A History of the Pakistan Army by Brian Cloughley

Pavo, Ijaz, and Fuzair,

Interesting conversation. Particularly I liked the idea that '65 was the last chance for Pakistan to defeat/take out India.

Can any of you military geniuses define what is meant by Idia's defeat or take out. What was going to ensure that India was defeated? Is there anything tangible there?

What Pavo is talking about in his article are some tactical errors and there is no war in the world that did not have tactical blunders by the generals. Tactical errors are accepted as we accept failures in other areas.

The problem with the 65 war was that their was no goal that the Pakistan set before they prepared for the war.
Once you set the goals, the next step is to define some strategy to achieve those goals. Tactics are at the bottom of the pile in this order!

So what was the initial goal for this war?

Was the goal to conquer Kashmir or was it to take out Delhi? Now if they were the goals, then define what the Pak army strategy was to make that happen. Again,Without the defined goals, how could you possibly discuss defeat or take out!

The Pak army had set some goals in Kashmir when they send infiltrators there. Their strategy was to defend the Pak areas if India decided to cross the international borders.

While the Pak army had some goals in Kashmir, its only goal in and around International borders was to defend and Gen Musa and Ayub Khan's strategy was based around defending and that is what they did! The plan was to defend and not be aggressive from the very beginning.

Pavo bemoans Musa's version but that is the most authentic version. They set out to defend and they planned for it.

The Kashmir insurgency started around May of '65. The Indian government right away warned Pakistan of the consequences. The Indians and Pakistanis started deployment along the international borders in the middle of June.

Indian position was mostly along the amristar-lahore corridor. There goal clearly was to defend that area.

Pakistan's goal was not to go to amrister so they too had defensive positions in that area but had aggressive position in areas that provided access to Kashmir.

In sept., India moved towards Lahore as they wanted to defend amrister. India too had a defensive strategy and once they got close to Lahore, they did not know what to do next and decided to just hang around there!

Both armies were fighting a defensive war around the International borders and that is evident from every book you read on the subject and Pavo himself is implying that in his article.

So let me hear from you geniuses what was the Goal for the '65 war to determine how it was the best chance for Pakistan to takeout or defeat India!

Pavo, Ijaz, and Fuzair,
Sorry that the post #97 is a little disjointed!

However, the basic questions remain:
What was the goal?
What was the plan to achieve the goal?
what was the strategy to implement the plan?

In the absence of all that, how you guys determined the Indian defeat or takeout.

Re: # 54 zeemax

"The fact is, whatever businesses Pakistan Army operates, are to fund the retirement benefits of the soldiers"

I understand these things, but just as an army points its guns towrads its own citizens they lose all previliges and descend themsleves down to the level of common criminals just having bigger guns. Army is not only terrorizing people but destroying everything which a country builds in decades - all institutions, all human rights, rampant mascares, occupying public property thru proxy qabza group, stealing our food, our electricity, our freedoms, killing our innocent children. They have lost all their previliges after that, There is only one conclusion of the battle between citizens of Pakistan and this criminal entity, that is, this criminal institution will be humiliated, dissolved, and disbanned forever. There is no mercy; no reconciliation; no going back.

Re: # 98
Hp you have got to the source.
What is goal. If there is problem with big naboghour(?) then victory is not possible as its not manifest destiny to rule 1 billion.
Now not to loose is winning.Like vietnam war general Giap once said at tet offensive winning was never goal, but to deny victory for stronger party is victory.
After 65 war led ot bangla desh departure. Military wanted probably to abandon the real estate when it was costing too much to rule and losses were mounting with no hope of recovery. It good to right size company says lahore management school.Now pakistan is tidy lean mean army with country behind it with its arms strengthened by megaton capacity bombs and missiles. It powerful fighting machine but even after nuclear exchange ruling 1 billion problem, its like ants , elephant can kill in thousands in one step but finally they can eat him to bone. Numbers count in war in long terms , our megatons can will at most 200 millions ( usa rumsfield warned may kill 5 million people in subcontinet in case of war). Even in nagasaki majority people in city survived even with nuclear disease.
Now our objective should should be Kashmir and if possible Punjab as failure is ok but low objective is crime.
Little here battle or there gains at microscopic level are fine but at macroscopic level it does not mean much. At this time its best to keep ourselves down and go after people who are making war/ economic war against like who are damaging national assets. Now I do not not if dams are allowed to attack by Law? As if even some indian dictector takes army command and blows ( even breach or power generators damaged, Mangla, tarbella, Sukkar and sui gas fields and few compressor staions along pipe lines we have little means big problem. So before staring war this things be considered. If we use megatons their weak atmo forces can use kilotons.

Overlong term we are different people, we may look same, or smell same or speak same language but different nations and leave them to their way we our way.
Overlong term we should look eastwards where is cultural ethos of masses and once India is out of sight it will slowly out of mind. THat is reason I am against hindi movies and old mughal empire and history. Just like 1400 years ago world shook and new age started without reference to old decadent past so 1947 is different we chose to become more modern and western and more orientation towards east and north of stans. We need to less interact with indians as they are carrying burden of old gandhi.

Unless we leave India mentally , Indian ethos will pull us down. So that Indus seperateness from Indo gangetic plains is acceptable as all history can be used or selectively used or misused if for good purpose. Let Pakistan go free, let Indians leave obsession to influence. It time to say good bye and go for westerway, for start Iran is good than India. Unless we leave India mentally we are not free. Only free people can do good and think clearly.
Good night. My mind is really confused recently.

Re: # 95 Mohor it would had been good if they taught in your school to respect people and be polite. I am not fond of lafangas from any where specially from india etc. When I was small things were still good , people new ways of real white people in power, to be stern but just and resonable and use polite language. Like saying "ji" yes sir, no sair, thank you sair etc. People use to use good dress , attire, real college educated never look punk like todays children, they pomed their hair, no ugli side burns, iron pants and shirts and they polished their boots with cream or asked boy to polish, read news papers, smoke state express , speak good english like english man , it was great time . Now this is bad time all punks. Please do not comment as you are lost in low new world. There was time when foren return means vilayat gone person now days people go to uae and singapore and think like gone to foren country. I do not interact with punks like you. When you learn manners like respecting people for their age than there money aND ACHIVEMENTS, and learn to say to people like sir and madam etc then I can interact with you. I wish you good luck but really all this punks should be whipped till they say what can do for you sir. Just miserable young punks, trouble to parents and all. useless people.
good night and good February

Lots are young immatured people are angry as i doubted that nano driving toy machine.

HP,
In 1962 Indo China War, India was fighting a communist regime and there is no way Pakistan could have exploited the situation in its favour. In fact if I remember and do cirrect me, at one time Ayub had offered India a joint defence pact. To me exploiting the situation of 1962 is a mere wish cause it did not materialise. Had Pakistan exploited it, a major conflict in the region would have broken out with USA on India's side.

As for 1965, it was ill concieved and badly planned. At a tactical and sub unit level there was brilliance and courage at display but the higher leadership on both sides lacked the professionalism to handle large armies and manouevere.

mad-ani

we don't respect losers... ha ha...

mercenary? hello....mercenaries get to pick their gigs...


