Comments on Ongoing Debate about ISI in the Afghan War

The essay is rather short ended. I actually expected some incisive stuff. Maybe written in a hurry, Amin could not conceal his biases. The essay would have definitively made better reading if it was more analytical.

When Northern Alliance reached Kabul with assistance of both USA and Russia, I thought that now it was back to square one. A time would come once this same alliance with the help of Russia and Shanghai-5 would push USA-NATO out of Afghanistan. Before that happens, the Pashtun resistance in Afghanistan has to be crushed so that the NA has a walkover. Maybe that takes place 5-10 years from now if it happens at all.

As I mentioned in a previous post and I reproduce here: -

"It may surprise many, but the contours of Pakistan's Afghan Policy were drawn in the mid 70s by Bhutto and Naseer Ullah Babar, who was then the Inspector General of Frontier Corps in NWFP. This was done in the backdrop of growing propaganda emanating from Kabul and supported by India for Pakhtoonistan. Some Afghan Student leaders and dissidents like Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud, Rabbani and Younis Khalis were brought to Pakistan for training and unleashed on Sardar Daud's Regime. This mass insurgency moderated Daud in 1977 and he was now prepared to sign the Durand Line. Unfortunately Zia's Coup removed Bhutto and an opportunity was lost. Soon Daud too was murdered and then came the Soviet invasion. Also recall that French Book, 'Muslim Threat to Soviet Russia'."

These Afghans kept hanging around Cherat and Peshawar for many years, till they were picked up by ISI/CIA for the Mock Jehad.

Cheerios

Yes .They used to talk about Isloo and all nonsense.Just compare Isloo after Lal Masjid ! You reap what you sow.All that constipated Silent Soldier.Silent Jihad making silently millions.Good keep it up.Now you guys will know what is civil war.Well done silent soldier.Cheers.

roses are red
violets are blue
the jihadi ideology you backed
is now killing you

#17 a small modification to that interact: I would say

"Had USSR not invaded A'stan, maybe US would never have intervened in A'stan. "

pakistan would have done with or without the US being interested. Having failed in the East Paksiatn and lost it, having tried Kashmir and done a Shimla they needed something else.

That the indians gave them Kashmir once more on a platter is besides the point.

Fakir sahib,

Had USSR not invaded A'stan, maybe US and Pak would never have intervened in A'stan. This is of course not to justify Pakistan's shameful role in that country.

Regards

Re: # 15;--

I am an Afghan and did not leave Afghanistan from 1978 till 1992.During this time damage to infrastructure was 95 % the work of ISI sponsored Murdagao Mujahids.In between 1992 and 2001 the remaining damage was done.All who did this were Pakistan sponsored.In contrast the North is very un damaged because it was controlled by relatively liberal Northern Alliance and Dostums Jumbish i Milli.

Fakir sahib,

I am not denying GoP/ISI's nefarious role in the tragedy of A'stan but a lot of blame has to be shared by the USSR too.

Regards

Re: # 13:-- I am posting Hamid Hussain's articles in Defence Journal October 2007 here.As I was told by Amin , he was compelled to write this letter to Defence Journal after reading Hamid Hussain's article.Amin was editor of Defence Journal from 1999 to 2002.

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DR HAMID HUSSAIN'S ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL





Recycling Old Myths

Hamid Hussain

Former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Afghan Cell chief Brigadier ® Muhammad Yusuf has written about his experiences. He has given first hand account of Pakistan 's involvement in Afghan affairs in 1980s which is very valuable for anyone interested in a very important chapter of the Cold War between Soviet Union and United States . Yusuf is a professional soldier belonging to Frontier Force Regiment (PIFFERS) and his career was typical of an infantry officer. He was reincarnated into a totally different role when he was assigned the task of heading the Afghan Cell of ISI in 1980s. He is still very well respected including this scribe as he has the distinction of not getting soiled with the corruption despite serving at a very senior position in intelligence apparatus. He deserves the honor and respect for trying to perform the assigned task to the best of his abilities and staying clean in a dirty environment. However, there is plenty of room for disagreeing with some of the policies during his tenure at Afghan Cell.

