Comments on Ongoing Debate about ISI in the Afghan War

Pakistani strategists are actually quite adroit at making grand plans , the only thing is they always come to nought. In the aftermath of USSR intervention in Afghanistan in 1978, they saw an opportunity to profit from the situation and grabbed it. The immediate tactic was to pose as a frontline state fighting a Commumist superpower, thereby gaining sympathy, aid and weapons from the generous, gullible and fearful West. Zia played on the West's fears by constantly bombarding it with the theory that the Russians' adventure in Afghanistan was actually a launching pad for further Southward movement towards the warm waters of Arabian Sea, thereby convincing the West that the next target was Pakistan itself. This argument was swallowed by the West hook, line and sinker and the arms and money came gushing in. Of course the Army generals swallowed a considerable part of the loot.
The next trick was to actually welcome the refugees into Pakistan and then gain world sympathy. This has partly succeeded but at what cost, an entire generation of Pakistanis became addicted on drugs peddled by the refugees, a free for all gun running racket has turned vast areas into lawless regions and native Pakistanis have been elbowed out of entire vocations.
Pakistan gained the status of a frontline state and became a large madrassa for the Islamis terrorists of the world, who were given the treatment of exalted guests, some of the guests were diverted to Kashmir with the fond hope that Kashmir will fall into the lap of Pakistan just like that.

The fact is the the Russians were always maintaining a close relationship with Afghanistan, the Khalq party of Dawood, Babrak Karmal, Taraqui all being pro-communists. As a practice most Afghan students went to Eastern bloc countries for higher education and most Afghanistan army officers were trained in USSR and almost everybody spoke Russian. Afghans were always closer to Russia than they were ever to Pakistan notwithstanding the proximity. So if the Northern aliance does not want anything to do with Pakistan they are just being traditional.
It is Pakistan's wont to claim close cultural and historical ties with its western neighbours often citing and eulogising the invaders who came to India from these parts and claiming a fraternal bond, but neither Iran nor Afghanistan or for that matter the newly independent states of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan or Tajikstan are reciprocating.

What have Pakistanis gained in return? All the grand plans have come to a naught. Afghanistan is not any closer to Pakistan that it was during the jehad, nor is it providing the proverbial depth against likely war with India. The west has dumped it as soon as its purpose was served. Kashmir remains a distant dream.The terrorists who were trained by ISI have not gone away but have become a frankenstein. The society has been devastated with three million rfugees refusing to go away and instead usurping a lot of opportunities for livelyhood which otherwise could have gone to native Pakistanis.
So the big question is why cannot Pakistan be ruled by real democrats and let it flower as a true federal democracy? It is time to send the army back to its barracks, so that the country can be governed internally democratically and externally steered with an objective foreign policy with no pretentious claims to leadership of the Muslim world

Re: # 35:-- You have quite a limited comprehension Dot Dash.U dont have the common sense to see that this is just a spontaneous response of the writer to an article published in defence journal in october 2007.Why he has raised this issue now is because the article that he was commenting on was published in October 2007.I have been studying this writer since a decade and he has been raising this issue since then.You seem like an Agent Provocateur ! Alas with a limited brain.

Re: # 34

pavocavalry sahib, precisely the point I was raising in #6. This article has some startling material...if only it was ordered better, and edited better (which Chowk Staff should have done)....I will reitterate what I said in #6

The worthwhile part of the article is the conluding paragraph, and I quote

"The so called Afghan Jihad was a success for many Pakistani and Afghans in personal terms.But these were a small minority.For the vast majority of Afghans it was a failure.Afghanistan lost the flower of its leadership,intellectuals and infrastructure ! "

But it need to be developed better. This is said in such a manner for the first time - and indeed this paragraph deals directly with the here and now, rather than the chimeral religiosity ........


Apart from this, this conclusion raises a number of questions:

(a) Why is this being raised now? Why was it not raised earlier? Indeed there was a fight here on Chowk many eons ago - why an american diplomat was quoted as sying that the pakistanis would sell their mothers (or something to this effect) for a few dollars - but this matter in the article was never brought up.