A note to Pakistan's brave soldiers used as mercenaries
by Abid Ullah Jan
(Saturday, February 2, 2008)

"Islam doesn’t allow war even against non-Muslims without reason, let alone Muslims."

Ink dries up in the Western Press lauding Musharraf as a valuable ally in the so-called war on terror. Is he an ally or a mercenary? Allies are consulted, mercenaries are hired.

All evidence suggests that although Mush had handlers in Mossad and US agencies since 1980, he has been a hired mercenary since January 2000 when he first readjusted the Nuclear Command Authority. Why is a retired general still calling the shots in NCA? The brave Pakistani Army soldiers are manipulated to kill other Muslims in the war of terror of Musharraf’s handlers.

It is time Pakistani soldiers look at what they are asked to do by a self-imposed, depressed and sick president. It is time that they look at the oath they took when joining the army. It is time that they look at the retired general and his actions (who violated his oath five times). It is time they check the direction of their muskets......which should be towards this retired general. Conscience – Zameer - of a brave soldier is a lot more precious than a few pieces of bread! Wake up!

In view of the present situation in Pakistan, where Muslims are pitted against Muslims, bloodshed is widespread, and where violence against fellow Muslims and aggression on assets and property, perpetrated under the guise of Islam, defence of Pakistan and the “war on terrorism” is daily occurrence, we need to seriously think over our actions. What are we fighting for? What is our objective? What is our cause? Are we on the highway to heaven or hell?

Before reaching any conclusion, let’s have a quick look at the ground realities.

The main objective of the Islamophobes, particularly in the US media, academia and politics was pitting Muslims against each other. It was promoted in the name of a “war within Islam.”[1] Soon after 9/11 the calls for a “war within Islam” intensified.[2]

Pakistan was the high value target[3] long before the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but undermining the Soviet Union was a priority. Focus shifted to Islam and Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Taliban became the perfect scapegoat. Instead of helping the Taliban to correct their approach and ways to living by Islam, Muslims fully participated in demonising the Taliban. Operation 9/11 was planned. A war on Afghanistan was planned even before that. The country was invaded and occupied not just for the sake of occupying Afghanistan but for encircling the cooperating Pakistan as well.

Since then Pakistan army has been rented at $100 million a month[4] by the US. There is no denying the fact and no one can challenge this reality. The other billions were not showered for development or poverty alleviation or institution building. Those funds were also provided to further consolidate occupation of Afghanistan and strengthen Pakistan army for fighting its own people in the coming war within Islam.

As we can clearly see, Pakistan army is fighting their own, local, Pakistani people. Pakistan army was used to provoke reaction of local populations by blockading and bombing their villages in the name of fighting foreign terrorists. There is no denying the fact that many refugees came from across the border, but most of the foreigners among them were either killed or handed over to the US in the early days of the US war on Afghanistan.

Even if there were some remaining refugees, such as Arabs or Chechens or Uzbeks, they never came to Pakistan with the intention to fight Pakistanis. If they wanted to fight and die, they would have stayed in Afghanistan and fought the invading forces there, rather than coming to Pakistan to kill Muslims. It is a matter of common sense that anyone who is so dedicated to the cause of Islam that he is willing to give his life, how on earth would he violate the very basic and strong injunctions of Islam that killing an innocent person amounts to killing the whole humanity.

The myth of Al-Qaeda[5] of exaggerated and Musharraf regime played a bigger role in this only to prove itself the biggest ally fighting a war for America. So far the US has to prove that Afghans or Chechens or Uzbeks had a hand in the operation 9/11. All evidence leads to the “inside job” of those in the position of power and control within the US. Japanese parliament is far more bold enough to discuss the 9/11 truth, where as it should have been the Pakistani leadership at all levels which should have questioned the premise of the “war on terrorism” and the flimsy justifications for invading and occupying Afghanistan.

Anyway, the more one impartially analyse the findings, the more one comes to the conclusion that the US war on Afghanistan is illegal and illegitimate in the first place. [6] So anything that the Pakistani soldiers may do to consolidate the US occupation of Afghanistan is illegal both according to the international law and norms, and totally illegal and immoral according to Islam. This is from where illegality of the military operations begins.

Then go back and history and see if there was not a perfect peace in the tribal areas before Mush’s joining the war of terror? During the tumultuous years of Afghan war, when Pakistan army recruited thousands of people from across the country and outside Pakistan, the tribal people largely remained neutral. There autonomy and related criminal activities by some aside, the tribal people had never engaged in any terrorist activities against the state of Pakistan in the past 60 years.

Now come to the role of Pakistan army, its motto and its mission. Against is original mission and mandate, today Pakistan army is engaged in what the US wants it to do.[7] The army itself is established on the foundation of Iman (Faith), Taqwa (fear of Allah) and Jihad fee sabeelillah (struggle in the cause of Allah). It is an inherently Islamic institution. What we need to assess is what has become of this Islamic army in a state, which the ex-commander in chief is not ready to accept as an Islamic State? Is the army still following the motto of Iman, Taqwa and Jihad fee Sabeelillah under the Generals who profess admiration for Mustafa Ataturk, who are staunchly secularists? Pakistan army was supposed to fight against the enemies of Pakistan and defend Pakistanis. Are they fighting the enemies of Pakistan? Did their victims declare a war on Pakistan? Or they have provoked a reaction to stage the drama of fighting terrorism?

Going one step further, the Pakistani soldiers must keep in mind that Pakistan not an Islamic state. It has not officially declared jihad against it own people. The regime is proudly participating in the “war of terrorism,” which has roundly been declared a war of terror even by non-Muslim analysts and impartial leading figures. By any standard and definition, the missions of Pakistan military within Pakistan are illegal and absolutely criminal. The army is engaged in the cause of the warlords in the United States. Period.

The neocons and their allied corporate terrorists have butchered millions of people on the 9/11 pack of lies. The Pakistani soldiers who are fighting for the warlords in Washington are committing crimes against humanity. If this war is not for Islam, not for Pakistan, not for saving Pakistanis from invading armies, then it is a totally unjust, criminal war against Pakistanis to please those who didn’t hesitate to declare a "war within Islam."

If someone argues that he is fighting against the “suicide” bombers and “terrorist,” we would like to hear: Why was their no “suicide bomber” in the past 60 years? Why was there no terrorist fighting them in the past 60 years? Why someone did not “misinterpret” Islam in the past 60 years? Why now? What happened all of a sudden? Who took all hopes of life from the people who know that if they don't die fighting, they are going to get butchered anyway. So why not kill a few of those who are out there hunting to kill them anyway. Who is responsible for pushing people to this extreme?

Military officers and front line soldiers would do well if they understand the over all context and stop fighting and killing innocent villagers, whose lives have directly been threatened in the name of fighting mythical al-Qaeda – a US bogey-monster to spread the war in the Muslim world. Of course, it’s hard to make both ends meet and being soldier one has no option but to obey orders, however, dying in the cause of George Bush is worse than quitting army or refusing to occupy Pakistani villages and killing innocent civilians in the name of Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The Pakistani regime cannot declare a people – Muslims - as infidels and declare open season on them. Even if there are Taliban, even if there are foreigners, one has to stop and ponder; did they declare a war on Pakistan? All propaganda aside, did they plan massacre of Pakistanis? Did they commit a crime? Above all, did they plan and execute Operation 9/11? The answer to these questions is: Absolutely not. Even if yes, bring the perpetrators before a court of law and punish them. Why this blanket war on parts of Pakistan, making life miserable for thousands of people, and displace them with the Israeli kind of collective punishment? There is not justification for continued butchery for pleasing the warlords in Washington.

