that they were most unlikely to alter their Statement in any way. He at once said, ``Well, then it is no use my making any suggestions``. These undeclared suggestions were connected with the difficulty which he conceived the British felt over the defence of India. From a previous conversation with him I believe that what he wanted to suggest was his idea that the British should remain as the binding force in the Indian Centre for some 15 years and deal with defence and foreign affairs for Pakistan and Hindustan consulting the Prime Ministers of each State.

4. He was perplexed about the interpretation of paragraph 15(v)[of the Cabinet Mission Plan - Jinnah weblog 4). He thought that it should have been so worded as to read that ``Provinces grouped in sections should be free to form groups..``. I told him that in my view that was the effect of paragraph 15(v). The provinces would be compulsorily grouped together in their sections at the Constituent Assembly and they would then be free to form groups or no.

He fully appreciated that if the representatives of Assam and North West Frontier Province did not take part in the work of their sections they could not be forced to do so and the sections would have to proceed without them, although this did not alter the fact that Assam and the North West Frontier Province would not be able to opt out of their group until the new constitution had been made.

5. He said that the preamble to the Mission`s Statement had bitterly hurt the feelings of the Muslims. Not only that, it was inconsistent with the rest of the Statement. This onslaught was quite unnecessary and had been done in order to placate Congress. Indeed, the word Pakistan was an anathema throughout the Statement. This preamble made matters even more difficult for him than before.

6. His general criticism of the Statement was that it had not settled any of the fundamentals. For example:-
(a) The Muslim group of Provinces had not got parity with the others at the centre.
(b) There was no real protection for the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly, because from the very start the chairman would be a Hindu, unless the Muslims were to say that the election of the chairman was a communal issue, in which case the Constituent Assembly would break down straight away.
(c) The position of the States was left far too vague.
(d) Provinces had not been given the right to seccede after 10 years although the Congress had always been willing to give the right to secede and had raised no real objection this time at Simla.
(e) The Union had been given the power to raise money. This was not a communal issue and would inevitably lead to taxation from the Centre with other subjects being added on the short list of the Union Government.

7. He explained to the Viceroy why there should be entirely separate Constituent Assemblies which only met together for the purpose of deciding the structure of the Union Government.

He thought the Viceroy had understood. This was a psychological matter and the Mission had created a single Constituent Assembly working in three sections only to please the Congress, ignoring Muslim feeling.

8. The only real safeguard for the Muslims was parity between Federations. The method of voting on communal issues would not work as there would always be dispute as to what was a communal issue and what was not.

9. He could not understand why the Muslim provinces has been split into two groups. He agreed that it was something to have the groups at all and without them he could not even have looked at the Scheme.

10. He disliked the Advisory Committee on which the Muslims would be in a minority, and as far as he could see would be unable to prevent the Union Constituent Assembly incorporating its recommendations as a part of the constitution of the Union Government, thus added another subject to those dealt with by the Union Government. ??

11. He dilated at considerable length on the attitude of Congress who had not conceded anything during the Simla Conference and would never approach the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of co-operation. They would aim the whole time to use their majority to steam-roller the Muslim League and sidetrack the provision as to safeguarding the Muslims on communal issues. It was inconceivable that such a Constituent Assembly could work at all.

12. He will not come down to Delhi until June 1st or 2nd. He can say nothing further until he has consulted the Muslim League Working Committee and Council. He is being bombarded with telegrams from his supporters protesting against the Statement and the Muslim reaction is very strong against it. My own impression is that he definitely wants to see where he is with the Muslim League before giving a decision on the Statement and he wants them to have time in which to absorb the two shocks which they have been given.
(a) His own letter agreeing to a Union Government
(b) The preamble to the Mission`s Statement.

He is particularly hurt that the Mission have seized on this concession(which was an enormous one from his stand point) and have not taken his offer as a whole. None of the provisios that went with it have been accepted. I pointed out to him that everything that Congress had asked for had not been accepted either but he did not seem particularly convinced.

13. I asked him, in view of the foregoing, whether he thought that the Muslim League Working Committee might possibly pass a resolution on the following lines:-
The British had exceeded their brief in pronouncing on the merits of Pakistan. They had no business to turn down what millions of people wanted. Their analysis of Pakistan was outrageous. But the Muslims had never expected the British to give them Pakistan. They had never expected anyone to give them Pakistan. They knew they had to get it by their own strong right arm.

The scheme outlined in the Cabinet Mission`s Statement was impracticable and could not work. But nevertheless in order to show that they would give it a trial, although they knew that the machinery could not function, they would accept the Statement and would not go out of their way to sabotage the procedure-but they would accept the Statement as the first step on the road to Pakistan.

