An Insight Into Pakistan Army and Musharraf

Re #157

This must be one of the best dissection of Indo-Pak army I've ever read!!!

Agha Hamayun,
I cannot agree more with you. As regards Musharraf, your assessment is the same as mine. If you read the teaser, "A combination of threat perception and indispensability strengthened his quest for legitimacy till it consumed his reformist self". conveys a similar sentiment.
You did not reply to #154. I am keen to know your answer.
Cheerios

#146 Posted by HP,

That was a nice wriggling out act. Houdini would have been impressed.

Re: # 159

That my dear is the bad part.It may produce a Zia type who lashed people.As long as the Pakistani state exists the army will play a part.So this is not a good news.With all his drawbacks and I have criticised this man more than any one else when he was at the height of his power,my dear , we have to admit , he was the best among the worst , just wait and see when another Pakistan Army general steps in .Men with low IQ like Kakar or a Terry tyrant Zia .Just see.Even Benazir and Nawaz Sharif will never allow a free press.Just see their past record.I think let the facts unravel themselves.

#158 "Pakistan Army as I see it will not produce a Musharraf again."

What a relief!!

I may add some remarks on General Musharraf.Musharraf as we saw him in the squash court was far different from general officers of that time.That he reached the rank of general officer was a miracle.Initially we had geat expectations from him but ultimately he got bogged down because he had to make use of the same people.It is very difficult to change the system.At the median level Musharraf succeeded in averting the threat in 2001.But at the strategic level we are doomed.The whole current of history is working against us.The problem started when Muslim separatism rose in the UP , not because of real idealism but because the Muslims could not compete with the non Muslims.Religion was picked as a slogan.The Islamism that we are seeing now is an extreme form of that slogan.When Jinnah fought for a Muslim state , secularism was gone.Frankly we the Muslims in name who have not being to a mosque for 30 years cannot reconcile with the more radical Muslims.Secular politicians have been discredited.The situation is very complex.My idea is that Musharraf was an exception and Pakistan Army as I see it will not produce a Musharraf again.So it will be very difficult to deal with future challenges.Musharraf new how to perform the supreme balancing act.I dont think his successors will be able to do that.

Why Indo-Pak Armies Failed in War
The failures of the two armies in the various conflicts.
[A H AMIN]


Around the time of partition there were great expectations from the successor armies of the old British Indian Army i.e the Pakistan and the Indian Army! Thus while discussing the boundaries of the to be partitioned province of Punjab an Indian giving evidence before the Punjab Boundary Commission stated “If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measur-

able distance of Ambala, but they (The future Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of 40 miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angle to their forces”. The same person in this discussion gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan”!

Compare this remark with the later performance of both Indian and Pakistan Armies in actual war which was pathetic in terms of speed of advance or area captured in all three Indo-Pak wars! On a personal level I may add that this subject of phenomenal mediocrity at strategic as well as operational level motivated me to write “The Pakistan Army till 1965”.

The reasons for the dismal performance of both the armies are to be seen in their historical background, the classes which were inducted in both the armies and in the impact of British military as well as colonial legacy on both the armies!

The reader may note that since it was the failure of success of armour that decided the issue in all Indo-Pak Wars at least as far as any decisive breakthrough was concerned the discussion centres around employment of armour and leadership with special reference to armour.

Before proceeding into the analytical phase a glance at two comparative decisive battles is necessary so that necessary lessons can be linked to the analysis. The four test studies are Pakistani armours failure to achieve a breakthrough on the first day of Operation Grand Slam in 1965, both Pakistani and Indian 1st Armoured Division's major offensives opposite Khem Karan and Chawinda Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's failure opposite Bara Pind. Following is a summary of the four battles.

Pakistani failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough on first day of Grand Slam

The Chamb Sector in 1965 was a very weakly held sector held by three dispersed Indian infantry battalions supported by a tank squadron of AMX-13 tanks which were like matchboxes as compared to the Pattons held by the two opposing Pakistani tank regiments i.e a superiority of 6 to 1 in tanks. Further Pakistan had immense artillery superiority both numerical and material of 6 to 1. Pakistani 8 Inch Guns were phenomenally superior to anything that the Indians had. Unfortunately, the Pakistani armour was distributed in penny packets to the two infantry brigades. Thus instead of using armour as a punch it was employed as a thin net as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced. Thus many tanks were lost on the first day and Indian brigade holding the sector withdrew during the night in an organized manner. This initial setback on the first day reduced Pakistani chances of victory which was later on compromised due to other political reasons.



Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at Chawinda

The major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership “marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily combined …but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great …it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke”.

The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre!



