Time for a fresh start
Ibne Sina October 13, 1999
#37 Posted by bahmad on October 15, 1999 2:31:52 am
In response to UR (Replies #: 18 and 30):
Dear UR:
I saw you comments on Professor Sumit Ganguly`s Christian Science Monitor writeup. I don`t know the veracity of his comments about General Musharraf. I want to provide some information about him such that you and other Chowkwalla could develop a critical appreciation (critique) of his writings. I have found the following information about him in a recent publication by Harrison, S. S. et al. (1999). India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (and Woodrow Wilson Center Press).
SUMIT GANGULY is professor of political science at Hunter College and the Graduate School of the City University of New York. A specialist on ethnic conflict in South and Southeast Asia, he has published articles in Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Current History, Foreign Affairs, the ]ournal of International Affairs, International Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Survival, and the Washington Quarterly. He has received grants from the American Institute for Indian Studies, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace. He has been both a Fellow and a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His most recent works are ``The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace`` and ``Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific`` (coedited with Michael E. Brown). He is currently at work on a manuscript that seeks to explain political quiescence and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.
My additional comments:
Professor Ganguly has contributed a chapter in the above mentioned book, entitled ``India: Policies, Past and Future.`` Students of South Asian affairs must read this article. He has also contributed a piece on ``The Indo-Pakistani Wars`` for Microsoft`s Encarta Encyclopedia. He is also viewed as an expert (widely-quoted) on nuclear issues, regional security and world politics. He is also the author of ``Understanding Contemporary India`` and ``Mending Fences: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in South Asia.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. If interested I could perhaps provide a little more information about the contents of some of his publications.
Dear UR:
I saw you comments on Professor Sumit Ganguly`s Christian Science Monitor writeup. I don`t know the veracity of his comments about General Musharraf. I want to provide some information about him such that you and other Chowkwalla could develop a critical appreciation (critique) of his writings. I have found the following information about him in a recent publication by Harrison, S. S. et al. (1999). India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (and Woodrow Wilson Center Press).
SUMIT GANGULY is professor of political science at Hunter College and the Graduate School of the City University of New York. A specialist on ethnic conflict in South and Southeast Asia, he has published articles in Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Current History, Foreign Affairs, the ]ournal of International Affairs, International Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Survival, and the Washington Quarterly. He has received grants from the American Institute for Indian Studies, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace. He has been both a Fellow and a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His most recent works are ``The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace`` and ``Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific`` (coedited with Michael E. Brown). He is currently at work on a manuscript that seeks to explain political quiescence and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.
My additional comments:
Professor Ganguly has contributed a chapter in the above mentioned book, entitled ``India: Policies, Past and Future.`` Students of South Asian affairs must read this article. He has also contributed a piece on ``The Indo-Pakistani Wars`` for Microsoft`s Encarta Encyclopedia. He is also viewed as an expert (widely-quoted) on nuclear issues, regional security and world politics. He is also the author of ``Understanding Contemporary India`` and ``Mending Fences: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in South Asia.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. If interested I could perhaps provide a little more information about the contents of some of his publications.
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#36 Posted by Ibne Sina on October 15, 1999 2:22:14 am
another good one ...
http://www.afr.com.au/content/991015/world/world4.html
http://www.afr.com.au/content/991015/world/world4.html
#35 Posted by bahmad on October 15, 1999 2:20:00 am
In response to UR (Respone # 39):
Dear UR:
Robert G. Wirsing of the University of South Carolina, in a review of Ganguly, S. (1997). The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. New York and Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, co-published with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, has said something that you may find interesting (American Political Science Review 92, 4, 1998, 959-60). This is a small book: only 182 pages and costs $49.95. Here are some excerpts from Professor Wirsing`s review.
``This book focuses on the roots of the insurgency that has embroiled the Indian-administered portion of the state since 1989.``
``In his examination of the sources of the insurgency in Kashmir, Ganguly begins with a discussion of four existing categories of argument--(1) that the insurgency is little more than state-sponsored (Pakistani) terrorism; (2) that the insurgency arises from India`s brutal denial of the Kashmiris` right of self-determination; (3) that the insurgency bears witness to the rise in Kashmir of ethnic subnationalism, which destroyed the syncretistic Kashmiri cultural identity (called kashmiriyat) that had bound Hindus and Muslims together peacefully for many centuries; and (4) what Ganguly labels circumstantial and atheoretical accounts, that the insurgency arises from a mix of historical variables. Dismissing all of them as more or less inadequate, Ganguly proposes an alternative explanation, one that relates the insurgency in Kashmir to the theoretical literature on ethnonationalism, and, in particular, to the pioneering work of Samuel P. Huntington on political mobilization and institutional decay. Ganguly argues that rapidly paced modernization, in the form of more education, literacy, exposure to mass media, and social and physical mobility, exponentially enlarged consciousness among Kashmiris of political rights and privileges. As their awareness grew of the possibility of an alternative future, so did their disaffection from the increasingly ill-functioning and repressive political apparatus--the ``institutional decay,`` in other words--that increasingly characterized political life in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Ganguly points to a curious paradox here, namely, that it was India`s considerable success in introducing the benefits of modernization to Kashmir that eventually produced a radicalized younger generation for whom violent and separatist sentiments had a natural appeal. Most of Ganguly`s book is an effort to chronicle the gradual widening of the gap between the enlarged expectations of Kashmiris and the Indian government`s declining ability and/or, willingness to alter the political circumstances that frustrated their realization.``
``. . .Ganguly himself furnishes an amazingly truncated and haphazard version of the Kashmir dispute`s earliest phases. Particularly puzzling is his rendering of the weeks immediately preceding the princely ruler of Kashmir`s request for Indian troops in late October 1947. He states, for instance, that ``under the terms of the Indian Independence Act, none of the princely states would be allowed to declare independence.`` (p. 8). In fact, the act did no such thing, the departing British having deliberately decided not to mandate the automatic legal transfer of paramount power over the princely states to the new governments of India and Pakistan at independence. That British reticence in this regard resulted in an immediate political tussle between India and Pakistan, the latter committing itself at that stage wholeheartedly to the legal right of the princes to decide the matter, is dealt with at considerable length by an Indian historian whom Ganguly cites frequently throughout his book (Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, 1968).``
``Equally puzzling is the distortion of events found in Ganguly`s narrative of the invasion of Kashmir by Pashtun tribals--an invasion that lent moral legitimacy to India`s airlifting of troops to the beleaguered ruler of the state. In Ganguly`s rendering, the ``invading column`` (p. 9) of tribesmen, augmented by disguised Pakistani troops, appears to have materialized at the Kashmir State border on October 22 following its participation in a successful rebellion earlier in the month slightly to the south in the Poonch subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir State. Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces. Also objectionable is Ganguly`s suggestion that the ruler of Kashmir, ``caught in a panic`` by the tribal invasion of October 22, appealed at that time for military assistance to the princely ruler of Patiala State. In this claim, Ganguly is given no support either by Lamb, whose version he dismisses, or by Jha (Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947.` Rival Versions of History, 1996), whom he cites approvingly. Jha, anxious to free the Indian government of responsibility for military assistance to the princely ruler of Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion, goes to great lengths, in fact, to demonstrate that the Patiala men were dispatched to Kashmir possibly even before India gained its independence on August 15 but in no case later than the early days of October.``
``Also to be questioned is Ganguly`s argument that Kashmiri Muslim disaffection from India is of very recent origin--hardly antedating the 1980s. As evidence, he points to the fact that neither in the 1965 nor 1971 wars between India and Pakistan did the Kashmiris seize the opportunity to rise against their Indian masters. It is true, of course, that they did not rise up then. But Ganguly runs well beyond available empirical evidence with his claim that ``the vast majority of Kashmir`s Muslims had [thus] amply demonstrated their loyalty to India during both the 1965 and the 1971 wars`` (p. 64).``
``His own proposal retains Kashmir solidly within India and, since it recommends only token concessions to Pakistan and rules out independence for Kashmir, is unlikely to meet with favor, at least initially, either in Pakistan or among vast segments of the Kashmiri Muslim population.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Dear UR:
Robert G. Wirsing of the University of South Carolina, in a review of Ganguly, S. (1997). The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace. New York and Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, co-published with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, has said something that you may find interesting (American Political Science Review 92, 4, 1998, 959-60). This is a small book: only 182 pages and costs $49.95. Here are some excerpts from Professor Wirsing`s review.