According to Islam, the blood, property, honour, and reputation of Muslims is sacrosanct on the grounds of the noble verses of the Holy Quran:

“And whoever deliberately and with premeditation kills a believer, his recompense is Hell to abide therein, and the Wrath and the Curse of God are upon him, and a great punishment is prepared for him”;

and the Immaculate Tradition of the Prophet Mohamed (PBUH):

“Everything pertaining to the Muslim is sacrosanct, including his blood, property, honor, and reputation”.

Islam doesn’t allow war even against non-Muslims without reason, let alone Muslims. Here is clear rule for the declaration of war in the words from the Qur’an:

60.8: "Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves the doers of justice."

If there is no way Muslims can declare a war on non-Muslims unless the non-Muslims have already declared a war against them on the account of religion and have driven them out from their homes, how can the Pakistani regime declare and justify a war on its own people who have not driven other Pakistanis out from their home or stopped them from practicing their faith. Even in war with non-Muslims, the Qur’an says, show them kindness and deal them justly. Where is kindness and justice in the Mush war on his own people?

Indiscriminate bombings, shelling civilian population, collective punishments, allowing the US to bomb Pakistani territory and then accepting responsibility[8] for it – where is sanity in all this, let alone justice.

Helicopter gunships have been used to spew fire from safe stand off heights from where, by implication, it is impossible to separate a terrorist from accompanying civilians. Heavy artillery – an even more undiscriminating weapon – is regularly employed. US U-2 spy planes, flying at 70,000 feet, unmanned Predator drones, equipped with Hellfire missiles, and unattended ground sensors (UGS) dropped from air at passes on the Hindu Kush are samples of the technological weight thrown against a people for the eradicating the non-existent, mythical al-Qaeeda. This is totally against international law and the clear message of the Qur’an.

In Pakistan, the major targets of the aggression of Pakistan army are mosques,[9] just as we see destruction of mosques at the hands of occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.[10] All houses of worship are sacrosanct, including mosques and the non-Muslim houses of worship of all faiths and religions. Therefore, these places of worship may not be attacked, appropriated, or in any other way used as a haven to perpetrate acts in contravention of Shari’a.

Necessarily therefore, it is incumbent upon all Muslims, and Pakistani soldiers in particular to adopt caution and vigilance against all attempts to sow division among them, break their ranks, or incite sedition, strife, and hate to corrupt their divine spiritual bonds with each other as brothers of a single ummah. Regardless of a job in the military, regardless of the military’s accesses against one’s loved one, all attacks on each other – the war within Islam – must stop immediately.

There is no place for aggression (Pakistan’s military) and the counter-attacks (retaliation in revenge) in Islam. It perpetuates the ongoing bloodshed amongst Muslims. The more responsible faction – the Pakistan army – has to stop provoking retaliation. It has to stop the war on Muslims. It has to pull back. It has to stop this war of madness. If there are criminals, brought them to justice in a court of law and punish them as a lesson for others. But this blanked war or terror must end. Otherwise the ruling is clear. They are fighting in the cause of neocons-Zionists and corporate terrorists. They are simply on the highway to hell. Pakistan army – both the generals and the foot soldiers - have to stop this madness even if it cost them their job.

Being in the position of power, Pakistan army is bound to provide security, protection and means of decent livelihood to all categories and sections of the Pakistani people and to uphold justice among them, principally, by ensuring the release of innocent detainees, by bringing to speedy and fair trial, and executing the ruling against, those indicted of crime, while observing strictly the principle of equality among all citizens.

Re:HP#97
"The problem with the 65 war was that their was no goal that the Pakistan set before they prepared for the war."

HP, you have hit the nail on the head. Its not just in 1965, but in all of its existence, Pakistan has never been able to formulate its military goal with respect to its rivalry with India.

The muslim invaders of the past had a simple goal - conquer India and establish their rule from Delhi. Pakistanis could never embrace such a goal since it would ironically undo partition and create a common country, albeit under muslim rule. Essentially it would go against its ideology of TNT. The other goal could be to somehow grab Kashmir from India and nothing else besides Kashmir. However, that is impossible since any such war (such as in 1965 and 71) would spill into Punjab, Rajasthan and other sectors which could lead to territorial loss for either side. In such a case, if India won, Pakistan would lose territory in a big way. If Pakistan won, partition would get undone again. Either option is unacceptable.

Therefore, Pakistan is basically in a state of strategic limbo when it comes to India. It doesnt want an ultimate showdown with India, nuclear or otherwise, since defeat will mean the destruction of pakistan with a secular akhand bharat while victory will also mean a destruction of pakistan with a muslim akhand bharat!! Either way it means a loss of Pakistan and the creation of akhand bharat!! Therefore, Pakistan has simply adopted a defensive doctrine to keep the status quo whatever it is. Yet its ideology requires it to be hostile to India. Thus it is just empty rhetorical hostility that can never really culminate into action since any kind of decisive action means the end of Pakistan as an entity. The question is whether it can morph into a benign, peaceful coexistence. The status quo situation and the presence of nukes demands it and that is where we are ultimately headed.

there is general agreement in both indian and pakistani military quarters that had the pakistani 1st armoured division offensive opposite khem karan succeeded indian army would have been really knocked down at the strategic level.this was agreed by a person no less than indian western command chief harbaksh singh.the pakis had a 7 to 1 superiority here but failed due to sheer incompetence.

similarly it was agreed that if the indian ist armoured div offensive oposite chawinda had succeeded pakistan would have lost the war.here too the indians had a huge 5 to 1 superiority in first four days of the offensive but failed due to incompetence of commander indian 1st armoured div KK Singh.

i am travelling and dont have access to my references,but here is one from an Indian:--

On the Beas controversy, Capt Amarinder Singh, who was Lieut-General Harbaksh Singh’s ADC, has recorded (The Tribune, December 4, 1999) how, following the induction of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division into the bridgehead established by them on the Khem Karan flank, Harbaksh refused General Chaudhuri’s order at 2.30 a.m. on the night September 9/10 to withdraw to the line of the Beas. The crisis passed over the next day at Asal Utar where the reorganised 4 Infantry Division and 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade effectively stalled the Pakistani thrust.

Had Harbaksh followed the Army Chiefs orders, communications to Jammu and Kashmir would have been severed from the rest of India and half of Punjab would now have been with Pakistan, altering the very complexion of the subcontinent’s history.

“Patton’s flop puzzles Army Chief” The Statesman (Sept, 26 1965) establishes that the Army Chief was not in tune with the situation on the Khem Karan front and did indeed get unduly alarmed. It was only because of Lieut-Gen Harbaksh Singh, the Western Army Commander, that the day was saved for India. Sandwiched as he was between a “hot-air” Chief and some “paper tiger” subordinates, Harbaksh led front and inspired his men in battle. Those who dithered in the face of the enemy, Harbaksh did not hesitate to sack. The Tribune (September 22, 1965) gave a run-down on Harbaksh who was “literally always on the move”, inspiring from the front.

