An Insight Into Pakistan Army and Musharraf

pavo saab thanks for all the interesting posts.

pavo saab thanks for all the interesting posts.

The Pakistan Army

From 1965 to 1971

November 2000


Selected Excerpts from “Pakistan Army Since 1965” re-drafted as an article exclusively for the “Defence Journal”. “The Pakistan Army Since 1965” is the second volume of the Two Volume history of Pakistan Army and covers Pakistan Army from 1965 till 2000.

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC makes an interesting foray down memory lane.

The finest summarising of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted Field Marshal of peace, by a contemporary, was done by Major General Fazal I Muqeem, when he described the state of affairs of the Pakistan Army during the period 1958-71; in the following words: "We had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one man’s will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for" 1.

The advent of Yahya Khan and Yahya’s Personality

Immediately after the 1965 war Major General Yahya Khan who had commanded the 7 Division in the Grand Slam Operation was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, appointed Deputy Army C in C and C in C designate in March 1966 2. Yahya was a Qizilbash3 commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun on 15 July 1939. An infantry officer from the 4/10 Baluch Regiment, Yahya saw action during WW II in North Africa where he was captured by the Axis Forces in June 1942 and interned in a prisoner of war camp in Italy from where he escaped in the third attempt4. In 1947 he was instrumental in not letting the Indian officers shift books 5 from the famous library of the British Indian Staff College at Quetta,where Yahya was posted as the only Muslim instructor at the time of partition of India.Yahya was from a reasonably well to do family, had a much better schooling than Musa Khan and was directly commissioned as an officer. Yahya unlike Musa was respected in the officer corps for professional competence. Yahya became a brigadier at the age of 34 and commanded the 106 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed on the ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1951-52. Later Yahya as Deputy Chief of General Staff was selected to head the army’s planning board set up by Ayub to modernise the Pakistan Army in 1954-57. Yahya also performed the duties of Chief of General Staff from 1958 to 1962 from where he went on to command an infantry division from 1962 to 1965.

Yahya was a hard drinking soldier approaching the scale of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey and had a reputation of not liking teetotallers. Yahya liked courtesans but his passion had more to do with listening to them sing or watching them dance. Thus he did not have anything of Ataturk’s practical womanising traits. Historically speaking many great military commanders like Khalid Bin Waleed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Eftikhar Khan and Grant were accused of debauchery and womanising. These personal habits still did not reduce their personal efficiency and all of them are remembered in military history as great military commanders! The yardstick is that as long as a military commander performs his job as a military leader well, debauchery drink etc is not important. Abraham Lincoln a man of great integrity and character when told by the typical military gossip type commanders, found in all armies of the world and in particular plenty in the Indo-Pak armies, about Grants addiction to alcohol dismissed their criticism by stating "I cannot spare this man. He fights"! Indeed while the US Civil War was being fought a remark about Grant was attributed to Lincoln and frequently repeated as a joke in army messes. The story thus went that Lincoln was told about Grant’s drinking habits, and was asked to remove Grant from command. Lincoln dismissed this suggestion replying "send every general in the field a barrel of it"! Once Lincoln heard this joke he said that he wished very much that he had said it! 6 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, praised by his enemies, i.e. the British, in the British Official History of WW One, as one of the greatest military commanders in world’s history was a great consumer of alcohol and chronic womaniser! It has been alleged that Kemal was a homosexual (a typically Turkish pastime) too and frequently suffered the ravages of venereal disease! The same was true for Petain one of the greatest military commanders of the French Army in WW One!

Gul Hassan Khan who served with Yahya in the General Headquarters in the early 1960s described Yahya as "professionally competent" and as a man of few words whom always approached the point at issue without ceremony.7 Muqeem described Yahya as "authoritarian by nature" and "reserved by temperament".8 Major General Sher Ali under whom Yahya served assessed Yahya as an officer of the "highest calibre". Shaukat Riza writing as recently as 1986 described Yahya as a good soldier, as a commander distinguished for his decision making and generous nature and one who gave his total trust to a man whom he accepted as part of his team or a colleague.9

Contrary to Gauhar’s judgement Yahya, at least in 1966-69, was definitely viewed as a professional in the army. His shortcomings in functioning as the Supreme Commander that became evident in the 1971 war were not known to anyone in 1966. No evidence exists, but it appears that Yahya’s sect and ethnicity may have played a part in Ayub’s decision to select Yahya as C in C. Musa writes in his memoirs that Yahya was not his first choice as Army C in C but was selected by Ayub overruling Musa’s reservations about Yahya’s character 10. This further proves that Ayub selected Yahya as the army chief for reasons other than merit. I am not implying that Yahya was incompetent, but merely the fact that Ayub was motivated by ulterior reasons to select Yahya. These reasons had something to do with Yahya’s political reliability by virtue of belonging to a minority! Yahya was not a Punjabi or a Pathan but belonged to a minority ethnic group as well as a minority ethnic group, just like Musa.This was no mere coincidence but a deliberately planned manoeuvre to have as army chief a man who was not from the two ethnic groups which dominated the officer corps, the Punjabis being more than 60 % of the officer corps and the Pathans being the second largest group after the Punjabis!11 Altaf Gauhar Ayub’s close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite uncharitably, and for reasons, other than dispassionate objective historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selected…in preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a harmless and loyal person".12

Selection of Army C in C

Foreign readers may note that almost all army chiefs of Pakistan Army were selected primarily because they were perceived as reliable as well as pliable! In Addition ethnic factors Vis a Vis prevalent political considerations played a part in their selection. Thus Liaquat the first premier selected a non Punjabi as the army’s first C in C since in 1950 Liaquat was involved in a political confrontation with Punjabi politicians of the Muslim League and had established a Hindustani-Pathan-Bengali alliance to sideline the Punjabi Muslims. Thus the most obvious nominee for the appointment of C in C i.e. Major General Raza, a Punjabi Muslim was not selected. Instead Ayub an ethnic Pathan, and one who already had been superseded and sidelined, and with a poor war record was selected as the first Pakistani Muslim army C in C. Similarly Ayub selected Musa simply because Musa was perceived as loyal despite not being competent! Yahya as Gauhar Ayub’s closest adviser and confidant admits, as earlier mentioned, was selected because he had hit the bottle hard; i.e. was harmless, and was loyal, and thus no danger to Ayub! In other words Gauhar advances a theory that Ayub selected Yahya (Gauhar’s subjective judgement) simply because it was politically expedient for Ayub to have this particular type of man as army chief! Gauhar judgement of Yahya has little value since it was highly subjective but Ayub’s reasons for selecting his army chief, as Gauhar describes it speaks volumes for the character of Ayub and I would say the orientation of all Pakistani politicians, both civilian and military! In third world countries every army chief is a military politician! The process was carried on and continues to date but this chapter deals with only 1965-1971, so more of this later!

The same was true for extensions given to the army chiefs. Ayub got three extensions since Iskandar Mirza perceived him as a reliable tool. He booted out Mirza, his benefactor, after the last extension in 1958! Ayub gave Musa an extension of four years in 1962 since he perceived Musa as reliable and politically docile, and thus no threat to Ayub’s authoritarian government. Since 1962 when Musa got his extension of service by one additional term of four years, which prolonged his service from 1962 to 196613, no Pakistani army chief was given an extension beyond his three or four year term. The situation however was still worse since Yahya took over power in 1969 and thus automatically extended his term as C in C till December 1971. Zia usurped power in 1977 and thus gave himself a nine year extension as Army Chief till he was removed to the army and the country’s great relief in August 1988 by Divine Design! Beg attempted to get an extension by floating the idea of being appointed as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces14 but was outmanoeuvred by his own army corps commanders, who gave a lukewarm response to the idea and by Ghulam Ishaq who was a powerful president and had a deep understanding of the military mind by virtue of having loyally and successfully served three military dictators.

Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971

Yahya energetically started reorganising the Pakistan Army in 1965. Today this has been forgotten while Yahya is repeatedly condemned for only his negative qualities (a subjective word which has little relevance to generalship as proved in military history)! The post 1965 situation saw major organisational as well as technical changes in the Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could function effectively while getting orders directly from the army’s GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have intermediate corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the 1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon after the war had started the US had imposed an embargo on military aid on both India and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but produced major changes in the Pakistan Army’s technical composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we’re not going to pay for it"!15 Pakistan now turned to China and for military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the Pakistan Army’s MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T-54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first batch was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 196616. The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan Army’s tank infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16 and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two more corps headquarters i.e. 2 Corps Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4 Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised.

In the 1965 War India had not attacked East Pakistan which was defended by a weak two-infantry brigade division (14 Division) without any tank support. Yahya correctly appreciated that geographical, as well as operational situation demanded an entirely independent command set up in East Pakistan. 14 Division’s infantry strength was increased and a new tank regiment was raised and stationed in East Pakistan. A new Corps Headquarters was raised in East Pakistan and was designated as Headquarters Eastern Command.18 It was realised by the Pakistani GHQ that the next war would be different and East Pakistan badly required a new command set up.

Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the army’s Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war. Yaqub was an aristocrat from a Hindustani Pathan background and was altogether different from the typical north of Chenab breed in depth of intellect, general outlook and strategic perception! In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who was not lavish in praising anyone "planning had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General Staff”.19 In other words Muqeem was implying that planning level in the army was relatively poor before Yaqub became the Chief of General Staff. But Muqeem went further and stated that the army’s war plans in the post 1965 era were still vague about "what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan".20 We will discuss more of this later.