Some of the tactics used during his tenure caused much pain and suffering to innocent Afghans and may be partly responsible for some long term negative fallout for Pakistan . He was responsible for sending Afghan proxies for deliberate bombing of cafeteria of Kabul University resulting in death of students and staff. Many independent minded and nationalist Afghans were assassinated on Pakistani soil. There is no evidence that ISI directly ordered their elimination, however the job was done by ISI's Afghan proxies and surely at that time ISI could have intervened or warned their proxies. This is the major problem with proxies. They will take the orders from the hand that feeds them but at the same time they follow their own agenda whenever possible. It was not the intention of ISI but fragmentation of Afghanistan was invariably linked with Afghan policy of Pakistan .

In 1980s, Afghan operation was a joint CIA-ISI operation where each party had its own influence and responsibilities. Yusuf could not escape working with CIA. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, 'relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained', 'I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff', 'I never visited the US embassy' and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows that he is uncomfortable to be seen close to Americans. It is true that Yusuf tried to keep his operations clear of direct CIA involvement and kept his distance from Americans which was the right course. Yusuf's independence was not much appreciated by CIA and they were happy to see him leave the Afghan Cell in 1987 when he was passed on for promotion to Major General. However, at other levels especially at higher level and lower operational level there was regular contact between ISI and CIA and this could not be avoided. Many details of these interactions are now public knowledge. CIA happily passed on the skills of sabotage, urban warfare, handling of explosives and assassinations to Afghans via Pakistanis. CIA kept its hands clean as nothing could be directly traced to them but enthusiastic Pakistani intelligence officers found themselves neck deep into the dirty world of covert operations and civil war. This would come back a decade later to haunt them and their country. Arab countries let loose their own lunatics into the killing fields of Afghanistan and Pakistan is now left with cleaning that mess in its own backyard. The final balance sheet shows that the demons which Pakistan helped to create have been able to kill more Pakistani civilians and soldiers than Pakistan 's real and imaginary enemies.

Yusuf praises his boss former ISI chief General Akhtar Abdul Rahman and tries to reincarnate him as a 'holy warrior', 'great strategist' and then throws in the caveat of 'anti-American' as an icing on the cake. All officers have some strengths and some weaknesses. National and personal interests frequently intermingle which need to taken into consideration. In analyzing any policy, individual traits of the officer involved helps to understand the policy. This should be done not as an admiration or condemnation exercise but to document different perspectives of a policy so that people can reach their own conclusions. Rahman was considered a mediocre officer by most of his peers. He had been superceded during his long career from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel all the way to General; a very unusual incident in Pakistan army. This was always a point of ridicule during his long career among army officers. He was successful because he was a close confidant of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq and gave him unquestioned loyalty. Two events; 1977 Martial Law and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided the right opportunity for Rahman's star to rise. General Zia and Rahman had very cordial relations with director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) William Casey during cooperation of United States and Pakistan against Soviet Union . To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. There is nothing wrong with countries cooperating to serve their interests. It is also normal for any country to engage in covert operations. Intelligence chief of any country have some kind of liaison with friendly countries and they also keep a line of communication open with even an adversary. This helps them to perform their job professionally. There is nothing wrong with these communications. Just as defaming someone for keeping channels open is not appropriate similarly downplaying or denying such contacts also does not help to understand a policy.

Officers can give their own perspective about events but they can not create their own facts to prove a point regardless of their motivations. They can argue that it was in Pakistan 's national interest to pursue a particular policy and present their arguments. However, simply throwing in religious symbols and half baked theories does not help in understanding a complex policy. Pakistani intelligence cooperated with CIA to safeguard its interests. The two major ones were containment of Soviets in Afghanistan and using U.S. dependence on Pakistan in Afghanistan to thwart pressures regarding country's nuclear weapons program. Now to reincarnate Zia and Rahman as 'anti-Americans' or 'holy warriors' are not much convincing. Majority of Pakistani officers now simply blame U.S. for the Afghan mess absolving themselves of any wrongdoing. They throw in conspiracies hatched by U.S. , Russia , India and Israel to harm them. In fact, weapons seized by Israelis from Palestinians in Lebanon were shipped via Pakistan to Afghan resistance forces. U.S. Congressman Charles Wilson specifically asked both General Zia and Afghan resistance leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar whether it was alright to ship these weapons to Afghans. Zia jokingly commented that 'just don't put Star of David on boxes' while Hikmatyar stated that he wouldn't mind using these weapons and that God has His mysterious ways to help Muslims.