At this proposition he was delighted and said ``That`s it, you`ve got it``, and I am completely convinced that that is what the Muslim League will do.

14. He will demand parity in the Interim Government if he decides to come into it. The Transfer of Power Vol VII, 373, page 684.



4- So it is understandable that Ayesha Jalal is an evil Pakistani and must lie according to you... but pray tell why H M Seervai, a well respected Indian jurist, is ``selectively`` quoting to upset you so much. H M Seervai was an honest man of integrity ... who showed people like you what you guys really were made of.... he must be saluted for the great work he did. And by the same token ... why do you think SK Majumdar, another Indian jurist, was doing that in his book ``Jinnah and Gandhi, their role in India`s quest for freedom``.


The problem is that you think the only way you can win an argument is attacking the credibility of your opponent. Very sad and yes ``nuff said`` indeed.

#676

1. What I pointed out in my previous post still stands. Jinnah would contemplate no arrangement in which either he did not have sole control of the executive or equal control of the executive-he insisted(as I quoted him) that if Congress was allowed to wield a majority in the executive or the Constituent Assembly, the Congress would seize power, destroy his party and force a constitution by force of arms.

Jinnah`s rejection of the CMP in 1947 which I quoted was after Congress accepted the British and the League`s interpretation and his reaction was to the plan`s intrinsic demerits in staving off a Congress majority. If CMP didn`t work even when Congress had accepted the interpretation which the British and League insisted upon, then when did you expect it to work?


2. I am not surprised that you are asking whether defence was a Union subject or not because even the Cabinet Delegation was confused about what Jinnah wanted when the subject was discussed in the Simla Conference. I have quoted from some of those discussions. When Jinnah first said there should be no Union legislature, that the Union issues foreign affairs and defence would be discussed by the Union ministers with the Group legislatures only, they asked him then why do you say Defence and Foreign Affairs are not Group subjects, if they are to be discussed in the Group legislatures only?

After Jinnah agreed to a Union legislature, he wouldn`t agree to Union having the power to raise finances for the Union. He said the Group legislatures would make grants to the Union, including for defence and foreign affairs. This was his position ALL through till 1947- that the Union must have no power to raise finances on its own and must depend on Group legislatures to finance it. Even if defence was designated a Union subject, the Union had no power to raise finances for it, and would depend on the Groups giving it money - so defence would certainly be discussed in Group legislatures which were to pay for it. Ergo defence was a Group subject, not solely a Union subject; how could it be when the Union had no power to pay for anything?

The Groups alone could decide whether to keep the Army united- the one that pays the piper calls the tune. So defence was not really a Union subject and there was no basis to believe the Indian Army would be kept united.

Anyone who repeats this defence, foreign affairs, communications formula today as the lost glory of the CMP is as confused or as tricky as Jinnah was when he proposed it and the British when they wrote it up. Nehru simply expressed a rather more realistic rather less confused opinion at the time and the sky fell down. The Constituent Assembly (excluding the Muslim League) said that customs was an element of external affairs and that was deemed equivalent to forcible Hindu takeover of the Muslim-majority provinces.

I suggest Pakistan or some other country ruing CMP actually implement this defence-foreign affairs-communications formula before lecturing Indians any more on it.

3. As for Ayesha Jalal and Seervai, they are amazingly selective in their quotes. Ayesha Jalal wholly skips 7 years (1940-1946) worth of Jinnah`s exhortations all over India to every large or small Muslim gathering that he could find, to work for a sovereign independent Pakistan.

Jalal/Seervai school of theories depend on disowning all those speeches of his - telling us either that Jinnah didn`t make those speeches(I have two whole volumes of them so that explanation does not work with me) or that Jinnah didn`t really mean them and infact for 7 years went around India collecting funds and soliciting members by misleading Muslims all over India from Balochistan to Assam by telling them he was working for a sovereign independent Pakistan. One is asked to only believe in his truthfulness during one moment of his acceptance of the CMP and one must not believe one word he said any time before or any time after that moment of acceptance. Well, that doesn`t work for me either.


4. An example of Seervai`s selective quoting is displayed below for anyone interested.

This is the main part of Muslim League`s resolution accepting of the CMP on June 6 1946:


In order that there may be no manner of doubt in any quarter, the Council of the All-India Muslim League reiterates that the attainment of the goal of a complete sovereign Pakistan still remains the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India for the achievement of which they will, if necessary, employ every means in their power, and consider no sacrifice or suffering too great.