Pakistani 1st Armoured Division's failure at Khem Karan

Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division with five tank regiments and additional two supporting tank regiments on the flanks failed to breakthrough the Khem Karan area on 7th and 8th September at a time when only one Indian tank regiment with ancient Sherman tanks was opposing the Pakistani five tank regiments having most modern Patton Tanks. The reason of the dismal performance was not Indian resistance but poor initial planning and staff work in not taking adequate measures to ensure crossing of one water course and one canal both in Pakistani territory! This delayed the induction of the armoured division in the battle area enabling the Indians to reinforce their lone Sherman tank regiment with two more tank regiments! It is ironic to note that the Pakistani plan to attack in this sector was not new but formulated many years before the war. Here was a case like Chawinda earlier discussed where there was failure in achieving a breakthrough despite a five to one superiority simply because the superiority could not be put into practice due to poor initial planning and staff work.



Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's Failure at Bara Pind

Pakistan's 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was launched at Bara Pind on 16th December 1971! The situation here was ironically similar to Indian situation at Gadgor on 8th September 1965! Three Pakistani Patton Regiments were available as against one Indian Centurion tank regiment holding a bridgehead at Bara Pind-Jarpal! Ironically as happened with the Indians at Gadgor here too the Pakistani tank brigade commander failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a three to one superiority. The first Pakistani tank regiment was initially launched with the initiative of the detailed planning of the attack, decentralized to the tank regiment commander! This was a fatal decision! The tank regiment commander known as Masood Chhakrra initially launched one tank squadron in attack. Once this squadron was badly beaten being in a frontal role against Indian tanks in static positions, he launched his remaining two squadrons a little to the north and again with disastrous consequences! Once the first tank regiment had failed the Pakistani tank brigade commander launched his second regiment again with disastrous results. In short three tank regiments failed to dislodge a single Indian tank regiment in a counter attack which was a planned contingency before the war and carried out in Pakistani territory. Prominent in this case was failure to coordinate artillery support which was available in abundance but not utilized in the attack plan. The Indian armoured corps historian held the view that the Pakistanis could have broken through even without artillery support if all three squadrons of 13 Lancers had attacked the Indian position in concentration!3



Analysis Failure occurred not because of material or numerical but other reasons

It has been a common practice to cite insufficient numerical superiority at the decisive point as a reason for failure. In all four cases, all decisive battles, this was not the case. The Pakistanis failed at Grand Slam despite 6 to 1 superiority on the first day. This was a case of not concentrating tanks and using them as infantry support vehicles. The Indian failed at Gadgor despite a 4 to 1 superiority. This was a case of the Indian brigade commander losing his nerve because of timidity and irresolution and the Indian GOC not spurring his brigade commander and instead withdrawing to the rear for the next two days while only one tank regiment opposed his division. The Pakistanis failed at Khem Karan despite a five to one superiority because of poor initial planning and incorrect armour tactics in withdrawing to the leaguer at night. Again Bara Pind was a failure in not integrating artillery in attack and in not concentrating the armoured brigade in attack.



British Colonial Legacy

Once the British initially came to India they allowed Indians entry in officer rank. The real danger in history has always been posed not by weapons but by men of resolute description! Thus Mustafa Kemal defied superpowers of his day not by any nuclear warhead but by generalship in the field!

Once the British came to India initially they were not aware of the dangers that Indians in higher rank could pose to their rule! Thus once a cavalry unit Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 it was an All Muslim unit with Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg. More notable was the case of Yusuf Khan!

Back in 1752 a Muslim of Pathan descent enlisted under Colonel Clive and distinguished himself in battle (not by verbosity on courses or in model discussions) on many occasions. As a reward for excellence in battle Yusuf Khan was made commandant of all Indian sepoys in the service of the English East India Company in 1754, three years before Plassey, presented with a medal in 1755 and further rewarded by renting of two districts in Carnatic for 20 Lakh Rupees in 1759 ! From 1760 onwards Yusuf Khan became more powerful and started defying the English East India Company. The Englishman were forced to start a war against Yusuf Khan which lasted for more than an year! All the British Troops of Madras Army were committed and peace only came after Madura Yusuf Khan's stronghold was finally captured on 13th October 1764!4

No more Yusuf Khans! This was the Englishmen's conclusion and this they enforced religiously right till 1947! Have no native leadership in the Indian Army! This was ensured as a policy right till 1947 even though Indo-Pak natives were admitted synthetically in the officer rank in 1919!

While Indians were recruited as officers from 1919 it was ensured that these must be the most slavish and meek ones! Outwardly smart and impressive in bearing, but loyal to the core, lacking initiative in higher decision making and good till only company and platoon level! Thus the basic aim of Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was to produce Indian officers who at best could be good company commanders and nothing more!