It has been rightly said that war is too serious a business to be left to the Generals. It would, however, be wrong to brand all Generals as incompetent. There have been many outstanding Generals like Slim and Eisenhower, who demonstrated faculties and statesmanship of a high order. In India we have had men like Harbaksh, Manekshaw and Sinha, the last of which was prevented from being elevated to the post of Chief because his intellect and integrity made bureaucrats uncomfortable.

BIMAL BHATIA
Panchkula

?
GURCHARANJIT SINGH LAMBA
24, SHAHEED UDHAM SINGH NAGAR, JALANDHAR CITY 144001.
PHONE & FAX : (0181)227665.
e-mail: gslamba@jla.vsnl.net.in

16 November, 1999

With the final march past of the legendary Lt. General Harbaksh Singh, VC, PVSM,PB,PV who commanded not only the columns but the hearts of the people in uniform or otherwise, has now got himself a prime place in the glittering pages of the Indian history.

The general got himself in the Indian Army in 1939, though immediately thereafter the political leadership spearheading the independence movement gave a call for boycott of the recruitment to the armed forces. The presence of a large number of entrants of that time from Punjab in the Indian Army thus proved only one point that but for the presence in large number of these soldiers during the 1947 and 1965 war with Pakistan the result would have been catastrophic.

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War the determined strategy and action plan of this war hero created legends and got him applause not only from friends but secret admiration from foes also. His war despatches published later were sold and read more in Pakistan than in India. In an exclusive interview to the writer of these lines the General in his eighties, was too youthful to shell out his reminiscences about the Army Chief General J. N. Choudhry's suggestion to realign his forces behind Beas, which has become sort a folklore. Giving details of this, he said that he was asked by Gen. Choudhry to come to Delhi for discussion but impressed upon him that he cannot move out from the front and later the meeting was held at Ambala. He also recalled that Chief's aircraft came escorted by two bombers and during his meeting he was able to convince the chief that the battle has not been lost and the apparent reverses are not a panic sign but this is quite a common phenomena in any war. "This suggestion was not at all
acceptable to me. We would have lost Amritsar, Khamkharan, Pathankot. Then why were we fighting. J & K would have been cut off, then what was the use. I told the Chief about it that if we loose J & K then what for we are fighting?" said General.


He recalled that his strategy was too simple that the enemy tank may penetrate deep inside but have to have the support of the soft vehicles. To prevent this he had a determined plan not to allow any Paki vehicle on the road. And he proved right too.

Recalling his contribution and determination, Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul in his book Confrontation with Pakistan writes,

"Government should by now be aware that in the midst of this grim crisis on 10 September Army Chief Chaudhuri asked Harbaksh Singh whether our forward positions should not be readjusted and established behind the Beas as the enemy Armoured Division might breakthrough. This would have meant pulling back our corps in this area nearly 40 miles from the front line, evacuating vital areas like Ferozepur, Khem Karan, Taran Taran,







Khalra, Wagah, Amritsar, and Dear Baba Nanak. Such action was not necessary at that juncture as the battle of Assal Uttar, near Khem Karan, was still being fought and by no means lost and there should have been no cause for panic. Thanks to the leadership and determination of Harbaksh Singh, who resisted the Army Chief's counsel, India was saved from a disastrous situation. The decision of this commander to make a resolute stand at Assal Uttar proved right, as by the 10 evening the Pakistani forces suffered a severe reverse. [P. 38-39] , In this war, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh received no worthwhile directions from Army Headquarters but influenced the battles favourable, wherever possible, by his personal leadership and courage. But for his sound judgement and example might not have achieved even an honourable stalemate."

The historians will evaluate the contribution of the great General, but since the Punjab was the battle field one thing is too sure that but for this action of the general of the Sikh regiment the Punjab and Punjabis would have got an unprecedented blow, the parallel of which is found in the chapters of invaders in the history.

Writing about this part of history Sirdar Kapur Singh in Sikhism & Politics published by SGPC says,

"In the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, it is now know, that but for the obduracy of a certain Sikh General it had almost been decided to abandon the entire Punjab west of Ambala to the invading Pakistani tanks. Just a week often days of occupation of the Sikh Homeland by the soldiers of Marshal Ayub and not a single Sikh virgin or a single Sikh rupee or a single Sikh sacred spot would have retained its purity or dignity, And the Sikh world its generals, barristers and psychoanalysts notwithstanding would have been enveloped by darkness and decay for fifty years at least if not forever. "

In the interview the General said very emphatically, "I had absolute confidence that I will not allow them to enter Amritsar."


The contribution of the General to the nation is so great that certain concerned quarters made specific suggestions to the honour General Harbaksh Singh during the forthcoming tercentenary celebrations of the Khalsa. It is no exaggeration that his contribution for this Nation and especially for the Punjab is no less than that of Banda Bahadur or Hari Singh Nalua, but that was not to be and no body even cared to invite him for the celebrations. This morning when I rang up an Akali activist and told him about the sad demise of the general, the question was, "who was General Harbaksh Sing

Saturday, November 27, 1999

Amin sahib/Ranjit bhai,

Just to digress. It is all well and good to discuss 1965 but what about now. Now that atom bombs have created a nuclear stalemate in the Indo-Pak military affairs, where do we go from here. What are Pakistan and India's options in Kashmir now?

Regards

Here is my friend Ravi Rikhye a respectable Indian military analyst:--

The Battle of Assal Uttar: Pakistan and India 1965

v.1.3 February 24, 2002

Agha Humanyun Amin (orbats)

Roland Davis (supplemental orbat information)

Ravi Rikhye (commentary)

Pakistan Orbat

Please note that President (General) Pervez Musharraf was a lieutenant of artillery in the 16 (SP) Field Regiment, 1st Armored Division Artillery.

Also please note that the Pakistan Army during this period normally assigned only seven infantry battalions to an infantry division (with the exception of the 12th Azad Kashmir Division). It was thought that Pakistan did not need a full complement of infantry. Great reliance was put on the excellance of Pakistan Artillery (justified, in the event), and in the numerical and quantitative superiority of the Pakistan Cavalry (only partially justified, in the event). After the 1965 War Pakistan recognized its error and increased infantry in its divisions to a more standard nine battalions.

11th Division was a new raising only some months old. For this reason, all its artillery came from other divisions and was either not replaced or replaced with new raisings. In the Pakistan Army new raisings relied heavily on recalled reservists who were not necessarily pleased to return to active duty, sometimes just weeks before the outbreak of war. The issue is not that some of the battalions failed to perform well, but that so many actually did a commendable job. In 1971, when India mobilized its reservists Territorial Army battalions, it remained unsatisfied with their performance even though the reservists had at least six months to retrain.

Pakistan raised four cavalry regiments as Tank Delivery Units (30, 31, 32, 33 TDU), intending to decieve the Indians as to their real strength. This gave Pakistan 17 regiments vs India's 15. Four of India's regiments were, however, equipped with the AMX-13 or PT-76, tanks which while excellent for reconnaissance, were near useless against Pakistan's M47/48 and M4 Shermans, and quite inferior to Pakistan's two M24 Chaffee regiments. This widend the disparity in Pakistan's favor even further.