Those who are familiar with the social background and career of Rahman and compares it with the lifestyle of his progeny may reach a different conclusion. In 1970s, officers went to condole Rahman's mother death to a mud family house. After Rahman was done with the ISI stint, he was on a totally different ground and accumulated quite a wealth. May be Pakistan army rewards some of its generals on a different pay scale. His progeny educated in U.S. are multi-millionaires and this is no secret. They are also major players in all wheeling-dealing orchestrated in General Head Quarters (GHQ) in the last two decades. Islamabad station of CIA was one of the most influential and Rahman had closest relations with William Casey and local CIA officers. Yusuf argues that Rahman was kicked upstairs as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) because Americans wanted him out of ISI. There is no evidence which supports this conclusion. In fact, U.S. ambassador and CIA wanted him to be retained as head of ISI as they were very comfortable with the long standing smooth working relationship with Rahman. This subject was directly discussed with General Zia ul Haq. The reason of pushing Rahman upstairs had to do with internal dynamics of senior brass. Rahman's boys were involved in surveillance of senior army officers and Rahman's personal close association with Zia resulted in many complications which needed to be addressed. Rahman prepared background checks of army officers considered for senior positions. There was a great deal of resentment among some senior officers who were either bypassed for promotion or didn't get the 'prized' appointments. They blamed Rahman for poisoning Zia's ears against them. Rahman didn't move to his new residence as CJCSC but decided to stay in his old residence as it was close to Zia's power house. As CJCSC, Rahman was not responsible for Afghan operations but he continued to meet Islamabad CIA station chief on regular basis to exchange information about Afghan operations. CIA got insight about internal intrigues of senior army brass through these meetings. Like any human being, Rahman had his strengths and weaknesses. He performed some of his assigned tasks professionally and made some mistakes at other times.

Historical facts can not be distorted to accommodate ideological inclinations. It is helpful to get perspectives from different sources to try to understand a policy. There are different positions about any given policy and each position needs to be heard. All angles of any given policy even the uncomfortable truths need to be acknowledged for better understanding. There is never one hundred percent consensus about any given policy and those involved in formulation, planning and execution of any foreign and security policy will have different perspectives. Analysis of past policies is a difficult task but it is an essential one for documenting history and learning lessons for future policies.



Hamid Hussain

August 20, 2007





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Revisionist History of Pakistan's Afghan Policy

Hamid Hussain

Recent few articles in national newspapers by former senior army officers about Afghanistan are an attempt to write a revisionist history. Pakistan has been deeply involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan for over two decades. The irony is that majority of Pakistanis are not aware of the history of this involvement. There are two reasons for this ignorance. First, major Pakistani players in Afghanistan are country's military intelligence personnel and second Pakistan 's policy was presented to general public in an ideological package. There was no attempt of serious discussion about benefits and risks of any given policy even among senior military and intelligence officers.

These Pakistani officers are rightly proud of providing support to Afghan resistance during Soviet occupation. However, they simply ignore the fact that after departure of the last Soviet soldier from Afghan soil in 1989, Pakistan was one of the parties directly involved in the civil war of Afghanistan . Pakistan supported one or other faction in a brutal civil war which resulted in death of hundreds of thousands of both combatants and civilians. This also resulted in complete destruction of Afghan civil society. Using religious symbols and euphemisms can not hide this simple fact. A large number of Afghans hold Pakistan responsible for destruction of their country to fulfill its own genuine and delusional national security interests. It is the right of Pakistani officers to defend their policies but they also need to acknowledge the other perspective whether they agree with it or not.