(b) Is this a part of the on going process of dismantling the aura around the Pak Army? This dribs and drab effort(s) is like killing with a thousand cuts! (ironic is it not!)

(c)Where are the numbers, and evidence - The article has material which read like conclusions, but these need to have a few more facts associated with them? The author (in this case I presume it is you pavocavalry) needs to assemble his arsenal together - I look forward to reading this stuff when he prints it here (defence journal is not something we all have access too!).

There are others, but I will leave those for now.

I had sent few copies of my book Pakistan Army til 1965 for display in Mr Books in Islamabad in November 1999.A person in all probability a serving officer in civies came and told the shops manager as per my friend Abid Hamza " Why you are displaying this book,its binding and cover is not good" !

This is for those who are commenting on the poor style of this letter.This was just a letter written after reading Hamid Hussain.Just concentrate on the substance.This so called Jihad was only about money.

Russians were far more civilised than Americans.They never bombed any major Pakistani city.Compare this with what USA did to Hanoi.Worse than Huns these Americans.

Re: # 31:-- You are more near the truth than anyone who has interacted so far.We saw all this with our own eyes.

Russia has committed a the basic blunder. USA, on behalf of Saudi Arabia committed bigger blunder. And the people of Afganisthan and other countries are suffering. The largest gainer from the entire conflict is Pakistan. Without Afganisthan problem, Pakistan would have been a begging bowl (The amount of US money poured in Pakistan, they should have purchased the entire country and made that their own territory).

Re: # 27:-- Islamic principles of earning money in name of Jihad.This is worse than a jew.Generals Zia , Akhtar etc had no war record.Just good liars and intriguer people these were.Zia Kana Dajal,Akhtar a constipated man.

Re: # 28;-- Majumdar Saaab , main aap ko follow kar rahan hoon, for long time.Please continue this good contribution .

Tigram bhai,

(You r one of the substantial and straight thinking intellectuals Majumdar Saaaab. )

If you are not pulling my leg, thank you very much!!!

Regards

ISI is clearly acting in conformity with the "Islamic Principles" of the constitution of PAkistan. It was responsible for telling the CIA how the "jehad" would be done in Afghanistan like it is being done in Kashmir. CIA gave ISI money and logistic support. The rest of the details were worked by the ISI in Afghanistan.

Re: # 7:-- You r one of the substantial and straight thinking intellectuals Majumdar Saaaab.

Re: # 21:-- I notice that all you writers are trying to pull each others legs and trying urself to pose as sages.

Attached is Agha's article on Taliban published in Defence Journal October 2007 issue.





The Ongoing Taliban War in Afghanistan- A Brief Assessment

A.H Amin







The Taliban War in Afghanistan has its origins in the Afghan Revolution of 1978.At that time Khalq and Parcham were the two key groups of the Afghan Leftists.The Khalq was the more rigid as well as extremist while the Parcham was more flexible, opportunistic and urbanized.The Khalq in turn had two groups the Pro Tarraki Khalqis and the Pro Hafizullah Amin Khalqis.

As the Afghan War intensified after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 just like the USA intervened in November 2001 the war became very complicated.The new Afghan Intelligence initially known as AGSA headed by the indomitable Sarwari was later reorganized by Dr Najeeb and was known as the KHAD.When Dr Najeeb became the Afghan President in 1986 the KHAD was headed by Ghulam Farooq Yaqubi from 1986 till his sad suicide in 1992.During this time the KHAD succeeded in having various secret protocols with various Afghan leaders from various factions of the so called Afghan Mujahideen.Most of these protocols were with non Pashtun Mujahid groups.Thus as a result the non Pashtun Mujahid groups were brought closer to the leftist regime and since they were seen as moderates the USSR saw them as future allies in Afghanistan.As a result the non Pashtun areas of the north were relatively undestroyed while the brunt of destruction was borne by Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.

General Yaqubi a great intelligence professional knew that if the Mujahids occupied Kabul he was a dead man.He destroyed many secret documents and killed himself when the Mujahids occupied Kabul abandoned by the Khalqis and Parchamis to them for the sake of peace.

