Text of Speech by Gen. Pervez Musharraf
Press Room October 17, 1999
#81 Posted by bahmad on October 25, 1999 12:11:54 pm
BBC, Monday, October 25, 1999 Published at 18:41 GMT 19:41 UK
Pakistan names ruling council
Pakistan`s new military rulers have named key members of their administration two weeks after the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a coup.
Six members have been named to a National Security Council - a powerful body that will govern the country until fresh elections are held.
The council will be headed by the country`s Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf, who is joined on it by two other top military men, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and the head of the Navy, Admiral Abdul Aziz Mirza.
The Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Mohammed Yaqub, who has worked for the International Monetary Firm, is one of four civilians in the council.
Others include lawyer Sharifuddin Pirzada, a constitutional expert, Imtiaz Shahibzada, a former civil servant and a prominent social worker, Attiya Inayatullah, who served in the administration of General Zia ul-Haq.
Note: What information do we have about Sharifuddin Pirzada, Imtiaz Shahibzada (Sahibzada, I suppose), and Attiya Inayatullah. Please post.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Pakistan names ruling council
Pakistan`s new military rulers have named key members of their administration two weeks after the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a coup.
Six members have been named to a National Security Council - a powerful body that will govern the country until fresh elections are held.
The council will be headed by the country`s Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf, who is joined on it by two other top military men, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and the head of the Navy, Admiral Abdul Aziz Mirza.
The Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Mohammed Yaqub, who has worked for the International Monetary Firm, is one of four civilians in the council.
Others include lawyer Sharifuddin Pirzada, a constitutional expert, Imtiaz Shahibzada, a former civil servant and a prominent social worker, Attiya Inayatullah, who served in the administration of General Zia ul-Haq.
Note: What information do we have about Sharifuddin Pirzada, Imtiaz Shahibzada (Sahibzada, I suppose), and Attiya Inayatullah. Please post.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
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#80 Posted by bahmad on October 25, 1999 1:13:53 am
In response to Pu Li (Reply #: 79):
Dear Pu Li:
With reference to the road the connected Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu, you wrote: ``The immediate danger in Kashmir was to Srinagar and the Kashmir valley, not to Jammu. Thus Gurdaspur did not help India in getting troops to Srinagar.``
Comment: Could you explain to me how the award of five Muslim majority tehsils to India helped India and why the Pakistanis have made such a big deal of this?
Your wrote: ``Hodson makes the claim that Radcliffe never explained his awards to anybody, before or after the fact. While Mountbatten told Hodson that he had asked Radcliffe to ensure that the award to Pakistan was balanced based on both West Punjab and East Bengal taken together, Radcliffe did not remember having even this conversation with Mountbatten. Hodson does not mention any influence of VP Menon on Radcliffe.``
Comment: If you compare this with what Feroz Khan Noon and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali wrote in their books, you may conclude that there was something fishy. Somebody was telling a lie (or hiding something). Akbar S. Ahmad (1997) has something interesting to say: ``Mountbatten recounted the sequence of events leading to the tragedy of Kashmir in marching in Srinagar on 24 October. This justified the use of Indian troops. Three days later India flew in troops, since the Maharaja had agreed to sign the Accession Instrument, thus joining India. ``Just in time,`` added Mountbatten. All this is now challenged by scholars (see, for example, Alastair Lamb, 1991, 1994; Schofield, 1996). In the last meeting between Jinnah and Mountbatten on 1 November Jinnah accused India of seizing Kashmir by ``fraud and violence`` (Wolpert, 1996: 420). In fact Mountbatten ensured that Indian troops were sent to Kashmir before the state declared its intention to join India or Pakistan, thus technically ordering an invasion of foreign territory (p. 138).`` He goes on.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. New references: Alastair Lamb (1991). Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990. Hertinfordbury: Rexford Books. Alastair Lamb (1994. Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. Hertinfordbury: Rexford Books. Victoria Schofield (1996). Kashmir in the Crossfire. London: I. B. Tauris. Stanley Wolpert (1996). Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dear Pu Li:
With reference to the road the connected Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu, you wrote: ``The immediate danger in Kashmir was to Srinagar and the Kashmir valley, not to Jammu. Thus Gurdaspur did not help India in getting troops to Srinagar.``
Comment: Could you explain to me how the award of five Muslim majority tehsils to India helped India and why the Pakistanis have made such a big deal of this?
Your wrote: ``Hodson makes the claim that Radcliffe never explained his awards to anybody, before or after the fact. While Mountbatten told Hodson that he had asked Radcliffe to ensure that the award to Pakistan was balanced based on both West Punjab and East Bengal taken together, Radcliffe did not remember having even this conversation with Mountbatten. Hodson does not mention any influence of VP Menon on Radcliffe.``
Comment: If you compare this with what Feroz Khan Noon and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali wrote in their books, you may conclude that there was something fishy. Somebody was telling a lie (or hiding something). Akbar S. Ahmad (1997) has something interesting to say: ``Mountbatten recounted the sequence of events leading to the tragedy of Kashmir in marching in Srinagar on 24 October. This justified the use of Indian troops. Three days later India flew in troops, since the Maharaja had agreed to sign the Accession Instrument, thus joining India. ``Just in time,`` added Mountbatten. All this is now challenged by scholars (see, for example, Alastair Lamb, 1991, 1994; Schofield, 1996). In the last meeting between Jinnah and Mountbatten on 1 November Jinnah accused India of seizing Kashmir by ``fraud and violence`` (Wolpert, 1996: 420). In fact Mountbatten ensured that Indian troops were sent to Kashmir before the state declared its intention to join India or Pakistan, thus technically ordering an invasion of foreign territory (p. 138).`` He goes on.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. New references: Alastair Lamb (1991). Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990. Hertinfordbury: Rexford Books. Alastair Lamb (1994. Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. Hertinfordbury: Rexford Books. Victoria Schofield (1996). Kashmir in the Crossfire. London: I. B. Tauris. Stanley Wolpert (1996). Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny. New York: Oxford University Press.
#79 Posted by Pu Li on October 24, 1999 6:18:15 pm
Re bahmad #76:
[Comment: Mushtaqur Rahman (1996: 60) writes: ``The boundary was obviously drawn to give India access to the road that passes through Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu. Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage bridge did contribute to India`s occupation of Jammu and even of Poonch, south of Pir Panjal. It was not until the completion of the Banihal Tunnel and the rebuilding of the Banihal Road that Kashmir Valley could be supplied by India on the ground.`` ]
The immediate danger in Kashmir was to Srinagar and the Kashmir valley, not to Jammu. Thus Gurdaspur did not help India in getting troops to Srinagar.
[Comment: In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 1992, Radcliffe`s secretary, Christopher Beaumont, confirmed that the boundary award was manipulated by Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru (DT, February 24, 1999). Mushtaqur Rahman claims that Rao Ayer (assistant secretary to the commission), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and V. P. Menon also played influential roles in revising the decisions of the commission (p. 59). However, after several years of the Partition, Radcliffe told a Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan got more than it should have. Then, in 1956, Radcliffe told Feroz Khan Noon in New York that he thought the Ravi River would make a better boundary between India and Pakistan. In fact, Radcliffe has given several different explanations on different occasions. He never explained why he gave the whole or part of five Muslim majority tehsils to India.]
Hodson makes the claim that Radcliffe never explained his awards to anybody, before or after the fact. While Mountbatten told Hodson that he had asked Radcliffe to ensure that the award to Pakistan was balanced based on both West Punjab and East Bengal taken together, Radcliffe did not remember having even this conversation with Mountbatten. Hodson does not mention any influence of VP Menon on Radcliffe.
I have not quoted an Indian author on the matter, only Hodson, on the basis that there is likely to be less bias than with an Indian author. So, you may want to read VP Menon’s books as well as those by other Indian authors to see what the Indian viewpoint is. You might feel that the British and Indian viewpoint coincide but then that is a conspiracy theory I cannot disprove.
[There is something more that we need to about the princely states, their rulers, and the role of Mountbatten regarding the future of the princely states. Akbar S. Ahmed (1997:124-5) in his book ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity`` (London: Routledge), based on Mountbattens television series, writes: ``Mountbatten was pushing the rulers of the princely states of India to opt for India or Pakistan in the Chamber of Princes.]