1st Armored Division [Maj. Gen. Naseer Ahmad Khan]

12th Cavalry (Division reconnaissance regiment, Chaffees)


Division Artillery [Brig. A.R. Shammi] (killed in an ambush)

3 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ghulam Hussain]

15 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ehsan Ul-Haq] (later Major General)

16 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Akram Chaudhry]

21 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Maqbool]


19 (SP) Light Anti Aircraft Regiment [Lt. Col. Mohammad. Sarwar]

1 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Altaf Hussain]


3rd Armored Brigade [Brig. Moeen] (in reserve, did not enter battle)

19th Lancers (Pattons) [Lt. Col. Bashir Ahmad] (Later replaced at Chawinda) - See Correspondence

7th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Abdul Rahman]


4th Armored Brigade [Brig. "Tony" Lumb]

4th Cavalry [Lt. Col. M. Nazir] Pattons

5th Horse [Lt. Col. M. Khan] Pattons (sole pre 1947 unit not to fight in any Indo-Pakistan action)

10th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)[Lt. Col. Fazal Kareem]


5th Armored Brigade [Brig. Bashir]

6th Lancers [Lt. Col. Shahibzad Gul] Pattons

24th Cavalry [Lt. Col. Ali Imam] Pattons

1st Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Syed Shabbir Ali]



11th Infantry Division [Maj. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan]

15th Lancers [Lt. Col. Iskandar Al Karim] I Corps Reconnaissance Regiment

32nd Tank Delivery Unit [Lt. Col. Aftab Ahmad] Shermans after war 32 Cavalry


Division Artillery [Col. Shirin Dil Khan Niazi] (Major General in 1971)

26 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ata Malik] (ex 7th Division)

38 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Hamid Tamton] (ex 8th Division)

12 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Bashir] (ex 8th Division)

9 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Gulzar] (ex 10th Division)

35 Heavy Regiment [Lt, Col. M. H. Ansari] (later Major General) (35 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)

Troop/88 Mortar Battery (ex 8th Division)

37 Corps Locating Regiment [Lt. Col. Khalil Ahmed Khan] (37 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)


3 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Saleem Malik]

25 Signals Battalion [Lt. Col. Anwar Ahmad Qureshi]


21st Infantry Brigade [Brig. Sahib Dad] initially detached, returned Sept. 6 Div striking force/reserve

5th Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Mumtaz]

13th Baluch (now spelled Baloch) [Col. M. Hussain]


52nd Brigade [Brig. S.R.H. Rizvi] (deployed from Kasur-Khem Karan Road to Kasur-Ferozepur Road)

2nd Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Fateh Khan]

7th Punjab [Lt. Col. Shirazi]

12th Baluch [Lt. Col. Akhtar]


106th Infantry Brigade [Brig. Nawazish Ali] (deployed Bedian Sector, North of Kasur)

1st East Bengal [Lt. Col. A.T.K. Haque]

7th Baluch [Lt. Col. Rasul Bux]


Indian Orbat

Werstern Army (Kashmir theatre, Punjab theatre down to Bikaner in Rajasthan)

[Lt. Gen. Harbax Singh] Commanding XV, I, XI Corps, total 11 divisions

XI Corps [Lt. Gen. J.S. Dhillon] Commanding 4, 7, 15 Divisions

2nd Independent Armored Brigade [Brig. T.K. Theograj]

3rd Cavalry [Lt. Col. Salim Caleb] Centurions

8th Lancers [Lt. Cpl. P.C. Mehta] AMX-13

(Third regiment was away in another sector)

1st (SP) Field Regiment (Sextons)

4th Mountain Division [Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh]

9th (Deccan) Horse [Lt. Col. A.S. Vaidya, later Army Chief] Sherman IV/V

A Squadron [Maj. J.M. Vohra, later Lt. Gen.]

B Squadron [Maj. G.S. Bal]

C Squadron [Maj. D.K. Mehta]

7th Mountain Brigade [Brig. Sidhu]

4th Grenadiers

7th Grenadiers

9th Jammu and Kashmir Regiment

62nd Mountain Brigade

1/9th Gorkha Rifles

13th Dogra

18th Rajputana Rifles

(33rd Mountain Brigade was away in another sector)

Caveat

Neither India nor Pakistan take their military history seriously. India, for example, has still to release its war histories for 1965 and 1971, though xeroxed copies were obtained by the Times of India. The histories are so bland as to be next to useless. The history of the 1962 War may not even have been written. Aside from the Ministry of Defense's in-house historians, no one is allowed access to war documents. The same is true of Pakistan. Much of the conduct of Indian and Pakistani battles is by means of verbal orders, and there seems to be no scheme of keeping proper records and notes of conversations and signals. Unsurprisingly, Indian and Pakistani military history becomes an unbroken disaster of "I said - he said" Few of the histories published by retired soldiers would meet the requirement of rigor needed for real history. The more decent writers couch their language in ambigious terms, so as not to hurt anyone's feelings. Those with an axe to grind go after their bete noir, who can do nothing right, while covering up their own errors, to indicate they did nothing wrong. Good research is expensive, and almost without exception no Indian or Pakistani writer, university, or publisher can afford to pay for it. So accounts are written in great part because you happen to run across an officer who was there, or a story told you by the batchmate of the general concerned, who heard it from a staff officer, who was told by someone from the general's staff…and so on. Even the most concietntious writer has trouble getting a fair picture under these cirucmstances, and the best such writers can do is to acknowledge their limitations, and continue. Else we would have no history at all, good or bad.

When writing about Indo-Pakistan wars, a further complication arises. Both sides find it near impossible to give the other credit where credit is due, whereas criticism becomes rabid propaganda. So the pakdef.com account of the Battle of Assul Uttar makes the outcome a great victory for the Pakistanis, with cruel and demanding Indian generals heedlessly sacrificng thousands of their men to make unsuccessful inroads into the staunch Pakistani defense. Pakistanis, being from the smaller and more insecure country, are worse when it comes to objectivity, but we also have no shortage of Indians without a good word for the Pakistanis. It remains unclear how anyone is supposed to learn anything when neither side wants to be fair.

Into this morass come two Pakistani writers, Maj. Agha Humanyun Amin and Brig. Z.A. Khan, both retired and former cavalry officers. Both have a disspassionate commitment to getting as close to the truth as possible, and both completely reject any attempt by their Government to put a gloss on mistakes. Both are iconoclasts with a keen eye for the absurdity that war generates. Both have a sense of humor, prodigious memories, and many friends willing to talk freely off the record. Thanks to Mr. Ikram Seghal of Pakistan Defense Journal, both have a forum from which to speak candidly and courgageously, and we are the richer for it. It is hard to come up with any Indian writers who equal Amin and Khan in their attention to detail and frankness, though overall you will find Indians readier to blast their own side than is true for Pakistanis. India being the bigger is less insecure.