When Kabul was abandoned by the Khalqis and Parchamis in April 1992 following the last minute betrayal of General Dostum a diehard Parchami till then the Afghan leftists dissolved the party and the Pashtuns joined Hekmatyar's Hizb e Islami while the non Pashtuns joined Ahmad Shah Massouds group of Jamiat I Islami.

The ensuing civil war which started after the Mujahid (so called) occupation of Kabul in April 1992 continued till November 2001 when the USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom.During this period a new power alignment took place.The Russians,Iranians and Indian Governments became patrons of the Non Pashtun Groups later known as the Northern Alliance while the Pashtun Groups initially Hikmatyar and later Taliban were supported by Pakistan as well as Saudi Arabia.

In a crude way the struggle drifted from ideological lines to ethnic lines with Parchamis who were mostly non Pashtuns joining the Jamiat of Massoud later known as Northern Alliance while the Khalqis who were Pahtuns joined Hekmatyar and later the Taliban.

The US invasion of Afghanistan was launched with internal collaboration of the Northern Alliance a largely Non Pashtun dominated alliance against the Taliban who were largely Pashtun.True that the Northern Alliance had some lightweight Pashtuns like Abdul Haq , Abdul Qadeer and Siaf , it was a largely non Pashtun group.This led to an ethnic war in Afghanistan in which the Pashtun majority was pitched against the non Pashtun minority which was a US ally.It became immaterial whether a man was a so called Mujahid or a Khalqi or a Parchami.The dividing line became language i.e whether you were a Pashtun or a non Pashtun.The US tried to change this impression first by introducing Abdul Haq and later Hamid Karzai but the popular perception remains that Afghanistan is no longer a Pashtun dominated country. Operation Enduring Freedom the US operation to invade and occupy Afghanistan in late 2001 was hailed as a new kind of war in the US press.Till to date there is no tangible proof that this operation has succeeded.

According to US claims (Refers - Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war- Carl Conetta-2002-PDA Monograph # 6 , 30 January 2002) following was achieved :--



1. A reasonable estimate is that 3,000 to 4,000 Taliban coalition troops died, including those killed in battle, captivity, and by strategic bombardment.(Refers- Kirk Spitzer, "Green Berets outfought, out thought Taliban," USA Today, 7 January 2002, p.1) Among these dead may be 600-800 "Afghan Arabs" affiliated with Al Qaeda (out of an original total of 2,000-3,000). Notably, only a fraction of Al Qaeda fighters -- perhaps 25 percent -- are pledged members of the organization; the remainder are foreign volunteers brought to Afghanistan to fight in the civil war under Al Qaeda auspices.

2. Approximately 7,000 Taliban and foreign troops were prisoners as of 15 January; less than 500 of these had been transferred to US custody. A disproportionate number of the prisoners held by the Northern Alliance militias were foreign fighters, especially Uzbek and Pakistani.

3. Most of the top Taliban leadership has survived the war and eluded capture; many are in Pakistan and seeking to re-integrate into Afghanistan . Of more than three dozen Taliban leaders on the Pentagon's "wanted list," more than 12 have been killed, injured or have defected.

4. At least eight of the 20 top Al Qaeda leaders and aides pursued by the Pentagon in Afghanistan are believed dead. However, only two had been reported captured as of 15 January. Eleven training camps affiliated with Al Qaeda, and many other Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan, have been destroyed or overrun.

The same US observer analysed US success or failure as following :--



1. The Alliance victory and Taliban collapse profoundly altered the national and regional strategic situation in several ways -- none of them auspicious in terms of long-term stability:



2. First, the rapid victory of the Alliance and collapse of the Taliban released centrifugal tendencies throughout Afghanistan , giving warlordism, banditry, and opium production a new lease on life. This essentially erased the one positive feature of the Taliban period. An immediate effect was the aggravation of the country's humanitarian crisis. A longer-term effect will be greater difficulty in building a unified polity and resilient civilian authority.