Promotions and Appointments

Selection and assessment of officers for higher ranks had depended on one man’s will and his personal likes and dislikes since 1950. Initially it was Ayub from 1950 to 1969 and Yahya from 1969 to 1971. Dictators fear all around them and this was the principal tragedy of the Pakistan Army. Selection and assessment of men was not a plus point in Yahya’s personality. It appears that either Yahya was not a good judge of men. In this regard Yahya continued Ayub’s policy of sidelining talented officers who had the potential of becoming a rival at a later stage! We will first deal with selection for higher ranks vis-a-vis war performance. Almost no one, who had blundered, except Brigadier Sardar Ismail the acting divisional commander of 15 Division, was really taken to task for having failed in the discharge of his military duties!21 Lord Bashir of Valtoha fame was promoted, and commanded the 6th Armoured Division after the war! On the other hand Major General Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank!22 Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan’s territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the 1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the Armoured corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose unit’s performance was described by the enemy opposing him as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General Headquarters pedantic officers as fit only to command a recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main Pakistani armour effort at Khem Karan was promoted to Major General rank and trusted with the command of Pakistan’s Armoured division! Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders of the army who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the following to say about Sher’s conduct while leading the Pakistan army’s most important infantry brigade counter attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division despite considerable numerical superiority was completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their salt could ignore".24 but the Army’s Selection Boards ignored Qayyum Sher once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ! But war performance or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under him as a brave and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank, which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did.

Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War

The 1965 War was rich in lessons and many lessons were learned; however the army’s reorganisation was badly affected by the political events of 1968-71. The two major areas of improvement after the war were in the realm of military organisation and military plans. It was realised finally that infantry and armoured divisions could not be effectively employed till they were organised as corps with areas of responsibility based on terrain realities.

The post 1965 army saw major changes in terms of creation of corps headquarters. On the other side no major doctrinal reappraisal was done after the 1965 War except raising new divisions and corps no major reform was undertaken to produce a major qualitative change in the army’s tactical and operational orientation. Today this is a much criticised subject. The events of 1965-71 however must be taken as a whole. When one does so a slightly different picture emerges. A major start was taken soon after 1965 after Yahya had been nominated as the deputy army chief, towards improving higher organisation and corps were created, but this process was retarded by the much more ominous political developments which increasingly diverted the army chiefs energies into political decision making from 1969 onwards.

The 1965 War was a failure in higher leadership. This was true for both sides. However, qualitative superiority by virtue of superior doctrine strategic orientation and operational preparedness became relatively far more important for the Pakistan Army than the Indians.

The Indians had already embarked on a programme of rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The material and numerical gap between the Indian and Pakistan armies started widening from 1962 and after 1965 it reached dangerous proportions! Further because of the 1965 War the Indians got an opportunity to improve their command and control procedures. The Indians the reader must note were already one step ahead of the Pakistanis in higher organisation since their army was organised to fight as corps since 1947-48 while the Pakistan Army had fought the 1965 War organised in divisions.

The Indians had failed to make good use of their considerable numerical superiority in infantry in 1965 but, they had learned many lessons which. This meant that in the next war the Indians could employ their numerically superior forces in a relatively better manner than in 1965. Further Pakistan had lost its major arms supplier the USA which had imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan. Thus the technical superiority in equipment which Pakistan had enjoyed in 1965 was nullified after 1965. On the other hand India had a much larger economy and thus far greater potential to buy from the open market than Pakistan. All these factors demanded a major qualitative change. One that would ensure that Pakistan could survive another war with India.It was an entirely new situation.

The year 1965 was a watershed in Pakistani military history. Till 1965 Pakistani planners thought in terms of liberating the Pakistani Alsace Lorraine i.e. Kashmir! The issue in the next war was no longer adding more territory but merely preserving the country’s territorial integrity! The country was in the grip of serious internal and external crisis. The Internal crisis stemmed out of 11 years of military rule which had sharply polarised the country into two wings i.e the Eastern and the Western Wing and even within the Western Wing the bulk of the populace was alienated with the Ayub regime. It appears that this major change in the overall geostrategic position was not grasped by those at the highest level. It appears that till December 1971 no one in the Pakistani GHQ seriously thought that the Indians would overrun East Pakistan. Too much hope was based on US or Chinese intervention. The Chinese could not possibly have intervened since all Himalayan passes were snowbound in Nov-Dec 1971. The United States on the other hand made no serious effort to pressurise India into not attacking East Pakistan. To make things further complicated the country’s internal cohesion was seriously weakened by the political conflict between the East and West Pakistan Provinces and the countrywide anti Ayub agitation which finally led to the exit of the self promoted Field Marshal Ayub from power in March 1969. The situation was extremely delicate, complicated and only a truly great leader at both civil and military level could have remedied the situation. Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army and the country there was no such man to steer the country’s ship out of troubled waters.

It appears that 1965 war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan at all. In this regard the Pakistani military decision-makers were swept away in the emotional stream of their own propaganda! The fact that the Pakistan Army was in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the Indians in the war, but failed due to primarily poor leadership at and beyond brigade level, and due to doctrinal and organisational deficiencies at the higher level was not accepted! It was a natural result of the fact that Pakistan functioned as a pseudo democracy under one man! This in turn had led to a ban on frank and open analysis of the army’s performance and role! On the other hand the Indian Army’s poor performance was openly and frankly analysed and the Indian critics did not spare the Indian C in C General Chaudri.25 It would not be wrong to say that the Indians thanks to a democratic system in which the army was not a sacred cow, unlike Pakistan, analysed their failings in 1965 in a more positive and concrete manner. Shaukat Riza the officially sponsored historian of the Pakistan Army admitted this fact. Shaukat thus observed, while briefly analysing the Commander in Chief’s General Training Directive of 1968, that "We admitted that the enemy would have better resources in number of troops, quality of equipment, research, development and indigenous production. In face of superiority we were relying solely on quality of our troops to win a war against India. But there was nothing in our satchel of organisation, tactical doctrine or even quality of professional leadership, which could substantiate this confidence. This was self-hypnosis where we were not really hypnotised”.26 It may be noted that the General Training Directive identified the enemy threat relatively realistically only in an extremely vague and rudimentary sense but gave no solution or tangible doctrine to combat it except, operations on broad front for all formations except those in Kashmir, Mountain Warfare for formations in Kashmir and Baluchistan, Snow Warfare for troops in the Northern Areas, Desert Warfare for formations located in Sind Baluchistan and Bahawalpur, Jungle and Riverine Warfare for formations in East Pakistan and Frontier Warfare for all formations in NWFP and Baluchistan!27 It was a piece of extreme naivety and was probably drafted by a staff officer after reading the recommendations of the last two years training directives and was merely signed by the army chief 28. The 1969 training directive dealt with attack by infiltration and anti infiltration measures29, something, which was just a whimsical fancy in a staff officer’s mind! Infiltration was buried soon and in 1971!

Strategic and Operational Dilemmas

Fazal Muqeem quite correctly described the adverse strategic situation in the post 1965 period in the following words, "with the almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or _ in numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means”.30 The only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period 1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so realistically and rationally! Fazal’s wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was dismembered into two countries. The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about martial superiority of their army! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi who served in the army’s propaganda/media management wing known as the ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate) states that "the 1965 war had exalted the military image to mythical heights”. 31 The common man drew false conclusions and to compound things further, the 1965 war was viewed differently in West and East Pakistan. The West Pakistani populace and particularly the majority West Pakistani ethnic groups i.e. the Punjabis saw the war as a triumph of a preponderantly Punjabi Muslim army over a numerically larger Hindu army! The East Pakistanis viewed the war as a war fought by a West Pakistani dominated army to protect West Pakistan, where some 90 % of the army was stationed! The Indians had not attacked Pakistan deliberately since their strategy was based on the fact that in case the bulk of Pakistan Army in the West Pakistan provinces northern half i.e. Punjab was destroyed Pakistan would automatically sue for peace or collapse! Thus they had concentrated the bulk of their army against West Pakistan in the 1965 War. On the Eastern Front the Indians outnumbered the Pakistani troops defending East Pakistan by more than three to one but did not attack East Pakistan out of fear of Chinese Army the bulk of which was concentrated opposite India’s Assam Province and the North East Frontier Agency. Later after the 1965 war the Indians with the benefit of hindsight painted this timid action in not attacking East Pakistan as an act of grand strategic dimensions. In any case the harm was done as far as East Pakistani perceptions about the war were concerned. The East Pakistanis increasingly started viewing the army as a west Pakistani entity created to defend only West Pakistan. The seeds of secession were firmly sown as a result of the 1965 War.

The strategic and operational dilemmas faced by the Pakistan Army can only be understood in terms of the complicated political situation in the period 1969-1971. Yahya Khan attempted to solve two highly complicated political problems that he had inherited from his predecessor and who were also the father and architect of both the problems. These were restoration of democracy and resolving the acute sense of deprivation which had been created in the East Pakistan province as a result of various perceived or real injustices during the period 1958-1969. Secessionist tendencies had emerged in the East Pakistan province where the people viewed Pakistan’s federal government with its capital in the West Pakistan as a West Pakistani elite dominated affair. A government which was Muslim in name but West Pakistani (Punjabi, Pathan and Hindustani in order of merit)32 dominated in essence and which had been exploiting the East Pakistan province like a colony since 1947! We will not examine the details of this perception since it is beyond the scope of this book. We are only concerned with the fact that this perception made things very complicated for the Pakistan Army. The bulk of the army was concentrated in the West Pakistan province in line with the strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. The likely political danger now lay in the fact that the East Pakistanis were increasingly viewing the army as a foreign and hostile entity. This perception could make things difficult for the lone infantry division of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The Indian Army had been rapidly expanded since 1965 and the Indians now possessed a military capability to overrun East Pakistan while part of its army kept the bulk of the Pakistan Army stationed in the West wing in check. The situation was made yet more complex by fears in West Pakistan about the East Pakistani majority leader Mujeeb’s intention to reduce the army in case he won the 1970 elections that Yahya had promised. Further Mujeeb’s "Six Point Formula" if enforced would have led to virtual disintegration of Pakistan since it envisaged a confedral system with a very high level of provincial autonomy. What would happen in case a civil war started in the East wing after the 1970 elections and India decided to take advantage of the adverse internal political situation by invading East Pakistan. The military planners in the GHQ knew clearly that in case an armed insurrection broke out in the East Pakistan province one infantry division would not be control it. In case troops were sent from the West wing to reinforce the East Pakistan garrison, the war plans in the West Wing would be compromised. These were serious questions, which no one in the GHQ could answer in 1969. No one exactly knew what would happen in the first general elections of Pakistan. How could anyone know? This basic right had been denied to the common man in both the wings since 1946!