Absolutely true. The Viceroy had two roles: that of governor-general of British territories in India and that of Crown Representative to the princely states. The princes wanted to retain British paramountcy after independence was granted to India and Pakistan so that they would maintain a direct link to the British Commonwealth. Britain, under the Labor Government, wanted to wash its hands off of India. So, the decision was taken that paramountcy would not be transferred to India and/or Pakistan but would lapse on Aug 15, 1947. However, the princely states were integrated into the economic and commercial framework of India. For instance, the railways didn’t snake around the princely states but cut through them to connect, to take one example, Delhi to Madras. Thus, political independence for the states, which is what lapse of paramountcy meant, would have posed serious problems for both India and Pakistan. Secondly, in several princely states, there was the equivalent of the Indian National Congress called the States People Congress agitating for political reform and union with an independent India, whatever form that might take. Independence might have been viable for a few states that had access to the sea but for landlocked states, no matter how big, it was not a viable option. In the State of Travancore, the Dewan who was in favor of independence for the state was stabbed in the streets of the capital for his stand. Thus, political feelings in many states were running high in favor of overthrowing the princes. Any statement about Mountbatten going back on the treaty obligations of the British Raj is just plain baloney because there was no way you could have had democratic rule (by election) in India but not in the princely states. Mountbatten, in telling the princes that it is in their own interests to make whatever deal they could with India and Pakistan, was telling them to look 20 years into the future and try to foresee what it might be like. No question Mountbatten twisted the arms of the Maharajas and Nawabs but it was not in favor of India against Pakistan. In fact, Bahawalpur which butts against Rajasthan in India was never questioned on its accession to Pakistan. Or Kalat or Chitral or Swat.
[Comment: Let me quote something from Akbar S. Ahmed (1997: 127) and leave the matter to you to decide whether Jinnah should have trusted Mountbatten to act as a neutral goveernor-general. Ahmed writes: ``After the first official meeting between Mountbatten and Nehru and the Viceroy wrote: ``Pandit Nehru struck me as most sincere.`` . . . On this occasion, ``they talked as much as anything of Jinnah, of whom Nehru spoke with mingled respect and loathing``. . . . Mountbatten, it seems, had already made up his mind about Jinnah before they had even become acquainted. After his first meeting with Jinnah on 5 April 1947 Mountbatten noted, ``My God, he was cold!`` ]
Didn’t seem to have mattered. He granted Jinnah Pakistan, didn’t he? What he wouldn’t do was not partition Punjab or Bengal. The Sikhs didn’t want to be part of Pakistan, the Hindus of Punjab and Bengal didn’t want to be in Pakistan just as the Muslims of Punjab and Bengal didn’t want to be in India, so the only logical choice was partition of those two provinces, which Jinnah denounced as a moth-eaten Pakistan.
The other thing people overlook is the fact that Jinnah refused to concede that anyone except the Muslim League could represent any of the Muslims of India. After the elections 1945, Jinnah demanded that the Congress should not appoint any Muslims to any of the ministries as that would be the sole privilege of the Muslim League, even though Congress was going to appoint a Muslim and a Backward Class member to the Cabinet out of its own share of ministries. He refused to deal with the President of the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Thus, Jinnah continued to harp on the Hindu-Muslim divide in a destructive fashion to further his own self-aggrandizement.
[Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces.]
It doesn’t matter what Ganguly, Jha or Akbar Ahmed might have to say on this. At least, both sides agree that Pakistan armed and led the tribals in their invasion of Kashmir. Hodson quotes a letter from the British Governor of NWFP to the effect that ``there is some foolishness going on here but you will know what I mean by the time you get this letter.`` It seems that the de-mobbed soldiers from the Poonch area rose against Hari Singh and he could not suppress the rebellion. But what caused India to intervene is the large-scale invasion of the tribals followed by the appeal of Hari Singh for help which was given only after Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession. Hodson quotes from correspondence and minutes of various meetings of the fateful days of Oct 22 - 26, lending credence to his version.
Hodson points out that there was one last chance; that Jinnah had agreed to a united India but Nehru blew it by saying that the Constituent Assembly of India would make its own rules and not respect the parity with Hindus granted to the 30% minority Muslim population of India; at which point Jinnah had no option but to demand partition of the country.
[Comment: Mushtaqur Rahman (1996: 60) writes: ``The boundary was obviously drawn to give India access to the road that passes through Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu. Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage bridge did contribute to India`s occupation of Jammu and even of Poonch, south of Pir Panjal. It was not until the completion of the Banihal Tunnel and the rebuilding of the Banihal Road that Kashmir Valley could be supplied by India on the ground.`` ]
The immediate danger in Kashmir was to Srinagar and the Kashmir valley, not to Jammu. Thus Gurdaspur did not help India in getting troops to Srinagar.
[Comment: In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 1992, Radcliffe`s secretary, Christopher Beaumont, confirmed that the boundary award was manipulated by Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru (DT, February 24, 1999). Mushtaqur Rahman claims that Rao Ayer (assistant secretary to the commission), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and V. P. Menon also played influential roles in revising the decisions of the commission (p. 59). However, after several years of the Partition, Radcliffe told a Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan got more than it should have. Then, in 1956, Radcliffe told Feroz Khan Noon in New York that he thought the Ravi River would make a better boundary between India and Pakistan. In fact, Radcliffe has given several different explanations on different occasions. He never explained why he gave the whole or part of five Muslim majority tehsils to India.]
Hodson makes the claim that Radcliffe never explained his awards to anybody, before or after the fact. While Mountbatten told Hodson that he had asked Radcliffe to ensure that the award to Pakistan was balanced based on both West Punjab and East Bengal taken together, Radcliffe did not remember having even this conversation with Mountbatten. Hodson does not mention any influence of VP Menon on Radcliffe.
I have not quoted an Indian author on the matter, only Hodson, on the basis that there is likely to be less bias than with an Indian author. So, you may want to read VP Menon’s books as well as those by other Indian authors to see what the Indian viewpoint is. You might feel that the British and Indian viewpoint coincide but then that is a conspiracy theory I cannot disprove.
[There is something more that we need to about the princely states, their rulers, and the role of Mountbatten regarding the future of the princely states. Akbar S. Ahmed (1997:124-5) in his book ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity`` (London: Routledge), based on Mountbattens television series, writes: ``Mountbatten was pushing the rulers of the princely states of India to opt for India or Pakistan in the Chamber of Princes.]
Absolutely true. The Viceroy had two roles: that of governor-general of British territories in India and that of Crown Representative to the princely states. The princes wanted to retain British paramountcy after independence was granted to India and Pakistan so that they would maintain a direct link to the British Commonwealth. Britain, under the Labor Government, wanted to wash its hands off of India. So, the decision was taken that paramountcy would not be transferred to India and/or Pakistan but would lapse on Aug 15, 1947. However, the princely states were integrated into the economic and commercial framework of India. For instance, the railways didn’t snake around the princely states but cut through them to connect, to take one example, Delhi to Madras. Thus, political independence for the states, which is what lapse of paramountcy meant, would have posed serious problems for both India and Pakistan. Secondly, in several princely states, there was the equivalent of the Indian National Congress called the States People Congress agitating for political reform and union with an independent India, whatever form that might take. Independence might have been viable for a few states that had access to the sea but for landlocked states, no matter how big, it was not a viable option. In the State of Travancore, the Dewan who was in favor of independence for the state was stabbed in the streets of the capital for his stand. Thus, political feelings in many states were running high in favor of overthrowing the princes. Any statement about Mountbatten going back on the treaty obligations of the British Raj is just plain baloney because there was no way you could have had democratic rule (by election) in India but not in the princely states. Mountbatten, in telling the princes that it is in their own interests to make whatever deal they could with India and Pakistan, was telling them to look 20 years into the future and try to foresee what it might be like. No question Mountbatten twisted the arms of the Maharajas and Nawabs but it was not in favor of India against Pakistan. In fact, Bahawalpur which butts against Rajasthan in India was never questioned on its accession to Pakistan. Or Kalat or Chitral or Swat.