3.That notwithstanding the affront offered to Muslim sentiments by the choice of injudicious words in the preamble to the statement of the Cabinet Mission, the Muslim League, having regard to the grave issues involved, and prompted by its earnest desire for a peaceful solution, if possible, of the Indian constitutional problem, and inasmuch as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission`s plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of complete[ly] sovereign Pakistan, and in the consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations, Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabiting the vast subcontinent.

It is for these reasons that the Muslim League is accepting the scheme, and will join the constitution-making body, and it will keep in view the opportunity and right of secession of Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in the Mission`s plan by implication. The ultimate attitude of the Muslim League will depend on the final outcome of the labours of the constitution-making body, and the final shape of the Constitutions which may emerge from the deliberations of the body jointly and separately in its three Sections.

The Muslim League reserves the right to modify and revise the policy and attitude set forth in this resolution at any time during the progress of the deliberations of the constitution-making body, or the Constituent Assembly, or thereafter if the course of events so require, bearing in mind the fundamental principles and ideals herebefore adumbrated, to which the Muslim League is irrevocably committed.


Well, fyi Seervai omits the bold portion (speaking of the irrevocable goal being a sovereign Pakistan with no sacrifice too great, of CMP being a step closer to the goal of sovereign Pakistan) and quotes only the italicised portion to ``prove`` that Muslim League was willing to work for a united India! It is very funny esp. because in an earlier chapter he spends many paragraphs bellyaching about how Rajmohan Gandhi ``dishonestly`` left out one sentence in something Maulana Azad said.

With equal ``honesty``, he insists that Gandhi is the villian for rejecting 2:1/3:1 Hindu:Muslim/Hindustan:Pakistan parity which would have saved India`s unity - without once mentioning that 56:44 parity destroyed Pakistan`s unity (he lays the primary blame for secession of Bangladesh on India).

`nuff said.

#678 by majumdar
[…Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Saadat Hassan Manto, Eqbal Ahmad, Bapsi Sidhwa
And you may add Yasser Latif Hamdani too to the list.]

Ama yaar, kyun iss kam-bakhat ke saath un murdaa logon ko bhi gaarat kar rahe ho?!


#674 by Mantolives
[….Is it possible that you are a lower caste Hindu…]

The weasel lawyer-cum-politician continues with his futile, half-hearted, and running-out-of-steam efforts to change the topic off the focus of this article – the endangered, pathetic, vile, green-at-the-core pathetic and yucky hellish jellish called the “Pakistani liberal” encountered every morning in the mirror and sustained through spousal resources – in the same mold as the first Islamic terrorist from the subcontinent – a puss-face vampire entitled Mohammed Ali Jinnah!

Yes! Pakistan Army believes in non-violence when under attack by the Indian Army and is the champion of underhanded tricks...

Pakistani Army is made up of Gandhians- is it???

Regards

Majumdar...

That I might add has more to do with the fact that your army is incapable of conquering its own people and ours has perfected this and only this... otherwise- Pakistanis are democrats to the core.

( four remarkable Pakistani liberals - the kind India is incapable of producing...

Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Saadat Hassan Manto, Eqbal Ahmad, Bapsi Sidhwa )

And you may add Yasser Latif Hamdani too to the list.

True, incapable of producing such luminaries but capable of remaining a democracy for 60 years.

Regards

( four remarkable Pakistani liberals - the kind India is incapable of producing...

Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Saadat Hassan Manto, Eqbal Ahmad, Bapsi Sidhwa )

And you may add Yasser Latif Hamdani too to the list.

True, incapable of producing such luminaries but capable of remaining a democracy for 60 years.

Regards

``equal control over the united Indian Army``

The reason I omitted the sole control bit was because Sadna obviously doesn`t know the meaning of the word ``interim``. She doesn`t understand that the final constitution would not have been interim government and interim government does not equal government under a constitution based on CMP.

The Cabinet Mission Plan, as accepted by Jinnah, which envisaged parity between Pakistan and Hindustan Units under one Union of India... did give both group federations equal control of the United Indian Army. What else would a federation mean.

This was a very logical step.. given Congress` penchant to collaborate with foreign powers i.e. Nazis, fascists, imperial Japan etc... had this been done, Hindustan would not have become the handmaiden of the Soviet Union (which it became during the cold war), nor would the Hindus show the militant belligerance that they`ve shown vis a vis China ... meanwhile there would be no disproportionately Pakistani Army (to Pakistani population) or ISI to force civilian politicians hands in Afghanistan...

This was an excellent solution.