This system was enforced as a Machiavellian policy! Sir Sivaswamy Ayer in 1921 demanded in the Indian legislative assembly that all seats to commissioned officer rank in Indian Army should be filled by open competitive exam held on all India basis.The British sabotaged this scheme! Thus when Indian Military Academy Dera Dun was established the Britisher ensured a slavish Indo-Pak officer corps by insisting that 30 out of 60 officer vacancies be given to rankers from Indian Army who had spent many years in ranks under British officers and considered more loyal than educated Indo-Pak candidates selected on the open merit!

As a result the Indian Army and its successors Indian and Pakistan Army remained pro West and conservative in outlook! In 1950s Ayub Khan was ready to defend Anglo Iranian Oil fields in Iran for US interests! A relationship with USA was cemented with the rationale that it would enable Pakistan to regain Kashmir! Yet when the time came in 1965 Pakistan's self-promoted field marshal had cold feet! The military advantage over India in 1965 in terms of superior equipment was lost in Khem Karan not because of material inferiority, where Pakistan had tank superiority of 6 to 1 on 7th and 8th September, but qualitative inferiority on part of Pakistani higher military leadership! India's leading military thinker Ravi Rikhye admitted in an article on www.orbat.com that Khem Karan had the potential to be India's Fourth Battle of Panipat had the Pakistan Army broken through!

Deliberate measures were taken to instil an inferiority complex in the Indian officers! Major General Jahanzeb who was commissioned in 1942 states “In their regiments they were treated with undignified and unconcealed contempt. Once a British regiment invited the Indian

C in C to dinner. On enquiry about the segregated table he was told unabashedly that it was for the attached Indian officers”. The general further stated that till mid-thirties Indians commissioned from Sandhurst were not allowed to enter the precincts of the Peshawar Club and there were cases when an Indian officer asked for a chair being told by the quartermaster that Indian officers were not authorized chairs.5

Indian Army experience in WW Two

The British Indian Army was basically an internal security army designed to ensure continuity of British rule in India. It had no dynamic operational role. Tanks were inducted only in 1938 and Indians were discriminated against in tank units. Major General Jahanzeb states “The Indian cavalry was the domain of the British aristocracy. The odd Maharaja's sons were admitted on sufferance. In 1932 three cavalry regiments were Indianised, the 3rd 7th and 16th. They accepted rich and titled Indian officers. The other regiments admitted Indian officers almost two years after declaration of World War Two, a fact which was to cost Pakistan dearly when it came into being”.6

To compound the fact further, the British had a phenomenally incompetent record in handling of armour and were beaten decisively by the Germans repeatedly from 1940 till 1942 when overwhelming material superiority enabled them to turn the tide.

In addition Indian war record was nominal since most of the Indian units in North Africa comprised of armoured cars while in Burma where the Indian tank regiments had Shermans there was no worthwhile enemy in front since the Japanese had very inferior tanks.

The Indian experience in WW Two was also significant. In North Africa they encountered Rommel who was a master of armoured warfare who could appear from any direction. Thus a strange fear of enemy on the flanks or in the rear imported from North Africa. Similarly, the Japanese who confronted the Indians in Burma were again masters of infiltration and the emphasis that the Indian officers saw was on security and defence rather than any bold offensive tactics.

The resultant failures in 1965 and 1971 had deep historical reasons.The Indian commanders who failed beyond unit level consisted of men who had operated in a tactical and operational environment in WW Two where operations were infantry biased. Even at Al Alamein the major tank attack was carried out by pure British army units while Indian units and formations were in a static or holding role or assisting British units in the initial breakthrough as infantry units. Thus, the post 1947 commanders of Indian and Pakistani army did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding because of which both sides failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough in all three wars.

It was a failure of the command as well as the staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and thought in terms of yards and furlongs rather than miles.Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their typical idea of a battlefield was a linear one rather than a multi-linear one. Their Burma and North Africa experience where the Japanese or Germans frequently appeared in their rear made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial “orders oriented” British Indian Army. These men had joined the army for social and personal advancement reasons and warfare to them was a job like WAPDA rather than a supreme test of nationalism or ideology.

Further, in the British way of war a higher commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to lack of initiative and dynamism.The same legacy was imported in the post-1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies.