[Comment: Let me quote something from Akbar S. Ahmed (1997: 127) and leave the matter to you to decide whether Jinnah should have trusted Mountbatten to act as a neutral goveernor-general. Ahmed writes: ``After the first official meeting between Mountbatten and Nehru and the Viceroy wrote: ``Pandit Nehru struck me as most sincere.`` . . . On this occasion, ``they talked as much as anything of Jinnah, of whom Nehru spoke with mingled respect and loathing``. . . . Mountbatten, it seems, had already made up his mind about Jinnah before they had even become acquainted. After his first meeting with Jinnah on 5 April 1947 Mountbatten noted, ``My God, he was cold!`` ]
Didn’t seem to have mattered. He granted Jinnah Pakistan, didn’t he? What he wouldn’t do was not partition Punjab or Bengal. The Sikhs didn’t want to be part of Pakistan, the Hindus of Punjab and Bengal didn’t want to be in Pakistan just as the Muslims of Punjab and Bengal didn’t want to be in India, so the only logical choice was partition of those two provinces, which Jinnah denounced as a moth-eaten Pakistan.
The other thing people overlook is the fact that Jinnah refused to concede that anyone except the Muslim League could represent any of the Muslims of India. After the elections 1945, Jinnah demanded that the Congress should not appoint any Muslims to any of the ministries as that would be the sole privilege of the Muslim League, even though Congress was going to appoint a Muslim and a Backward Class member to the Cabinet out of its own share of ministries. He refused to deal with the President of the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Thus, Jinnah continued to harp on the Hindu-Muslim divide in a destructive fashion to further his own self-aggrandizement.
[Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces.]
It doesn’t matter what Ganguly, Jha or Akbar Ahmed might have to say on this. At least, both sides agree that Pakistan armed and led the tribals in their invasion of Kashmir. Hodson quotes a letter from the British Governor of NWFP to the effect that ``there is some foolishness going on here but you will know what I mean by the time you get this letter.`` It seems that the de-mobbed soldiers from the Poonch area rose against Hari Singh and he could not suppress the rebellion. But what caused India to intervene is the large-scale invasion of the tribals followed by the appeal of Hari Singh for help which was given only after Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession. Hodson quotes from correspondence and minutes of various meetings of the fateful days of Oct 22 - 26, lending credence to his version.
Hodson points out that there was one last chance; that Jinnah had agreed to a united India but Nehru blew it by saying that the Constituent Assembly of India would make its own rules and not respect the parity with Hindus granted to the 30% minority Muslim population of India; at which point Jinnah had no option but to demand partition of the country.
#78 Posted by jay on October 24, 1999 6:18:15 pm
Ayub khan had to go to tashkent, bhutto had to go to simla, they were impelled by the set of events, they were victims of history, they had the ball and chain of history, the mill stone of kashmir on their necks, blikers of TNT.
Lahore is a different story, no one compelled NS to go there, there was more than 30 years of peace under the shadow of nuclear weapons, he was aware of what is happening to the economy, the holy cow eating all the food, may be just may he thought, let us change history. He new that the istitutions of pakistan cannot be trusted in this, he started the `track 2` diplomacy, he had spectacular success. I trust the words of now much ,maligned, niaz naik, that the final settlement was only months away, it involved some adjustments of LOC, and conversion of LOC into onternational border.
May be more than any pakistani, he knew his position in the history of south asia, he had the courage look back at the history and dared to make one. I cannot forsee any solution to indo-pak situation other than the one arrived at by NS.
It is time for the historians and the veracity police of chowk to look at the dominant paradigms that guide international support. One has to create a human drama, refugees in bosnia, masaccres in Timor, civil war in sirra leone. If pakistan wants an alternate solution to the above, attempts should be made to create that, i cannot see pakistan having the vision to undertake that.
Here is one idea for pakistan to consider. Recruit the hindus of pakistan and send them on a mission to influence the hindus of kashmere so that they attack the muslims, a la bosnia, the muslims flood to azad kashmere, world demand and acquisience for pak operation in kashmere, a la bangladesh, kashmere is liberated and the pakistanis live happily ever after.
Recognised military operation is unlikely to succeed, even with the bomb, mujahideen attacking the military patrols, secretariates and killig of the candidates for the recent elections will only confirm the pak interference for which there can be no international support. There is an option, which BB mentioned, 100,000 battle hardened afghan mujahideen storming kashmere. For a similar tactic by the iranians, iraq had to use poison gas. There are military experts on the chowk, it could be an option, now that the kargil supporters have come to the fore in pakistan.
For the historians, it would be a good aspect to ponder. In the history written by pak tenured professors, NS will be a corrupt politician who tried to undermine the sacrosanct military. They will ignore the kargill, they will ignore the fact that the coup was underway befor the plane landed, they will ignore that the TV stations were taken over long before, they will ignore the apparent `autonomy` of the troops and they will never link it to kashmere.
From an indian perspective, NS will remain a man of vision, who uttered the taboo, peace, and the military sabotaged him, he needed to control and manage military so that he could change history.
The veracity police of chowk will read and quote only the pak version to seek tenure, the barbers of india will talk of the indian version.
#77 Posted by concerned on October 24, 1999 11:57:41 am
jay:
your pragmatism and forward thinking are laudable. what are you proposing in kashmir?
your pragmatism and forward thinking are laudable. what are you proposing in kashmir?
#76 Posted by bahmad on October 24, 1999 1:36:21 am
In response to Pu Li (Reply #: 73):
Dear Pu Li:
Thank you for a very informative post. I am not an expert on the history of Partition and the issue of Kashmir. You have raised some issues for which I personally have not formed my own opinions. So, my response is based on what other have written, as well as my common sense. The ultimate conclusion of this exercise is that the history of South Asia is very messy, and it will remain messy until we really decide to resolve our problems on the basis of goodness, friendship, trust, fairness, equality, and other necessary virtues. These virtues are often incompatible with politics.
You suggest that Hodson`s book gives the ``impression that the British were bending over backwards in order to be neutral and were trying their best to push India into independence as opposed to actually trying to retain power for some more time.`` You are right that most Indians and Pakistanis do not carry such a positive (in terms of neutrality) image of the colonial British. The most popular thesis is that of ``divide and rule.``
The British may not have been neutral or they may have used the policy of divide and rule in the interest of the Raj, they were not scoundrels with no sense of justice. However, we cannot claim without any fear of contradiction that they were beyond political-personal influence and manipulation. It is plausible that Mountbatten proposed Nehru to take the matter of Kashmir to the Security Council of the United Nations as the best viable option.
If Hodgson has exploded several myths about the Partition prevalent in Pakistan, we cannot simply take Hodgson`s word as final. I think, there are many aspects of our history which will be sorted out in due course of time with good critical scholarship.
Pu Li, you wrote: ``The first [myth] is that Muslim-majority Gurdaspur district was given to India so that India would have a land route to Kashmir. Hodson points out that no roads existed from Gurdaspur district into Kashmir in 1947 and the existing roads were all from Pakistan, and the Indian troops had to be airlifted to Srinagar.`` Comment: Mushtaqur Rahman (1996: 60) writes: ``The boundary was obviously drawn to give India access to the road that passes through Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu. Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage bridge did contribute to India`s occupation of Jammu and even of Poonch, south of Pir Panjal. It was not until the completion of the Banihal Tunnel and the rebuilding of the Banihal Road that Kashmir Valley could be supplied by India on the ground.``
Then you state: ``The other [myth] is that Mountbatten influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe in the Boundary Commission`s awards. Radcliffe didn`t attend the hearings of the Boundary Commission most of the time but read the commission`s proceedings every night and, when the Indian and Pakistani commissioners didn`t agree on a specific boundary, he drew the line based on the minutes of the hearings. Radcliffe drew the lines based, but not exclusively, on population, taking into consideration other factors.`` Comment: In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 1992, Radcliffe`s secretary, Christopher Beaumont, confirmed that the boundary award was manipulated by Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru (DT, February 24, 1999). Mushtaqur Rahman claims that Rao Ayer (assistant secretary to the commission), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and V. P. Menon also played influential roles in revising the decisions of the commission (p. 59). However, after several years of the Partition, Radcliffe told a Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan got more than it should have. Then, in 1956, Radcliffe told Feroz Khan Noon in New York that he thought the Ravi River would make a better boundary between India and Pakistan. In fact, Radcliffe has given several different explanations on different occasions. He never explained why he gave the whole or part of five Muslim majority tehsils to India. Andrew Roberts (1994: 97) in his book ``Eminent Churchillians`` (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) quotes Mountbatten saying ``I`ll tell you something ghastly. The reasons behind his [Radcliffe] Awards weren`t very deep-seated at all.`` There is something more that we need to about the princely states, their rulers, and the role of Mountbatten regarding the future of the princely states. Akbar S. Ahmed (1997:124-5) in his book ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity`` (London: Routledge), based on Mountbattens television series, writes: ``Mountbatten was pushing the rulers of the princely states of India to opt for India or Pakistan in the Chamber of Princes. With one stroke he was going to terminate centuries of history, social obligations and legal treaties. The princes were demanding their own independent grouping--neither India nor Pakistan--on the basis of strong legal, cultural and historical arguments. Some states were as big as European countries and had histories of independent rule at least as old as theirs. Then the Chief Minister to one of the princes announced that his master was on the high seas and could not be consulted. Picking up a crystal paperweight, Mountbatten peered at it. ``A picture is forming,``he murmured. ``Yes, I can see the ruler. He wishes you to sign the agreement.`` Upon hearing this the Chief Minister signed. Others followed suit. The Viceroy played the Pied Piper for the Indian princes.`` What a wonderful saga, as told by Mountbatten himself (I presume)?
