The General and Kargil

General Pervez Musharraf
Military misjudgment

Oct 5th 2006
From The Economist print edition
The Pakistani leader`s memoir may be a bestseller, but it does him little justice

AFP

THERE are good things to be said about General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan`s president and army chief, and he is, as he might put it, proud and unstinting in his resolution to say them, over and over, in his cliché-ridden and boringly boastful autobiography, “In the Line of Fire”.

General Musharraf—and there are enough phrases familiar to those who have followed his career to prove that he wrote quite a lot of it—comes across as humourless, vain and insecure. Sentences as smug as, “My career was now well on course, given all my qualifications and achievements”, are spattered across almost every page. There are many references to the president`s (allegedly) fine musculature. Any less than glorious event in his life, after at least a refreshingly sinful youth, is blamed on some less worthy individual, a dull superior or jealous peer, whom the author is all too happy to name. And yet, painful though it is to read, this is a quite remarkable book, about dramatic events and, as the occasional sentence lets slip, an interesting and impressive man.
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For a start, the book`s timing is remarkable. It is unusual for serving heads-of-state to publish memoirs, for good reason. General Musharraf denigrates Pakistan`s chief ally, America, for the bullying way in which it manages its foreign policy and for failing to live up to its promises. He is also bafflingly rude about India, given that he has staked his name on making peace with it. Of India`s leader, he says: “The initial signs of sincerity and flexibility that I sensed in Manmohan Singh seem to be withering away.” He suggests that Osama bin Laden is not, as often supposed, in Pakistan`s wild northern areas, but in eastern Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan`s leader, whom General Musharraf accused of resembling an ostrich last week at a bad-tempered summit in Washington, DC, is not pleased by the book. Neither is almost anyone in Pakistan, although it is selling briskly there (see article). General Musharraf scorns most of the country`s civilian politicians—tactless, if justifiable—including some of his supporters.

Insults aside, the book does not tell us much that is new. Most interesting are the details of events leading to the arrest in Pakistan of several top terrorists, including Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the attacks on the twin towers, and other al-Qaeda members; General Musharraf says 689 al-Qaeda members have been arrested, of whom 369 have been handed over to America. That is a testament to the efficiency of Pakistan`s security services, even though Mr Musharraf accuses America of having failed to provide the technical kit it promised.

Such digs at the superpower may be for the benefit of Pakistanis, many of whom find General Musharraf too quick to leap to its bidding. But the book is meant for a Western audience, by whom, it is clear, General Musharraf considers himself ill judged. It contains bold treatises on the political and economic reforms he has overseen since stealing power in his 1999 coup. These include a messy, but promising, effort to devolve power to the local level, and the creation of elected councils with fixed quotas for women representatives. There are also quotas for women in provincial and national assemblies. General Musharraf has given a boost to female emancipation in Pakistan, although the full impact of the changes he has introduced will not be felt soon. Even better, he has delivered broad structural improvements to Pakistan`s economy, which had been in a desperate way. This was not, as he suggests, the result of his own genius. He is economically semi-literate. But he can take credit for appointing wise technocrats.

In short, heaven forbid that anyone unfamiliar with Pakistan should wholly trust this book. General Musharraf is as partial as any campaigning politician. One monstrous example is his account of a short war with India at Kargil in 1999, when he was merely army chief. It began when Pakistani state-sponsored jihadist militants attacked across the front-line in contested Kashmir, drawing a ferocious Indian response. General Musharraf calls this an over-reaction—but if it were, it was understandable—and he says that India`s army came off worse in the fray, even to the point where the military ran out of coffins for their dead. Yet he omits to mention the hundreds—some say thousands—of Pakistani fighters who were slaughtered in a humiliating retreat.

Disingenuously, he says the war at Kargil was an important catalyst in the peace process that followed: if that is true, it is because Pakistan, not India, was forced to the table by the drubbing it took there.

An election is due in Pakistan next year, and General Musharraf is increasingly unpopular. This is because of a litany of perceived failures, including a muddle-headed war he has prosecuted in the northern areas, and rising inflation. It is also because, despite their appalling experiences of civilian leadership, and their acquiescence in his coup, Pakistanis have tired of army rule.

The bad news in this book is that General Musharraf refuses to recognise this truth: “The Pakistan Army has always been held in high esteem as the only powerful stabilising factor in the nation,” he insists. He does not seem to show any inclination to quit his twin role, as he is constitutionally obliged to do.

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Re:urstruly#126

Your long post is so full of misconceptions that it is hard to argue against all of it.