Conclusion

Today the serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army console themselves with the fact that today's officer is far more educated than his predecessors. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Both the armies have crossed the stage where a decisive defeat could be inflicted on each other. In the post-Nuclear Age conventional superiority or conventional weapons are no longer decisive. Warfare has been privatized with ideological organizations conducting a war that is spread all over the globe with multiple cells in nominal communication with each other. Today when an army marches into operation in one region its enemies react by bomb blasts in areas previously considered unassailable! The mainland of USA once considered impregnable has been rendered vulnerable since 9/11.

The other country's army is no longer the decisive target to be eli-

minated as the Iraq war has proved.Iraqi resistance continues despite the demise of Iraqi Army! Airpower alone cannot win wars as is proved in Afghanistan and Iraq!

The Indian thrust is today no longer to defeat Pakistan in Siachen or Kargil! The thrust is on cultural wars, psychologically disarming moves and on strengthening the economy.

Seen in this context Pakistan Army is still preparing for the previous war. No effort is being made to organize the populace for a conflict which would continue even after the conventional army has collapsed.

The future wars will have no beginning and no end, fought with soft power and by modifying educational syllabi and trade regulations! Conducted by proxy through minority ethnic groups and by minority sects who are threatened by majority sects.

Conversely, the Indian leadership has realized that it would be cheaper to win the race by unconventional means and projecting India as a moderate state with its western borders with a state full of fanatics and lunatics who deserve to be bombed without remorse. Whatever policies that President Musharraf is following are seen in the West as the efforts of one man, while the Pakistani nation is being increasingly perceived as an unstable state which must not be trusted with nuclear weapons. If the military regime fails to find a viable solution to the political problems of Pakistan and design a suitable exit strategy Pakistan's future may not be brighter than Serbia or Somalia!

The fact that today's Pakistan is far more vulnerable than 1947 or 1965 or 1971's Pakistan is not being understood. Nuclear weapons may not prove to be a guarantee of Pakistan's survival unless the political and military forces decide in the best interest of the nation to respect each other! The important point to be noted is that Pakistan was the result of a political process and the armed forces were meant to be a subordinate organ of the political leadership!

The next threat would not be the Indian 1st Armoured Division with its many mechanically unfit tanks but combined forces of many hostile neighbours attacking Pakistan's Nuclear facilities by stealth! The next conflict will be multi-national and very fast moving! This time there would be no KK Singhs worrying about their flanks since Pakistan may be facing not India alone but a combined Indian-Israeli-US onslaught!

The lesson of today's Pakistan remains that Pakistan is ill-equipped for the future challenges that it may face! Rather Balkanisation at best and Somalisation at worst cannot be ruled out! With a crisis of legitimacy paralyzing this country's natural growth since 1954 the future does not appear to be bright!

All depends on which country has a superior Grand Strategy and can handle its total national resources in a better manner!

END NOTES



Page-318-Remarks of Sir Zafrullah Khan- “The Partition of the Punjab” - A compilation of official documents-Volume Two-National Documentation Centre-Lahore-1983-Printed at Ferozsons.
Pages-244 & 245-On War- Carl Von Clausewitz-Penguin-1974.
Page-506-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1947-71-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi -1993
Page-28-The First Punjabis-Maj M.I Qureshi-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1953.
Pages-21 & 22-Role of Armed Forces in the Independence of the Subcontinent-Major General Jahanzeb Khan -Defence Journal-Vol X -No 9-1984.
Pages-52 & 53-From Bitter Lakes to Bitter Thoughts-Major General Jahanzeb Khan (Retired) -The Sabre and Lance -1997-Golden Jubilee Issue-The School of Armour and Mechanised Warfare-Nowshera-Pakistan. On a personal level I would like to add that this publication was a singlehanded Herculean feat of Brigadier Munawar Rana the then commandant of that otherwise bulky and bureaucratic bastion of pedantry.