Yahya Khan and the Political Situation- 1969-1971

Now a word on Pakistan’s internal political situation in 1969 and its negative effects on the Pakistan Army. It appears that, had not Ayub Khan alienated the East Wing by his pro West Pakistani elite policies and also had not alienated the West Pakistani and East Pakistani populace by his self-serving policies, there would have been no East Pakistan problem which resulted in Pakistan’s break-up in 1971 or any anti-Ayub agitation in both the country’s provinces of East and West Pakistan that finally led to the fall of the Ayubian system of government in March 1969. The foreign readers may note that the East wing versus West wing rivalry had been constitutionally resolved through the passing of the 1956 Constitution, once the representatives of the East wing had most large heartedly accepted the principal of 50 % parity in the country’s legislature despite the fact that their actual ratio in the country’s population entitled them to 54 % seats in the assembly! Both the wings now started coming closer since issues were settled inside the parliament rather than by subversion or agitation. However Ayub in league with the president Iskandar Mirza repeatedly conspired to derail democracy and in league with Iskandar Mirza finally usurped power in the country by imposing the first Martial Law in October 1958. He sidelined Mirza in less than a month and imposed a one-man rule on the country. Ayub despised the East Pakistanis and as Army C in C had stopped more raisings of infantry battalions of East Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis on the other hand were anti-Ayub and resented Ayub’s policies of allocating a predominantly large part the resources of the country on the development of the West Wing. Further during the Ayub era, the strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in concentrating the bulk of the Pakistan Army in the West wing was developed. This further alienated the East wingers since there was an unofficial ban on recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms of the army and the expanded army increasingly became a West Pakistani army, instead of being a national army.33

Once Ayub handed over power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969 Yahya inherited a two-decade constitutional problem of inter provincial ethnic rivalry between the Punjabi-Pathan-Mohajir dominated West Pakistan province and the ethnically Bengali Muslim East Pakistan province. In addition Yahya also inherited an eleven-year-old problem of transforming an essentially one-man ruled country to a democratic country, which was the ideological basis of the anti Ayub movement of 1968-69. Herein lies the key to Yahya’s dilemma. As an Army Chief Yahya had all the capabilities, qualifications and potential. But Yahya inherited an extremely complex problem and was forced to perform the multiple roles of caretaker head of the country, drafter of a provisional constitution, resolving the One Unit question 34, satisfying the frustrations and the sense of exploitation and discrimination successively created in the East Wing by a series of government policies since 1948. All these were complex problems and the seeds of Pakistan Army’s defeat and humiliation in December 1971 lay in the fact that Yahya Khan blundered unwittingly into the thankless task of cleaning dirt in Pakistan’s political and administrative system which had been accumulating for twenty years and had its actual origins in the pre 1947 British policies towards the Bengali Muslims. The American author Ziring well summed it up when he observed that, "Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless uncompromising insensitive and grossly inept leader…While Yahya cannot escape responsibility for these tragic events, it is also on record that he did not act alone…All the major actors of the period were creatures of a historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to accommodation and compromise, to bargaining and a reasonable settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned to act in a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted violent judgements”. 35

The irrefutable conclusion is that Yahya failed as an Army Chief not because he lacked the inherent capabilities but because he tried to do too many things at the same time. This as we earlier discussed was the prime reason for failure of the Pakistan Army to develop and function as a dynamic entity beyond unit level in the 1965 war and in the pre 1965 era.

In all fairness one cannot but admit that, Yahya Khan, sincerely attempted to solve Pakistan’s constitutional and inter provincial/regional rivalry problems once he took over power from Ayub in March 1969. The tragedy of the whole affair was the fact that all actions that Yahya took, although correct in principle, were too late in timing, and served only to further intensify the political polarisation between the East and West wings. He dissolved the one unit restoring the pre 1955 provinces of West Pakistan, promised free direct, one man one vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a basic human right which had been denied to the Pakistani people since the pre independence 1946 elections by political inefficiency, double play and intrigue, by civilian governments, from 1947 to 1958 and by Ayub’s one man rule from 1958 to 1969. However dissolution of one unit did not lead to the positive results that it might have lead to in case "One Unit" was dissolved earlier. Yahya also made an attempt to accommodate the East Pakistanis by abolishing the principle of parity, thereby hoping that greater share in the assembly would redress their wounded ethnic regional pride and ensure the integrity of Pakistan. Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it intensified their separatism, since they felt that the west wing had politically suppressed them since 1958. Thus the rise of anti West Wing sentiment in the East Wing, thanks to Ayub Khan’s anti East Wing policies, had however reached such tremendous proportions that each of Yahya’s concessions did not reduce the East West tension. Yahya announced in his broadcast to the nation on 28 July 1969, his firm intention to redress Bengali grievances, the first major step in this direction being, the doubling of Bengali quota in the defence services 36. It may be noted that at this time there were just seven infantry battalions of the East Pakistanis. Yahya’s announcement although made with the noblest and most generous intentions in mind was late by about twenty years!

Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that had been accumulating for more than two decades. Yahya’s intention to raise more pure Bengali battalions was opposed by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the General Officer Commanding 14 Division in East Pakistan, since the General felt that instead of raising new purely Bengali battalions, Bengali troops should be mixed with existing infantry battalions comprising of Punjabi and Pathan troops.37 Such was the strength of conviction of General Khadim about not raising more pure Bengali battalions that once he came to know about Yahya’s orders to raise more East Pakistani regiments, he flew to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to remonstrate against the sagacity of raising more pure Bengali units. Khadim’s advice that Bengali troops could not be relied upon in crisis situations should have been an eye opener for all in the GHQ. No one at least at that time took his advice seriously. It appears that the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan Muslim

The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis. However much later an interesting controversy developed in which the Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed each other for doing so! The Hindustanis blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis blaming many Hindustani ICS old foxes of the 1950s! There is no doubt that this exercise in Bengali degrading was neither totally or exclusively Punjabi led but a a true for all West Pakistanis business!

The foreign reader may note that Bengalis were despised as a non martial race from the British times. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan a Hindustani Muslim and an eminent Muslim leader of the North Indian Muslims in late 19th century made open fun of Bengalis in his various speeches, notably the one delivered at Lucknow in 1887. I.H Qureshi another prominent Hindustani Muslim and a post 1947 cabinet minister declared in a roundabout manner that the Bengalis were an inferior race. Ayub made various remarks implying that the Bengalis were an inferior race in his memoirs written in 1967.38

Inflated Perceptions about Pakistani military effectiveness

The essence of the whole business was the fact that the Pakistani GHQ placed entire reliance on the “Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war” and felt that somehow, in the next war to miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well! The tangible military facts of the Indo Pak politico-military scenario were not analysed in their true dimension! It was a classic case of perceptual distortion and losing sight of reality. Eric Berne an eminent psychologist defined "adjustment" as "ability to change one’s images to correspond to a new reality”. Berne rephrases "adjustment" as "flexibility" which he defines as " ability to change your images as they should be changed according to reality". This in Berne’s view is more important than intelligence. Berne thus concluded that ‘the successful man is the one whose images correspond most closely to reality, because then his actions will lead to the results, which he imagines".39 This as a matter of fact are one of the prime functions of a military and political leader. The success of the western democracies lay in the fact that one man was never totally in command but civil and military functions were divided and shared between various appointment holders aided by a host of staff officers and research Organisations. This sadly was not Pakistan’s case where one man from 1958 wielded all power, both civil and military onwards. The situation was not so complicated till 1965 since Pakistan enjoyed material and technical superiority till 1965 and because the troop ratio between Pakistan and India was relatively manageable40. Unfortunately in Pakistan after 1971 all blame was heaped on Yahya’s shoulders. The fact that the psychosis that had afflicted the Pakistani decision makers in the period 1966-1971 and finally led to the great humiliation of 1971, had a close connection with the nature of Pakistan’s experiences as a nation in the period 1947-1971 was not accepted and instead Yahya was made a scapegoat for all that had gone wrong. We will analyse more of this in the next chapter. I will quote Berne once again to define greatness or the lack of it in Pakistan during the period 1947-1971. But before we do it we must understand that man is not fully autonomous but is a prisoner of historical environmental and physiological circumstances. There are very few truly great men who act more autonomously than the multitude. Berne thus defined individual human greatness as " A great man is the one who either helps to find out what the world is really like or else tries to change the world to match his image. In both cases he is trying to bring images and reality closer together by changing one or the other”. In the period 1966-1971 Pakistan did not have the resources to change the world to match its images nor great men who had the depth of character and intellect to find out what the world is really like and changing their images!