3. Second, the advance of the Alliance and defeat of the Taliban altered the principal lines of opposition in Afghan society. Rather than following a "Taliban versus anti-Taliban" axis, conflict reoriented along purely ethnic, tribal, and sect lines. Within this, the position of Tajik and Uzbek minority interests advanced disproportionately. This will likely lead to a new bipolar configuration in the country: Pashtun versus non-Pashtun. The ethnic reframing of the Afghan struggle altered the political implications of US military operations in the country, which had focused almost exclusively on Pashtun areas since late-November.

4. Third, the increased salience of ethnic, tribal, and sect lines of division also increased the centrifugal pressures on the international coalition supporting the operation. Notably, the Alliance victory had substantially increased Russian influence in Afghanistan , contrary to US interests and to the dismay of both Pakistan and Iran. Indian interests (tied to the Tajik militias) also advanced substantially. These developments increased the prospects for intensified regional contention over Afghanistan.



This is not a brief written by an ISI general but the expert analysis of a US scholar.




The Afghan mission, NATO's first deployment outside of Europe or the US, is the alliance's biggest ground operation in its history with 35,000 soldiers currently in the country. The majority of these troops hail from the US and the UK. The ISAF currently has five regional commands in Afghanistan: north, south, east, west and Kabul . The ISAF's headquarters are at Camp Warehouse , 16 kilometers east of Kabul.

According to Brigadier General Patrick de Villiers of France, the ISAF's mission in Kabul is to hold Taliban insurgents in check while winning the hearts and minds of the local population by pursing small development projects in conjunction with local leaders to improve living standards while respecting local religion and culture.The same generally is the stated NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

The Turkish Armed Forces will lead the Kabul Regional Command mission until 6 December, when Italy takes the helm until August 2008.

Some Facts and Figures



NATO troops breakdown in Afghanistan as of early 2007 (based on interviews with various ISAF officers and authors own estimates)



United States, 12,000

Britain, 5,200

Germany, 2,750

Netherlands, 2,100

Canada 2,200

Italy, 1,800

France, 1,000

Romania, 750

Spain, 625

Turkey, 475

Norway, 350

Denmark, 325

Belgium, 300

Hungary, 200

Portugal, 180

Greece, 180

Bulgaria, 150

Lithuania, 135

Czech Republic, 100

Estonia, 90

Slovakia, 60

Slovenia, 50

Latvia, 35

Iceland, 15

Luxembourg, 10

Poland, 10

Non-NATO

Sweden, 350

Australia, 200

Croatia, 120

Macedonia, 120

New Zealand, 100

Finland, 100

Albania, 30

Azerbaijan, 20

Ireland, 10

Austria, 5

Switzerland, 5




The present situation is that the Taliban are controlling large parts of the following provinces :--



1. Ghazni (Andar District,Muqur) At least 30 % of the province by day and 60 % after sunset till dawn)

2. Zabul (At least 75 % of the province)

3. Uruzgan ( At least 55 % of the province)

4. Helmand (At least 80 % of the province)

5. Paktika (At least 20 % of the province)

6. Khost (At least 20 % of the province)

7. Paktia (At least 10 % of the province)

8. Farah (At least 55 % of the province)

9. Kunar (At least 20 % of the province)

10. Laghman (At least 20 % of the province)

11. Kapisa (Tagab district)

12. Kandahar ( at least 45 % )


Communications :---



1. Kabul –Torkham Highway is 90 % safe but there have been incidents of attacks on oil tankers.Many of these are however insurance frauds done by owners of oil tankers coming from Pakistan or by their crew who first sell the fuel and then put the tankers on fire.

2. Kabul-Kandahar Heart Highway :-- It is unsafe for any kind of civilian traffic between Muqur in Ghazni till Shahr e Safa in Kandahar and from Maiwand in Kandahar Province till Farah Rud and Adraskan in Herat Province in between 1600 in the evening till dawn.