``This book focuses on the roots of the insurgency that has embroiled the Indian-administered portion of the state since 1989.``
``In his examination of the sources of the insurgency in Kashmir, Ganguly begins with a discussion of four existing categories of argument--(1) that the insurgency is little more than state-sponsored (Pakistani) terrorism; (2) that the insurgency arises from India`s brutal denial of the Kashmiris` right of self-determination; (3) that the insurgency bears witness to the rise in Kashmir of ethnic subnationalism, which destroyed the syncretistic Kashmiri cultural identity (called kashmiriyat) that had bound Hindus and Muslims together peacefully for many centuries; and (4) what Ganguly labels circumstantial and atheoretical accounts, that the insurgency arises from a mix of historical variables. Dismissing all of them as more or less inadequate, Ganguly proposes an alternative explanation, one that relates the insurgency in Kashmir to the theoretical literature on ethnonationalism, and, in particular, to the pioneering work of Samuel P. Huntington on political mobilization and institutional decay. Ganguly argues that rapidly paced modernization, in the form of more education, literacy, exposure to mass media, and social and physical mobility, exponentially enlarged consciousness among Kashmiris of political rights and privileges. As their awareness grew of the possibility of an alternative future, so did their disaffection from the increasingly ill-functioning and repressive political apparatus--the ``institutional decay,`` in other words--that increasingly characterized political life in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Ganguly points to a curious paradox here, namely, that it was India`s considerable success in introducing the benefits of modernization to Kashmir that eventually produced a radicalized younger generation for whom violent and separatist sentiments had a natural appeal. Most of Ganguly`s book is an effort to chronicle the gradual widening of the gap between the enlarged expectations of Kashmiris and the Indian government`s declining ability and/or, willingness to alter the political circumstances that frustrated their realization.``
``. . .Ganguly himself furnishes an amazingly truncated and haphazard version of the Kashmir dispute`s earliest phases. Particularly puzzling is his rendering of the weeks immediately preceding the princely ruler of Kashmir`s request for Indian troops in late October 1947. He states, for instance, that ``under the terms of the Indian Independence Act, none of the princely states would be allowed to declare independence.`` (p. 8). In fact, the act did no such thing, the departing British having deliberately decided not to mandate the automatic legal transfer of paramount power over the princely states to the new governments of India and Pakistan at independence. That British reticence in this regard resulted in an immediate political tussle between India and Pakistan, the latter committing itself at that stage wholeheartedly to the legal right of the princes to decide the matter, is dealt with at considerable length by an Indian historian whom Ganguly cites frequently throughout his book (Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, 1968).``
``Equally puzzling is the distortion of events found in Ganguly`s narrative of the invasion of Kashmir by Pashtun tribals--an invasion that lent moral legitimacy to India`s airlifting of troops to the beleaguered ruler of the state. In Ganguly`s rendering, the ``invading column`` (p. 9) of tribesmen, augmented by disguised Pakistani troops, appears to have materialized at the Kashmir State border on October 22 following its participation in a successful rebellion earlier in the month slightly to the south in the Poonch subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir State. Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces. Also objectionable is Ganguly`s suggestion that the ruler of Kashmir, ``caught in a panic`` by the tribal invasion of October 22, appealed at that time for military assistance to the princely ruler of Patiala State. In this claim, Ganguly is given no support either by Lamb, whose version he dismisses, or by Jha (Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947.` Rival Versions of History, 1996), whom he cites approvingly. Jha, anxious to free the Indian government of responsibility for military assistance to the princely ruler of Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion, goes to great lengths, in fact, to demonstrate that the Patiala men were dispatched to Kashmir possibly even before India gained its independence on August 15 but in no case later than the early days of October.``
``Also to be questioned is Ganguly`s argument that Kashmiri Muslim disaffection from India is of very recent origin--hardly antedating the 1980s. As evidence, he points to the fact that neither in the 1965 nor 1971 wars between India and Pakistan did the Kashmiris seize the opportunity to rise against their Indian masters. It is true, of course, that they did not rise up then. But Ganguly runs well beyond available empirical evidence with his claim that ``the vast majority of Kashmir`s Muslims had [thus] amply demonstrated their loyalty to India during both the 1965 and the 1971 wars`` (p. 64).``
``His own proposal retains Kashmir solidly within India and, since it recommends only token concessions to Pakistan and rules out independence for Kashmir, is unlikely to meet with favor, at least initially, either in Pakistan or among vast segments of the Kashmiri Muslim population.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
#32 Posted by UR on October 15, 1999 1:27:54 am
Bilal: I think I have seen Mr. Ganguly speak on these issues on television. That is the point I was trying to make. How could such scholarly people spread such misinformation. People in the US consider them authorities on India-Pakistan relations, and listen to them. Their ridiculous remarks will only cause furthur problems amongst Pakistanis and Indians. I hope their aim is not to incorrectly potray the Pakistani Army as fundamentalists in the US, just to help out India. I have no respect for people like that.
Jay: You said, ``but what i cannot understand is the total silence from you and other pakistanis, above all from the author.`` I do not know why their is silence from other Pakistanis. However I do know why there is silence from the author. He is a professor in Pakistan, who writes regularly in newspapers. I think Chowk just asks his permission to reprint his articles from Pakistani newspapers. I read this same article in The NEWS; a Pakistani newspaper.
Jay: You said, ``but what i cannot understand is the total silence from you and other pakistanis, above all from the author.`` I do not know why their is silence from other Pakistanis. However I do know why there is silence from the author. He is a professor in Pakistan, who writes regularly in newspapers. I think Chowk just asks his permission to reprint his articles from Pakistani newspapers. I read this same article in The NEWS; a Pakistani newspaper.
#31 Posted by Ibne Sina on October 15, 1999 1:20:58 am
interesting read ...
Ambitious Ziauddin steered Nawaz to political disaster
News Intelligence Unit
By Kamran Khan
ISLAMABAD: Within half an hour of his surreptitious climb to the post of the
Chief of Army Staff on Tuesday afternoon, the former Inter-Services
Intelligence chief, General Khawaja Ziauddin knew that the Army he was
supposed to lead was not prepared to accept his command.
The News Intelligence Unit (NIU) has gathered that all of Ziauddin`s phone
calls to the Corps Commanders and the Chief of General Staff -- placed from
the Prime Minister`s House in Islamabad on Tuesday -- drew a blank, a
reaction that almost instantly drew down the curtains on former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif`s second term in office.
Debriefing sessions with detained aides of the Nawaz Sharif administration
by security officials here have disclosed that the former ISI chief-led
operation to stage an in-house coup in the Army was driven by his personal
ambitions ignoring the actual situation on the ground.
``Even a layman in Pakistan is aware that any operation of this sort can
never be completed without the active support of the troops and commanders
posted in the cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi,`` an Army official
commented.
``It was foolish of the former prime minister not to be aware that his
nominee for the Army chief didn`t have the key support of the 10 Corps and
more specifically the 111 brigade,`` he added.
It has now become clear that Lt. Gen. Ziauddin was the architect of the
secret operation that envisioned the official announcement of his promotion
to the post of COAS once Gen Pervez Musharraf boarded PIA Flight PK 805 in
Colombo for a journey that severed his contact with the GHQ for a good 200
minutes.
It was also Lt. Gen. Ziauddin who, along with the former principal secretary
Saeed Mehdi, had suggested to Nawaz Sharif that General Pervez Musharraf`s
plane must not be allowed to land at Karachi so that he could be arrested at
any other less busy airports in Sindh.
Sources said that Ziauddin had assured Sharif that he would gain the full
command of the Army much before the landing of General Pervez Musharraf`s
plane at Karachi airport, a dream that suddenly transformed itself into
Sharif and Ziauddin`s worst nightmare.
Officials here believe that because of his family and, more particularly,
his father`s old ties with Khawaja Ziauddin`s family, Sharif always wanted
to appoint him to the coveted post of the COAS, but he couldn`t do that
since he had ignored a senior-most three star general as General Jehangir
Karamat`s replacement. Several close aides to Sharif had often conceded in
the past that Gen Kuli Khan Khattak was ignored because Sharif was not
comfortable with a Pathan general.
Ziauddin, an officer from the Army`s Corps of Engineers, was one course
junior to Gen. Ali Kuli Khan and Gen. Pervez Musharraf at the Pakistan
Military Academy, but even before Karamat`s dramatic exit from the Army,
Ziauddin had told his friends about the likelihood of his replacing Gen.
Jehangir Karamat.
Sources said that General Karamat had posted him as the Corps Commander,
Gujranwala in response to a personal request from Sharif, who wanted to give
him a fair chance at the time of Karamat`s retirement.
Those who had close access to Sharif always contended that his decision to
appoint Gen Musharraf was a stopgap arrangement between Gen. Karamat`s
abrupt resignation and Ziauddin`s eventual appointment as the COAS.
Ziauddin`s appointment as the ISI chief, minutes after Musharraf`s posting
as the COAS, spoke volumes of Sharif`s bent of mind at the time.
With the knowledge that doubts deliberately created about Musharraf`s tenure
as the COAS would further deteriorate worsening relations between the Army
and the former prime minister, Ziauddin using his position as the ISI chief
nonetheless invented an intriguing conspiracy theory on the Kargil crisis
and helped fuel misinformation that the Army leadership got Sharif trapped
by launching the Kargil operation.
During the Kargil crisis, Gen. Ziauddin`s exclusive briefing to the former
prime minister almost always contradicted the GHQ`s version. ``He was
responsible for planting the seeds of intrigue on the Kargil issue in
Sharif`s mind,`` according to a reliable official source.
In his rash drive to convince Sharif that Musharraf`s removal as the COAS
would ease tension with the Army, Ziauddin is believed to have also
encouraged the former Intelligence Bureau chief Colonel (retd) Iqbal Niazi,
to invent a variety of Army-backed threatening scenarios for Sharif, who
apparently had an unlimited appetite for stories that painted a highly
negative picture of Musharraf and the corps commanders considered close to
the COAS.
Khawaja Ziauddin`s desperation to please Nawaz Sharif became evident on the
first day of his appointment as the ISI chief when he readily confirmed a
police-doctored version about the culprits allegedly involved in the ghastly
murder of Hakim Mohammad Said.
On Ziauddin`s report, submitted without any independent verification, Sharif
got an excuse to knock out the democratic set-up in Sindh, an act that later
emerged as part of a well-engineered plot to make way for the installation
of an exclusive PML-run unelected administration in Sindh.
An independent Army probe later discovered that the Sindh Police`s version
of the Hakim Said case, with a stamp of ISI confirmation from Gen. Ziauddin,
was nothing but ``a pack of lies.`` Neither Sharif nor Ziauddin, however, ever
acknowledged the blunder.
In another desperate attempt to please the former prime minister, Ziauddin
ordered the illegal detention of Najam Sethi, the editor Friday Times, for
more than two weeks. Despite the Army`s blunt refusal to initiate sedition
or treason charges against Sethi, Ziauddin obliged Sharif and Saifur Rahman
by keeping Sethi locked up for about 20 days.
Sethi had been handed to Ziauddin`s ISI after being abducted by IB goons
from his Lahore residence. Sources said Ziauddin agreed to hold Sethi in
illegal detention in response to a single phone call from Saifur Rahman, who
later also made Sharif speak to him on the subject.