Former army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg is now seeing conspiracies and grand conspiracies everywhere. In late 2001, when U.S. was in the final stage of the routing of Taliban, Beg cried wolf. He argued that U.S. was planning to divide Afghanistan . He conveniently forgot to tell the audience that Pakistan 's exclusive support of its own Pushtun proxies put all non-Puhstun groups including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazara in the opposite camp. Pakistan 's short sighted policies not only widened the Afghan fault lines but also sent majority of non-Puhstun leaders into the arms of India . He is now seeing intelligence agencies of every country sitting in the dark corners of Afghanistan to settle scores with Pakistan . However, he fails to mention the fact that this art was perfected by Pakistan long before any spook dreamed of having a stint in a war ravaged Afghanistan . Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officials were making and breaking alliances with their Afghan proxies. Weapons were pumped to everybody who was willing to jump in the bed without any serious thought about the consequences. ISI officers were working in Pakistani embassy in Kabul and Pakistani consulates in Kandahar , Herat , Jalalabad and Mazar Sharif in 1990s. In this capacity, they coordinated with their own proxies in the civil war of Afghanistan . Pakistan picked and dumped its Afghan proxies with a breathtaking speed. One could easily imagine the feelings of Afghans who were on the receiving end. Off course, all blame can not be put on Pakistan 's door. Afghans of call ethnicities willingly played the part in destruction of their own country. Iran , Russia and India supported their own proxies with money and weapons. It was a power struggle among the wolves which was presented as a 'holy war'.

Pakistani intelligence brass not comprehending the rapidly changing local, regional and international currents failed to calibrate its polices and paid a heavy price. 1990s saw the gradual shift in Washington regarding Afghan operation after the departure of Soviet troops. This was the time when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in retreat while Congress and State Department bureaucrats were getting restless and wanted to manage Afghan policy. A new interagency Afghan group (headed by Peter Tomsen; other members included Chief of Near East division of CIA Thomas Twetten, Richard Haas from National Security Council and delegates from Pentagon and sections of State Department) decided to directly deal with Afghan commanders inside Afghanistan. Afghan players engaged in the power struggle especially those who were not happy with ISI Colonels were euphoric about opening of a new direct channel of money and guns. They were showing signs of independence and two meetings of National Commanders Shura in Paktia and Kunar alarmed ISI which saw this as an effort to outflank them. Pakistan 's nemesis Ahmad Shah Masud was behind these maneuvers. ISI got alarmed and tried to break away some of these commanders and encouraged their subordinates to rebel by providing weapons and money while at the same time invited Massoud to Islamabad for a meeting. Later, ISI opened channels of negotiations with Najib and former King Zahir Shah. When Lieutenant General Javed Nasir took over as Director General (DG) of ISI, he closed down all contacts with Afghan government stating that he was not going to negotiate with 'communists', 'atheists' and 'infidels'. Afghan game became dirtier during this time and further fractured Afghan resistance. In addition, Pakistan 's policy became haphazard with no serious long term planning.

Those who contend that Pakistan 's Afghan policy in 1990s was in the country's best interest should give rational and logical arguments about the soundness of their policy. Using religious rhetoric and simply referring to real and imaginary conspiracies of outsiders is not going to convince people that right course was adopted. Majority of intelligence officers involved in Afghan adventure blame every one including U.S. Russia , Iran , India , Pakistani politicians and foreign office of their own country for the Afghan mess.

Limited intellectual horizon of officer corps, simplistic world view, paranoia, total disregard of facts which are contrary to one's opinion and lack of perception is quite evident from the statements and writings of many senior officers. Difference of opinion about any given policy is an accepted norm and contending parties present their point of view in a cogent and rational way to support their point of view. Some retired senior Pakistani officers are mixing policy issues with their own biases, dreams and delusions totally oblivious to facts. They are trying to explain a policy through the prism of an ill defined ideology, pan-Islamic ideas, anti-American rhetoric and anti-Indian sentiment which is resulting in further confusion rather than clarification of a policy.