I was in FC College from 1976 to 1980 and I would make a few observations.The top students that we had in that time did not join the army.Who are the top guys in academics.In Pakistan it is learning by rote.The best student who joined the army was Adeel Kazi.Kazi was a few years senior to me in Saint Mary's Academy Lalazar.When I joined FC College he rose to become the Secretary of the Students Union from the Peoples Student Federation side.At that time army which you call the best institution was financing the Jamiat goons and the President of the FC College Union dear Aminullah a Khakwani from Mailsi was murdered by these Jamiat guys.The culprits were never punished.Anyhow Kazi did join the army and he did well but he was retired summarily as a lieutenant colonel.He had various drawbacks.One he was not a sycophant,two--he was not from Pindi,Jhelum,Khushab or Sargodha.Other classfellows or contemporaries who joined the army were mediocre in college but did well in the army.The factual position as I see it as the army is fast corroding in quality.The process started in 1951 when Liaquat promoted Ayub Khan who had a record of tactical timidity in Burma.The process was accelerated after 1977.Zia brought in a bunch of sycophants based on political loyalty.The process continues.The army had great deterrent value and it inspired respect and fear.Now it has lost that.Promotion is based on being a harmless , docile, sycophant.The ACR system encourages sycophancy and careerism.The majority of officers recruited from districts in between River Chenab and Indus are rural based and quite parochial.Musharraf is the last from the breed of urbanites.That he became a general in this army was a miracle.Destiny as they say it.A result of the false premise of Nawaz Sharif that a man recruited from a minority would be more docile and pliable.Being DGMO , being DGISI in peace does not mean that an officer is good or bad.We had Javed Hassan who made Humayun alive in Second Battle of Panipat in his book launching the Kargil fiasco.The unfortunate part is that army has been compromised.It has become a contender.It has become materialistic.Real military virtue has eroded.General officers are involved in real estate and the defence forces have become very expert in developing Defence Societies.Bulleya cannot be bad if he did not become a major.That is not the criteria.The real test of the army would be war.In peace all armies are good armies.

Bulleya (or Romair?) I would have to say that some of your allegations regarding your former employer are incorrect and absurd. From personal experience, I would have to tell you that the top most student of our class from school and college joined one of the military services where, obviously, he is now doing outstandingly well. That this fellow invariably used to top our class is significant, because some of our other friends are now top notch physicians/surgeons working as consultants in the US, which includes some who are also Ivy League University professors, high flown engineers, civil services fellows and judges. You may or may not understand that every army in the world has to inculcate into their employees that they are superlative and the best, to psychologically boost morale, because such is the nature of the job. This has to also be so with any topnotch sporting team, or any fighter. As such, the faith and loyalty of a good soldier in any good army is always to the institution. In fact, that is how the French Foreign Legion, which is solely composed of mercenaries, operates with loyalty and bravery. We can obviously understand that the standards of the army have lowered down a lot as they have hired on people like yourself, however its heartening to know that they let you go before you could become Major. Presently the only viable institution in Pakistan is the military. However by this I in no way wish to condone military interventions into politics, but I also have to add for good measure that bureaucracy, judiciary and politicians are all corrupt to the core, and if they had been doing their jobs properly, people would have been satisfied with them and would not have tolerated military interventions and would not have danced with joy on the streets as they did when the thug Nawaz Sharif was booted out.

Agha,
No this article was never meant to project Kayani. The paragraph I wrote on him describes his long association within the present system. For seven long years he briefed Musharraf in his capcity as DGMO, DGISI and Commander 10 Corps. So what does this imply?

Re: # 151

Shaheen Sehbai is a bold journalist but he is not a warlord general so even if he speaks the truth he is silenced.First he worked with Sindhi Memon Seths of DAWN newspaper.They made use of him and did not support him when he came under fire.Look at whats happening in Pakistan.If you have guns and you capture power you are a good guy.I know General Shahid Aziz.He was a man of character , that is why he was not made Vice Chief of Army Staff.That was why he resigned from NAB.

Agha

The Pakistan Army's origins can be traced to collaborator elements of the pre 1947 British.Particularly the Punjabi Muslim soldiers of the pre 1947 British Indian Army were the most loyal to the British.This was in collaboration to Ranghar Muslims of the Cavalry who led the war of 1857 against the British.In contrast to Afridi and Mahsud Pashtuns who contantly fought against the British.After 1947 the Pakistan Army was turned by Ayub into a good American mercenary.

As far as non Muslims being given key positions are concerned.This is incorrect.The best Parsi office Maj Gen Kaizad Manik Sopariwala was last in the insignificant position of Director Log Area.Many promising Qadiani officers were not promoted beyond colonel rank in Zia era and the discrimination remains.

Particularly after 9/11 the army has successively lost its deterent value and is now in clash with its own so called people in NWFP and Balochistan.

This article seems to be an effort to project General Kayani.

One last thing I may add.Beg was the only neutral chief of the army after Yahya and an exception.Thats why fair elections were held in 1988.

Arrogant attitude of the army generals particularly Ayub Khan led to alienation in East Pakistan and its separation.

Here is a two year old article that some readers here may not have seen before. I hadn't. It tells a revealing story.

...SR

Corrupt Musharraf's Generals, Exposed by Musharraf's
Generals by Shaheen Sehbai - The South Asia Tribune -
29 April 2005

WASHINGTON, April 29: General Pervez Musharraf
cannot, and does not, publicly claim that he has
eliminated corruption altogether in Pakistan but he
frequently boasts about cleaning up the top levels of
his military cum civil administration.