Reliable sources said that Ziauddin was also behind severe criticism of the
Kargil crisis by at least two corps commanders, who later met Sharif in
Ziauddin`s presence. These meetings were never reported to the COAS, who
later reacted by removing both corps commanders from their posts.
For Sharif, sources said, Ziauddin`s mission was to divide the corps
commanders on ethnic and professional lines and to create an anti-Musharraf
lobby amongst the corps commanders.
``Since his appointment as the DG ISI, Ziauddin was playing a dangerous game
that pitched his boss against the Army,`` observed a senior official. ``His
operation ultimately turned out to be hara kari (suicide).``
Ambitious Ziauddin steered Nawaz to political disaster
News Intelligence Unit
By Kamran Khan
ISLAMABAD: Within half an hour of his surreptitious climb to the post of the
Chief of Army Staff on Tuesday afternoon, the former Inter-Services
Intelligence chief, General Khawaja Ziauddin knew that the Army he was
supposed to lead was not prepared to accept his command.
The News Intelligence Unit (NIU) has gathered that all of Ziauddin`s phone
calls to the Corps Commanders and the Chief of General Staff -- placed from
the Prime Minister`s House in Islamabad on Tuesday -- drew a blank, a
reaction that almost instantly drew down the curtains on former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif`s second term in office.
Debriefing sessions with detained aides of the Nawaz Sharif administration
by security officials here have disclosed that the former ISI chief-led
operation to stage an in-house coup in the Army was driven by his personal
ambitions ignoring the actual situation on the ground.
``Even a layman in Pakistan is aware that any operation of this sort can
never be completed without the active support of the troops and commanders
posted in the cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi,`` an Army official
commented.
``It was foolish of the former prime minister not to be aware that his
nominee for the Army chief didn`t have the key support of the 10 Corps and
more specifically the 111 brigade,`` he added.
It has now become clear that Lt. Gen. Ziauddin was the architect of the
secret operation that envisioned the official announcement of his promotion
to the post of COAS once Gen Pervez Musharraf boarded PIA Flight PK 805 in
Colombo for a journey that severed his contact with the GHQ for a good 200
minutes.
It was also Lt. Gen. Ziauddin who, along with the former principal secretary
Saeed Mehdi, had suggested to Nawaz Sharif that General Pervez Musharraf`s
plane must not be allowed to land at Karachi so that he could be arrested at
any other less busy airports in Sindh.
Sources said that Ziauddin had assured Sharif that he would gain the full
command of the Army much before the landing of General Pervez Musharraf`s
plane at Karachi airport, a dream that suddenly transformed itself into
Sharif and Ziauddin`s worst nightmare.
Officials here believe that because of his family and, more particularly,
his father`s old ties with Khawaja Ziauddin`s family, Sharif always wanted
to appoint him to the coveted post of the COAS, but he couldn`t do that
since he had ignored a senior-most three star general as General Jehangir
Karamat`s replacement. Several close aides to Sharif had often conceded in
the past that Gen Kuli Khan Khattak was ignored because Sharif was not
comfortable with a Pathan general.
Ziauddin, an officer from the Army`s Corps of Engineers, was one course
junior to Gen. Ali Kuli Khan and Gen. Pervez Musharraf at the Pakistan
Military Academy, but even before Karamat`s dramatic exit from the Army,
Ziauddin had told his friends about the likelihood of his replacing Gen.
Jehangir Karamat.
Sources said that General Karamat had posted him as the Corps Commander,
Gujranwala in response to a personal request from Sharif, who wanted to give
him a fair chance at the time of Karamat`s retirement.
Those who had close access to Sharif always contended that his decision to
appoint Gen Musharraf was a stopgap arrangement between Gen. Karamat`s
abrupt resignation and Ziauddin`s eventual appointment as the COAS.
Ziauddin`s appointment as the ISI chief, minutes after Musharraf`s posting
as the COAS, spoke volumes of Sharif`s bent of mind at the time.
With the knowledge that doubts deliberately created about Musharraf`s tenure
as the COAS would further deteriorate worsening relations between the Army
and the former prime minister, Ziauddin using his position as the ISI chief
nonetheless invented an intriguing conspiracy theory on the Kargil crisis
and helped fuel misinformation that the Army leadership got Sharif trapped
by launching the Kargil operation.
During the Kargil crisis, Gen. Ziauddin`s exclusive briefing to the former
prime minister almost always contradicted the GHQ`s version. ``He was
responsible for planting the seeds of intrigue on the Kargil issue in
Sharif`s mind,`` according to a reliable official source.
In his rash drive to convince Sharif that Musharraf`s removal as the COAS
would ease tension with the Army, Ziauddin is believed to have also
encouraged the former Intelligence Bureau chief Colonel (retd) Iqbal Niazi,
to invent a variety of Army-backed threatening scenarios for Sharif, who
apparently had an unlimited appetite for stories that painted a highly
negative picture of Musharraf and the corps commanders considered close to
the COAS.
Khawaja Ziauddin`s desperation to please Nawaz Sharif became evident on the
first day of his appointment as the ISI chief when he readily confirmed a
police-doctored version about the culprits allegedly involved in the ghastly
murder of Hakim Mohammad Said.
On Ziauddin`s report, submitted without any independent verification, Sharif
got an excuse to knock out the democratic set-up in Sindh, an act that later
emerged as part of a well-engineered plot to make way for the installation
of an exclusive PML-run unelected administration in Sindh.
An independent Army probe later discovered that the Sindh Police`s version
of the Hakim Said case, with a stamp of ISI confirmation from Gen. Ziauddin,
was nothing but ``a pack of lies.`` Neither Sharif nor Ziauddin, however, ever
acknowledged the blunder.
In another desperate attempt to please the former prime minister, Ziauddin
ordered the illegal detention of Najam Sethi, the editor Friday Times, for
more than two weeks. Despite the Army`s blunt refusal to initiate sedition
or treason charges against Sethi, Ziauddin obliged Sharif and Saifur Rahman
by keeping Sethi locked up for about 20 days.
Sethi had been handed to Ziauddin`s ISI after being abducted by IB goons
from his Lahore residence. Sources said Ziauddin agreed to hold Sethi in
illegal detention in response to a single phone call from Saifur Rahman, who
later also made Sharif speak to him on the subject.
Reliable sources said that Ziauddin was also behind severe criticism of the
Kargil crisis by at least two corps commanders, who later met Sharif in
Ziauddin`s presence. These meetings were never reported to the COAS, who
later reacted by removing both corps commanders from their posts.
For Sharif, sources said, Ziauddin`s mission was to divide the corps
commanders on ethnic and professional lines and to create an anti-Musharraf
lobby amongst the corps commanders.
``Since his appointment as the DG ISI, Ziauddin was playing a dangerous game
that pitched his boss against the Army,`` observed a senior official. ``His
operation ultimately turned out to be hara kari (suicide).``
#30 Posted by jay on October 15, 1999 12:56:00 am
Dear Bilal,
Here is another example of the TN phenomenon, right here on the chowk. There is an article by Parvez about the nuclear options for pakistan and a criticm of the indian proposal. In the very beginning i posted that the article makes no mention of the arch stone of the indian policy ``NO FIRST USE``, which has resulted in the multimodal deployment requirements. I would have prefered in the article or at least some other posts by some one else to say, `` oh indians are such and such and for such and such cannot be trusted``. I would have glady accepted it or may be refuted it.
The entire article, talking about the survivability of pak weapons after ``premptive`` indian attack would have vanished like fairy floss in a tidal wave, if the author had mentioned about the indian no first use idea. There is every reason and there is a role for articles like this, they should be published, but what i cannot understand is the total silence from you and other pakistanis, above all from the author.
There is a fear of reality, there is a fear criticism, there is a fear that some thing, may be an article by a pakistani could have some fatal flaw, and better that we dont confront it. Ignore it completely, if it is pointed out by an outsider, if it is by an indian. Bilal, can you find a link between this and my previous post about mujahir, if you can find it, give it a name, give me the word.
Let me conclude by taliking about christians in kerala. Many untouchables in kerala converted to christianity. After the newness has faded and the support from christian organisations withered, the new christians realised that the special previlages accorded to untouchables are not availabt to them. They held demonstrations, wrote artcles about their plight, in those days we all listened, looked at it as an interesting phenomenon and the governement with public support ligislated to create a new caste, approximately translated as ``exhausted christian``, as part of the hindu system of caste.
What is its link to the nuclear bombs and mojahir, well, there is no need to get worked up, there could be innovative solutions, to the extend of christians as a caste in the hindu system. My language is not provocative,i hope, but the ideas are disturbing to the self satisfied, it could upset the old, but challenge the young. Bilal, the young wont be `misguided` as you allege, by my posts, they might just start to think for them selves.
When one reads a book, the thoughts are that of the author, when you quote even the words are his, there comes a time in ones life, where the thoughts are unique, which doesnt need the crutches of quotes, if at all, only to the extend of credits.
Here is another example of the TN phenomenon, right here on the chowk. There is an article by Parvez about the nuclear options for pakistan and a criticm of the indian proposal. In the very beginning i posted that the article makes no mention of the arch stone of the indian policy ``NO FIRST USE``, which has resulted in the multimodal deployment requirements. I would have prefered in the article or at least some other posts by some one else to say, `` oh indians are such and such and for such and such cannot be trusted``. I would have glady accepted it or may be refuted it.
The entire article, talking about the survivability of pak weapons after ``premptive`` indian attack would have vanished like fairy floss in a tidal wave, if the author had mentioned about the indian no first use idea. There is every reason and there is a role for articles like this, they should be published, but what i cannot understand is the total silence from you and other pakistanis, above all from the author.
There is a fear of reality, there is a fear criticism, there is a fear that some thing, may be an article by a pakistani could have some fatal flaw, and better that we dont confront it. Ignore it completely, if it is pointed out by an outsider, if it is by an indian. Bilal, can you find a link between this and my previous post about mujahir, if you can find it, give it a name, give me the word.