Pakistan army is a large organization of about half a million personnel with thousands of officers of all ranks. These officers are a small minority among a large group. It should also be remembered that most of these officers have been accused of many acts of omission and commission including allegations of political intrigues and improper use of national exchequer while wearing the uniform. A number of them have been removed from army by military's own leadership. It is expected that these officers will present a point of view which exonerates them of all wrongdoing. In the absence of reasonably independent investigative journalism or serious academic research, many aspects of Pakistan 's Afghan policy are still shrouded in mystery. The view of a small minority of officers is the only version available to Pakistani audience. However, in this effort, these officers are damaging the work of professional intelligence officers mainly mid level (Majors & Colonels) who gave their best to perform the job assigned to them. They risked their lives and worked ethically and professionally. Many of these officers whose names will never be known presented their views candidly which ran against the conventional wisdom of their seniors to the detriment of their own careers. These are the unsung heroes of the much maligned Pakistani intelligence. People like General Mirza Aslam Beg, former heads of ISI including Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani and Javed Nasir have their fair share in some of the short sighted policies which proved more dangerous to the country than any adversary's move. Rational analysis with new information and acknowledging any mistake to learn lessons is not a trait of Pakistani senior brass. Majority of them who have not fought any battle are walking a fine line between dreams and delusions causing more confusion rather than bringing clarity.



Hamid Hussain

August 18, 2007

Fakir,

A'stan was collectively destroyed by the Russian invaders as well as the Yanks as well as their lackees (the puppet Karma/Najeeb govt and Mujaheeds). Whatever was left was finished off by the Talibs and the warlords.

Regards

Re: # 11:--

Also we Afghans follow Dr Hamid Hussain.So please read his article on ISI in Afghanistan in Defence Journal October 2007 issue.Amin Agha I can meet since he is in Kabul but Dr Hamid I think is abroad in USA.

Re: # 6:---

The assertions that you have are not correct.The tinpot generals destroyed Afghanistan.

The good part is the ending.Now Pakistan is in the same crisis that it imposed on Afghanistan.So all your life style will go to hell.Visit Kabul and see how your paid hirelings the Murdagao Mujahids destroyed it.

Re: # 8

No I did not miss it - he is comapring life styles....

In fact the really intersting and bold comment which needed to be explored in greater depth (as I said in #6) was the last paragraph of the article The phrase "so called afgha jihad...." needs to be explored....

Re: # 6

You have missed the essence of what he is saying.Compare the pathetic Paki generals with men like Najeeb Jan and Malgaray Aslam Watanjar.

Re: # 6

You have missed the essence of what he is saying.Compare the pathetic Paki generals with men like Najeeb Jan and Malgaray Aslam Watanjar.

Amin sahib/Diesel sahib,

At least one thing can be said about American Imperialism that some of the countries which were ruled by 'Peons of The West" went on to become very wealthy and successful nations- Eg. Japan, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea. The Russian stooges remained third rate nations until they had junked Commie-ism

Regards

typical, green jealous, envious desi article.....the authors sole raison detre seema s to be to complain about the life-style of the people in power, e.g quote from the article

"Now compare the above with life style of General Zia's son . Zia was from humble background.So was the case of General Akhtar who led the so called Afghan Jihad and now his sons are multi millionaires and sitting ministers in the present Pakistani Government. "

The essential conclusion/premise of the article is bold, and assertive and needs to be told...but the manner in which this is done leaves a lot to be desired.....coming from a person of Agha Amin's standing, I would have expected something more stimulating and scintillating than this gibberish....(atleast choskstaff should allow the author to write in urdu, and translate the article themselves).


The worthwhile part of the article is the conluding paragraph, and I quote

"The so called Afghan Jihad was a success for many Pakistani and Afghans in personal terms.But these were a small minority.For the vast majority of Afghans it was a failure.Afghanistan lost the flower of its leadership,intellectuals and infrastructure ! "

But it need to be developed better. This is said in such a manner for the first time - and indeed this paragraph deals directly with the here and now, rather than the chimeral religiosity ........