Now his own trusted men are exposing these tall claims
by pointing fingers and naming the military regime's
big guns who are turning out to be the really big
thieves. A few most glaring examples:

When a prominent cabinet minister who was visiting
Washington a few months back, revealed quietly to me
and a friend, the horrifyingly ugly scale of land
grabbing and fake land sale scams going on in
Pakistan, especially in Punjab, we frankly did not
believe him.

We thought the minister was trying to get even with
his uniformed masters for not fulfilling the tall
political promises made to him. But the magnitude of
the scams was such that the minister genuinely felt
concerned and wanted us to write about them, although
as a politician he was not going to raise his voice
publicly and was prepared to serve those very Generals
in every top position.

The minister has now been proved right. Thanks to one
of the more upright Generals in the present lot, the
Corps Commander of Lahore, Lt. General Shahid Aziz,
details of the massive land scams are emerging.

Our ministerial source says Corps Commander Aziz, has
started a serious investigation against his
predecessor, the last Corps Commander of Lahore,
currently posted in the GHQ, Lt. General Zarrar Azim,
known in the real estate world of Lahore as General
Zarrar Zamin (land).

Early results of this fight between the top military
bulls has revealed that General Zarrar was so deeply
involved in the scam of Lahore Defence Society that in
the price of every plot of land allotted in the
society, a fee of Rs 600,000 (US$10,000) had to be
built-in, almost automatically, meant for the Corps
Commander's office.

In this scam, it is now being found by the detectives
of the new Corps Commander, that not only the
out-going CC was involved, he was using a junior
officer, Major Lodhi as a front man. This major is
related to General Musharraf's coup partner and now
retired General Aziz of Kargil fame.

The details of these Defence Society scams are mind
boggling. Thousands of plots of lands are designated
in official files as Defence Society land and these
plots are then sold and re-sold on files. More paper
Housing Societies are registered and approved and they
claim vast tracts of land without owning a square
yard.

According to our source, in Lahore alone there are
12,000 files of plots for Sectors 7, 8, 9 and 10 for
which there is no land actually available on the
ground. How many thousands of more such plots have
been sold is not yet known but the probe ordered by
Lt. Gen. Aziz will bring out some facts.

According to a going joke in the Army Mess Circuit,
the last request General Musharraf made to Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Delhi was to give him
8,000 acres of land from the Indian territory across
the Wagah-Atari border, 30 miles from Lahore, in
return for Kashmir and Siachin, because "my boys have
already sold this land in the files."

Lahore is not the only Land of Land Scams. What has
happened in Gwadar and Rawalpindi is of no less
import.

The ministerial source said in the Bahria Town of
Rawalpindi and Lahore, thousands of non-existent plots
have been sold by the scheme managers. In Bahria Town
of Lahore for 7,000 available plots 28,000
applications were accepted with deposits. But in
Bahria Town Islamabad/Rawalpindi 77,000 plots have
been sold which require land equivalent to 16 built-up
sectors of Islamabad.

"What we are getting into is the Mother of all Scams
because billions upon billions of people's money has
been collected by these project sponsors while there
is no land to be allotted. How many of these buyers
get back their deposits and when, is the 50 billion
rupees question," the source said.

Incidentally official records of the Ministry of
Defence presented before the National Assembly show
that Pakistan Army has Defence Housing Societies in
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad on an area of only
179,308 Kanals, or 22,500 acres. Pakistan Navy and Air
Force have two housing societies each covering an area
of 712 and 536 acres of land respectively.

Another of Musharraf's top commanders, Lt Gen. Tariq
Wasim Ghazi, former Corps Commander of Karachi became
notoriously famous in Karachi for similar land scams
in Defence Society, Karachi, including Creek City and
allotment to two special people, Humayun Butt and
Fareed Veerani. Who are these specials and what is
their involvement is being investigated by South Asia
Tribune and will be revealed soon.

The Gwadar land scam has already infuriated the Baloch
leadership and one reason why they are so violent and
non-compromising is how their mother land is being
sold and resold to outsiders after it was fraudulently
bought from them for peanuts. In Gwadar the Generals
and their front men were quietly told to buy the land
from locals much in advance of announcement of mega
projects. Once this mopping up operation was
completed, the projects were announced and trading of
this real estate began, multiplying the prices by 20
or even 40 times.

The ministerial source said the bigger scandal in
Gwadar has started just recently when Government has
ordered all its banks and State-owned Corporations to
buy land in Gwadar at market prices. Middlemen have
already sold and resold these plots many times over to
different parties to perk up the market price. "The
tax payer will now end up paying the premium to these
land mafias," the source said.