Let me conclude by taliking about christians in kerala. Many untouchables in kerala converted to christianity. After the newness has faded and the support from christian organisations withered, the new christians realised that the special previlages accorded to untouchables are not availabt to them. They held demonstrations, wrote artcles about their plight, in those days we all listened, looked at it as an interesting phenomenon and the governement with public support ligislated to create a new caste, approximately translated as ``exhausted christian``, as part of the hindu system of caste.
What is its link to the nuclear bombs and mojahir, well, there is no need to get worked up, there could be innovative solutions, to the extend of christians as a caste in the hindu system. My language is not provocative,i hope, but the ideas are disturbing to the self satisfied, it could upset the old, but challenge the young. Bilal, the young wont be `misguided` as you allege, by my posts, they might just start to think for them selves.
When one reads a book, the thoughts are that of the author, when you quote even the words are his, there comes a time in ones life, where the thoughts are unique, which doesnt need the crutches of quotes, if at all, only to the extend of credits.
#29 Posted by Anarchistan on October 15, 1999 12:44:17 am
sir, you are truly a voice of reason in unreasonable times...i`ve read ``the man who would be king`` and, in retrospect, it seems prophetic
for believers in fate, let it be noted that musharraf landed in karachi at 19:47 pakistan time. perhaps this is a good omen for the country; lord knows we need them.
for believers in fate, let it be noted that musharraf landed in karachi at 19:47 pakistan time. perhaps this is a good omen for the country; lord knows we need them.
#28 Posted by UR on October 15, 1999 12:44:17 am
JR:
Answers to some of your questions.
I personally did not support the Kargil operation, for the following reasons.
First of all, I do not think there is any kind of military solution to Kashmir, so there is no point in either side trying one. I have commented on this in detail in on of the other articles.
Secondly, no country should carry out military operations, if they cannot back them up politically. Because in the end, military operations are decided by the their political success, and not their military success.
Thirdly, I believe Pakistan`s aim in Kargil, was to cut off the lines of communication to Siachen. Siachen (in Pakistan`s opinion) is Pakistani land occupied by the Indian army, in an operation similar to Kargil. However, if Kargil had to be carried out to achieve this goal, then to do it immeidately after the Lahore diplomacy was wrong.
My views have been proven. And Pakistan has received a political defeat in Kargil. I disagree with people who state that Pakistan was given a military defeat, as well. In my experience of military tactics, in the moutainous Kashmiri area, anyone who is first to capture the heights basically wins the game; whether they are Hindu, Muslim, Indian, Pakistani, German or Japanese is immaterial. It is the basic laws of Physics that are in play. The best the opposing forces can do is to create a stalemate. This is what Pakistan has created in Siachen. But since India occupied the posts in Siachen first, it is probably impossible for the Pakistan military to remove them. A similar stalemate would have occured in Kargil. The only way for India to dislodge the mujahideen and Pakistani forces from the heights, would have been to bomb them endlessly. This is what India was doing. Since the Pakistani Air Force was not giving any air cover, India achieved some success through these bombings. However, had the Pakistani Air Force given air cover, then the Indian Air Force would not have been able to bomb endlessly. So a stalemate like Siachen would have occurred, in my opinion, with Pakistan occupying the high ground. However, I am not sure whether Pakistan would have been able to keep the Indian supply lines to Siachen cut off indefinitely. Again I am basing all this on the fact that whoever gets the high ground in that area, has basically won half the battle. Had India occupied the heights first, then India would have won half the battle.
Pakistan and India are already wasting there money in the Siachen stalemate, ever since India moved its forces there. In my opinion, a similar stalemate in Kargil would not have served any purpose to either country. This is only my personal analysis, and I have not based it on news reports from either side.
You stated: . ``Jay was only pointing out that a reputed paper had conveniently forgotten to mention Musharaf`s Mohajirness for obvious reasons. The paper did not want to get pulled up for telling Pakistan at this crucial juncture that the one at the helm of affairs was actually a Mohajir.`` This statement will sound very strange to any Pakistani. Why should a newspaper mention the ethnicity of any Pakistani, that it writes about? Perhaps that is common in India, but not in Pakistan.
Jay himself has now suggested that he was extrapolating. That is the problem with his comments on this situation. He is extrapolating about issues on which he has little knowledge. I have no idea how he has decided that the paper did not publish Musharaff`s muhajirness for, ``obvious`` reasons. Did Jay talk to the person who wrote the article? I believe he is extrapolating incorrectly again. How about stopping these extrapolations, based on little factual knowledge, so that no more confusion is caused. If the paper itself stated the reason for not mentioning Musharraf`s muhajirness, then I will accept your argument. Otherwise stick to the facts. And kindly extrapolate only about issues that you know and understand.
You stated: ``No Army should overstep its position and dismiss an elected civilian government. If democracy was truly being practiced in Pakistan then this coup is completely extra constitutional. This should be condemned from all quarters rather than speculating that it is a cloud with a silver lining. Most Pakistanis are jumping the gun and hoping Musharaf is the savior.``
In principle, I completely agree with everything you state here. The reasons most Pakistanis, including myself, are supporting this action so far, is that the situation under NS had just gotten terribly pathetic. I am not sure if you understand how bad the situation was getting. So what else could be done, if NS was bent upon completely destroying the country. This sounds understandably strange to most people who are not familiar with the actual situation in Pakistan.
You also stated: ``I tried putting myself in his shoes and I realized that I would not be able to stick a sword into the belly of the earth that bore me and my ancestors.`` This statement makes no sense to me. There have been many officers in the Indian military who were born in what is now Pakistan. They have fought for India against Pakistan. Would you make a similar statement about them? If your answer is, ``yes`` then I respect your view on this. Otherwise, you are only looking at one side of the issue.
Musharaff is not sticking a sword into anyone`s belly. Kashmir is an area in dispute, and he, as the Pakistani COAS was leading a battle, as was the Indian COAS. Did you expect him to resign, just because he was born in Dehli? What if I suggested that Indian COAS should resign because India has occupied Siachen, and I think that is an aggression similar to Kargil. Would you agree with me? Both COAS`s have a job to do, and they were carrying out their jobs. I highly doubt Musharraff was working without Nawaz`s approval. Although, the Indian media seems to have convinced you that he was. The Indian commuity in the US also sponsored a similar media campaign in US newspaper suggesting the Pakistani Army was operating on its own. I have no idea how they received such sensitive intelligence information.
I have already mentioned the remarks of Mr. Ganguly, a fellow at Stanford, who has now stated to the Christian Science Monitor that Musharraf is a militant or fundamentalist, and was brought up by Zia. Where do these people get their info, and why are the creating misinformation. This will only cause furthur problems between Pakistan and India.
There are other points you have made. In my opinion, some are valid and some are not. I will comment about those later. I hope you can see that, even if we disagree, I am more than willing to have a discussion on issues, like Kargil/Kashmir etc. becuase both of us have info on it. However when people start extrapolating on Pakistan`s internal issues (like why a paper did not use the word muhajir) without adaquete background knowledge, then not much room for discussion is left.
Answers to some of your questions.
I personally did not support the Kargil operation, for the following reasons.
First of all, I do not think there is any kind of military solution to Kashmir, so there is no point in either side trying one. I have commented on this in detail in on of the other articles.
Secondly, no country should carry out military operations, if they cannot back them up politically. Because in the end, military operations are decided by the their political success, and not their military success.
Thirdly, I believe Pakistan`s aim in Kargil, was to cut off the lines of communication to Siachen. Siachen (in Pakistan`s opinion) is Pakistani land occupied by the Indian army, in an operation similar to Kargil. However, if Kargil had to be carried out to achieve this goal, then to do it immeidately after the Lahore diplomacy was wrong.
My views have been proven. And Pakistan has received a political defeat in Kargil. I disagree with people who state that Pakistan was given a military defeat, as well. In my experience of military tactics, in the moutainous Kashmiri area, anyone who is first to capture the heights basically wins the game; whether they are Hindu, Muslim, Indian, Pakistani, German or Japanese is immaterial. It is the basic laws of Physics that are in play. The best the opposing forces can do is to create a stalemate. This is what Pakistan has created in Siachen. But since India occupied the posts in Siachen first, it is probably impossible for the Pakistan military to remove them. A similar stalemate would have occured in Kargil. The only way for India to dislodge the mujahideen and Pakistani forces from the heights, would have been to bomb them endlessly. This is what India was doing. Since the Pakistani Air Force was not giving any air cover, India achieved some success through these bombings. However, had the Pakistani Air Force given air cover, then the Indian Air Force would not have been able to bomb endlessly. So a stalemate like Siachen would have occurred, in my opinion, with Pakistan occupying the high ground. However, I am not sure whether Pakistan would have been able to keep the Indian supply lines to Siachen cut off indefinitely. Again I am basing all this on the fact that whoever gets the high ground in that area, has basically won half the battle. Had India occupied the heights first, then India would have won half the battle.
Pakistan and India are already wasting there money in the Siachen stalemate, ever since India moved its forces there. In my opinion, a similar stalemate in Kargil would not have served any purpose to either country. This is only my personal analysis, and I have not based it on news reports from either side.
You stated: . ``Jay was only pointing out that a reputed paper had conveniently forgotten to mention Musharaf`s Mohajirness for obvious reasons. The paper did not want to get pulled up for telling Pakistan at this crucial juncture that the one at the helm of affairs was actually a Mohajir.`` This statement will sound very strange to any Pakistani. Why should a newspaper mention the ethnicity of any Pakistani, that it writes about? Perhaps that is common in India, but not in Pakistan.
Jay himself has now suggested that he was extrapolating. That is the problem with his comments on this situation. He is extrapolating about issues on which he has little knowledge. I have no idea how he has decided that the paper did not publish Musharaff`s muhajirness for, ``obvious`` reasons. Did Jay talk to the person who wrote the article? I believe he is extrapolating incorrectly again. How about stopping these extrapolations, based on little factual knowledge, so that no more confusion is caused. If the paper itself stated the reason for not mentioning Musharraf`s muhajirness, then I will accept your argument. Otherwise stick to the facts. And kindly extrapolate only about issues that you know and understand.