Pu Li, you wrote: ``When Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought would be the cost of having separate governors-general, Jinnah replied he understood very well that it may cost Pakistan twenty crores of rupees (at that time, Pakistan`s share of the British Raj`s assets was 55 crores). Mountbatten`s reply was it may cost Pakistan its entire future. Considering how Kashmir has dragged on, one could say that Mountbatten was prescient. If there had been a single governor-general (whoever it was) for both dominions, that person would have to be notified by both cabinets as to their positions and potential courses of action and he would have been in a position to mediate in a neutral fashion.`` Comment: Let me quote something from Akbar S. Ahmed (1997: 127) and leave the matter to you to decide whether Jinnah should have trusted Mountbatten to act as a neutral goveernor-general. Ahmed writes: ``After the first official meeting between Mountbatten and Nehru and the Viceroy wrote: ``Pandit Nehru struck me as most sincere.`` . . . On this occasion, ``they talked as much as anything of Jinnah, of whom Nehru spoke with mingled respect and loathing``. . . . Mountbatten, it seems, had already made up his mind about Jinnah before they had even become acquainted. After his first meeting with Jinnah on 5 April 1947 Mountbatten noted, ``My God, he was cold!`` Not long afterwards he compared Nehru (``a real great man``) and Jinnah (``a megalomaniac``). For additional details about the nature of relationships between Mountbatten and Jinnah, see Akbar S. Ahmad (pp. 116-142).
Your statement: ``As it was, when the news of the tribal invasion of Kashmir reached New Delhi, Mountbatten, in his capacity as Chairman of the Defence Council of India, organized the Indian response, thus giving rise to Churchill`s comments that you mention.`` Comment:
Robert G. Wirsing, University of South Carolina
In a book review of Sumit Ganguly`s book ``The Crisis in Kashmir`` (New York: Cambridge University Press), Professor Robert G. Wirsing of the University of South Carolina wrote something that would clear some air (if we accept Wirsing`s views). Wirsing wrote: ``Equally puzzling is the distortion of events found in Ganguly`s narrative of the invasion of Kashmir by Pashtun tribals--an invasion that lent moral legitimacy to India`s airlifting of troops to the beleaguered ruler of the state. In Ganguly`s rendering, the ``invading column`` (p. 9) of tribesmen, augmented by disguised Pakistani troops, appears to have materialized at the Kashmir State border on October 22 following its participation in a successful rebellion earlier in the month slightly to the south in the Poonch subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir State. Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces. Also objectionable is Ganguly`s suggestion that the ruler of Kashmir, ``caught in a panic`` by the tribal invasion of October 22, appealed at that time for military assistance to the princely ruler of Patiala State. In this claim, Ganguly is given no support either by Lamb, whose version he dismisses, or by Jha (Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947.` Rival Versions of History, 1996), whom he cites approvingly. Jha, anxious to free the Indian government of responsibility for military assistance to the princely ruler of Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion, goes to great lengths, in fact, to demonstrate that the Patiala men were dispatched to Kashmir possibly even before India gained its independence on August 15 but in no case later than the early days of October.``
Pu Li, I am sorry for a belated response.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Dear Pu Li:
Thank you for a very informative post. I am not an expert on the history of Partition and the issue of Kashmir. You have raised some issues for which I personally have not formed my own opinions. So, my response is based on what other have written, as well as my common sense. The ultimate conclusion of this exercise is that the history of South Asia is very messy, and it will remain messy until we really decide to resolve our problems on the basis of goodness, friendship, trust, fairness, equality, and other necessary virtues. These virtues are often incompatible with politics.
You suggest that Hodson`s book gives the ``impression that the British were bending over backwards in order to be neutral and were trying their best to push India into independence as opposed to actually trying to retain power for some more time.`` You are right that most Indians and Pakistanis do not carry such a positive (in terms of neutrality) image of the colonial British. The most popular thesis is that of ``divide and rule.``
The British may not have been neutral or they may have used the policy of divide and rule in the interest of the Raj, they were not scoundrels with no sense of justice. However, we cannot claim without any fear of contradiction that they were beyond political-personal influence and manipulation. It is plausible that Mountbatten proposed Nehru to take the matter of Kashmir to the Security Council of the United Nations as the best viable option.
If Hodgson has exploded several myths about the Partition prevalent in Pakistan, we cannot simply take Hodgson`s word as final. I think, there are many aspects of our history which will be sorted out in due course of time with good critical scholarship.
Pu Li, you wrote: ``The first [myth] is that Muslim-majority Gurdaspur district was given to India so that India would have a land route to Kashmir. Hodson points out that no roads existed from Gurdaspur district into Kashmir in 1947 and the existing roads were all from Pakistan, and the Indian troops had to be airlifted to Srinagar.`` Comment: Mushtaqur Rahman (1996: 60) writes: ``The boundary was obviously drawn to give India access to the road that passes through Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu. Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage bridge did contribute to India`s occupation of Jammu and even of Poonch, south of Pir Panjal. It was not until the completion of the Banihal Tunnel and the rebuilding of the Banihal Road that Kashmir Valley could be supplied by India on the ground.``
Then you state: ``The other [myth] is that Mountbatten influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe in the Boundary Commission`s awards. Radcliffe didn`t attend the hearings of the Boundary Commission most of the time but read the commission`s proceedings every night and, when the Indian and Pakistani commissioners didn`t agree on a specific boundary, he drew the line based on the minutes of the hearings. Radcliffe drew the lines based, but not exclusively, on population, taking into consideration other factors.`` Comment: In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 1992, Radcliffe`s secretary, Christopher Beaumont, confirmed that the boundary award was manipulated by Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru (DT, February 24, 1999). Mushtaqur Rahman claims that Rao Ayer (assistant secretary to the commission), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and V. P. Menon also played influential roles in revising the decisions of the commission (p. 59). However, after several years of the Partition, Radcliffe told a Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan got more than it should have. Then, in 1956, Radcliffe told Feroz Khan Noon in New York that he thought the Ravi River would make a better boundary between India and Pakistan. In fact, Radcliffe has given several different explanations on different occasions. He never explained why he gave the whole or part of five Muslim majority tehsils to India. Andrew Roberts (1994: 97) in his book ``Eminent Churchillians`` (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) quotes Mountbatten saying ``I`ll tell you something ghastly. The reasons behind his [Radcliffe] Awards weren`t very deep-seated at all.`` There is something more that we need to about the princely states, their rulers, and the role of Mountbatten regarding the future of the princely states. Akbar S. Ahmed (1997:124-5) in his book ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity`` (London: Routledge), based on Mountbattens television series, writes: ``Mountbatten was pushing the rulers of the princely states of India to opt for India or Pakistan in the Chamber of Princes. With one stroke he was going to terminate centuries of history, social obligations and legal treaties. The princes were demanding their own independent grouping--neither India nor Pakistan--on the basis of strong legal, cultural and historical arguments. Some states were as big as European countries and had histories of independent rule at least as old as theirs. Then the Chief Minister to one of the princes announced that his master was on the high seas and could not be consulted. Picking up a crystal paperweight, Mountbatten peered at it. ``A picture is forming,``he murmured. ``Yes, I can see the ruler. He wishes you to sign the agreement.`` Upon hearing this the Chief Minister signed. Others followed suit. The Viceroy played the Pied Piper for the Indian princes.`` What a wonderful saga, as told by Mountbatten himself (I presume)?