Many Pakistani intellectuals with the naivety of a provincial farm maiden try to heap the whole blame on liquor and Yahya or on liquor alone! This unfortunately is too simplistic a view! The Pakistanis as a nation were forming wrong and unrealistic images right from 1947! Too much faith was based on ideology (Islam) to unite two entirely diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! Even Shauakat Riza a pro establishment historian, commenting on religion as a common factor between the East and West wings caustically noted that “Twenty four years is too long to gamble on one card”41 History was distorted to show that the Muslims were ruling the timid Hindu when the British snatched power from the brave Muslims by treachery! This was sadly not the case! In reality the Muslims were saved from total defeat by the British advent in India! A false image was formed by official propaganda right from 1947 that the Muslims were more martial than the timid Hindus were! It was a poor modification of the "Martial Races Theory" of the British, which was a purely imperialist theory to "Divide and Rule" India! But once Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame was heaped on Yahya and liquor, disregarding the fact that Yahya was merely the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable fact that many great commanders in history were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive womanisers and drinkers!

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, "Miracles he mused, ‘may indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s help is of the utmost importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a defender”. Siddiqi further noted that "The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’ …The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a taboo”.42 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views. Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, "We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much bigger frontier”. 43

Many years earlier one of the greatest thinkers of this world Sigmund Freud rightly noted that "the irrational forces in man’s nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them”. Freud thus concluded that "a small minority might be able to live a life of reason but most men are comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions rather than with the truth". As a matter of fact whole nations can be victims of delusions. This has happened many times in history. The same was true for the Pakistani nation, or the predominantly West Pakistani elite!

Sultan Khan who served as Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary with Yahya during the fateful year of 1971 noted at many places in his memoirs that most Pakistani generals thought that the Pakistani soldier was more martial and would somehow emerge successfully through the East Pakistan War. Gul Hassan, Sultan thus noted, was one of them and firmly believed in the power of bayonet to solve all problems! The tragedy is that after the war all the blame was heaped on Yahya and the fact that the whole elite and all those who mattered were under influence of highly irrational ideas was deliberately suppressed. Till this day in presentations and studies carried out in Pakistan Army’s schools and colleges of instruction, Yahya is made the scapegoat for the entire 1971 fiasco and the fact that the whole of West Pakistani was under influence of a psychotic state is ignored.

Historical Background of Superiority Complex in the Pakistan Army

It is necessary to examine the historical reasons for this false feeling of superiority in the Pakistan Army in 1969-71. It may be noted that the vast bulk of Muslims, just like the vast bulk of Hindus of the Indo Pak Sub Continent were caught in a vicious square of "ethnicity” "ideology" "exploitation by feudal and capitalist classes" and above all "British Colonial rule" during the period 1858-1947. In 1857 the common soldiers (sepoys), both Hindu (some three fourth) and Muslims (around one fourth) from modern UP province attempted a rebellion against the British. This rebellion was crushed by the Britishers using European as well as Punjabi (largely Muslim and relatively less Sikh and Hindu) Pathan (less in number than Punjabis) Gurkha and Madrasi troops. The rebellion’s end in 1858 marked a major turn in British policy in India. Till 1857 British policy as executed by various Viceroys of the private English East India Company was markedly egalitarian and anti feudal. A major policy change was introduced from 1858 onwards once the British crown took over the governance of India. Feudals who were viewed as unnecessary anachronisms by Dalhousie were now viewed as allies against future rebels while ethnic/religious factors which were not important in army recruitment before 1857, now became a matter of careful policy, since the pre 1857 was largely one in which soldiers were mixed down to platoon level regardless of race or religion. The British policy now changed since the Hindustani44 Hindus and Muslims regardless of race or religion had jointly rebelled. Thus from 1858 onwards the British introduced the concept of One class companies with soldiers from one religious as well as ethnic class in any single infantry company or cavalry troop. Due to various reasons discussed in detail in the previous volume of this history the British actively followed a policy of Punjabising from 1858 to 1911. As a result by 1911 the Indian Army was largely a Punjabi although not a Punjabi Muslim dominated army45.

The reader may note that during the period 1885—1911 when the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major war took place; that could prove that Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops, and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history. Thus the “Martial Races Theory” was based more on political considerations than on any tangible or concrete military effectiveness or relative combat effectiveness in any war! In any case the pre 1947 Indian Army was never a Muslim majority army at any stage of its history. Many Britishers were crystal clear about the situational or historical relativity of the so called martial effectiveness even in the first half of the nineteenth century. Henry Lawrence a Civil Servant of the English East India Company thus summed up the whole business about martial effectiveness once he said “Courage goes much by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as he considers he is expected to behave. Once two Roman Legions held Britain; now as many Britons might hold Italy". On the other hand , the reasons why the British preferred the Punjabis in the army in preference to other races were rationalised by many Britishers by stating that the British preferred the Indian Army to be composed of “Martial Races”46.

The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an Imperial gimmick to boost the ego of the cannon fodder. Various British writers like Philip Mason frankly admitted that the real reason for selective recruitment was political reliability in crisis situations which the Punjabis had exhibited during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.47 Another British officer thought that "Martial Races Theory" had a more sentimental and administrative basis rather than anything to do with real martial superiority. C.C Trench thus wrote, “Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial. To Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to be…There was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinking…Brahmins had been prominent in the mutiny, and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service48. The “Special Commission appointed by the Viceroy” to enquire into the organisation of Indian Army was more blunt in outlining the political reliability factor once it stated that "lower stratum of the Mohammadan urban population, the dispossessed landholders (many of them, off course, Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the cadets of the old Muhammadan families (as)… the only people who really dislike British rule” 49 . The reason why the Punjabis whether Sikh Hindu or Muslim were more loyal to the British at least till 1919 lay in complex socio-political background of the province and the complex relationship between the Sikhs Hindus and Muslims of the province. Its discussion is beyond the scope of this work. The fact remains that in the first world war the Punjabi case for priority race for recruitment to the army was once again reinforced when the Punjabi soldiers, Sikh Muslim and Hindu loyally served the British in France Mesopotamia Egypt Palestine and Gallipoli. Philip Mason thus wrote that the "Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock” while “a faint question mark hung over the Pathans” 50. Such was the difference in reliability within the units that when two Pathan squadrons of 15 Lancers passively refused to fight against the Turks in Mesopotamia, the Punjabi Squadrons remained staunch and the Pathan squadrons were disbanded and replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons from 14th Murray Jat Lancers! The Hindustani/Ranghar Muslims were also further discredited once the 5th Light Infantry a pure Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit composed of Delhi region Hindustani Pathans, and Ranghar Muslims rebelled and seized Singapore for about a day in 1915.51 It was more a question of political reliability than being more martial that led to further Punjabisation of the army after the first world war. Thus in 1929 as per the “Report of the Statutory Commission on Indian Constitutional Advancement”, military ability was not evenly distributed in the entire population and, the capacity to fight was confined to the martial races! The commission ignored the fact that recruitment was done to fill ethnic quotas as decided by the Indian government and was not open to all classes! As per this commission’s report some 86,000 or some 54.36% Indian Army combatants out of a total of 158,200 were from Punjab province. These did include some Ranghar Muslims who were administratively Punjabi although Hindustani ethnically/culturally, but there is no doubt that the vast bulk of these men were ethnically Punjabi. The important part of the whole business was the fact that once 19,000 Nepali Gurkhas, who were in reality foreigners, included in the above mentioned total of 158,200 men are excluded the Punjabi share in Indian Army rose to 61.8%. The Pathans thanks to their political record in the First World War had been reduced to just 5,600 men 52 or just 4.02% out of which at least a thousand were non Pathans!

The same state of affairs continued till the outbreak of the Second World War with the major change being the Punjabi Sikhs who became relatively less reliable politically because of being under communist influences 53. However the reader may note, so as not to be led astray by any false claims that in 1939 the Indian Army was only 37% Muslim, the rest being non Muslim including about 12.8 % Sikhs 10.9% Hindu Gurkhas and 37.6% other Hindus54. Immense demands of WW Two forced the British to diversify the recruitment pattern of the Indian Army and although Punjab remained the top contributor of recruits, it provided about 754,551 out of a total of 24,61,446, or 30.65% recruits to the Indian Army between 3rd September 1939 and 31 August 1945. 55 The reader may note that some 314,356 or a total of 41.66% from the Punjab contribution and 12.77% recruits were Punjabi Muslims56. Thus although Punjab led positionwise as a province in recruitment, there never was any Punjabi Muslim majority or even Punjabi Muslim majority or even near majority in recruitment to the Indian Army in WW Two. However a myth was widely propagated in Pakistan that the Punjabi Muslims were the most martial race and the Pathan Muslims were the second most martial race57. I may add that I heard this ridiculous and irrational myth thousands of times in the course of my 13 years service in Pakistan Army. On the other hand the knowledge of historical knowledge may be gauged from the fact that as late as 1992 in a book written and published in the staff college a brigadier made the Mughal Emperor Humayun fight the second battle of Panipat, at a time when Humayun was already dead!