Because the Battle of Assul Uttar was a disaster for Pakistan cavalry, as an Indian I have chosen to use Amin and Khan's accounts rather than the Indian accounts, such as the excellent treatise by Lt. Col (Dr) Bhupinder Singh (1965 War: Role of Tanks, BC Publishers, Patiala, India, 1982) . To me what happened on the Pakistan side is of more interest than what happened on the Indian side. Amin and Khan have the inside story, which was not available in such detail to the world till they spoke. I hope also that by using primarily Pakistani sourcess, I will deflect criticism from chauvinistic Pakistanis who might think I am bent on slandering Pakistan because I am an Indian. I have been in enough trouble with my government for exposing Indian lies and propaganda with regard to Pakistan. If I can slam my own government for its stuypidies and mistakes, I certainly have the right to examine the mistakes and stupidites on the Pakistan side. I have no interest in proving something at the expense of someone else. Scholarship and propaganda are two different things. Like Amin and Khan, I am interested in the truth, however imperfectly we may get to view it.

My main concern, in this first of two parts, is to try and understand why Pakistan's 1st Armored Division, the pride of its army, blundered so badly at Assul Uttar despite an eneormous superiority in armor. In the second part, I will try and understand why the newly raised Pakistan 6th Armored Division, in contrast, put such a staunch defense in the Battle of Chaiwanda, against a much more closely match adversary.

Introduction

In 1965, Pakistan had two armored divisions, the 1st and the 6th. Both fought major battles. While the 6th Armored Division acquited itself well, the 1st Armored Division failed miserably and completely. Its division commander, two of its three brigade commanders, and most of its staff officers were transferred out as reprimands for their unacceptable performance. This division witnessed scenes that have never taken place in the history of the Pakistan cavalry, before or since. We have an armored regiment where, after the CO is killed, the 2nd in command refuses to take charge and none of the squadron commanders picks up when the 2 i/c refuses. We have armored infantry abandoning their APCs when they come under friendly fire, and then running from the field, all the way back home. We have a regimental commander who achieves his phase line, but does not bother to inform brigade, and then decides if brigade - who has no idea where he is - does not link up with him that night, he will surrender in the morning, Seventy officers and men from two squadrons decide they had best push off while they can, and leave for Pakistani-held territory. The next morning, as good as his word, the regimental commander surrenders as soon as someone can be arranged to accept the surrender, and hands over 11 running tanks in the process. We have a divisional engineer regiment that builds a bridge across an obstacle, only to find the banks are too high for passage, and then has to rectify the problem, halting the entire division in the process. We have regimental commanders arguing with brigade commanders, brigade commanders arguing with the division commander, instead of cooperating to get on with the battle.

We know all this and more because two Pakistani retired officers have written of these strange and perhaps unique events. Our sources for the Battle of Assul Uttar are primarily Pakistani, and we ask Pakistani readers who may get offended to keep that in mind.

Opening stages

On September 5/6, Indian XI Corps (4 Mountain, 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions, 2nd Independent Armored Brigade) launched its three divisions against Lahore. 4th Mountain Division was on the southern axis, alunching from Khem Karan towards Kasur, which lay perhaps 6-7 km from the international border. 7th Division was to the north of 4th Mountain Division, also aiming at Kasur from a different direction. The Indians deny Lahore was their objective, saying instead that their attacks were limited to keeping Pakistan from launching a major attack against the Punjab. Be that as it may, had India gained Kasur, it could have outflanked the Lahore defenses, which would have been under attack from two different direcxtions. The defenses of Kasur were immensely difficult to negotiate. The Pakistanis had done a superb job of building defenses that could hold superior Indian numbners failing that, inflict such heavy losses that the gain would be unworthwhile.

4th Mountain Division (two brigades, a third was in another sector) and a Sherman regiment attacked at seven points, expecting to be opposed by a single regular infantry battalion. Instead, it found a brigade reinforced with armor, and the entire Pakistan 1st Armored Division sitting behind. Pakistan 11 Infantry Division defended the Southern Lahore area with six battalions. Because of the large frontage, only its 21st and 52nd Brigades were defending Kasur, now subject to a two-pronged attack by India. 11th Division, though a completely new formation, was led by a geenral who repeatedly showed a capacity for rapid action aimed at keeping the initiave. Pakistani plans were to seize Khem Karan, opening the way for a rapid advance to the Beas River. The Beas had two bridges over it at this time Pakistan was to seize one bridge and then turn north. If successful, this manuver would have isolated eleven divisions of the Indian Army, more than half its effective strength at the time, in the Punjab, Pathankot, Jamm, Kashmir, and Ladakh. The way to Delhi would also have been open, a liesurely one-day drive. This was because India had no reserves, and no troops east of the Beas River. Had Pakistan succeeded, a Fourth Battle of Panipat could have taken place: the first three, fought from 1526 onward, changed the fate of India each time, and the Fourth would have been no different.

The Pakistani counterattack caught advanced Indian troops in a difficult position. They had pushed forward as far as possible under the impression they faced only one regular infantry battalion supported by paramilitary forces, and were without reserves to sustain their offensive. They also had only one tank regiment of Sherman IVs and Vs armed with 76mm guns in support, absolutely no match for the Pakistan M47/48 Patton. Pakistan artillery was, as usual, superbly handled, with the 140 guns available to the sector by pooling all units within range. The Indian division was completely outgunned in artillery: as a mountain division it had 120mm mortars and 105mm pack howitzers, though a single heavy regiment was deployed in support. Indian 106mm RCLs were deployed on a meagre scale of six per infantry battalion and were essentially ineffective against the Pakistani tanks except at close range. The PAF - again as always in contrast to the IAF - supported the ground troops with all means at its disposal. Last, and this is very important, the Indian infantry had insufficient training on facing armor, quite aside from the shortage of appropriate anti-tank weapons. RCL crews would hold their fire for fear of giving away their positions.

Considering the situation, GOC Indian 4th Mountain Division immediately ordered the division to fall back and assume a horseshoe shaped defensive position with Assul Uttar as its focal point. This village of 1500 persons had presumably been evacuated, but we do not know the situation here. As in most accounts of battles, the civilians who live on or near the battlefield are seldom mentioned. Both India and Pakistan, however, have a good record of clearing civilians off the field before fighting, and neither side bombs civilian targets. So the non-combatant loss on both sides is low. Now, of course, thanks to the United States, which has declared water purification plants, baby food factories, and electrical power plants as legitimate targets for attack, India and Pakistan may well change their mind. Assul Uttar was chosen because it was located at the focal point of two roads leading from Pakistan to Khem Karan, and thus the defenders could cover both likely axes of advance.

The Pakistanis have said that 4th Mountain Division was routed. From their viewpoint, it is understandable they thought so: some Indian infantry units, unable to take the pressure of Pakistani artillery and air attacks, unable to defend themselves against Pakistani armor, and quite aware of how seriously outgunned the Indian tanks were, retreated before being ordered to withdraw, or withdrew in a disorderly manner. Considering the speed with which the Indians set up their new defense line which was never breached - about 24 hours - it is, however, more reasonable to accept that the division withdrew in an overall organized manner.

Either on the 6th itself or on the 7th, Pakistan 11th Division etablished a bridgehead in Indian territory. On September 7, Pakistan 5 Armored Brigade of its 1st Armored Division began the first Pakistani attack that culminated in the battle of Assul Uttar. Also concentrating in the bridgehead were 4th Armored Brigade and 21st Infantry Brigades. It is difficult without better accounts to tell how many attacks the Pakistanis made: 4th and 5th Armored Brigades made at least five, perhaps seven or even eight attacks between them. At the very first, Pakistan 5th Brigade overran Khem Karan. Subsequently, however, every attack was defeated by the Indians though they did npot suceed till after the ceasefire in getting back lost ground. Even Khem Karan, however, was not fully under Pakistan control till September 10.