3. Kandahar-Spin Boldak Highway :-- Safe during daytime but unsafe after 1600 till dawn.

4. Kabul-Mazar-Hairatan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies.

5. Kabul-Kunduz-Bandar Sher Khan Highway :-- Safe 24 hours except odd cases of robberies.

Suicide Bombings :--



My personal study indicates that 70 % of suicide attacks against US/NATO/Afghan National Army/Afghan National Police occurred in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces ,15 % occurred in Kabul Province and 15 % in Khost,Ningrahar,Ghazni and Kunar.This scribe personally witnessed three suicide attacks and did manage to capture one on the camera in September 2006.According to some statistics compiled by Century Foundation New York the approximate casualties were as following :--

According to the Associated Press the USA has suffered as of Friday, Sept. 28, 2007, at least 375 members of the U.S. military had died in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan as a result of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, according to the Defense Department. The department last updated its figures Sept. 22, 2007.Of those, the military reports 249 were killed by hostile action.

According to US Think Tank Century Foundations updated report of September 2007 casualty breakdown in Afghanistan was as follows:---



September 07, 2006

By the numbers: Casualties, Sept 2006

Here are the latest casualty figures I could find (Sept 7, 2006):



Violence related deaths in past four months: 1600 Source: AP

Coalition deaths since 2001: 466 Source: CNN

Non-US coaltion deaths: 137

US wounded in action since 2001: 893 Source: CNN



Breakdown of NATO/ISAF Casualties (Source Century Foundation/CNN)

US: 329

UK: 39

Canada: 32

Germany: 18

Spain: 18

France: 9

Italy: 6

Romania: 4

Denmark: 3

Holland: 3

Sweden: 2

Norway: 1

Portugal: 1

Australia: 1








AN ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS



The Taliban and USA had no conventional match so it was logical that the Taliban disintegrated initially in face of the US bombing offensive and later ground attacks of Northern Alliance as well as the US forces.



The Taliban's started re-grouping after mid 2002 having realized that the USA and its NATO allies had sparse ground forces.Initially they targeted NGOs and construction companies but by 2004 they started applying the tactics learnt in Iraq in Afghanistan.



By 2005 they were generally organized as regional battle groups under a command and control system.An assessment of this is shown on the map.Each regional group comprised a hard core of 150 to 350 and a total mobilized armed strength of 1000 to 2000 fighters.



According to a study done by this scribe for an international client IEDs were initially imported from Datta Khel and Pishin but later each regional group started manufacturing their own IEDs.Weapons and munitions were bought from Iranian Baloch and Kurd smugglers or from groups in Central Asian Republics.Most of the weapons were smuggled via Iran.



Taliban control over Helmand and South Nimroz ensured that they controlled the main drug transit routes hence this enabled them to maintain a strong leverage with Pakistani and Iranian Baloch tribes.



The USA and its NATO allies appear to have the following strategy :---



Control the key airfields of Afghanistan with minimum strength.
Hold Kabul in strength.
Show piece patrolling in Southern Provinces giving the impression that the ISAF/NATO is active but in reality avoiding pitched battles or any heavy troop copmmitment.
Rebuild the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.This may take many dccades.Actual fighting indicates that both the ANA and ANP have extremely limited value while operating independently.Thanks to US insistence the Afghan Army was destroyed effectively in the period 1989-92 and building a effective army may take many decades.
It appears that the long term strategic purpose of Afghanistan was to dominate the regional states as well the resources by occupying airbases which would enable the USA to attack targets of its choosing , may they be WMDs or other installations.Effective countermeasures by President Putin of Russia however severely limited US influence in the Central Asian Republics.
Pressurise/armtwist Pakistani into destroying the main Taliban bases in Waziristan and North Balochistan.


The Taliban strategy is as following :---



Harass Kabul Herat Road disturbing container movements.
Cause attrition on British-Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar the Pashtun heartland thus demonstrating to all Pashtuns in Afghanistan that the Talibans are a major player.
Dominate the major drug production areas in the south and the main drug export routes thus financially sustaining the ongoing war.
Carry out continuous suicide and IED\bombings in Kabul and surrounding area sapping morale Of anti Taliban forces and demoralising civilians.
Carry out selective IED/Suicide Attacks against US Forces and US Civilans
Targeting the Afghan National Police which was not completely disintegrated in 1988-92.The Taliban know that the hard core of the Afghan Government is the ANP trained by the indomitable Sayyid Gulabozai.The Afghan National Police has at least 25 % officers trained in ex USSR and is very professional as well as patriotic.Thus the attacks on Afghan National Police by the suicide bombers as well as IEDs.