You stated: ``No Army should overstep its position and dismiss an elected civilian government. If democracy was truly being practiced in Pakistan then this coup is completely extra constitutional. This should be condemned from all quarters rather than speculating that it is a cloud with a silver lining. Most Pakistanis are jumping the gun and hoping Musharaf is the savior.``
In principle, I completely agree with everything you state here. The reasons most Pakistanis, including myself, are supporting this action so far, is that the situation under NS had just gotten terribly pathetic. I am not sure if you understand how bad the situation was getting. So what else could be done, if NS was bent upon completely destroying the country. This sounds understandably strange to most people who are not familiar with the actual situation in Pakistan.
You also stated: ``I tried putting myself in his shoes and I realized that I would not be able to stick a sword into the belly of the earth that bore me and my ancestors.`` This statement makes no sense to me. There have been many officers in the Indian military who were born in what is now Pakistan. They have fought for India against Pakistan. Would you make a similar statement about them? If your answer is, ``yes`` then I respect your view on this. Otherwise, you are only looking at one side of the issue.
Musharaff is not sticking a sword into anyone`s belly. Kashmir is an area in dispute, and he, as the Pakistani COAS was leading a battle, as was the Indian COAS. Did you expect him to resign, just because he was born in Dehli? What if I suggested that Indian COAS should resign because India has occupied Siachen, and I think that is an aggression similar to Kargil. Would you agree with me? Both COAS`s have a job to do, and they were carrying out their jobs. I highly doubt Musharraff was working without Nawaz`s approval. Although, the Indian media seems to have convinced you that he was. The Indian commuity in the US also sponsored a similar media campaign in US newspaper suggesting the Pakistani Army was operating on its own. I have no idea how they received such sensitive intelligence information.
I have already mentioned the remarks of Mr. Ganguly, a fellow at Stanford, who has now stated to the Christian Science Monitor that Musharraf is a militant or fundamentalist, and was brought up by Zia. Where do these people get their info, and why are the creating misinformation. This will only cause furthur problems between Pakistan and India.
There are other points you have made. In my opinion, some are valid and some are not. I will comment about those later. I hope you can see that, even if we disagree, I am more than willing to have a discussion on issues, like Kargil/Kashmir etc. becuase both of us have info on it. However when people start extrapolating on Pakistan`s internal issues (like why a paper did not use the word muhajir) without adaquete background knowledge, then not much room for discussion is left.
#27 Posted by jay on October 14, 1999 6:17:03 pm
Dear Bilal,
I have been branded to such an extend that i have to start every post with a preamble, if not an apology for provocation, if not a cyber war.
About musaraff, i was only extrapolating, what i would have felt in a similar situation. I am proud that that indias defence research is headed by a muslim of the rank of a cabinet minister, i am proud that indian president is an untouchable, i am proud that indian defence minister isa christian and above all i am proud that in the constituency where i could have voted in the recent state election has elected a marxist muslim as the representative.
I celebrate the divercity, support for the minority and the down trodden. I celebrate that advani, if i remember was born in lahore. I am proud that my thesis supervisor was a pakistani with whom i have still contacts after 15 years. I am proud that my best friend of 30 years standing, in whose house i have stayed every time i visited india is a muslim.
I was only asking why the pakistanis are not proud that musraf is a mojahir. In my stupid way of thinking, confirmed by the uproar it has created on the chowk, i seek an explanatory construct, i again stupidly call it the two-nation theory. Bilal, give me another explanation, give me another word.
I have been branded to such an extend that i have to start every post with a preamble, if not an apology for provocation, if not a cyber war.
About musaraff, i was only extrapolating, what i would have felt in a similar situation. I am proud that that indias defence research is headed by a muslim of the rank of a cabinet minister, i am proud that indian president is an untouchable, i am proud that indian defence minister isa christian and above all i am proud that in the constituency where i could have voted in the recent state election has elected a marxist muslim as the representative.
I celebrate the divercity, support for the minority and the down trodden. I celebrate that advani, if i remember was born in lahore. I am proud that my thesis supervisor was a pakistani with whom i have still contacts after 15 years. I am proud that my best friend of 30 years standing, in whose house i have stayed every time i visited india is a muslim.
I was only asking why the pakistanis are not proud that musraf is a mojahir. In my stupid way of thinking, confirmed by the uproar it has created on the chowk, i seek an explanatory construct, i again stupidly call it the two-nation theory. Bilal, give me another explanation, give me another word.
#26 Posted by Moez on October 14, 1999 6:17:03 pm
What a powerful and eye opening editorial!
See yourself how the GHADHAAR Nawaz Sharif has planted the seeds of division within the only disciplined and professional institution of Pakistan. Shame on him! If the tapes were given to dehli were proved, will show how power hungry and faithless corrupt he was. God help us.
Saviours?
Two weeks ago, we asked ``whether some sort of political change was in the air`` and answered that ``if change is to come, good or bad, it must originate from the direction of GHQ or the PM`s house`` (TFT Editorial, ``Optional leaders or policies?``, September 30th). And that is what happened on the fateful day of October 12. A civilian coup against the military leadership was launched from the PM`s house and thwarted by GHQ in a counter-coup. The story of events leading up to the two coups is worth recapitulating, if only to gauge what lies ahead.
General Pervaiz Musharraf, it may be recalled, was handpicked by Nawaz Sharif as COAS after General Jehangir Karamat was sacked last year for decrying the lack of a consultative process of governance. Then, disregarding criticism, General Musharraf went out of his way to prop up Mr Sharif`s government - from ordering the army to unearth ghost schools and carry out a long overdue census to manning military courts and running WAPDA. He did so because he sincerely believed that his efforts were aimed at enhancing national security and ``nation-building``.
But some months ago, following the enforced withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kargil under American pressure, the chummy relationship between the PM and COAS began to sour. As the Kargil episode increasingly came to called the ``Kargil misadventure``, Mr Sharif decided to pass the buck to the army and get General Musharraf to take the rap for it. Indeed, speculation was rife at the time that Mr Sharif`s Intelligence Agencies had bugged conversations between the COAS and CGS and passed on the tapes to New Delhi as ``proof`` of Mr Sharif`s ``innocence`` in the matter. Irked, the COAS was compelled to publicly assert that ``everybody was on board`` re Kargil. Relations between the two deteriorated when the COAS announced that ``there would be no unilateral withdrawal from Kargil`` even as Mr Sharif was making plans to rush to Washington and surrender unilaterally, an event which led to much demoralisation and anger within the armed forces.
Matters now took an ugly turn. Even as General Musharraf was rushing from pillar to post, exhorting his troops to keep their morale high, Mr Sharif was secretly sowing the seeds of division in the upper echelons of the armed forces. Rumours were floated to suggest that the COAS had not taken his colleagues, including the Air Chief and the Navy Chief as well as several Corps Commanders, into confidence, the idea being to undermine the authority of the COAS and sow dissension within the ranks.
For Mr Sharif, it was a tried and tested strategy - weaken an opponent by creating tensions and misunderstandings between his colleagues and him, isolate him and then destroy him. That was how Mr Sharif had contrived the ouster of the chief justice of the supreme court, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, in 1997. Now the strategy was swiftly executed once again and at least two corps commanders (General Saleem Haider in Mangla and General Tariq Pervez in Quetta) along with the DG-ISI, General Khawaja Ziauddin, were egged on to flout the authority of the COAS and challenge his views at home and abroad, in private and in public. The stage was set for a coup against the army high command by Mr Sharif which would begin with the sacking of General Musharraf.
But General Musharraf was not blind to goings-on in the PM House. So he moved to protect his flanks and consolidate his home base. General Saleem Haider was transferred from a command position at Mangla to a staff position at GHQ on September 20 and General Tauqir Zia, a loyalist, appointed to head the critical corps. Then, on October 10th, General Tariq Pervez was sacked by the COAS, as a warning to other generals that dissent at the behest of the PM or at the alter of personal ambition would not be tolerated. The dye was cast. The COAS was ready to thwart any attempt to remove him from his command and purge his senior colleagues. Shortly thereafter, he made the confident statement that he ``would complete his tenure``, suggesting that the prime minister would not, or could not, remove him.
However, disregarding the obvious ``moves`` by the COAS to ``protect`` himself, Mr Sharif made bold to put his plan into action. General Musharraf was confirmed as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, so that he would be lulled into a false sense of security. Then Mr Sharif waited for the COAS to go to Sri Lanka on official business before striking.
Mr Sharif`s trip to the UAE when the COAS was in Sri Lanka came out of the blue. It was not on any agenda. Nor could one fathom what Mr Sharif urgently needed to discuss with the Emir of the UAE. But the composition of the PM`s entourage was the giveaway. What was the need to take the DG-ISI with him? Why were Mushahid Hussain and Pervez Rashid, head honchos of media disinformation, members of the select entourage? What was Nazir Naji, the PM`s speech writer, doing in the UAE along with the PM? There were no press conferences or speeches or briefings. Clearly, all were together to put the finishing touches to a coup against the army high command away from the prying eyes and ears of Military Intelligence.
The evidence of October 12 confirms this. Mr Sharif went to Multan, ostensibly for a routine, scheduled public meeting, to give the impression of ``business as usual``. Then the civilian coup was launched, shortly after General Musharraf`s PIA flight took off from Sri Lanka and he was out of contact with GHQ. Pakistan TV in Islamabad was ``occupied`` at 5 pm by Pervez Rashid and a contingent of the police. The announcement of General Musharraf`s sacking, as well as the appointment of General Ziauddin, followed. General Ziauddin is then reported to have called up the CGS, General Aziz, to inform him that he was on his way to GHQ to take charge. When he was politely rebuffed on the plea that GHQ wanted to wait for General Musharraf to arrive and relinquish charge, the counter-plan went into operation. The pilot of the PIA flight carrying the COAS to Karachi was radioed by Chairman PIA Khaqan Abbasi to divert the Airbus to Nawabshah where a special plane and a police escort was waiting to arrest and transport the COAS to Islamabad. When the pilot protested that the airstrip at Nawabshah could not accommodate the Airbus, he was ordered to fly to Dubai. When the pilot said he did not have sufficient fuel to do so, he was ordered to go to Islamabad. Then General Musharraf intervened and ordered the pilot to land at Karachi and discovered that a coup against him was in the process of unravelling.