Islam has been around in the subcontinent for 1000 years. Let me ask you the following -

1. How many wars did ALL hindus fight with ALL muslims in the subcontinent before 1947?

2. How many times did hindus declare holy war on Islam?

3. During the past 1000 years, name me one hindu ruler who made any muslim revert back?

4. Since 1947, name me one muslim who has reverted back based on hindu pressure in India.

The answer to all the above is a big fat zero. Do hindus resent muslim conversion from the past? Of course they do. After all if a part of your community is lost to you, you will feel bad too. However, we have reconciled to it and we have never initiated a conflict on that basis. In fact, India has excellent relations with every muslim country except for Pakistan.

On the other hand, it is Pakistanis who have not reconciled to the fact that there is no longer muslim rule all over the subcontinent. That is the latent desire which gets manifested by creating excuses to create and continue a conflict.

Ranjit #130,
I understand the point you are trying to make, but I insist on historical accuracy. So:


Islam has been around in the subcontinent for 1000 years. Let me ask you the following -

1. How many wars did ALL hindus fight with ALL muslims in the subcontinent before 1947?
While maybe not ALL, the 3rd battle of Panipat in 1762 pitted Abdali`s Afghans, Mughals, and the Nizam against Mahrattas and Sikhs.

2. How many times did hindus declare holy war on Islam?
No one really declares ``holy war`` against a faith. Hindus have at numerous times engaged in murderous violence against unarmed Muslims - Jabalpur, Ahmedabad, Ayodhya, Bombay, Gujarat (Naroda Patya), etc...


3. During the past 1000 years, name me one hindu ruler who made any muslim revert back?
There was a movement in the last century to convert Meo Muslims back to Hinduism and it did succeed. There have been other attempts - especially in the east.


4. Since 1947, name me one muslim who has reverted back based on hindu pressure in India.

Nargis - LOL

#131
two questions (just for historical accuracy)

1) which battle was fought at Panipat in 1762? (I dont know of any)
2) Which Sikh units participated at Panipat? under who`s leadership?

bongdons,
Sorry, I meant 1761.
The battle with the Sikhs happened in 1762, Sardar Jassa Singh Ahluwalia was leading the Sikhs.
My apologies for the confusion I created.

Re: # 134

You are asking too many uncomfortable questions. .... the arab goo chaaters are going to
come after you .....

Remember the fate of the russioan journalist ....

*makes menacing gesture*

ok so i am still a little confused....but why should sharif run off to washington..i mean if the indians were so scared of the nukes, why did they not go to washington? after all it was summer and its real hot in dilli? or alternatively why did clinton not summon vajpayee and tell him to cool his guns?

#134 jang {``....but why should sharif run off to washington``}... {``or alternatively why did clinton not summon vajpayee and tell him to cool his guns? ``}


Elementary Jangson,
Sharif, being the perennial pervert, was well aware of the Cubans in the Oval Office and of course, the possibility of paging an intern or two while looking for Bubba`s orifice (office). He had heard that Washington, especially near the White House and the Ellipse, was the center of explosive fireworks around the Fourth of July. Thus, being the putrid Paki pervert, our man Nawaz Sharif, took the opportunity. Now, you ask ``why not Vajpayee Ji?`` Very dumb question. Seriously, do you really expect Vajpayee to catch an intern the way he walks and the speed with which he walks. Also, Mr. Vajpayee`s guns have been cool for a very long time and Clinton did not need to tell him to do that.

hmmm...the discussion seems to be definitely moving forward....no longer are the discussants referring to one another as plain ``macaca``.

Now it is ``ugly macaca``. ``moron maccaca`` ``dimwit macaca``.


next step, it will be: ``like totally ugly macaca``.

Perhaps we should send the discussion the other way and talk sublimely of ``ma and caca`` (as in ``mother and child`` as illustrated in the following painting

#137 yar salim be serious now..vajpayee is/was a brahmachari and would surely be as interested in a white-house encouter. no real physical prowess was necessary, clinton would have provided the cigars anyways...anyhoo in this case the there prolly was no intern, just clinton, the cigars, mr sharif and a matchbox.

#139, Jang, {``anyhoo in this case the there prolly was no intern, just clinton, the cigars, mr sharif and a matchbox``}

Jang,
Surely you jest and speak in erroneous ways, my friend. I know for a fact that Nawaz Sharif had rented a white sherwani over white shalwar kameez for the occasion.

Re:salim_chauhan#131

[...1. How many wars did ALL hindus fight with ALL muslims in the subcontinent before 1947?
While maybe not ALL, the 3rd battle of Panipat in 1762 pitted Abdali`s Afghans, Mughals, and the Nizam against Mahrattas and Sikhs....]