ANALYSIS







The strategic challenges that the USA confronts are complex and challenging and the present US leadership lacks the strategic talent to find a solution.Just sitting in Afghanistan and Iraq is not the solution.If not a reverse it is certainly not a success for USA and its allies.And every day spent in Iraq and Afghanistan without striking at the real centre of gravity is a strategic failure of USA.







Using the Northern Alliance as main Allies



The USA was seen as friends of Non Pashtuns in 2001.This created an alienation and feeling of betrayal in Pashtuns both in Afghanistan and Pakistan .This fact was admitted even by US scholars.Professor Rasul Amin who is this scribe's personal friend offered a very interesting explanation of this US failure.According to Prof Rasul Amin who was also Afghanistan's first Education Minister the main US advisor who according to US decision makers possessed Solomon's wisdom about Afghanistan,Zalmay Khalilzad was a non Pashtun.Rasul Amin stated in various discussions that Zalmay was a Changharay ( of Hindu/Indian origin) and not a Pashtun.He thus carried a conscious as well as unconscious bias against Pashtuns.This led to his advocating a course in US policy as a result of which US position became very partisan and negative in the eyes of the Pashtun population.



The USA achieved little by this favour ironically.The Northern Alliance's real allies and saviours were the Russians,Indians and Iranians and this remains the present position.To rub salt in the wound today the Northern Alliance propagates that they singlehandedly removed the Taliban understating and under emphasizing the impact of US aerial bombardment on Taliban.Thus although without USA intervention the Taliban would still have been ruling Afghanistan,the USA failed to gained the goodwill that they deserved from the Northern Alliance.The Northern Alliance knows that their permanent allies are Russia,India and Iran while USA is a dangerous ally which can change its policy at any times.Thus US policy laid the foundation of a possible division of Afghanistan into Pashtun and non Pashtun parts.This may take a decade or more but a foundation has been laid.



US strategy is not aimed at pacifying Afghanistan



The force ratio of USA and its major NATO allies is so low that it is not designed to pacify or control whole of Afghanistan.The major US targets its appears were the airbases and those they occupied.These airbases will go a long way in enabling the USA to strike at a multiple number of targets in the region.This has already led to China and Russia becoming better allies and has not served US policy.



Material motivation of various major participants exposed



One good result of the war is the fact that materialistic motivation of many majopr participants has been exposed.When the USSR intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 the then Pakistani military regime adopted a policy of aiding Afghan rebel groups on the slogan of Jihad.Today with more than 20 Christian countries occupying Afghanistan and with Pakistan facing a more grave threat on its Western borders there is no talk of Jihad now.The motivation in 1979 was to get foreign aid and this has remained the motivation in 2001.The same is true for the so called Mujahids of 1979-1989.They fought a Jihad against a non Christian USSR and are now major vassals of more than 20 Christian countries occupying Afghanistan.



Taliban a force to stay on the scene



In pure military as well as political terms the Taliban are a force that will stay on the scene unless there is a major change in US strategy.This would not lead to US withdrawal but it would certainly make Afghanistan's Pashtun and non Pashtun divide deeper.The USA would be the loser as the Northern Alliance regards Russia as a more solid and reliable friend and ally.The Taliban will dominate the south and the drug trade and there dominance would ensure that the Pashtuns remain relatively uneducated.Thus fundamentalism would be strengthened in the Afghan South and the regional threat will remain functional.



Taliban's Ability to acquire SAM capability will be a serious challenge to USA/NATO



Presently the Taliban have no SAM capability but if they acquire this the whole balance in Afghanistan would seriously tilt against the Americans/NATO.Presently the NATO is the master of the land battlefield because of dominance of the skies.This has enabled it to occupy Afghanistan with minimum forces and to economise on the war expenditure.A few SAMs can however change the whole situation.