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the Corps Commander Pindi had sent a contingent to stop the PTV authorities from broadcasting news of the sacking of General Musharraf and the appointment of General Ziauddin as the new army chief. But the small contingent was overpowered by a force led by the PM`s military secretary and the PTV broadcasts were resumed. This compelled GHQ to despatch a stronger force and rout the erstwhile coupmakers. Troops loyal to General Musharraf had already sealed the PM and his close associates in the PM House and elsewhere by the time General Musharraf landed in Islamabad and assumed full operational charge. Then the corps commanders went into session to determine how to deal with the situation, eventually declaring that the Sharif government had been ``dismissed`` (by whom, it was not said) and that the Chairman JCSC and COAS (not CMLA), General Pervaiz Musharraf, would address the nation in due course.
The facts are clear enough. General Musharraf is not an innate, politically ambitious, coup-maker. The sincerity in his short but emphatic four minute address to the nation on October 13 rings true, every word of it. Mr Sharif, on the other hand, clearly tried to over-reach himself once too often and failed. Indeed, he seemed to have been finally emboldened in his recklessness by the statement of support from the Clinton administration in Washington warning the army not to carry out a coup some weeks ago!
It is also clear that a majority of the people of Pakistan had had enough of the Sharifs and their hangers-on. They were repressive, deceitful, corrupt, incompetent and dangerous. Not too many tears are going to be shed at the passing of their rogue regime. And as for democracy, it died in Pakistan when the supreme court was stormed and the judiciary humiliated and undermined, when parliament was gagged, when provincial governments were arbitrarily removed, when the press was attacked, when the bureaucracy was politicised, when all checks and balances on the power of the prime minister were systematically removed and the sword of the impending Shariah Bill was waved to scare away conscientious dissenters. If a formal burial of this long-decaying corpse was ordered on the day of the successful counter-coup, does it matter?
It matters in one sense. All other things being equal, democracy is still the least objectionable system of the lot. But there are democracies and democracies. Indeed, there are as many forms and types of democracy as there are countries. Nor do elections constitute the be-all and end-all of democracy. Apart from a number of Western countries with history on their side, most new nations cannot demonstrate uninterrupted periods of successful democratic practise. Nor is democracy an end unto itself. Indeed, it is meant to be a means to desireable ends like security, stability, prosperity, creativity. So where does that take us?
We have had ten years of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Each regime has been worse than its predecessor. Neither has given us security, stability, prosperity. Indeed, we have become worse off on all these fronts with each passing year. That is why our loss of faith in the electoral system is now reflected in diminishing turnouts at the polls and an increasing resort to arms to fulfill our needs or overcome our frustrations and alienation. Therefore another round of sham elections with the same ``leaders`` and candidates is the last thing we need.
Most Pakistanis are desperate for an ``interim arrangement`` which will hold across-the-board accountability and set the new rules of the game to include the many demands of good governance before the political system is opened up a couple of years down the line for a fuller form of representative federal democracy. This is a do-able formula. But certain conditions are attached to it. The ``caretakers`` must be transparently above-board and competent. They must be prepared to take hard decisions without fear or favour. They must have the moral authority to lead from the front so that no one may cast a stone at them. And they must demonstrate the collective courage and wisdom to reverse course on a number of disastrous domestic and foreign policy adventures.
General Pervaiz Musharraf and his colleagues have unwittingly arrived at a critical juncture of Pakistani history. Everything around them smacks of failure on a grand scale. If they can deliver a significant portion of a new agenda to restructure and revamp Pakistan, history will remember them as the saviours of Quaid i Azam`s dream. If they can`t - for whatever reasons - the implosion will engulf them as surely as it will all of us.
The Friday Times Oct 15, 1999.
See yourself how the GHADHAAR Nawaz Sharif has planted the seeds of division within the only disciplined and professional institution of Pakistan. Shame on him! If the tapes were given to dehli were proved, will show how power hungry and faithless corrupt he was. God help us.
Saviours?
Two weeks ago, we asked ``whether some sort of political change was in the air`` and answered that ``if change is to come, good or bad, it must originate from the direction of GHQ or the PM`s house`` (TFT Editorial, ``Optional leaders or policies?``, September 30th). And that is what happened on the fateful day of October 12. A civilian coup against the military leadership was launched from the PM`s house and thwarted by GHQ in a counter-coup. The story of events leading up to the two coups is worth recapitulating, if only to gauge what lies ahead.
General Pervaiz Musharraf, it may be recalled, was handpicked by Nawaz Sharif as COAS after General Jehangir Karamat was sacked last year for decrying the lack of a consultative process of governance. Then, disregarding criticism, General Musharraf went out of his way to prop up Mr Sharif`s government - from ordering the army to unearth ghost schools and carry out a long overdue census to manning military courts and running WAPDA. He did so because he sincerely believed that his efforts were aimed at enhancing national security and ``nation-building``.
But some months ago, following the enforced withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kargil under American pressure, the chummy relationship between the PM and COAS began to sour. As the Kargil episode increasingly came to called the ``Kargil misadventure``, Mr Sharif decided to pass the buck to the army and get General Musharraf to take the rap for it. Indeed, speculation was rife at the time that Mr Sharif`s Intelligence Agencies had bugged conversations between the COAS and CGS and passed on the tapes to New Delhi as ``proof`` of Mr Sharif`s ``innocence`` in the matter. Irked, the COAS was compelled to publicly assert that ``everybody was on board`` re Kargil. Relations between the two deteriorated when the COAS announced that ``there would be no unilateral withdrawal from Kargil`` even as Mr Sharif was making plans to rush to Washington and surrender unilaterally, an event which led to much demoralisation and anger within the armed forces.
Matters now took an ugly turn. Even as General Musharraf was rushing from pillar to post, exhorting his troops to keep their morale high, Mr Sharif was secretly sowing the seeds of division in the upper echelons of the armed forces. Rumours were floated to suggest that the COAS had not taken his colleagues, including the Air Chief and the Navy Chief as well as several Corps Commanders, into confidence, the idea being to undermine the authority of the COAS and sow dissension within the ranks.
For Mr Sharif, it was a tried and tested strategy - weaken an opponent by creating tensions and misunderstandings between his colleagues and him, isolate him and then destroy him. That was how Mr Sharif had contrived the ouster of the chief justice of the supreme court, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, in 1997. Now the strategy was swiftly executed once again and at least two corps commanders (General Saleem Haider in Mangla and General Tariq Pervez in Quetta) along with the DG-ISI, General Khawaja Ziauddin, were egged on to flout the authority of the COAS and challenge his views at home and abroad, in private and in public. The stage was set for a coup against the army high command by Mr Sharif which would begin with the sacking of General Musharraf.
But General Musharraf was not blind to goings-on in the PM House. So he moved to protect his flanks and consolidate his home base. General Saleem Haider was transferred from a command position at Mangla to a staff position at GHQ on September 20 and General Tauqir Zia, a loyalist, appointed to head the critical corps. Then, on October 10th, General Tariq Pervez was sacked by the COAS, as a warning to other generals that dissent at the behest of the PM or at the alter of personal ambition would not be tolerated. The dye was cast. The COAS was ready to thwart any attempt to remove him from his command and purge his senior colleagues. Shortly thereafter, he made the confident statement that he ``would complete his tenure``, suggesting that the prime minister would not, or could not, remove him.
However, disregarding the obvious ``moves`` by the COAS to ``protect`` himself, Mr Sharif made bold to put his plan into action. General Musharraf was confirmed as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, so that he would be lulled into a false sense of security. Then Mr Sharif waited for the COAS to go to Sri Lanka on official business before striking.
Mr Sharif`s trip to the UAE when the COAS was in Sri Lanka came out of the blue. It was not on any agenda. Nor could one fathom what Mr Sharif urgently needed to discuss with the Emir of the UAE. But the composition of the PM`s entourage was the giveaway. What was the need to take the DG-ISI with him? Why were Mushahid Hussain and Pervez Rashid, head honchos of media disinformation, members of the select entourage? What was Nazir Naji, the PM`s speech writer, doing in the UAE along with the PM? There were no press conferences or speeches or briefings. Clearly, all were together to put the finishing touches to a coup against the army high command away from the prying eyes and ears of Military Intelligence.
The evidence of October 12 confirms this. Mr Sharif went to Multan, ostensibly for a routine, scheduled public meeting, to give the impression of ``business as usual``. Then the civilian coup was launched, shortly after General Musharraf`s PIA flight took off from Sri Lanka and he was out of contact with GHQ. Pakistan TV in Islamabad was ``occupied`` at 5 pm by Pervez Rashid and a contingent of the police. The announcement of General Musharraf`s sacking, as well as the appointment of General Ziauddin, followed. General Ziauddin is then reported to have called up the CGS, General Aziz, to inform him that he was on his way to GHQ to take charge. When he was politely rebuffed on the plea that GHQ wanted to wait for General Musharraf to arrive and relinquish charge, the counter-plan went into operation. The pilot of the PIA flight carrying the COAS to Karachi was radioed by Chairman PIA Khaqan Abbasi to divert the Airbus to Nawabshah where a special plane and a police escort was waiting to arrest and transport the COAS to Islamabad. When the pilot protested that the airstrip at Nawabshah could not accommodate the Airbus, he was ordered to fly to Dubai. When the pilot said he did not have sufficient fuel to do so, he was ordered to go to Islamabad. Then General Musharraf intervened and ordered the pilot to land at Karachi and discovered that a coup against him was in the process of unravelling.