Salim bhai, how come the Punjabi, Bengali, Sindhi and UP muslims are not included in this 1762 war on behalf of the muslims? Arent they the majority of muslims in the subcontinent? That precisely proves my point - hindus never ganged up and fought a war with indigenous muslims.

[2. How many times did hindus declare holy war on Islam?
No one really declares ``holy war`` against a faith. Hindus have at numerous times engaged in murderous violence against unarmed Muslims - Jabalpur, Ahmedabad, Ayodhya, Bombay, Gujarat (Naroda Patya), etc...]

My point is that there were no formal jihads or crusades as compared to the middle-east where such formally declared wars went on for centuries!! Occasional communal riots, while despicable, do not scale up to the level of crusades.

[3. During the past 1000 years, name me one hindu ruler who made any muslim revert back?
There was a movement in the last century to convert Meo Muslims back to Hinduism and it did succeed. There have been other attempts - especially in the east.]

Wonderful point. Once again shows the hollowness of urstruly`s thesis that hindus are chomping at the bit to ``revert`` muslims, given that this is all you could pull up from 1000 years history.

As usual, reality shows it`s well known bias against the pakis..

The US version of Kargil

Zinni`s book, ``Battle Ready`` written with fiction writer Tom Clancy and published by GP Putnam`s Sons, a member of the Penguin Group in May 2004, covers Zinni`s career from Vietnam to Kargil and Pakistan is mentioned in less than 10 pages scattered over the 450-page hard cover edition. Zinni`s account of Kargil is, however, detailed and covers pages 346 to 350. Earlier he also devotes one page to Pakistan `s position when in 1998 Nawaz Sharif was about to detonate the nuclear bomb in response to the Indian test.

According to him America intervened decisively in 1999 to end the Kargil stalemate between India and Pakistan and provided a face saving exit to Nawaz Sharif. General Pervez Musharraf, according to Zinni, ``encouraged the then PM to hear out the US withdrawal proposal``. When Kargil took place General Zinni was sent on a special mission to Pakistan by President Bill Clinton.

The Pakistan Army had at the time claimed that its troops were not involved in Kargil and it were the Kashmiri Mujahideen who were fighting but Zinni writes with full authority and knowledge that the entire operation was carried out by the Pakistan forces. More proof of this was, incidentally, provided in the Punjab Assembly on June 1, when the provincial government placed data in the house stating that 2,000 acres of special land in Punjab had been allotted to the Pakistan Army for distribution among the families of the troops killed in the Kargil war.

General Zinni writes: ``On the 21st of April, (1999) I traveled to Pakistan for several days of meetings with the new Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf. The two of us connected quickly and easily. He was bright, sincere, and personable. A fervent nationalist who nevertheless leaned toward the West, he was as appalled as General Karamat over the ever-worsening corruption within the civilian government.

``Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf`s attention and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out.

``Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face); but after I insisted, he finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal. We set up a meeting with Clinton in July.``

This is General Zinni`s account of Kargil and what he says is the US version of how things were perceived in Washington and how they were settled. No matter what Nawaz Sharif or General Musharraf may claim, the truth has to be sifted out from what the others have to say about the issue and Zinni has given the most authentic third-party account. Analysts and historians can now determine whether General Musharraf has written the truth or what Nawaz Sharif has been saying is right.

reality: female of the canine species..

General Pervez Musharraf
Military misjudgment

In short, heaven forbid that anyone unfamiliar with Pakistan should wholly trust this book. General Musharraf is as partial as any campaigning politician. One monstrous example is his account of a short war with India at Kargil in 1999, when he was merely army chief. It began when Pakistani state-sponsored jihadist militants attacked across the front-line in contested Kashmir, drawing a ferocious Indian response. General Musharraf calls this an over-reaction—but if it were, it was understandable—and he says that India`s army came off worse in the fray, even to the point where the military ran out of coffins for their dead. Yet he omits to mention the hundreds—some say thousands—of Pakistani fighters who were slaughtered in a humiliating retreat.

Disingenuously, he says the war at Kargil was an important catalyst in the peace process that followed: if that is true, it is because Pakistan, not India, was forced to the table by the drubbing it took there.

IMO indian army took a good beating in terms of losses of jawans and afsars (its acknowledged in indian accounts)..but what was getting paki army anxious was measured air-power demonstrated. i dont think indians would have sent an occupying army, they would have merely started more air incursions on supply lines on PoK, and with limited air force of pakis, low on spares (and prolly a reluctant airforce) this was not an escalation they wanted.

over to you HP.