By now, HQ Indian 2nd Armored Brigade with two regiments (one Centurion, one AMX-13) had moved to reinforce Indian 4th Mountain Division. On the 8th and 9th Pakistan armor attacked repeatedly, to be beaten back with heavy losses, both to the Indians and the terrain, which was soft in many places. On September 10th, the day of the last attack, the advancing Pakistani tanks ran into 4th Division's horseshoe ambush, and the attackers were annhilated. The ambush was placed in sugarcane fields - the crop was standing tall and ready to be harvested - and Indian Shermans had learned by now to hold their fire till Pakistani tanks came within 550-750 meters. At longer ranges Indian shot simply bounced off the Pattons.This ambush was only one part of the reason for the Pakistani defeat at Assul Uttar.

The other reason was that the Pakistan Chief of General Staff himself arrived to push the offensive forward. He took over the business of giving orders to the brigades - three command levels down. Odd as this may seem, GOC Indian XI Corps, otherwise an excellent commander, was at one point ordering the movement of tank troops and even single tanks on the battle field, five and six levels down! To ensure the CGS's orders were executed, GOC 1 Armored Division ordered the Officer Commanding Pakistan 5th Armored Brigade to drive back some kilometers for a meeting. The conversations were intercepted, and the Indians ambushed the GOC's convoy, an indication of how intersperesed the two armies were and how fluid the battlefield. The artillery brigadier was killed, and though the GOC escaped - contrary to Indian belief he also had been killed - it appears that Pakistan 1st Armored Division completely disintegrated.

If the twin setbacks of Assul Uttar and the ambush were inusfficient, on the same day Pakistan GHQ ordered the division's third brigade to the Sialkot sector, where the fiercest tank battles since World War II were underway. The next day 1st Armored Division was reorganized. Its 4th and 5th Brigades were given one tank regiment and one armored infantry battalion each, and the division HQ plus 4th Armored Brigade was sent north against the possibility of an Indian breakthrough at Sialkot.



This did not end the battle of Khem Karan-Kasur. The Indians continued attacking until the ceasefire was announced - by September 19th Pakistan had started to run of ammunition, aircraft spares, and reserve equipment. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Air Staff met with the President of Pakistan that day to request a ceasefire be negotiated. Twenty-three days into the war, Pakistan was done for - hardly surprising, as the Americans had kept Pakistan on a short leash, giving just 14-21 days of supplies. Enough time for the Americans to arrive should a communist power attack Pakistan insufficient to do India any serious harm. Meanwhile, India was just getting into its stride, learning from its mistakes, pulling fresh mountain troops from the east into the western theatre. Logically, India should have continued the war, but was talked into a ceasefire by Russia and America, both of whom wanted the status quo preserved. That is another story.

Before we go into the reasons the Pakistani offensive failed, I am compelled to make a general observation. Western military experts and observers have had a lot of fun taunting both India and Pakistan for the limited results in the 1965 War. I would like to ask, how many wars have Britain, France, and the United States won in 23-days, and if so, were both sides as evenly matched as India and Pakistan? I need say no more on the subject, and I hope future western historians writing about India and Pakistan show a little more humility.

Analysis

Now to some analysis. The Patton was a far superior tank to anything the Indians possessed, and the Pakistanis outnumbered the Indians 3-1 in tanks if we exclude Indian AMX-13s, and 3-0 in armored infantry. Are we justified in this exclusion? The had no more utility in battle than an armored car, perhaps less, because after it fired off its 12 round magazine, it was left defenseless till resupplied. It was acceptable as a reconnaissance vehicle completely unacceptable as a tank. The Pakistani M24 Chaffee may have been a light tank, but it was a proper tank, and a successful one. Quite incidentally, the US had agreed to replace the M24 with the more modern M41, but refused when the time came because it was wooing India.

The Patton had computers to handle firing solutions most important, it could fight at night, whereas none of the Indian tanks could. The Indians had perhaps half as many artillery pieces as the Pakistanis, and were outgunned to boot. If that wasn’t enough, Pakistani artillery command was absolutely first rate - a result of the excellent training imparted by the Americans. The Pakistanis had good air support, the IAF had its own problems and was usually absent. The pure infantry numbers were equal. Pakistani defenses were long-planned and thickly constructed Indian defenses were hastily thrown up in the field. The Pakistani commander had helicopters available to him, and could arrive anywhere on the battlefield in short order, and did. The Indian commander had no such advantage. So what went wrong?

Many of the following points are equally applicable to Indian armor forces, but since our attempt is to understand why Pakistan did not succeed when it should, we will discuss India only tangentially.

1. Command failures at all levels

According to Pakistani sources, GOC 1st Armored Division, two brigade commanders, three of the six tank regimental commanders, all three of the infantry battalion commanders, and the engineer battalion commander failed to command their troops as required. The division was the pride of the Pakistan Army, and four of the six many of cavalry regiments plus all three Frontier Force Regiment infantry battalions were seasoned units with at least one hundred years of service each. How such a situation came about in a highly professional army and in the leading division of the Pakistan Army is not something we as outsiders can answer. The mystery is compounded by the contrast with 6th Armored Division's memorable stand in the Sialkot sector.

2. Dilution of cavalry regiments due to new raisings

Under the 1954 US plan, Pakistan was to have eight tank regiments of 75 tanks each, and the US supplied approximately 700 tanks toward this end. This left ample numbers of tanks for war wastage and training. In 1962, Pakistan decided to switch to an establishment of 44 tanks per regiment this enabled 4 new regiments to be raised. Pakistan wanted to raise four more regiments, but this would have breached the manpower celings set by the US. Instead, Pakistan created four Tank Delivery Units, which in reality were reserve tank regiments. Between 1960 and 1965 Pakistan more than doubled the number of its armored regiments, from 8 to 18, without increasing either its tank fleet or its training capabilities. In the subcontinental context of the day, a minimum of 2-3 years were required to train new crews from scratch, and a new regiment required at least two years to shake down even with seasoned cadres taken from other regiments. Though the Pakistanis for some reason do not emphasize this point, even with recalled reservists, the training standard in cavalry regiments must have been affected. India, by contrast, had yet to seriously undertake its armor expansion, so all its regiments were seasoned. We know many of the Pakistani crews at Assul Uttar were inadequate trained because many tanks had 50 miles or less on their odometers, indicating they had been pulled straight from war reserves. The Indians believe that the Patton was too complex a weapon system for a subcontinental army of the day, and this too created difficulties. Last, by raising so many extra regiments without any increase in tank strength, the Pakistan cavalry had very little left over for reserves.

Parenthetiucally, it is worth noting that had the US supplied Pakistan the agreed number of M36 tank destroyers, India, already inferirior in numbers of tank regiments, 14 to 18, would have been in serious trouble. The M36 mounted a high-velocity 90mm gun in a turret, and was a lethal anti-tank weapon. It was to provide anti-tank support for Pakistan's infantry division. This would have freed Pakistan from using armored regiments to support its infantry, leaving all 18 regiments to be utilised for offensive operations. Only six Indian regiments were available for this role (4 in Indian 1st Armored Division and two excluding AMX in Indian 2nd (Indpendent) Armored Brigade. We can only speculate on what the outcome might have been had Pakistan deployed three full-strength armored divisions.