In a much quieter operation in Lahore the City
Government of Nazim (Mayor) Mian Amer Mahmood claimed
on Sunday, April 24, that it had succeeded in vacating
3,000 kanals (375 acres) of land belonging to schools
from a land mafia, but interestingly he did not name
the mafia. Most of those who read the small story or
who were present when the announcement was made
understood who was involved.

While Corps Commanders of Musharraf are involved in
perpetuating or dismantling these land scams, one of
his pillars of accountability, the former head of the
National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Lt. General
(Retd) Amjad Hussain was himself accused of massive
corruption in the corporation he has been heading.

This charge of corruption was leveled in the National
Assembly of Pakistan and involved the Fauji
Foundation, undeniably the largest corporate body of
Pakistan, now waiting to take over the largest public
sector company, Pakistan State Oil.

The National Assembly was told last week that a
high-level inquiry had been ordered against the
management of the Fauji Foundation after detection of
huge financial bunglings. General Amjad was facing the
inquiry for selling a sugar mills in a non-transparent
manner at less than the highest bid to a business
enterprise which did not even participate in the
bidding process.

The Assembly was told that the Khoski Sugar Mills was
sold at Rs300 million against a previous bid of Rs387
million offered by a private party. Defence Minister
Rao Sikandar ordered the inquiry to fix responsibility
on those who violated the financial procedures and
rules by going out of the way to benefit a favorite
firm.

While the above details show that in-service Generals
and Corps Commanders were being investigated for
corruption, another officially announced corruption
case was against the management of the South Asian
Federation (SAF) Games, interestingly consisting of
all military officers headed by Lt. General Arif
Hassan.

The management of SAF Games has been found involved in
financial irregularities to the tune of Rs201 million,
which among other charges, include giving undue
benefit to private organizations through "verbal
agreements," Daily Dawn said quoting an audit report .

The ninth SAF Games management included Chairman Lt.
Gen. Arif Hassan, Chief of staff and chief
coordinating officer Brig. Amjad Javaid, Information
and media director Lt. Col. Syed Mujtaba Tirmizi,
Administration Director Brig. Ahmad Riza Siddiqi,
Communications Director Brig Abid Hussain Bhatti,
Technical Director Lt. Col. (retired) Muhammad Yahya,
Procurement Director Lt. Col. Mansoor Abbas,
Information Technology Director Lt. Col. Umer Farooq,
Finance and Marketing Director Lt. Col. Azhar Dean,
Ceremonies Director Brig. Arif Rasul Qureshi, Protocol
Director Brig. Khalid Rasheed Lodhi and Chief Engineer
Lt. Col. Usman Saeed.

The question being asked in all relevant circles was
that even to organize an sporting event, none of the
very well qualified civilians was found to be suitable
and from top to bottom all army men had been inducted
as if it SAF Games were military exercises. And now
these sacred cows have been found to be involved in
irregularities and corruption.

In a military regime, obviously the Corps Commanders
and senior Generals are the top level of Government
and if scams and scandals involving these top men are
officially exposed, some in the National Assembly and
others by leaks to the media by his own people, how
would General Musharraf explain his claims of
eliminating top level corruption.

fuzair #: "I think we agree substantially (at least about the competence level of the average.....Aitzaz Ahsan maybe; NS or BB, don't make me laugh!"

....i think it is the job of everyone to present facts on this site.....specifically about areas they are familiar with.....this is what i have tried to do regarding the military....

trust me, the military is truly degenerating......not mediocrity, but totally degenerated....it is the job of every patriotic pakistani to highlight that.....if such a degenerating organization takes over the country, it will degenerate the country also......

i highly doubt the staff officers of the pak army, or the coas - kayani - would have the intellectual acumen to discuss too many issues, competently at the leve they need to be analysed.....i doubt they have that level of understanding......

once again, i say this through personal experience......when i joined as a cadet the current generals were captains.......when i was a captain these guys were colonels and wing commanders etc.....they were my commanders.....i have sat in messes with them and have heard their discussions, and have discussed issues with them.......the only individuals with whom one could have even a half intelligent discussion were the doctors and engineers, who had quite a bit of exposure....

......i cannot see how any of these guys, could all of a sudden increase their capabilities just by doing one defence course in usa or in pindi or quetta......

trust me, the combined intellectual capital of pakistan's general staff is less than the intellectual capital available in the top circles of habib bank, or packages limited, or lums etc.....i am saying this from experience, as i am now working to some extent with the later groups.....

as of musharraf, bb or ns, you are correct.....none of them can deliver any longer.....

one should support one thing.....the rule of law......and this is a point in pakistan's history where rule of law was about to be supreme........that rule of law will put musharraf and kayani on trial for treason, and should hang them as per the constitution.....it should put benazir on trial for corruption and confisicate her assets........nawaz sharif has already been tried and his assets have been confisicated.....

rule of law should be supreme!!....