Pu Li, you wrote: ``When Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought would be the cost of having separate governors-general, Jinnah replied he understood very well that it may cost Pakistan twenty crores of rupees (at that time, Pakistan`s share of the British Raj`s assets was 55 crores). Mountbatten`s reply was it may cost Pakistan its entire future. Considering how Kashmir has dragged on, one could say that Mountbatten was prescient. If there had been a single governor-general (whoever it was) for both dominions, that person would have to be notified by both cabinets as to their positions and potential courses of action and he would have been in a position to mediate in a neutral fashion.`` Comment: Let me quote something from Akbar S. Ahmed (1997: 127) and leave the matter to you to decide whether Jinnah should have trusted Mountbatten to act as a neutral goveernor-general. Ahmed writes: ``After the first official meeting between Mountbatten and Nehru and the Viceroy wrote: ``Pandit Nehru struck me as most sincere.`` . . . On this occasion, ``they talked as much as anything of Jinnah, of whom Nehru spoke with mingled respect and loathing``. . . . Mountbatten, it seems, had already made up his mind about Jinnah before they had even become acquainted. After his first meeting with Jinnah on 5 April 1947 Mountbatten noted, ``My God, he was cold!`` Not long afterwards he compared Nehru (``a real great man``) and Jinnah (``a megalomaniac``). For additional details about the nature of relationships between Mountbatten and Jinnah, see Akbar S. Ahmad (pp. 116-142).
Your statement: ``As it was, when the news of the tribal invasion of Kashmir reached New Delhi, Mountbatten, in his capacity as Chairman of the Defence Council of India, organized the Indian response, thus giving rise to Churchill`s comments that you mention.`` Comment:
Robert G. Wirsing, University of South Carolina
In a book review of Sumit Ganguly`s book ``The Crisis in Kashmir`` (New York: Cambridge University Press), Professor Robert G. Wirsing of the University of South Carolina wrote something that would clear some air (if we accept Wirsing`s views). Wirsing wrote: ``Equally puzzling is the distortion of events found in Ganguly`s narrative of the invasion of Kashmir by Pashtun tribals--an invasion that lent moral legitimacy to India`s airlifting of troops to the beleaguered ruler of the state. In Ganguly`s rendering, the ``invading column`` (p. 9) of tribesmen, augmented by disguised Pakistani troops, appears to have materialized at the Kashmir State border on October 22 following its participation in a successful rebellion earlier in the month slightly to the south in the Poonch subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir State. Indian and Pakistani accounts of the facts of this invasion disagree violently; but there is widespread agreement that a significant portion of the tribesmen were recruited for the invasion in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier Province, that they were transported to the Kashmir State border in trucks and busses through Pakistan`s Hazara district, and that at the border they were joined by rebellious Muslims from Poonch and from the Jammu and Kashmir State forces. Also objectionable is Ganguly`s suggestion that the ruler of Kashmir, ``caught in a panic`` by the tribal invasion of October 22, appealed at that time for military assistance to the princely ruler of Patiala State. In this claim, Ganguly is given no support either by Lamb, whose version he dismisses, or by Jha (Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947.` Rival Versions of History, 1996), whom he cites approvingly. Jha, anxious to free the Indian government of responsibility for military assistance to the princely ruler of Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion, goes to great lengths, in fact, to demonstrate that the Patiala men were dispatched to Kashmir possibly even before India gained its independence on August 15 but in no case later than the early days of October.``
Pu Li, I am sorry for a belated response.
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
#75 Posted by jay on October 24, 1999 1:36:21 am
History, history more of history, what mounbatten thouight of , what nehrue did do and what jinnah didnt do. Where is it leading to, they are only hollow words about dead people who can no longer defend. It is good for the academic, the prolific quotes on the chowk gives me the impression that chowk is part of the `citation index` computation, may the academic here can get tenure bsed on it.
``verous people have interpreted history in various ways, the NEED THOUGH IS TO CHANGE IT`.
I can give an example of change in the 3000 year history of hinduism, by a few who believed in the above quote.
Guruvayoo is one of the `holiest` temples in kerala. 20 years ago an untouchable was appointed as the head priest of the temple. One should realise that in the 3000 year old hindu tradition, untouchable is subhuman, he is below the lowest caste, he is outside the caste system.
This happened in kerala, a state marred by the immortal words of vivekananda, `it is a mad house`. Plight of the untouchable is in the hidu mythology, the story of Eklavya, an untouchable who dared to learn archery, had his thumb chopped off by the alleged guru, so that he can never pracice it.
Yes, untouchability is part of the hindu history, it is part of the hindu mythology. Yet, some one said, what is the use of repeating history, what is the use of asking scolarly interpretations, let us change.
If untouchables are subhuman according to the hindu history, let us give him the highest job, again, according to the history.
Yes, it changed history, nobdy in karala cares a damn about the caste of the priest, it has become a non issue.
Of course, the people involved were not academics, seeking citation index, they were not history buffs, they new that version of history from a pro at priceston was no superior to the version from the local barber, they were not feudals and position seekers, they saw a problem, assessed what can be done, and simply did it.
When will the TNT theorists wake up, assess the geo-political situation, and just do it, not the Nike way.
#74 Posted by bahmad on October 23, 1999 2:37:01 pm
In response (Reply #: 72):
Dear Irfan Ahmed:
Thank you for your kind note, I commend you for your ability to think better. However, I personally feel that we cannot take out Pakistan from its mess by emotionalism. Control of emotions is one of the first steps toward winning a war. We need to declare our war against deference and slavery (lack of freedom of minds, bodies, and spirits, unfairness and unequal distribution of wealth, poverty and hunger, ignorance (lack of education), poor health and diseases, unsanitary living and working conditions, lack of clean air and water, environmental degradation, and above all our fast growing population. All these tasks are extremely difficult and we need to have a good political system to slowly and gradually get out this rut. Of course, accountability is a fundamental requirement of a political system. A Bangladeshi friend has so aptly said recently (on Chowk) that democracy is ``not only about honesty or absence of corruption; it is also about plurality, moderation, personal freedom, and institutional accountability.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. I am glad that you have access to books on Pakistan. Please write me at bahmad@home.com and we will go from there. I also live in the US.
Dear Irfan Ahmed:
Thank you for your kind note, I commend you for your ability to think better. However, I personally feel that we cannot take out Pakistan from its mess by emotionalism. Control of emotions is one of the first steps toward winning a war. We need to declare our war against deference and slavery (lack of freedom of minds, bodies, and spirits, unfairness and unequal distribution of wealth, poverty and hunger, ignorance (lack of education), poor health and diseases, unsanitary living and working conditions, lack of clean air and water, environmental degradation, and above all our fast growing population. All these tasks are extremely difficult and we need to have a good political system to slowly and gradually get out this rut. Of course, accountability is a fundamental requirement of a political system. A Bangladeshi friend has so aptly said recently (on Chowk) that democracy is ``not only about honesty or absence of corruption; it is also about plurality, moderation, personal freedom, and institutional accountability.``
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
P.S. I am glad that you have access to books on Pakistan. Please write me at bahmad@home.com and we will go from there. I also live in the US.
#73 Posted by Pu Li on October 23, 1999 10:13:04 am
Re Bilal Ahmad #71:
When you read HV Hodson`s book, you get the impression that the British were bending over backwards in order to be neutral and were trying their best to push India into independence as opposed to actually trying to retain power for some more time. Even if this interpretation is correct, the fact remains that Britain actually found it could not hold on to the subcontinent. So, I accept that Hodson has painted the British in better terms than Indians and Pakistanis think of them.
Mountbatten would have liked to be the first governor-geneal of both Pakistan and India. In such a case, he would have to be totally neutral between the two dominions. However, as a constitutional head-of-state of India only, he had to accept the advice of his Council of Ministers; hence, in Pakistani eyes, he was partial toward India. But after Aug 15, 1947, Mountbatten had no choice. The book points out, though, several instances where he prevailed upon Nehru and Sardar Patel to be more generous toward Pakistan than they wanted to be.