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the Corps Commander Pindi had sent a contingent to stop the PTV authorities from broadcasting news of the sacking of General Musharraf and the appointment of General Ziauddin as the new army chief. But the small contingent was overpowered by a force led by the PM`s military secretary and the PTV broadcasts were resumed. This compelled GHQ to despatch a stronger force and rout the erstwhile coupmakers. Troops loyal to General Musharraf had already sealed the PM and his close associates in the PM House and elsewhere by the time General Musharraf landed in Islamabad and assumed full operational charge. Then the corps commanders went into session to determine how to deal with the situation, eventually declaring that the Sharif government had been ``dismissed`` (by whom, it was not said) and that the Chairman JCSC and COAS (not CMLA), General Pervaiz Musharraf, would address the nation in due course.
The facts are clear enough. General Musharraf is not an innate, politically ambitious, coup-maker. The sincerity in his short but emphatic four minute address to the nation on October 13 rings true, every word of it. Mr Sharif, on the other hand, clearly tried to over-reach himself once too often and failed. Indeed, he seemed to have been finally emboldened in his recklessness by the statement of support from the Clinton administration in Washington warning the army not to carry out a coup some weeks ago!
It is also clear that a majority of the people of Pakistan had had enough of the Sharifs and their hangers-on. They were repressive, deceitful, corrupt, incompetent and dangerous. Not too many tears are going to be shed at the passing of their rogue regime. And as for democracy, it died in Pakistan when the supreme court was stormed and the judiciary humiliated and undermined, when parliament was gagged, when provincial governments were arbitrarily removed, when the press was attacked, when the bureaucracy was politicised, when all checks and balances on the power of the prime minister were systematically removed and the sword of the impending Shariah Bill was waved to scare away conscientious dissenters. If a formal burial of this long-decaying corpse was ordered on the day of the successful counter-coup, does it matter?
It matters in one sense. All other things being equal, democracy is still the least objectionable system of the lot. But there are democracies and democracies. Indeed, there are as many forms and types of democracy as there are countries. Nor do elections constitute the be-all and end-all of democracy. Apart from a number of Western countries with history on their side, most new nations cannot demonstrate uninterrupted periods of successful democratic practise. Nor is democracy an end unto itself. Indeed, it is meant to be a means to desireable ends like security, stability, prosperity, creativity. So where does that take us?
We have had ten years of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Each regime has been worse than its predecessor. Neither has given us security, stability, prosperity. Indeed, we have become worse off on all these fronts with each passing year. That is why our loss of faith in the electoral system is now reflected in diminishing turnouts at the polls and an increasing resort to arms to fulfill our needs or overcome our frustrations and alienation. Therefore another round of sham elections with the same ``leaders`` and candidates is the last thing we need.
Most Pakistanis are desperate for an ``interim arrangement`` which will hold across-the-board accountability and set the new rules of the game to include the many demands of good governance before the political system is opened up a couple of years down the line for a fuller form of representative federal democracy. This is a do-able formula. But certain conditions are attached to it. The ``caretakers`` must be transparently above-board and competent. They must be prepared to take hard decisions without fear or favour. They must have the moral authority to lead from the front so that no one may cast a stone at them. And they must demonstrate the collective courage and wisdom to reverse course on a number of disastrous domestic and foreign policy adventures.
General Pervaiz Musharraf and his colleagues have unwittingly arrived at a critical juncture of Pakistani history. Everything around them smacks of failure on a grand scale. If they can deliver a significant portion of a new agenda to restructure and revamp Pakistan, history will remember them as the saviours of Quaid i Azam`s dream. If they can`t - for whatever reasons - the implosion will engulf them as surely as it will all of us.
The Friday Times Oct 15, 1999.
#25 Posted by JR on October 14, 1999 6:17:03 pm
Bilal, UR:
Based on your interacts I know you have been very civil. I like your writing voices too. However, when you suddenly pounced on Jay when he was just stating facts, you seemed to completely break away from the volley-and-return to bang-bang-bang. That is why I was saying that you guys were being too high handed. Jay was only pointing out that a reputed paper had conveniently forgotten to mention Musharaf`s Mohajirness for obvious reasons. The paper did not want to get pulled up for telling Pakistan at this crucial juncture that the one at the helm of affairs was actually a Mohajir. This is a very valid point brought forth by Jay. He was not being provocative in my opinion.
Musharaf having been born in Delhi was news to me. I tried putting myself in his shoes and I realized that I would not be able to stick a sword into the belly of the earth that bore me and my ancestors. This is how I feel and I am not saying that others should feel this way, but I cannot suddenly switch allegiances based on dates. For me the permanence of the soil bears more sanctity than the political whims of a misled peoples. This is why I stated I do not understand the Pakistani mindset.
Aside, UR having served in the Pak army has never commented on questions about how the Pak Army now wants all the credit for Kargil when all along the Pak Army and the government have stated that it was only Mujahideens sitting on the Peaks. When Pakistani papers alongside Indian papers were giving Indian soldier body counts, there was scarce mention of Pakistani body counts or losses. And can anybody across the fence explain a nation that is so divided within that while one of its arms was extended in friendship the other stabs a vicious sword into the side of the country whose hand was held out in friendship too. All the Pakistanis on this forum have steered clear of commenting specifically on these.
No Army should overstep its position and dismiss an elected civilian government. If democracy was truly being practiced in Pakistan then this coup is completely extra constitutional. This should be condemned from all quarters rather than speculating that it is a cloud with a silver lining. Most Pakistanis are jumping the gun and hoping Musharaf is the savior.
I hope I have made my position clear. There is no need to accuse me of anything, these are statements like every other on this forum.
Based on your interacts I know you have been very civil. I like your writing voices too. However, when you suddenly pounced on Jay when he was just stating facts, you seemed to completely break away from the volley-and-return to bang-bang-bang. That is why I was saying that you guys were being too high handed. Jay was only pointing out that a reputed paper had conveniently forgotten to mention Musharaf`s Mohajirness for obvious reasons. The paper did not want to get pulled up for telling Pakistan at this crucial juncture that the one at the helm of affairs was actually a Mohajir. This is a very valid point brought forth by Jay. He was not being provocative in my opinion.
Musharaf having been born in Delhi was news to me. I tried putting myself in his shoes and I realized that I would not be able to stick a sword into the belly of the earth that bore me and my ancestors. This is how I feel and I am not saying that others should feel this way, but I cannot suddenly switch allegiances based on dates. For me the permanence of the soil bears more sanctity than the political whims of a misled peoples. This is why I stated I do not understand the Pakistani mindset.
Aside, UR having served in the Pak army has never commented on questions about how the Pak Army now wants all the credit for Kargil when all along the Pak Army and the government have stated that it was only Mujahideens sitting on the Peaks. When Pakistani papers alongside Indian papers were giving Indian soldier body counts, there was scarce mention of Pakistani body counts or losses. And can anybody across the fence explain a nation that is so divided within that while one of its arms was extended in friendship the other stabs a vicious sword into the side of the country whose hand was held out in friendship too. All the Pakistanis on this forum have steered clear of commenting specifically on these.
No Army should overstep its position and dismiss an elected civilian government. If democracy was truly being practiced in Pakistan then this coup is completely extra constitutional. This should be condemned from all quarters rather than speculating that it is a cloud with a silver lining. Most Pakistanis are jumping the gun and hoping Musharaf is the savior.
I hope I have made my position clear. There is no need to accuse me of anything, these are statements like every other on this forum.
#24 Posted by tariqlodi on October 14, 1999 3:30:13 pm
Sigh of relief once again for a while, may be, for Pakistani Nation! As a Pakistani I am not yet mature and much concerned or affected by the form of government, no form of government changes my life, but what bewilders me most is the worlds concern about systems of governments in Pakistan. As I see it they will accept a martial law government if it has squealed on armtwisting and bowed to the conditions laid down by them. Then they will forget the plight of the masses, the human rights violations etc.etc. and allow the martial law administrator to do whatever way he liked, no matter even if it is a farce, to stage election and win the majority vote for their face saving that they are dealing with a legitimate government for the people by the people of the people! Instances are not rare, 1964 B.D. Ayub Khan elections and the elections held by General Zia! Mr. America is very much concerned nuclear capability should not be acquired by any other nation and not certainly without his permission and inspection. He realises that inspection of his arsenal will jeopardise his defence! Please, we are a very new and proud, though may be a small nation, enlighten our path you want us to traverse with one standard. Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Israel, Bosnia, Chechnya are all very illustrative examples of world conscience and care. The people of small countries are habitual of hunger. They may lessen their plight if they vowed not to accept the expensive world loan to pay for the luxuries of the socalled donors!
tariqlodi
tariqlodi
#23 Posted by bahmad on October 14, 1999 2:30:57 pm
In response to JR (Reply #: 14):
Dear JR:
In response to my Reply # 13, you have provided (I think, unwarranted) support to jay. I wonder if you have read my previous numerous interactions between jay and myself. Please read them and then form an opinion.
If all Pakistanis agree on some point, then it is really very hard to understand the Pakistani mindset. In reality, all Pakistanis only rarely agree on any issue. I think, this is a healthy sign. It seems to me that we, in Pakistan, are going through a somewhat silent intellectual revolution. You need to have a good grasp of the Pakistani history to appreciate it.