Romair:

I think we agree substantially (at least about the competence level of the average Pakistani officer); we disagree on whether or not Musharraf is morally guilty of high treason; and of whether or not the "bloody civilians" would do a better job: Aitzaz Ahsan maybe; NS or BB, don't make me laugh!

You are probably right that what I said was true of the Army 20+ (or more) years ago; I've been completely out of touch with the Army since the early 1990s and my stint in Gilgit and the people I knew in FCNA. It is certainly true, and I know this first hand, that the Army was very concerned about the quality of GCs it was getting into PMA in the 1970s.

Mateen Sahib: No, I don't have a chip on my shoulder about the Army. I am very much a product of the Army, so to speak, and it is because I owe so much to it that I despair of what has become of it.

No.73 [and later posts]: bulleya: I did state that I will not “waste any more time/space” to respond to your posts. But, I am a nerd for doing right by my conscience – so here goes!
On your commendable performance during whatever period spent in uniform, congrats! But, I do request you to read again what I’ve written in my posts [nos. 60/61], and Ijaz Gul’s [no. 62].
Be proud – ‘shaan chahiye’ to hold your head high that the ‘good’ of the Institution you have served is ‘indelible’ and remains. The ‘bad’ that has set in, is of a transitory nature, a deviation that is bound to be either ‘corrected’ or ‘re-done’ back to the basics: that is why the Pakistan Army survives as an integral whole, and living up to the expectations of the Nation.
You may keep on ‘trashing’ the Institution, and shouting inanities on the alleged ‘treason’ of the ex-COAS and the present COAS: it makes nary a difference to the Service; and will not change the ground realities in living colour! Smell the flowers, bulleya, not the soil!

Two quotes from not-so intellectual sources:
“A chip on the shoulder only indicates that there is wood higher up” [“Neeta’s Natter”, Stardust, April 1990 issue]; and
“In the space of forty-five years, Pakistan has gone from a nation searching for a country, to a country searching for a nation” [Christina Lamb, ‘Waiting For Allah’]


Nos.119/121: fuzair. You also seem to have a ’chip’ to unburden!! My PMA Course: 7th War Course. I acknowledged your responses on my article, “Faith, National Direction and Religion”, in August/September 2000.

No.63: viqarm: Too simplistic! Though it sounds quite ‘infra- democratic’, away from the ‘ultra-undemocratic’. Frankly, there is dire need to:
- Re-structure the State, alter the geographical and jurisdictional divisions to re-create maybe 16 – 20 ‘provinces’ or ‘administrative areas’, instead of the current 7 [including 4 Provinces and NA/FATA/PATAs].
- Rehash the contours of ‘governance’: the Four pillars [LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, JUDICIARY – in that priority, as now]; and the 4th, what is now referred to as the “fourth estate”: I would refer to it as ‘NATIONAL PULSE’ [To denote Media, Thinktank(s), Academia. Also, inputs from World bodies such as UN, World Bank and reputed, non-intrusive, unbiased organisations or groups such as are supported by the UN etcetra.
- The primary Three Pillars of the NATION-STATE must be responsible, mutually answerable and proactive extensively supported/advised by the Fourth Pillar – when so desired by any or all of the primary Pillars or the Government-in-being at any level.
- Re-think the system of government, administration and governance in Pakistan. As a start, consider having really representative ‘legislators’: it is totally unethical and immoral to have goons such as the majority who now sit in our Assemblies [and likely to be come January 2008, again!]. Particularly so, the strange fashion prevalent in the sub-continent to ‘create’ a seat for ‘X’ from Chichokimalian to get ‘elected’ as the representative of e.g. Malkani 1000 km away!! The present form and substance of ‘parliamentary democracy’ is a total farce – even the ‘mother country’ and its ‘bulldog breed’, are fed up of the indecent shenanigans that go on there!

To ALL: Ijaz Gul has given further valuable suggestions in his later posts, by way of response and/or ‘ijtehad’ to the query suggested in his article title and the preamble.

Those who are interested, may want to glance at my articles on Chowk, and, of course the interacts therein:

http://www.chowk.com/site/articles/index.php?id=12904
Religiosity, National Ethos and Governance]

http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000884&channel=ci vic%20center; [Faith, Religion and National Direction]

http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00001059&channel=civ ic%20center ; [Why Pakistan?]