Several myths about the Partition prevalent in Pakistan are exploded in the book. The first is that Muslim-majority Gurdaspur district was given to India so that India would have a land route to Kashmir. Hodson points out that no roads existed from Gurdaspur district into Kashmir in 1947 and the existing roads were all from Pakistan, and the Indian troops had to be airlifted to Srinagar. The other is that Mountbatten influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe in the Boundary Commission`s awards. Radcliffe didn`t attend the hearings of the Boundary Commission most of the time but read the commission`s proceedings every night and, when the Indian and Pakistani commissioners didn`t agree on a specific boundary, he drew the line based on the minutes of the hearings. Radcliffe drew the lines based, but not exclusively, on population, taking into consideration other factors. The Chittagong Hill Tracts went to Pakistan, on the basis that they were more closely linked economically to East Bengal (all the roads there led into East Bengal, not Assam), though the tribals were non-Muslims. Similarly, in Punjab he took into account natural boundaries such as rivers and canals to the extent possible. Lahore with a Sikh/Hindu majority went to Pakistan and Amritsar with a Muslim majority went to India.
Hodson doesn`t spare Indian or Pakistani leaders in his analysis. When Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought would be the cost of having separate governors-general, Jinnah replied he understood very well that it may cost Pakistan twenty crores of rupees (at that time, Pakistan`s share of the British Raj`s assets was 55 crores). Mountbatten`s reply was it may cost Pakistan its entire future. Considering how Kashmir has dragged on, one could say that Mountbatten was prescient. If there had been a single governor-general (whoever it was) for both dominions, that person would have to be notified by both cabinets as to their positions and potential courses of action and he would have been in a position to mediate in a neutral fashion. As it was, when the news of the tribal invasion of Kashmir reached New Delhi, Mountbatten, in his capacity as Chairman of the Defence Council of India, organized the Indian response, thus giving rise to Churchill`s comments that you mention. He was of course the villain in some Indian eyes because he asked, and Nehru accepted, that the accession of Kashmir be provisional subject to ascertaining the wishes of the populace. He also persuaded Nehru to refer the dispute to the UN where Sir Zafrullah Khan argued the Pakistani case so brilliantly that the UN ignored the fact that India`s case on Kashmir was legally sound. (It wasn`t, in the case of Junagadh. But Pakistan played its cards very well, indirectly telling India that Kashmir and Hyderabad would be the price India would have to pay for taking Junagadh.)
The issue is that India considered itself the successor state to the British Raj and wanted to inherit the British powers of paramountcy over the princely states. In which case, with the exception of Kalat, Bahawalpur, Swat, Chitral, etc., which were all either well inside the Pakistani landmass or totally Muslim in population, India would have had control over the rest of India. The Maharaja of Kashmir would have had an Indian resident instead of a British resident as would the Nawab of Junagadh. When the British refused to transfer paramountcy to India and Pakistan, both dominions went about getting as many princely states to sign the instruments of accession as possible. If Hari Singh of Kashmir had not hesitated, there would be no Kashmir problem today.
Pakistan always attempted to gain parity for Muslims with Hindus. With Muslims amounting to 30% of the total population of India, the Muslim League demanded equal representation at the Federal level. When the Congress wouldn`t accept that, the Muslim League demanded separation of the Muslim majority provinces from India into Pakistan. Congress then demanded partition of Punjab and Bengal and, as Jinnah found to his dismay, advanced his own arguments about dominance of the majority over the minority to justify the partition of the provinces. If the provinces had not been partitioned and Kashmir and Hyderabad had gone to Pakistan, then India and Pakistan would have been roughly equal and Jinnah would have achieved the parity that he wanted.
Having lost parity that was so tantalizingly close in 1947 and then losing Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan has suffered severe blows to its national psyche. This is still being played out today. Thus the Pak nuke tests in response to Indian nuke tests and Pakistan`s refusal to accept that China is India`s primary enemy. Thus the Pakistani overspending on its military. Thus the influence of the Pak Army over its civilian insitutions and this, the latest, military coup. Perhaps, this may be the single factor that will continue to determine Pakistan`s future.
When you read HV Hodson`s book, you get the impression that the British were bending over backwards in order to be neutral and were trying their best to push India into independence as opposed to actually trying to retain power for some more time. Even if this interpretation is correct, the fact remains that Britain actually found it could not hold on to the subcontinent. So, I accept that Hodson has painted the British in better terms than Indians and Pakistanis think of them.
Mountbatten would have liked to be the first governor-geneal of both Pakistan and India. In such a case, he would have to be totally neutral between the two dominions. However, as a constitutional head-of-state of India only, he had to accept the advice of his Council of Ministers; hence, in Pakistani eyes, he was partial toward India. But after Aug 15, 1947, Mountbatten had no choice. The book points out, though, several instances where he prevailed upon Nehru and Sardar Patel to be more generous toward Pakistan than they wanted to be.
Several myths about the Partition prevalent in Pakistan are exploded in the book. The first is that Muslim-majority Gurdaspur district was given to India so that India would have a land route to Kashmir. Hodson points out that no roads existed from Gurdaspur district into Kashmir in 1947 and the existing roads were all from Pakistan, and the Indian troops had to be airlifted to Srinagar. The other is that Mountbatten influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe in the Boundary Commission`s awards. Radcliffe didn`t attend the hearings of the Boundary Commission most of the time but read the commission`s proceedings every night and, when the Indian and Pakistani commissioners didn`t agree on a specific boundary, he drew the line based on the minutes of the hearings. Radcliffe drew the lines based, but not exclusively, on population, taking into consideration other factors. The Chittagong Hill Tracts went to Pakistan, on the basis that they were more closely linked economically to East Bengal (all the roads there led into East Bengal, not Assam), though the tribals were non-Muslims. Similarly, in Punjab he took into account natural boundaries such as rivers and canals to the extent possible. Lahore with a Sikh/Hindu majority went to Pakistan and Amritsar with a Muslim majority went to India.
Hodson doesn`t spare Indian or Pakistani leaders in his analysis. When Mountbatten asked Jinnah what he thought would be the cost of having separate governors-general, Jinnah replied he understood very well that it may cost Pakistan twenty crores of rupees (at that time, Pakistan`s share of the British Raj`s assets was 55 crores). Mountbatten`s reply was it may cost Pakistan its entire future. Considering how Kashmir has dragged on, one could say that Mountbatten was prescient. If there had been a single governor-general (whoever it was) for both dominions, that person would have to be notified by both cabinets as to their positions and potential courses of action and he would have been in a position to mediate in a neutral fashion. As it was, when the news of the tribal invasion of Kashmir reached New Delhi, Mountbatten, in his capacity as Chairman of the Defence Council of India, organized the Indian response, thus giving rise to Churchill`s comments that you mention. He was of course the villain in some Indian eyes because he asked, and Nehru accepted, that the accession of Kashmir be provisional subject to ascertaining the wishes of the populace. He also persuaded Nehru to refer the dispute to the UN where Sir Zafrullah Khan argued the Pakistani case so brilliantly that the UN ignored the fact that India`s case on Kashmir was legally sound. (It wasn`t, in the case of Junagadh. But Pakistan played its cards very well, indirectly telling India that Kashmir and Hyderabad would be the price India would have to pay for taking Junagadh.)
The issue is that India considered itself the successor state to the British Raj and wanted to inherit the British powers of paramountcy over the princely states. In which case, with the exception of Kalat, Bahawalpur, Swat, Chitral, etc., which were all either well inside the Pakistani landmass or totally Muslim in population, India would have had control over the rest of India. The Maharaja of Kashmir would have had an Indian resident instead of a British resident as would the Nawab of Junagadh. When the British refused to transfer paramountcy to India and Pakistan, both dominions went about getting as many princely states to sign the instruments of accession as possible. If Hari Singh of Kashmir had not hesitated, there would be no Kashmir problem today.