In August 1947 the British Indian Army was divided into the Pakistan and Indian armies. Two divergent recruitment policies were followed in both the armies. The Indians broadened their army’s recruitment base, officially declaring that recruitment was open to all Indian nationals.58 Thus the post 1947 Indian Army drifted away from being the pre 1939 Punjabised army. In Pakistan, Mr Jinnah the politician-statesmen who created Pakistan almost single-handedly, as the country’s first Head of State, adopted a sensible policy, to make the army a national army. Jinnah ordered immediate raising of two infantry battalions of Bengali Muslims in 1948 reversing the anti Bengali policy of the pre 1947 British colonial government.59 Jinnah’s far sighted as well as just policy of bringing Bengalis in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army was discontinued by General Ayub Khan who was the first Pakistani Muslim C in C of the Pakistan Army and became the Army Chief in January 1951. Ayub although allegedly guilty of tactical timidity in the WW Two in Burma60 had a low opinion61 about the Bengalis and discontinued the expansion of the East Bengal Infantry Regiment from 1951 to 1966. Thus by 1966 the Pakistan Army was a predominantly West Pakistani (Punjabi dominated) army. In addition the vast bulk of it except one infantry division was stationed in West Pakistan in line with the strategic concept evolved in Ayub’s time that the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. Thus the “Martial Races Theory” was carried on till 1971 and in 1971 the vast bulk of West Pakistanis really felt that they were a martial race. This superiority complex played a major part in the wishful thinking in the Pakistani High Command that somehow the Indians would not invade East Pakistan in strength or even if they did so, the troops of this martial race (which was subdued by an 8 % Sikh minority from 1799 to 1849, till it was liberated by the English East India Company!) would frustrate the Indian Army, despite all the tangible numerical and material Pakistani inferiority. Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan’s memoirs are full of the existence of this irrational belief in the Pakistani High Command. Whatever the case at least the 1971 War proved that the real reason for the Indian Army’s martial fervour or relatively better performance was the British factor, keeping in mind the net total available resources of British Empire or its allies in the two world wars.

New Raisings – 1966-1971 and the army’s operational plans

New raisings as discussed earlier were done right from 1965-66 onwards. The Pakistani high command correctly assessed that lack of infantry played a major role in the failure of Pakistani armour to translate its convincing material and technical superiority into a major operational or strategic success. New raisings became more essential since US military aid, which had enabled Pakistan Army to function relatively more effectively as compared to the Indians, was no longer available because of the US ban on arms exports to both India and Pakistan.

EXISTING DIVISIONS AND NEW RAISINGS FROM 1965 TO DECEMBER 197162

SER NO
1965 REMARKS 1966-1968 REMARKS 1968-1971 REMARKS
1
7 DIV Peshawar Part of 2 Corps. Reserve Division to Support 1 Armd Div Operations in Bahawalnagar area.
2
8 DIV Sialkot. 1 Corps Part of 1 Corps Defence of Shakargarh Bulge. Under 1 Corps
3
10 DIV Lahore 1 Corps Part of 4 Corps. Defence of Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Part of 4 Corps
4
11 DIV Ditto Part of 4 Corps.
5
12 DIV Headquarters In Murree Defence of Azad Kashmir
6
14 DIV East Pakistan Defence of East Pakistan
7
15 DIV Sialkot Part of 1 Corps. Defence of Sialkot Sector.Under 1 Corps
8
1 ARMD DIV Multan 1 Corps Part of 2 Corps. Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Multan. Under 2 Corps.
9
6 ARMD DIV Kharian 1 Corps Part of 1 Corps. Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Kharian. Under 1 Corps.
10
9 DIV Reserve Div. Raising completed at Kharian by 1968. Airlifted to E.Pak in March 1971
11
16 DIV Reserve Div. Quetta. Raising complete by 1968. Ditto
12
17 DIV Kharian. Raising complete by 1968. Reserve Division To support 6 Armoured Division operations
13
18 DIV Raised at Hyderabad in June-July 1971 for defence of 560 miles area from Rahimyar Khan to Rann of Katch.
14
23 DIV Raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 for Chhamb-Dewa Sector previously in area of 12 Div.
15
33 DIV Raised in December 1971.Reserve Division of 2 Corps later split between Shakargarh Bulge and Sindh in the war.
16
37 DIV Raised in Dec- 71 Jan-72.

The table of raisings above is self-explanatory. The most important organisational changes which occurred in the army till the 1971 war were as following. Firstly the army was organised into three corps i.e the 1 Corps, 2 Corps and 4 Corps and 12 18 and 23 Divisions. The 1 corps headquarter was designated to command four divisions i.e 8, 15, 17 InfantryDivisions and 6 Armoured Division63. 15 and 8 Infantry Divisions were responsible for defence of Sialkot Sector and the Shakargarh Bulge respectively while 17 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division were the strike force of the corps and also part of Pakistan Army’s strategic reserves. In addition the 1 Corps also had an independent armoured brigade (8Armoured Brigade). 4 Corps consisting of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, 105 Independent Infantry Brigade and 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade was responsible for the area between Ravi River and Bahawalpur. The 2 Corps with its headquarters at Multan was a strategic reserve corps. This corps consisted of the 1st Armoured Division (Multan), 7 Infantry Division and later 33 Infantry Division. Three infantry divisions i.e the 12, 23 and 18 Infantry Divisions were directly under GHQ and responsible for defence of Azad Kashmir, Chhamb-Dewa Sector and Sind-Rahimyar Khan respectively.

Tangibles and Intangibles - The Pakistan and Indian Army’s military worth by January 1971

By January 1971 the Pakistan Army was a reasonable military machine. Its main battle tank was the Chinese T-59 which was almost as good as any Indian tank.Its strategic reserves had the potential to deter any Indian aggressive military move. It was on its way to becoming a really national army since Yahya’s announcement of 1969 to allow recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms. Organisationally the command was coherently and logically distributed in corps and divisions and the organisational imbalances of 1965 had been totally removed. Yahya Khan had not failed as the C in C.

The Indian Army was numerically larger but the advantage was not overwhelming since the Indian Army was divided between the Chinese Border West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Technically the Indians had relatively better Soviet tanks but numerically the Pakistani armour was larger than Indian arm

Why Indo-Pak Armies Failed in War
The failures of the two armies in the various conflicts.
[A H AMIN]

May 2004

Around the time of partition there were great expectations from the successor armies of the old British Indian Army i.e the Pakistan and the Indian Army! Thus while discussing the boundaries of the to be partitioned province of Punjab an Indian giving evidence before the Punjab Boundary Commission stated “If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measur-

able distance of Ambala, but they (The future Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of 40 miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angle to their forces”. The same person in this discussion gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan”!

Compare this remark with the later performance of both Indian and Pakistan Armies in actual war which was pathetic in terms of speed of advance or area captured in all three Indo-Pak wars! On a personal level I may add that this subject of phenomenal mediocrity at strategic as well as operational level motivated me to write “The Pakistan Army till 1965”.

The reasons for the dismal performance of both the armies are to be seen in their historical background, the classes which were inducted in both the armies and in the impact of British military as well as colonial legacy on both the armies!

The reader may note that since it was the failure of success of armour that decided the issue in all Indo-Pak Wars at least as far as any decisive breakthrough was concerned the discussion centres around employment of armour and leadership with special reference to armour.

Before proceeding into the analytical phase a glance at two comparative decisive battles is necessary so that necessary lessons can be linked to the analysis. The four test studies are Pakistani armours failure to achieve a breakthrough on the first day of Operation Grand Slam in 1965, both Pakistani and Indian 1st Armoured Division's major offensives opposite Khem Karan and Chawinda Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's failure opposite Bara Pind. Following is a summary of the four battles.

Pakistani failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough on first day of Grand Slam

The Chamb Sector in 1965 was a very weakly held sector held by three dispersed Indian infantry battalions supported by a tank squadron of AMX-13 tanks which were like matchboxes as compared to the Pattons held by the two opposing Pakistani tank regiments i.e a superiority of 6 to 1 in tanks. Further Pakistan had immense artillery superiority both numerical and material of 6 to 1. Pakistani 8 Inch Guns were phenomenally superior to anything that the Indians had. Unfortunately, the Pakistani armour was distributed in penny packets to the two infantry brigades. Thus instead of using armour as a punch it was employed as a thin net as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced. Thus many tanks were lost on the first day and Indian brigade holding the sector withdrew during the night in an organized manner. This initial setback on the first day reduced Pakistani chances of victory which was later on compromised due to other political reasons.



Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at Chawinda

The major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership “marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily combined …but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great …it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke”.

The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre!



Pakistani 1st Armoured Division's failure at Khem Karan

Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division with five tank regiments and additional two supporting tank regiments on the flanks failed to breakthrough the Khem Karan area on 7th and 8th September at a time when only one Indian tank regiment with ancient Sherman tanks was opposing the Pakistani five tank regiments having most modern Patton Tanks. The reason of the dismal performance was not Indian resistance but poor initial planning and staff work in not taking adequate measures to ensure crossing of one water course and one canal both in Pakistani territory! This delayed the induction of the armoured division in the battle area enabling the Indians to reinforce their lone Sherman tank regiment with two more tank regiments! It is ironic to note that the Pakistani plan to attack in this sector was not new but formulated many years before the war. Here was a case like Chawinda earlier discussed where there was failure in achieving a breakthrough despite a five to one superiority simply because the superiority could not be put into practice due to poor initial planning and staff work.



Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's Failure at Bara Pind

Pakistan's 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was launched at Bara Pind on 16th December 1971! The situation here was ironically similar to Indian situation at Gadgor on 8th September 1965! Three Pakistani Patton Regiments were available as against one Indian Centurion tank regiment holding a bridgehead at Bara Pind-Jarpal! Ironically as happened with the Indians at Gadgor here too the Pakistani tank brigade commander failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a three to one superiority. The first Pakistani tank regiment was initially launched with the initiative of the detailed planning of the attack, decentralized to the tank regiment commander! This was a fatal decision! The tank regiment commander known as Masood Chhakrra initially launched one tank squadron in attack. Once this squadron was badly beaten being in a frontal role against Indian tanks in static positions, he launched his remaining two squadrons a little to the north and again with disastrous consequences! Once the first tank regiment had failed the Pakistani tank brigade commander launched his second regiment again with disastrous results. In short three tank regiments failed to dislodge a single Indian tank regiment in a counter attack which was a planned contingency before the war and carried out in Pakistani territory. Prominent in this case was failure to coordinate artillery support which was available in abundance but not utilized in the attack plan. The Indian armoured corps historian held the view that the Pakistanis could have broken through even without artillery support if all three squadrons of 13 Lancers had attacked the Indian position in concentration!3



Analysis Failure occurred not because of material or numerical but other reasons

It has been a common practice to cite insufficient numerical superiority at the decisive point as a reason for failure. In all four cases, all decisive battles, this was not the case. The Pakistanis failed at Grand Slam despite 6 to 1 superiority on the first day. This was a case of not concentrating tanks and using them as infantry support vehicles. The Indian failed at Gadgor despite a 4 to 1 superiority. This was a case of the Indian brigade commander losing his nerve because of timidity and irresolution and the Indian GOC not spurring his brigade commander and instead withdrawing to the rear for the next two days while only one tank regiment opposed his division. The Pakistanis failed at Khem Karan despite a five to one superiority because of poor initial planning and incorrect armour tactics in withdrawing to the leaguer at night. Again Bara Pind was a failure in not integrating artillery in attack and in not concentrating the armoured brigade in attack.



British Colonial Legacy

Once the British initially came to India they allowed Indians entry in officer rank. The real danger in history has always been posed not by weapons but by men of resolute description! Thus Mustafa Kemal defied superpowers of his day not by any nuclear warhead but by generalship in the field!

Once the British came to India initially they were not aware of the dangers that Indians in higher rank could pose to their rule! Thus once a cavalry unit Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 it was an All Muslim unit with Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg. More notable was the case of Yusuf Khan!

Back in 1752 a Muslim of Pathan descent enlisted under Colonel Clive and distinguished himself in battle (not by verbosity on courses or in model discussions) on many occasions. As a reward for excellence in battle Yusuf Khan was made commandant of all Indian sepoys in the service of the English East India Company in 1754, three years before Plassey, presented with a medal in 1755 and further rewarded by renting of two districts in Carnatic for 20 Lakh Rupees in 1759 ! From 1760 onwards Yusuf Khan became more powerful and started defying the English East India Company. The Englishman were forced to start a war against Yusuf Khan which lasted for more than an year! All the British Troops of Madras Army were committed and peace only came after Madura Yusuf Khan's stronghold was finally captured on 13th October 1764!4

No more Yusuf Khans! This was the Englishmen's conclusion and this they enforced religiously right till 1947! Have no native leadership in the Indian Army! This was ensured as a policy right till 1947 even though Indo-Pak natives were admitted synthetically in the officer rank in 1919!

While Indians were recruited as officers from 1919 it was ensured that these must be the most slavish and meek ones! Outwardly smart and impressive in bearing, but loyal to the core, lacking initiative in higher decision making and good till only company and platoon level! Thus the basic aim of Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was to produce Indian officers who at best could be good company commanders and nothing more!

This system was enforced as a Machiavellian policy! Sir Sivaswamy Ayer in 1921 demanded in the Indian legislative assembly that all seats to commissioned officer rank in Indian Army should be filled by open competitive exam held on all India basis.The British sabotaged this scheme! Thus when Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was established the Britisher ensured a slavish Indo-Pak officer corps by insisting that 30 out of 60 officer vacancies be given to rankers from Indian Army who had spent many years in ranks under British officers and considered more loyal than educated Indo-Pak candidates selected on the open merit!

As a result the Indian Army and its successors Indian and Pakistan Army remained pro West and conservative in outlook! In 1950s Ayub Khan was ready to defend Anglo Iranian Oil fields in Iran for US interests! A relationship with USA was cemented with the rationale that it would enable Pakistan to regain Kashmir! Yet when the time came in 1965 Pakistan's self-promoted field marshal had cold feet! The military advantage over India in 1965 in terms of superior equipment was lost in Khem Karan not because of material inferiority, where Pakistan had tank superiority of 6 to 1 on 7th and 8th September, but qualitative inferiority on part of Pakistani higher military leadership! India's leading military thinker Ravi Rikhye admitted in an article on www.orbat.com that Khem Karan had the potential to be India's Fourth Battle of Panipat had the Pakistan Army broken through!

Deliberate measures were taken to instil an inferiority complex in the Indian officers! Major General Jahanzeb who was commissioned in 1942 states “In their regiments they were treated with undignified and unconcealed contempt. Once a British regiment invited the Indian

C in C to dinner. On enquiry about the segregated table he was told unabashedly that it was for the attached Indian officers”. The general further stated that till mid-thirties Indians commissioned from Sandhurst were not allowed to enter the precincts of the Peshawar Club and there were cases when an Indian officer asked for a chair being told by the quartermaster that Indian officers were not authorized chairs.5

Indian Army experience in WW Two

The British Indian Army was basically an internal security army designed to ensure continuity of British rule in India. It had no dynamic operational role. Tanks were inducted only in 1938 and Indians were discriminated against in tank units. Major General Jahanzeb states “The Indian cavalry was the domain of the British aristocracy. The odd Maharaja's sons were admitted on sufferance. In 1932 three cavalry regiments were Indianised, the 3rd 7th and 16th. They accepted rich and titled Indian officers. The other regiments admitted Indian officers almost two years after declaration of World War Two, a fact which was to cost Pakistan dearly when it came into being”.6

To compound the fact further, the British had a phenomenally incompetent record in handling of armour and were beaten decisively by the Germans repeatedly from 1940 till 1942 when overwhelming material superiority enabled them to turn the tide.

In addition Indian war record was nominal since most of the Indian units in North Africa comprised of armoured cars while in Burma where the Indian tank regiments had Shermans there was no worthwhile enemy in front since the Japanese had very inferior tanks.

The Indian experience in WW Two was also significant. In North Africa they encountered Rommel who was a master of armoured warfare who could appear from any direction. Thus a strange fear of enemy on the flanks or in the rear imported from North Africa. Similarly, the Japanese who confronted the Indians in Burma were again masters of infiltration and the emphasis that the Indian officers saw was on security and defence rather than any bold offensive tactics.

The resultant failures in 1965 and 1971 had deep historical reasons.The Indian commanders who failed beyond unit level consisted of men who had operated in a tactical and operational environment in WW Two where operations were infantry biased. Even at Al Alamein the major tank attack was carried out by pure British army units while Indian units and formations were in a static or holding role or assisting British units in the initial breakthrough as infantry units. Thus, the post 1947 commanders of Indian and Pakistani army did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding because of which both sides failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough in all three wars.

It was a failure of the command as well as the staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and thought in terms of yards and furlongs rather than miles.Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their typical idea of a battlefield was a linear one rather than a multi-linear one. Their Burma and North Africa experience where the Japanese or Germans frequently appeared in their rear made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial “orders oriented” British Indian Army. These men had joined the army for social and personal advancement reasons and warfare to them was a job like WAPDA rather than a supreme test of nationalism or ideology.

Further, in the British way of war a higher commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to lack of initiative and dynamism.The same legacy was imported in the post-1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies.

Conclusion

Today the serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army console themselves with the fact that today's officer is far more educated than his predecessors. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Both the armies have crossed the stage where a decisive defeat could be inflicted on each other. In the post-Nuclear Age conventional superiority or conventional weapons are no longer decisive. Warfare has been privatized with ideological organizations conducting a war that is spread all over the globe with multiple cells in nominal communication with each other. Today when an army marches into operation in one region its enemies react by bomb blasts in areas previously considered unassailable! The mainland of USA once considered impregnable has been rendered vulnerable since 9/11.

The other country's army is no longer the decisive target to be eli-

minated as the Iraq war has proved.Iraqi resistance continues despite the demise of Iraqi Army! Airpower alone cannot win wars as is proved in Afghanistan and Iraq!

The Indian thrust is today no longer to defeat Pakistan in Siachen or Kargil! The thrust is on cultural wars, psychologically disarming moves and on strengthening the economy.

Seen in this context Pakistan Army is still preparing for the previous war. No effort is being made to organize the populace for a conflict which would continue even after the conventional army has collapsed.

The future wars will have no beginning and no end, fought with soft power and by modifying educational syllabi and trade regulations! Conducted by proxy through minority ethnic groups and by minority sects who are threatened by majority sects.

Conversely, the Indian leadership has realized that it would be cheaper to win the race by unconventional means and projecting India as a moderate state with its western borders with a state full of fanatics and lunatics who deserve to be bombed without remorse. Whatever policies that President Musharraf is following are seen in the West as the efforts of one man, while the Pakistani nation is being increasingly perceived as an unstable state which must not be trusted with nuclear weapons. If the military regime fails to find a viable solution to the political problems of Pakistan and design a suitable exit strategy Pakistan's future may not be brighter than Serbia or Somalia!

The fact that today's Pakistan is far more vulnerable than 1947 or 1965 or 1971's Pakistan is not being understood. Nuclear weapons may not prove to be a guarantee of Pakistan's survival unless the political and military forces decide in the best interest of the nation to respect each other! The important point to be noted is that Pakistan was the result of a political process and the armed forces were meant to be a subordinate organ of the political leadership!

The next threat would not be the Indian 1st Armoured Division with its many mechanically unfit tanks but combined forces of many hostile neighbours attacking Pakistan's Nuclear facilities by stealth! The next conflict will be multi-national and very fast moving! This time there would be no KK Singhs worrying about their flanks since Pakistan may be facing not India alone but a combined Indian-Israeli-US onslaught!