IED and Suicide Attacks Main Strength of Taliban



The Taliban have mastered the use of IEDs and have a large reservoir of suicide bombers.These are two formidable weapons that they possess against which the USA/NATO has no countermeasure or remedy.







Conclusion



The Afghan battlefield will see few decisive battles and would continue to be a slow war of attrition in which the NATO/ISAF will rarely see the faces of their enemies.Time is on the side of Taliban.The NATO/USA has to decide on a definite strategy unless their aim is just to control the strategic Afghan airfields as jump off points for attacks on other regional countries in the next decade.Pakistan lost the good will it should have had in Afghanistan because its foreign policy was controlled by non Professionals.This failure started from removal of Agha Shahi from the Foreign Office.Shahi was not in favour of doing everything that the Americans told the Pakistanis.He was a seasoned diplomat.After his exit the Foreign Office passed into hands of soldiers turned diplomats with an over ride gear from General Zia and the so called Silent Soldier.

Seen in retrospect Pakistan's Afghan policy was a failure and the threat in 2007 to Pakistan's integrity is far more grave than in 1979.In this scenario the Taliban are a major contender.They have acquired a fearsome reputation not only as warriors in the Pashtun areas but also in the eyes of their NATO opponents.However the talk of engaging them is impractical.The battle that they are fighting is to the bitter end and this fact has to be digested by all decision makers on all sides.The Taliban have succeeded in destabilisng the region and herein lies their nuisance value.

Mr Gul this is not an essay as the title inside indicates.This is a letter stating some impressions.The feedback that this writer has offered is quite thought provoking.

FakirIppi,

Yourself being Afghan (even though you use the moniker of someone from North Waziristan), I have full sympathy for your embitterment over your country's destruction.

Afghanistan, in one way or another, was always a USSR client in recent history. All the roads were built by the Russians, most trade was with Russia, and even butter was imported from there. There was a beer factory though owned by some Pir family.

King Zahir Shah ruled only in Kabul (just as Karzai does now) with autonomous regional war lords backing him through a loya jirga (just as Karzai does now) with absolutely no writ over the rest of the land. The only difference between then and now in terms of federal authority is that Zahir Shah managed to keep the foreign policy and currency uniform through loya jirga consensus, which fell apart after direct Russian intervention. Pakistan had nothing to do with that.

It is though true that Shahre-Nau in Kabul was an island populated by persian speaking Tajiks, in a sea of misery populated by Pushtoons, which was Afghanistan. Now, that island is gone as well.

Pakistan's interest was solely in ensuring whoever won after the civil war subsequent to soviet withdrawal remained friendly to Pakistan. Certainly that wasn't going to be the Lion of Panjsher who was supported by the Indians, so they had no choice but to support the southern Pushtoons i.e. first Hikmetyar, and later Taliban, who were ethnically and geographically close to Pakistan and could be counted upon as allies.

I also believe it is a fallacy that Taliban were 'created' by Pakistan. They were a spontaneous movement born in refugee camps in Pakistan, and supported initially by the trucking and drug mafias alone to protect their convoys. In fact, the very first time when Pakistan engaged Taliban's services was when a Pakistani trade convoy headed for Central Asian Republics was guarded through the entire length of war-torn Afghanistan, full of highwaymen at each turn, by Taliban. One thing after that led to another and Pakistan dumped Hikmetyar in favour of Mullah Umar when the former failed to take Kabul.

Another important figure which people miss is Jalaluddin Haqqani, the present mentor of the 'Pakistani Taliban'. He was the fierce Jihadist fighter whom CIA coveted and one of those feted by Reagan on the White House lawns as the 'moral equivalent of our founding fathers'. Haqqani, Pakistan and USA's blue-eyed boy, was offered to turn against Taliban by musharraf in 2001 but refused, and initiated the Waziristan rebellion in support of Taliban and the 'Arab Afghans' aka Al-Qaida, which has now turned against Pakistan after Pakistan army intervention in FATA.

Point is, Pakistan is not responsible for Afghanistan's destruction, but a victim of the Afghans inability to hold their country together.

(P.S. The assertion re rise of Taliban are taken from Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars". Ahmed Rashid has an opposing view which I believe to be totally false.)