Pakistan always attempted to gain parity for Muslims with Hindus. With Muslims amounting to 30% of the total population of India, the Muslim League demanded equal representation at the Federal level. When the Congress wouldn`t accept that, the Muslim League demanded separation of the Muslim majority provinces from India into Pakistan. Congress then demanded partition of Punjab and Bengal and, as Jinnah found to his dismay, advanced his own arguments about dominance of the majority over the minority to justify the partition of the provinces. If the provinces had not been partitioned and Kashmir and Hyderabad had gone to Pakistan, then India and Pakistan would have been roughly equal and Jinnah would have achieved the parity that he wanted.
Having lost parity that was so tantalizingly close in 1947 and then losing Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan has suffered severe blows to its national psyche. This is still being played out today. Thus the Pak nuke tests in response to Indian nuke tests and Pakistan`s refusal to accept that China is India`s primary enemy. Thus the Pakistani overspending on its military. Thus the influence of the Pak Army over its civilian insitutions and this, the latest, military coup. Perhaps, this may be the single factor that will continue to determine Pakistan`s future.
#72 Posted by iahmed on October 23, 1999 9:23:52 am
Dear Mr Bahmad
First of all I want to apologize to you for unnecessary labeling you as ignorant. It is getting harder and harder for me to control my emotions after seeing my country failing many times. I will be careful in the future.
Returning to the topic, you argued that democracy take forms in different parts of the world. What I presented my views about democracy were universal. In every democratic system no matter what form it takes, has an effective accountibilty process in it. Democracy with no accountibilty fails to hold any meaning. The institutions in pakistan that suppose to be the guardians of demoracy were always the pawns in the hands of rulers. Since most of the time army was incharge, it delibrately made these institutes subservient to their interest. It never intended to make them independent so they could provide justice without discriminating. The greed to acquire power by our rulers at all cost made institutions like police and courts extremely corrupt. Due to these reasons our people are deprived of justice and even cold-blooded murders by influentials go unchecked. The reason for all this is lack of democracy. So when you mentioned that my concept of accountibilty is narrow this is because you failed to see the whole picture. Accountibility can only be effective if our institutes of justice are strong and are under nobody`s influence. And this is only possible under democracy. When you said that murders and wroungdoings comitted my states go unchecked it is due to the resons I have mentioned above. Democracy is not resposible for the mess created by dictators. It can clean up the mess but only if made to work to its full efficiency. This continuation of repeated coups will not solve anything rather they will aggrivate the whole situation. The institutions will remain loyal to the rulers and there will be no justice.
TO Heba-Sameen,
Its and honor for me that you considered my post ``insightful`` after severely condomming me for being a wannabe Indian. I have been living in US for the last 4 years and since then I have visited Pakistan thrice. Beside I read newspapers regularly. Thanks to information superhighway. My university where I am studying has a nice collection of books on pakistan by various Pakistani and foreign authors. So I have been quite informed about the mess back home. You considered corruption as the most common link as to the army rule. Corruption as a whole is a problem faced my all sorts of governments whether democratic or theocratic. In what kind of system it is checked and stopped? It is only democracy. In other systems accountibility remains servant to the rulers and they use it on their own discretion. Please refer to my reply to Mr Bahmad reguarding the failier of democracy for keeping check on corruption. I don`t see any hope whether army will root out our problems. And lastly please reply to Mr Concerned as he has asked you an excellent question.
Irfan Ahmed
First of all I want to apologize to you for unnecessary labeling you as ignorant. It is getting harder and harder for me to control my emotions after seeing my country failing many times. I will be careful in the future.
Returning to the topic, you argued that democracy take forms in different parts of the world. What I presented my views about democracy were universal. In every democratic system no matter what form it takes, has an effective accountibilty process in it. Democracy with no accountibilty fails to hold any meaning. The institutions in pakistan that suppose to be the guardians of demoracy were always the pawns in the hands of rulers. Since most of the time army was incharge, it delibrately made these institutes subservient to their interest. It never intended to make them independent so they could provide justice without discriminating. The greed to acquire power by our rulers at all cost made institutions like police and courts extremely corrupt. Due to these reasons our people are deprived of justice and even cold-blooded murders by influentials go unchecked. The reason for all this is lack of democracy. So when you mentioned that my concept of accountibilty is narrow this is because you failed to see the whole picture. Accountibility can only be effective if our institutes of justice are strong and are under nobody`s influence. And this is only possible under democracy. When you said that murders and wroungdoings comitted my states go unchecked it is due to the resons I have mentioned above. Democracy is not resposible for the mess created by dictators. It can clean up the mess but only if made to work to its full efficiency. This continuation of repeated coups will not solve anything rather they will aggrivate the whole situation. The institutions will remain loyal to the rulers and there will be no justice.
TO Heba-Sameen,
Its and honor for me that you considered my post ``insightful`` after severely condomming me for being a wannabe Indian. I have been living in US for the last 4 years and since then I have visited Pakistan thrice. Beside I read newspapers regularly. Thanks to information superhighway. My university where I am studying has a nice collection of books on pakistan by various Pakistani and foreign authors. So I have been quite informed about the mess back home. You considered corruption as the most common link as to the army rule. Corruption as a whole is a problem faced my all sorts of governments whether democratic or theocratic. In what kind of system it is checked and stopped? It is only democracy. In other systems accountibility remains servant to the rulers and they use it on their own discretion. Please refer to my reply to Mr Bahmad reguarding the failier of democracy for keeping check on corruption. I don`t see any hope whether army will root out our problems. And lastly please reply to Mr Concerned as he has asked you an excellent question.
Irfan Ahmed
#71 Posted by bahmad on October 23, 1999 2:33:09 am
In response to Pu Li (Reply # 69):
Dear Pu Li:
Your posting also shows you maturity. This is the kind of response that we need to learn to write (even if we disagree with it wholly or partly).
In appreciation of the sameen sisters, your wrote: ``If you want to learn more about the Kashmir problem, I refer you to ``The Great Divide`` by H. V. Hodson. Mr. Hodson was the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy of India (not to Lord Mountbatten but earlier) and has chapters devoted to Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. He had access to Mountbatten`s papers and extensively interviewed Mountbatten`s staff in writing this book some 15 years after the Partition.``
Comment: I have not read H. V. Hodson`s ``The Great Divide.`` Thanks for the tip. I know that H. V. Hodson is a respected scholar. However, if Winston Churchill`s accusation had some merit, as Mountbatten himself told to his biographer, then we must read this book but with caution. Mountbatten said/complained: ``He [Churchill] accused me of having planned and organised the first victory of Hindustan (he refused to call it India) against Pakistan by sending in British trained soldiers and British equipment to crush and oppress the Muslims in Kashmir`` (Philip Ziegler, 1986, Mountbatten: The Official Biography, London: William Collins Sons, page 461).
In his book, ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity,`` Akbar S. Ahmad have provided several reasons to support his thesis that Mountbatten was the first ``Paki basher`` and had damaged Pakistan (see pages 133-142).
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Dear Pu Li:
Your posting also shows you maturity. This is the kind of response that we need to learn to write (even if we disagree with it wholly or partly).
In appreciation of the sameen sisters, your wrote: ``If you want to learn more about the Kashmir problem, I refer you to ``The Great Divide`` by H. V. Hodson. Mr. Hodson was the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy of India (not to Lord Mountbatten but earlier) and has chapters devoted to Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. He had access to Mountbatten`s papers and extensively interviewed Mountbatten`s staff in writing this book some 15 years after the Partition.``
Comment: I have not read H. V. Hodson`s ``The Great Divide.`` Thanks for the tip. I know that H. V. Hodson is a respected scholar. However, if Winston Churchill`s accusation had some merit, as Mountbatten himself told to his biographer, then we must read this book but with caution. Mountbatten said/complained: ``He [Churchill] accused me of having planned and organised the first victory of Hindustan (he refused to call it India) against Pakistan by sending in British trained soldiers and British equipment to crush and oppress the Muslims in Kashmir`` (Philip Ziegler, 1986, Mountbatten: The Official Biography, London: William Collins Sons, page 461).
In his book, ``Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity,`` Akbar S. Ahmad have provided several reasons to support his thesis that Mountbatten was the first ``Paki basher`` and had damaged Pakistan (see pages 133-142).
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
#70 Posted by bahmad on October 23, 1999 2:25:24 am
According to a BBC interview, Munawar Hassan of Jamaat-i-Islami (one of my college mates) said that there is no room for secularism in Pakistan (circa October 21, 1999).