The lesson of today's Pakistan remains that Pakistan is ill-equipped for the future challenges that it may face! Rather Balkanisation at best and Somalisation at worst cannot be ruled out! With a crisis of legitimacy paralyzing this country's natural growth since 1954 the future does not appear to be bright!

All depends on which country has a superior Grand Strategy and can handle its total national resources in a better manner! The BJP is poised to win and may abandon much of its conciliatory rhetoric after the elections! The danger is that an extremist party in India may be perceived as a civilised force in international relations.



END NOTES


Page-318-Remarks of Sir Zafrullah Khan- “The Partition of the Punjab” - A compilation of official documents-Volume Two-National Documentation Centre-Lahore-1983-Printed at Ferozsons.
Pages-244 & 245-On War- Carl Von Clausewitz-Penguin-1974.
Page-506-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1947-71-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi -1993
Page-28-The First Punjabis-Maj M.I Qureshi-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1953.
Pages-21 & 22-Role of Armed Forces in the Independence of the Subcontinent-Major General Jahanzeb Khan -Defence Journal-Vol X -No 9-1984.
Pages-52 & 53-From Bitter Lakes to Bitter Thoughts-Major General Jahanzeb Khan (Retired) -The Sabre and Lance -1997-Golden Jubilee Issue-The School of Armour and Mechanised Warfare-Nowshera-Pakistan. On a personal level I would like to add that this publication was a singlehanded Herculean feat of Brigadier Munawar Rana the then commandant of that otherwise bulky and bureaucratic bastion of pedantry.He was not promoted to general rank despite being than 95 % officers of the tank corps just because he was a Qadiani.How can we blame the Indians for being biased !

Re: # 187:--

Attached is my article on an aspect of Paki military history:--

Stray Reflections on Commencement of 'Pakistan Army Since 1965'

A.H Amin

The first part of this book 'The Pakistan Army till 1965' was distributed free of cost to a vast cross section of people including retired and serving Pakistani army officers of ranks varying from captain to four star general. Some copies were sent to libraries both Pakistani as well as foreign and some copies sent to research oriented organisations. No feedback was received from Pakistani readers, a happening, which may be termed as a rule rather than an exception. I have been writing for various Pakistani military journals since 1989. The various articles, which I thus wrote, dealt with doctrine, military training, leadership etc. With the exception of four cases out of which three were letters written praising my articles in two lines by officers who retired as colonels or brigadiers and one in which a factual error inadvertently committed by me was pointed out by the late General Attiq-ur-Rahman. No letter was written by any officer critically analysing my articles. The same is true for the vast majority of articles published in various army journals and magazines. The trend in Pakistan since independence has been towards anti-intellectualism.

There are historical reasons for this anti-intellectualism. The irony is that the situation was not remedied after independence. Education in British India was aimed at acquiring degrees so that Indians could become lawyers doctors or government officials. That they surely did, in the process of which some acquired great wealth and also became political leaders, senior civil servants and prosperous middle class professionals. The intellectual basis of modern Europe's success was the renaissance, the French Revolution and the Industrial revolution. During this period great progress was made in Europe in political thought, philosophy and scientific advancement. The Indo-Pak sub-continent was introduced to modern thought by the British by virtue of being colonial subjects of the English East India Company. Thus research intellectual activity etc were never important or of any consequence for the people of the Indo-Pak. On the other hand a mad rush towards acquiring rank and status, government jobs or political power by claiming to be champions of Hindu and Muslim rights plagued the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent! Once this mad rush for government patronage and jobs got an impetus from 1858, communalism became a major factor in Indo-Pak politics. This was since at this time the other parts of the world were talking about nationalism, socialism and political liberties. All the intellectual thrust of Indians was towards interpreting laws in communal terms! This was a Godsend blessing for the British colonial rulers! They encouraged communalism since it divided the Indians and ensured that they stayed away from dangerous ideas like war of liberation against the colonial state or from socialism or communism. The British very cleverly introduced parliamentary institutions, which enabled the leading Indians to divert their energy into harmless constitutional debates!

The fathers of communalism as an idea in Indian politics were Syed Ahmad Khan, Lala Lajpat Rai, Gandhi and the Jauhar brothers! The British on the other hand right from 1858 followed a subtle but brilliant policy, introducing parliamentary democracy as bait to divert the energies of the more prominent Indians! A bait, which aroused ambition, whether based on ego, lust for glory, social recognition or material rewards! Peaceful yet heroic! Safe yet glorious! The double advantage of pursuing a prosperous law practice or business career or wielding feudal power while at the same time also being leaders of the subject Indians and the possible successors of the British Viceroys! Parliamentary democracy or its prospects once the British finally left India produced two distinct kinds of reactions, both of which helped the British and went against the people of the Indo-Pak Sub-continent! The leaders of the Hindu majority saw themselves as successors of the British Viceroys while the principal leaders of the Indian Muslims hypothesised that parliamentary democracy in independent India would mean Hindu ascendancy and Muslim subservience or more correctly all power in the hands of the Hindu politicians! The Hindu-Muslim question in reality was a 'Hindu-Muslim leaders clash of ego' question! It all started once the British introduced local self-government based on elections from the 1860s and aggravated more and more as leaders who were Hindu by accident of birth tried to sideline other leaders who were Muslim by accident of birth! Initially leaders from both the communities talked in terms of high sounding slogans like 'Nationalism' 'Liberty' 'Democracy' etc but became more narrow in approach once their religion became a psychological disqualification in being leaders of all Indians! The fact that the vast majority of Indians whether Muslim or Hindu would remain poor as they were before 1947 and are in the year 2000 was not important for these men. The Congress and League were essentially bourgeois parties with a larger feudal presence in the league and a larger urban business presence in the Congress. Both these parties employed religion as a tool to further their party agendas, middle class business class or feudal on the whole and egoistic at the higher level!

Nehru was an atheist and a socialist, Mr Jinnah was a highly Westernised man, and yet both were great Hindu and Muslim leaders. Both the parties were instruments of business professional and feudal classes to achieve maximum power and both increasingly divided Indian society on communal lines simply because their leaders were essentially highly egotistical men! The irony of Indo-Pak history is the fact that modern Indo-Pak history is a story of clash of great men like Nehru and Jinnah who employed religion as a tool simply because they correctly albeit ironically realised that the people of the Indo-Pak were too naive to understand vague slogans like liberty or democracy and could only be galvanised or mobilised by raising religious slogans! In a more advanced Indian society Nehru and Jinnah may have been leaders of all Indians rather than only Hindu Indians or Muslim Indians! India, however, was like Europe around the time of the 30 years war and thus both these great men were forced by historical circumstances to be only communal leaders! Both wanted to be leaders of all Indians regardless of race or religion, but both were forced, thanks to the fire of religious communalism lit by glorified agitators or complex and outwardly impressive hypocrites like Gandhi to be communal leaders! Nehru was too sophisticated a man to be a Hindu and Jinnah was too enlightened a man to be only a leader of Indian Muslims. It was a twist of fate that both are today remembered albeit rightly as leaders of Hindu or Muslim India.

Thus while the other parts of the world intellectually as well as materially made great progress during the period 1850-1950 all the energies of the Indians at all levels were increasingly diverted into communalism; thereby ensuring that intellectually as well as materially the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent remained backward! History was written as Muslim or Hindu history, politics was practised as Hindu or Muslim politics and while Europe was experimenting with radical social legislation, all the energies of Indian constitutionalist were absorbed in debating representation on basis of religion! College or University education was important because it was a pre-requisite for government jobs or to practise in the law courts! Research teaching and writing were unproductive jobs since they did not enable a man to be a deputy collector or barrister or doctor! It was a mad race made further mad by frequent outbursts of communal frenzy, which increased as population increased during the period 1890-1940. All this helped the Britishers who had been traumatically shaken by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 when a largely Hindu majority army had rebelled under Muslim leaders! The British were thus happier playing the role of judges resolving Hindu Muslim disputes rather than performing the more unpleasant task of facing a combined political movement of all Indians regardless of race or religion as in 1857, 1919 or 1922 ! This is the basis of anti-intellectualism in the Indo-Pak Sub-continent. It is more true for Pakistan since the Muslims were educationally more backward and relatively less true, yet still true and applicable to India too!