Your statement: ``A discussion is a discussion and why have Bilal and UR chosen not to counter your points but rather take away from it by accusing you of provocation etc.``
Comment: I think, UR has been extremely polite in his response. As far as I am concerned, I have very patiently engaged in a serious of discussions with jay. In many cases, both jay and myself have appreciated each other. However, there is something interesting about jay that I have long been trying to figure out. For example, Jay has persistently talked about the two nation theory. I have, on several occasions, tried to engage with him and tried to fully understand his understanding of the two nation theory. Jay has always chosen not to tell me/us what he means by the two nation theory, how it evolved over time, and what it really means to an average Pakistani in his/her everyday live. Being a very intelligent and knowledgeable person, and to my disappointment, jay has failed to show that he (barely) adequately understands the Indian Freedom Movement, the role of Muslims in it, the conditions that led to the creation of Pakistan. So you are right that a discussion is discussion, but a discussion must be based on something concrete and/or its theorization. I did not chose to counter his point, of General Musharraf being of Mohajir background, because I didn`t appreciate jay`s apparent engagement in the cyber warfare. A discussion should be a discussion, not a warfare. Although emotions are a part of every human being, my writings generally reflect my intellectual focus (rather than emotional focus). I am still waiting for jay`s response.
Your statement: ``Bilal especially was talking about young Indians and Pakistanis getting the wrong ideas, yah right! Climb down UR and Bilal from your high pedestals.``
Comment: I don`t understand your point. Please clarify. May I ask you, what do you know about me?
Your statement: ``Jay has pointed out some very interesting facts, the most recent being that a person of Indian birth is number 1 in Pakistan today. It is even more interesting and shocking to think that this Musharaff leads an Army against the soil of his birth and the home of his ancestors.``
Comment: So what? We were all Indians once upon a time (I don`t prefer the phrase British Indians, although this is technically more appropriate). Our forefathers were loyal inhabitants of the land that we now call India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc. Let us not degrade their contributions by pointing out petty pieces of information that General Musharraf was born in India or by creating unnecessary tension in an already tension-ridden society of the South Asians. A lot of us and our parents and grandparents were born in India (when India was somewhat United under the control of the British). The current reality is that Pakistanis do not belong to contemporary India. This, however, does not mean that there should not be peaceful coexistence among various South Asian nationalities.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Dear JR:
In response to my Reply # 13, you have provided (I think, unwarranted) support to jay. I wonder if you have read my previous numerous interactions between jay and myself. Please read them and then form an opinion.
If all Pakistanis agree on some point, then it is really very hard to understand the Pakistani mindset. In reality, all Pakistanis only rarely agree on any issue. I think, this is a healthy sign. It seems to me that we, in Pakistan, are going through a somewhat silent intellectual revolution. You need to have a good grasp of the Pakistani history to appreciate it.
Your statement: ``A discussion is a discussion and why have Bilal and UR chosen not to counter your points but rather take away from it by accusing you of provocation etc.``
Comment: I think, UR has been extremely polite in his response. As far as I am concerned, I have very patiently engaged in a serious of discussions with jay. In many cases, both jay and myself have appreciated each other. However, there is something interesting about jay that I have long been trying to figure out. For example, Jay has persistently talked about the two nation theory. I have, on several occasions, tried to engage with him and tried to fully understand his understanding of the two nation theory. Jay has always chosen not to tell me/us what he means by the two nation theory, how it evolved over time, and what it really means to an average Pakistani in his/her everyday live. Being a very intelligent and knowledgeable person, and to my disappointment, jay has failed to show that he (barely) adequately understands the Indian Freedom Movement, the role of Muslims in it, the conditions that led to the creation of Pakistan. So you are right that a discussion is discussion, but a discussion must be based on something concrete and/or its theorization. I did not chose to counter his point, of General Musharraf being of Mohajir background, because I didn`t appreciate jay`s apparent engagement in the cyber warfare. A discussion should be a discussion, not a warfare. Although emotions are a part of every human being, my writings generally reflect my intellectual focus (rather than emotional focus). I am still waiting for jay`s response.
Your statement: ``Bilal especially was talking about young Indians and Pakistanis getting the wrong ideas, yah right! Climb down UR and Bilal from your high pedestals.``
Comment: I don`t understand your point. Please clarify. May I ask you, what do you know about me?
Your statement: ``Jay has pointed out some very interesting facts, the most recent being that a person of Indian birth is number 1 in Pakistan today. It is even more interesting and shocking to think that this Musharaff leads an Army against the soil of his birth and the home of his ancestors.``
Comment: So what? We were all Indians once upon a time (I don`t prefer the phrase British Indians, although this is technically more appropriate). Our forefathers were loyal inhabitants of the land that we now call India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc. Let us not degrade their contributions by pointing out petty pieces of information that General Musharraf was born in India or by creating unnecessary tension in an already tension-ridden society of the South Asians. A lot of us and our parents and grandparents were born in India (when India was somewhat United under the control of the British). The current reality is that Pakistanis do not belong to contemporary India. This, however, does not mean that there should not be peaceful coexistence among various South Asian nationalities.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
#22 Posted by Moez on October 14, 1999 2:13:32 pm
I read his (Jay) reply# 10 and also read his earlier replies and it seems to me this guys has already a negative mindset about Pakistan.
First, he accuses the general being a pro-taliban type then news came he is moderate, so now he is trying to portray him as a mohajir and trying to CREATE a rift b/w chowkwalas and other Pakistani.
Well, let me tell you, if you never lived in Pakistan and doesnt know about the how people feel about the army then please just keep your analysis (blurred one fromm reading too much Rediff on the net)to yourself. Otherwise share some your EXPERTISE with substance!!! will you?
Now, as per ``Mohajir`` in Pakistan, there are several people in Pakistan who have and had occupied senior positions in Pakistan`s affairs in all fields. So, what if the general came out to be a MOHAJIR, it will not make him less patrotic!!!!
Furthermore, if you want to engage in a meaningfull responses (this article) try to come up with good and practical solutions otherwise you will be the part of the problem too.
First, he accuses the general being a pro-taliban type then news came he is moderate, so now he is trying to portray him as a mohajir and trying to CREATE a rift b/w chowkwalas and other Pakistani.
Well, let me tell you, if you never lived in Pakistan and doesnt know about the how people feel about the army then please just keep your analysis (blurred one fromm reading too much Rediff on the net)to yourself. Otherwise share some your EXPERTISE with substance!!! will you?
Now, as per ``Mohajir`` in Pakistan, there are several people in Pakistan who have and had occupied senior positions in Pakistan`s affairs in all fields. So, what if the general came out to be a MOHAJIR, it will not make him less patrotic!!!!
Furthermore, if you want to engage in a meaningfull responses (this article) try to come up with good and practical solutions otherwise you will be the part of the problem too.
#21 Posted by RV on October 14, 1999 1:25:16 pm
Ref UR`s post# 18
Its amusing to see the army loyalist cropping up on chowk so soon after the military takeover. More amusing is their attempts to whitewash the lavish lifestyles of these generals.
I guess UR, being an ex-army man, can provide some information on following:
- what is the pay structure in Pakistani army
- how much is the official salary of a general
- How is that children of most of the Army generals (and Lt. generals...) land into US universities. General Musharraf is no exception. In fact his brother too is enjoying the fruits of democracy in US.
It was quite sad to learn that pakistani public has been celebrating the official demise of democracy in pakistan. (ooops... military has declared democracy to be intact even after the takeover) Especially when the opposition was so close to overthrow the unpopular Nawaz government by democratic means. Political alliances were gathering strength and the sapling of democracy was taking roots. It takes a cycle of several good and bad governments to grow the democratic temprament in the psyche of the people (India and its repeated election is a glorious example).
Maybe democracy is the right system for pakistanis (or pakistanis are not the right kind of people for democracy)
Its amusing to see the army loyalist cropping up on chowk so soon after the military takeover. More amusing is their attempts to whitewash the lavish lifestyles of these generals.
I guess UR, being an ex-army man, can provide some information on following:
- what is the pay structure in Pakistani army
- how much is the official salary of a general
- How is that children of most of the Army generals (and Lt. generals...) land into US universities. General Musharraf is no exception. In fact his brother too is enjoying the fruits of democracy in US.
It was quite sad to learn that pakistani public has been celebrating the official demise of democracy in pakistan. (ooops... military has declared democracy to be intact even after the takeover) Especially when the opposition was so close to overthrow the unpopular Nawaz government by democratic means. Political alliances were gathering strength and the sapling of democracy was taking roots. It takes a cycle of several good and bad governments to grow the democratic temprament in the psyche of the people (India and its repeated election is a glorious example).
Maybe democracy is the right system for pakistanis (or pakistanis are not the right kind of people for democracy)
#20 Posted by Godot on October 14, 1999 1:25:16 pm
Re: JR, #14
The fact is that, prior to 14 August 1947, there were no mohajirs. It did not matter whether one lived in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Dehli, Lukhnow, or Bihar. They were all Indians. Now, if someone moved to Karachi or Lahore from, say, Dehli, after 14 August 1947, what makes him any different than from someone who always lived in Karachi or Lahore? After 14 August 1947, everyone in now what constitutes Pakistan is a Pakistani, regardless of his (or her) origin of birth. [By the way, when Musharraf was born, in the year 1943, there was no Pakistan.]
You and Jay are an example of a stereotypical Hindu that is fed into Pakistani mind: a conniving enemy who wants to destroy Pakistan and who is always trying to sow the seeds of hatred among Pakistanis, ie, divide and conquer. I do not believe that. Unfortunately, you and Jay are proving me wrong.
The fact is that, prior to 14 August 1947, there were no mohajirs. It did not matter whether one lived in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Dehli, Lukhnow, or Bihar. They were all Indians. Now, if someone moved to Karachi or Lahore from, say, Dehli, after 14 August 1947, what makes him any different than from someone who always lived in Karachi or Lahore? After 14 August 1947, everyone in now what constitutes Pakistan is a Pakistani, regardless of his (or her) origin of birth. [By the way, when Musharraf was born, in the year 1943, there was no Pakistan.]
You and Jay are an example of a stereotypical Hindu that is fed into Pakistani mind: a conniving enemy who wants to destroy Pakistan and who is always trying to sow the seeds of hatred among Pakistanis, ie, divide and conquer. I do not believe that. Unfortunately, you and Jay are proving me wrong.
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