3. Role of infantry inadequately understood/7th Division shifted

Pakistan seemed to have little conception that tanks require the close support of infantry. Time and again tanks were sent out with little or no infantry support, and on that fateful day at Assul Uttar, the tanks riding into the ambush had no infantry support. Perhaps we should not be too harsh on Pakistan - Israel did not understand this till after 1973. It is not as if infantry was short - the division had four battalions of its own and another battalion (1 FF) from the 11th Division was under command. To add to the problems, the 1st Armoured Division's running mate, 7th Infantry Division, had been broken up with its brigades going to reinforce other sectors. Had 1st Division been able to work with it usual partner, matters might have turned out differently.

4. No reconnaissance at Assul Uttar

Pakistan sent its tanks to Assul Uttar with infantry and without performing reconnaissance. The Indians hid their Shermans in tall sugarcane fields - the crop was ready for harvesting. The Shermans were spaced out every 500 meters. When the Pakistanis rolled into the U-shaped Indian defensive positions, they were hit from every side while unable to see where the Indian fire was coming from. Though the Patton was almost invulnerable at range, at 6-800 meters it could be destroyed by Indian Centurions and Shermans. Moreover, according to the Indians, the Patton tended to catch fire when hit, causing crews to bail out rapidly following a hit.

5. No logistics support

This point is not discussed in any detail in Pakistani accounts. Nonetheless, several times tanks were lost after they ran out of fuel or got bogged down in soft terrain.One wonders where 1st Divisions ARVs and fuel tankers were. Our purely impressionistic take is that (a) insufficient attention was paid to logistics to begin with (b) the division may have been short of B vehicles - Brig. Khan says when the division moved to its battle station several hundred vehicles broke down because of insufficient peacetime maintenance (c) the fluidity of the battlefield inhibited B echelon personnel from replensihing their advanced troops. No one can blame administrative troops in soft vehicles for their relcutance to charge up and down an insecure battlefield, with the danger of an ambush always present. Further, the Indians were also constantly on the attack, so if an area was under Pakistan control in the morning, it might not be in the afternoon, and the Pakistanis might regain the area at night. (d) Overall communications were poor.

6. Faulty concentration area/Too small a bridgehead/ Faulty tactics

Pakistan crammed an armored division and a substantial fraction of an infantry division into what appears to be an area less than 30-40 square kilometers and bounded by rivers, canals, and streams. This analyst has seen no good maps, and so this remains an impression, but he suspects there is something to this. In any event, creating a single small bridgehead for an entire armored division to pass through would seem to work only if the lead armored brigade attacks with utmost rapidity and violence. The lead brigade, 5th Armored, would repeatedly get pushed back on the bridgehead, or would return on its own. Each time a brigade left the bridgehead, it was told to attack two or three divergent targets so that its effort was split. The shifting of units from one HQ to another, or one sector to another, even as battles were underway was a notorious feature in both armies. Indian 2nd Independent Brigade, for example, had all its integral regiments taken away before the outbreak of war, and replaced by three other regiments. True that the armored corps on both sides was small, so every officer knew every other officer, but it cannot be helpful to chop and change just before and all through battles. Instead of using tanks against infantry, both sides insisted on colliding head on with each other's tank regiments in the old cavalry tradition.

7. Tank units too quick to recoil

This is a criticism equally applicable to Indian tank units. First, because of a paucity of resources, both sides had little armor relative to the size of their armies. Because the infantry was unable to protect itself against tanks even for a short time, tanks had to be dispersed in penny packets all over the battlefielf for infantry support - even in armored brigades and divisions. Tanks were valuable, they were also - in the absence of proper tank-infantry cooperation - highly vulnerable. The lack of reconnaissance information in Indo-Pakistan Wars is absolutely remarkable: most of the time both sides were fighting almost blind over terrain with which they had little familiarity, and often with outdated, bad, or no maps at all. Given these circumstances, it is unsurprising that both sides tended to quickly recoil if they came upon each other unexpectedly. The unit that you came upon suddenly was just as happy when you bounced back and would very rarely come afater you - because it too was bouncing back, worried about the unknowns surrounding the situation. There was no conception of selecting an objective and sticking to it, taking the inevitable casualties as a necessary condition of success. Ironically, of course, the one time the Pakistanis did bash on regardless under pressure from the CGS and divisional commander, they drove into the Assul Uttar ambush. If the Pakistan armored infantry had been doing its job, this would not have happened. Incidentally, the integral reconnaissance troops of Pakistani armored regiments were mounted on jeeps, so one cannot really expect these men to go forth boldly into the unknown. Again ironically, in seeking to limit casualties by bouncing back, in the long run the casualties were greater than if the push had been maintained.

8. Returning to leauger at night

Incredibly, after Pakistani tanks had pushed forward, often at cost, the moment darkness fell, the concern was solely to get back to a secure position, just as happened in the Western Desert. After all, Indians and Pakistani both learned their craft from the British. So most of the gains of the day - sometimes all of the gains of the day - were surrendered. The rationale was that the tanks were exposed to enemy tank-hunting parties working at night. Well, that's what the armored infantry and SP guns were for, weren't they? And what about the excellent night-vision equipment on the Patton? And the moonlit nights? How is an army supposed to advance if it falls back everynight? Armored brigade commanders would invariably ask to return to secure territory once the light began to fail once a tank regimental commander, who had advanced with a single platoon of infantry, asked not to be ordered back at nightfall, and the brigade commander refused because he could not spare additional infantry. His infantry was still trying to clear out the Indians from the route of advance.

9. Faulty Command and Control

In the absence of a corps HQ, GOC 11th Division was given overall command of 1st Armored Division as well. He had his hands full protecting his extended sector and maintaining his bridgehead, particularly with two of his seven manuver units detached to the armored brigade. This double-responsibility could not have helped a situation already bedevilled by bad leadership.

Hvaings aid all this, we have to return to the issue of leadership. In 1st Armored Division, there was none. The contrast with 11th Infantry Division couldn’t have been greater. This division had been hastily raised a few months earlier, but its commander was a very tough, very steady soldier. He always kept his focus on obtaining and maintaining the bridgehead, no matter what the Indians were up to. He personally visisted all his rifle companies every day, and so was never in danger of the appaling ignorance that seemed to have befogged higher HQ for the armored division. India put in nine attacks in 12 days against his division. He held off every one of them. One wonders what if he had been commander of 1st Armored Division….

Re:pavo

Pavo sahib, we need to look at the end game. As I mentioned to HP, if either side wins a war, it means the end of Pakistan and the creation of akhand bharat, whether it is under secular or muslim rule depends on if India or Pakistan wins. Therefore, Pakistan will never fight an offensive war against India since it doesnt want to lose its unique nationality. It is forced by its own national doctrine of Two Nation Theory, to be in a defensive posture against India.

On the other hand, India initially wanted akhand bharat, but now it doesnt since hindus do not want to live with 500 million muslims since they are scared that muslims will take over entire India. Thus you have two sides who are desperate to hang on to the status quo, albeit for different reasons.