Pakistan and India have produced very few serious military writers. In Pakistan the situation is worse since an unofficial ban was imposed on military writing by various military usurpers who ruled the country for the greater part of its history. Unfortunately the larger number of men who joined the officer corps of both the Indian and Pakistan Army were from the relatively less educated or superficially educated classes of Indo-Pak society. There were some military writers in Pakistan like Attiq-ur-Rahman, Fazal Muqeem, Shaukat Riza and A.I Akram. Attiq-ur-Rahman wrote well but was more obsessed with more outward forms of military discipline and was more of a martinet and proper soldier than a military writer of depth. A man of impeccable integrity, a man of Honour and a most cultured and proper soul, Attique did not have any of the dynamism or subtlety of a Liddell Hart or Fuller. He was never remembered as an inspiring field commander but as a 100 percent proper soldier who was obsessed with military drill and haircut.As a retired officer he was obsessed with Golf Courses which he rightly regarded as a waste of time and effort. However, this was where his concern ended. He stopped writing after 1990 and thus retired from the army's intellectual life at a time when the army needed a serious military writer. General A.I Akram wrote well but his books dealt with seventh and eighth century Arab Wars and had little relevance as far as practical utility in terms of modern warfare unit level tactics or operational strategy was concerned. General Shaukat Riza dabbled more with military writing but his writing lacked depth, broad outlook and dynamism. He was employed by Zia's military regime to write a heavily doctored trilogy on the history of the Pakistan Army at a time when the man was semi-senile and sick. The resultant three books thus lacked depth of analysis, their only significance being, a collection of three rudimentary handbooks which provide basic facts about order of battle, broad outline plans and other basic details which untouchable low caste retired majors like this scribe cannot ever obtain access to through normal official channels available to any researcher in any civilised country! Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan stands out as the relatively most competent clearheaded and coherent out of all the above mentioned gentlemen. His books lacked strategic vision and a broad outlook but nevertheless were precise and forthright without confusing layouts which are hallmarks of all Shaukat Riza's books. The unfortunate part about Muqeem's writings was the fact that Muqeem wrote first as a sycophant serving general hopeful of getting the next rank and later as a retired general to please or at least cover up an all powerful serving prime minister. The positive aspect about Muqeem's works was the fact that Muqeem was generally precise, correct and exact in analysing a fallen gladiator, a typical quality of all successful men, at least in the Indo-Pak Sub-continent, where a primitive historical state of civilisation and political system do not allow dispassionate, blunt critical and forthright analysis. This is relatively more true for Pakistan which has witnessed military rule or dictatorship in guise of democracy for the greater part of its history; I would say, for its entire history from 1947. Lack of critical analysis due to dangers of being labelled blasphemous is the greatest tragedy of history writing in all countries where Muslims live! Perhaps the reasons can be found in the fact that Christianity is 500 years older than Islam and may be in the year 2500 we in this part of the world will be writing history the way Europeans are doing in 2000! The problem with history writing in Islamic countries is lack of tolerance. Those in power are sacred figures by virtue of authority and totalitarian powers. Analysis or forthright analysis is dangerous in most cases and injudicious in many! Muqeem may have been an excellent historian in West Europe! But the question is that Muqeem was not willing to be sidelined or isolated or persecuted in a society, which does not tolerate criticism of those in the higher echelons of power! Thus each of Muqeem's work although relatively better than others was a condemnation of the previous regime's military efforts! Thus in his first book he criticised Liaquat the first Prime Minister for incompetence in the Kashmir War while raising Ayub to the level of a modern Napoleon. In his second major book Fazal rightly criticised Ayub for structurally weakening the army by encouraging sycophants and retiring relatively better officers who were perceived as likely political threats. Similarly Muqeem's analysis of the 1971 war is reasonably balanced, but exonerates Mr Bhutto of all blame and also exonerates the Pakistan Army of the terrible genocide that it carried out in East Bengal in 1971. Shaukat criticises Bhutto since he was Zia's principal political opponent but exonerates Ayub of all the blunders and the follies committed in the period 1950-1969!

A very learned gentleman who I hold in very high esteem by virtue of being a close friend of one of my dearest friends rightly told me to reduce what he called 'polemics' in the first volume of this history. A conceptual difference arises about the use of the word 'Polemics'. The term has different meaning for different people and is unfortunately used in a sweeping manner to dismiss valid historical criticism! There is no denying of fact in stating that 'Polemic' may be an unpleasant figure of speech for a professor of English literature or a criminal error of conduct for a sycophant or a man of this world. The fact that polemics i.e. 'practice of controversial discussion' is something, which is the essence of all historical writing, is absolutely undeniable and incontrovertible. The historian cannot be a diplomat in order to escape being branded as one who indulges in polemics. The historian has to indulge in controversy because there are no archives or source material in any library or records office in this world, which enable a research scholar to understand the innermost depths of human personality. Every historian who wants to be loyal to posterity has to be polemical. History is but another name of a never-ending controversy! At some point in time or text all historians enter the realm of polemics! It's a part of their craft or calling! I wrote an article for the Command and Staff College Quetta about two years ago. It contained some criticism about the higher organisation of the Pakistan Army. The article was surprisingly published since the Staff College was headed at that time by one of the most upright and intellectually honest generals of Pakistan Army; a rare commodity in a sub-continental army and I would say in any army of the world. In addition the staff college's principal magazine's editor at that time was one of the most dynamic and boldest colonels, (at least in my humble opinion), of the army! The colonel editor who twice risked his career by attacking the Quetta Police over an entirely honourable issue in 1979, and by refusing to supervise Degchas in a general officers daughter's wedding in early 1987 was being posted out to command a tank regiment. Somehow he managed, or I should say was instrumental in ensuring that my article criticising the higher command organisation be published in the 'Citadel' magazine. The Editorial Introduction was, however, written by another colonel who succeeded him as the editor and belonged to the majority 'go safe' calculate a decade ahead 'take no risk' breed of career officers! The clever editor exonerated himself of all that I had said in the article by stating that 'the article lacks documentation for certain controversial assertions'. The gentleman's point was valid but this is what historical analysis is all about; i.e. dealing with controversy in face of fog and obscurity and lack of documentation! Who in this world can find documentary evidence for saying that many wars that this world fought were to satisfy egos of Kings, Presidents or Prime Ministers! That revolutions killed millions or that countries were divided simply because one politician did not want the other to be the country's next Prime Minister or Governor General! So much for 'Polemics', bad word for professors, careful men, career officers, successful men! But one of the most essential tools in historians craft.

Re: # 187;-- You are right.A conspiracy against originality and boldness it is.Nylon socks full of fresh manure !

I thorougly enjoyed reading all this stuff on the Pakistan Army. One of the reasons that Pakistan Army is where it is; is that there is no tolerance for a discussion like this within the Army itself.... and that is proof enough that the Army is going nowhere!!!!!!!!!

Re: # 184:-- Its a viable institution , but unfortunately this viability may not last ! The whole geopolitical scenario is against Pakistan.The coming two years are very dangerous.

I entirely agree with you sir.Regards.

Provocavalry much thanks for your lengthy accounts into the machinations of the Pak military. Keep in mind though that from my earlier post #155, by military services I meant either of the three services, army, navy or air force. When I said the only viable institution, I didn’t mean the best or greatest of the world’s institutions, but ok let me correct myself now: the only viable institution in the land of the pure which is crumbling down fast, though still a shade better than the other existent bureaucratic monoliths. Meanwhile do you know what goes on in the lives of ordinary people when they come face to face with Mafiosi of a faceless bureaucracy demanding a pound of flesh? If we become nitpicking critical we can easily punch gaping holes into the bureaucracy of any military of the world, or for the matter of that, any huge bureaucracy. Obviously there are blemishes in American, British, French, Chinese, or Russian etc armies too if you delve deeper into it (and by no stretch of the imagination am I saying that we are what they are!). I think the name of the game ought to be to come up with constructive criticism rather than just to make anarchistic declarations. It seems like it has become very fashionable of late to run down everything that has to do anything with the native land, which is partly justified, but also partly because of the traitorous, selfish streak that exists within almost each individual that belongs to the sub-continent. That is how a handful of individuals of the East India Company came from 5000 miles away to trade with India and ended up occupying it. If the land of the pure is still enslaved by the west, don’t blame them; blame ourselves. Meanwhile keep having fun with the inebriating stuff, a liter or two of it per day is never known to have hurt anyone.

This military system is a conspiracy against originality and boldness as I first wrote in my article on decisio making published in the Command and Staff College Magazine Citadel 1/94.

Good summing up !

This military system is a conspiracy against originality and boldness as I first wrote in my article on decisio making published in the Command and Staff College Magazine Citadel 1/94.

Good summing up !

Because the discussions are moving in the direction of military sociology with the interaction of many ex officers, I would like to add a few notes for consideration.

Having studied Military Sociology and occasion to read books such as ' The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations by Samuel P. Huntington,
‘The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics’ by S.E. Finer, ‘Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations’ by Morris Janowitz and ‘Military Sociology’ by Amos Perlmutter quoted extensively by Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, I came to realise that PakArmy never reformed from its colonial legacy to the present.

In military sociology, armies are categorized revolutionary (China, Russia, Israel and now Iran) professional revolutionaries (USA, France,) professional (Germany, India), colonial (UK, Portuguese) and colonised (Pakistan, Thailand Philippines, Indonesia etc). In post colonial nations, where political institutions failed to create nationhood and where security threats existed like Pakistan, Thailand and Indonesia, military became a major stake holder in national policies as also for acquisition of latest technologies. Hence whether the interventions were with a pre conceived mindset (Ayub-Yahya in 1958 and Yayha 1969) or reactive (Zia 1977) or preconceived/reactive (Musharraf 1999), it began with a very low opinion of the political establishment.

Military corporatism and exclusivity considered vital characteristics to maintain military culture in due course got eroded. Having experienced unbridles power, it also became un-challengeable. Hence we see that despite many a failure, military was neither effectively challenged nor held accountable.

Also over a period of time the military developed its hardcore cadre comprising the operations and intelligence branches also called General Staff who developed an analysis format resulting in stereotyped conclusions. Hence young officers trained in this culture grew up to be its best guardians. This General Staff has also played havoc with the Trinitarianism of Clausewitz. As a result no military operation in the history of Pakistan army could meet the ends of policy. This is something worse than the bankrupt German Staff who liquidated an otherwise good Schlieffen Plan.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, both governance and military have become the forte of mediocre. Any one with fresh out of box but logical ideas cannot survive and remains a misfit.

Dear Fuzair

Thanks for the feedback.The greatness or magnanimity of some British is admirable but docility of many Indian races including the so called martial races cannot be ignored.Normally I am no longer writing on colonial history since I went to Afghanistan.This article was an exception.My old friends in the PRAVDA wanted something, so I wrote this piece.

Kabul is a very lonely place and you require one litre of Whiskey or Vodka every day to survive.The soun