Hamza Alavi, a leading scholar of Pakistani origin, in his article ``Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan,`` while commenting on Zia`s period, wrote:
``To block the path of the PPP returning to power he [Zia] instituted a system of ``partyless democracy.`` Elections were held on a non-party basis in January 1985, with political parties banned and their activists in prison. An exception to this rule was the privilege given to the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Islamic fundamentalist party, which supported Zia throughout, to let its candidates identify themselves as `Islam loving` candidates. Conditions for the Jamaat`s electoral success could not have been more favorable. But the country had had enough of Islamic fundamentalism and the Jamaat was totally routed, a result so humiliating that the Jamaat chief, its Amir, tendered his resignation because of the debacle.``
This passage raises a few question:
Why JI`s performance was so bad despite Zia`s support? Will General`s Musharraf`s apparent support for secularism/liberalism/progressivism provide an ideological base for the JI to consolidate support and outperform all other parties in the next election (if and when held)? Will General Musharraf become our second father of the nation (Atta Pakistan) replicating some of the Turkish reforms?
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
Hamza Alavi, a leading scholar of Pakistani origin, in his article ``Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan,`` while commenting on Zia`s period, wrote:
``To block the path of the PPP returning to power he [Zia] instituted a system of ``partyless democracy.`` Elections were held on a non-party basis in January 1985, with political parties banned and their activists in prison. An exception to this rule was the privilege given to the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Islamic fundamentalist party, which supported Zia throughout, to let its candidates identify themselves as `Islam loving` candidates. Conditions for the Jamaat`s electoral success could not have been more favorable. But the country had had enough of Islamic fundamentalism and the Jamaat was totally routed, a result so humiliating that the Jamaat chief, its Amir, tendered his resignation because of the debacle.``
This passage raises a few question:
Why JI`s performance was so bad despite Zia`s support? Will General`s Musharraf`s apparent support for secularism/liberalism/progressivism provide an ideological base for the JI to consolidate support and outperform all other parties in the next election (if and when held)? Will General Musharraf become our second father of the nation (Atta Pakistan) replicating some of the Turkish reforms?
Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad
#69 Posted by Pu Li on October 23, 1999 2:25:24 am
Hiba and Nehdia Sameen,
Your posts show your abilities to analyze the points, argue logically, and respond in a mature fashion. I am amazed you have been able to keep your emotions in check while writing on such an emotionally charged issue. Hats off to both of you. If only 10% of Pakistani womenhood possess the skills you have demonstrated, Pakistan would be a most formidable country. (Forget the men; they don`t count.)
If you want to learn more about the Kashmir problem, I refer you to ``The Great Divide`` by H. V. Hodson. Mr. Hodson was the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy of India (not to Lord Mountbatten but earlier) and has chapters devoted to Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. He had access to Mountbatten`s papers and extensively interviewed Mountbatten`s staff in writing this book some 15 years after the Partition. He does admit that not having access to Jinnah`s or Nehru`s papers (if such exist) was a handicap in that he had to base some of his analysis on other people`s impressions of those two principal characters in that great drama.
It is ideas that shape nations and words that give form to ideas. The idea of Pakistan as expressed by Jinnah`s words gave rise to the Pakistan nation. One of the things that seem to have rankled Pakistan most is the fact that the other part of the subcontinent chose to call itself India and not Hindustan, though in all the demands for Pakistan, the Muslim League always referred to Hindustan and Pakistan as the two component nations of India. Well into the late 1960s, Dawn used to refer to India as Hindustan. More recently, the name Bharat seems to have taken hold among certain more extreme publications since India uses that as its name in the Hindi language.
Let us look at these names. Hindustan was the name used by Persian invaders to describe the land they were invading. This was also the name chosen by the Moghul emperors as the name of their empire. As such, Hindustan includes most, if not all, of today`s Pakistan and Bangladesh. Hence Pakistanis, by definition, are Hindustanis!
On the other hand, India, meaning the land of the Indus river, applies to today`s Pakistan through which it flows exclusively and certainly not to the nation-state called India. Thus, Pakistanis are Indians as well!
The problem would have been solved if, in 1947, the nation of Pakistan had demanded and got the name India; at least, it would have had logic on its side. It would be the larger Indian population that would have had to explain to the rest of the world where Bharat is! A basic mistake that has caused the Pakistani nation a whole lot of angst.
So, please be patient with Mr. Irfan Ahmad when he said he would prefer, in these dark days, to call himself an Indian. He certainly has geography on his side, if not politics.
Finally, should you two young ladies in the future happen to fall in love with and marry some lucky persons from the other side of the border, I hope you too would be proud to call yourselves Indians, after your adopted country, without losing your identities of being from the land of the Indus river, the nation of Pakistan.
Your posts show your abilities to analyze the points, argue logically, and respond in a mature fashion. I am amazed you have been able to keep your emotions in check while writing on such an emotionally charged issue. Hats off to both of you. If only 10% of Pakistani womenhood possess the skills you have demonstrated, Pakistan would be a most formidable country. (Forget the men; they don`t count.)
If you want to learn more about the Kashmir problem, I refer you to ``The Great Divide`` by H. V. Hodson. Mr. Hodson was the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy of India (not to Lord Mountbatten but earlier) and has chapters devoted to Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. He had access to Mountbatten`s papers and extensively interviewed Mountbatten`s staff in writing this book some 15 years after the Partition. He does admit that not having access to Jinnah`s or Nehru`s papers (if such exist) was a handicap in that he had to base some of his analysis on other people`s impressions of those two principal characters in that great drama.
It is ideas that shape nations and words that give form to ideas. The idea of Pakistan as expressed by Jinnah`s words gave rise to the Pakistan nation. One of the things that seem to have rankled Pakistan most is the fact that the other part of the subcontinent chose to call itself India and not Hindustan, though in all the demands for Pakistan, the Muslim League always referred to Hindustan and Pakistan as the two component nations of India. Well into the late 1960s, Dawn used to refer to India as Hindustan. More recently, the name Bharat seems to have taken hold among certain more extreme publications since India uses that as its name in the Hindi language.
Let us look at these names. Hindustan was the name used by Persian invaders to describe the land they were invading. This was also the name chosen by the Moghul emperors as the name of their empire. As such, Hindustan includes most, if not all, of today`s Pakistan and Bangladesh. Hence Pakistanis, by definition, are Hindustanis!
On the other hand, India, meaning the land of the Indus river, applies to today`s Pakistan through which it flows exclusively and certainly not to the nation-state called India. Thus, Pakistanis are Indians as well!
The problem would have been solved if, in 1947, the nation of Pakistan had demanded and got the name India; at least, it would have had logic on its side. It would be the larger Indian population that would have had to explain to the rest of the world where Bharat is! A basic mistake that has caused the Pakistani nation a whole lot of angst.
So, please be patient with Mr. Irfan Ahmad when he said he would prefer, in these dark days, to call himself an Indian. He certainly has geography on his side, if not politics.
Finally, should you two young ladies in the future happen to fall in love with and marry some lucky persons from the other side of the border, I hope you too would be proud to call yourselves Indians, after your adopted country, without losing your identities of being from the land of the Indus river, the nation of Pakistan.
#68 Posted by concerned on October 23, 1999 2:25:24 am
hiba and sameen:
it is really refreshing to see the likes of you on this board. please keep writing.
i`d only like to ask you one question, and you don`t have to respond if you don`t want to. if mr ahmed had said, `i`d rather call myself an american`, or `i`d rather call myself a british`, instead of `i`d rather call myself an indian`, would you feel equally disgusted with him and for the same reasons?
i wish you the very best of luck to you in everything you do.
it is really refreshing to see the likes of you on this board. please keep writing.
i`d only like to ask you one question, and you don`t have to respond if you don`t want to. if mr ahmed had said, `i`d rather call myself an american`, or `i`d rather call myself a british`, instead of `i`d rather call myself an indian`, would you feel equally disgusted with him and for the same reasons?
i wish you the very best of luck to you in everything you do.
#67 Posted by hiba_sameen on October 22, 1999 6:43:41 am
I thank all the senior members of this board for the encouragement.
Mr. Irfan Ahmed,
Thank you once again for your insightful post. It seems to me that you are quite well-informed about the issues of Pakistan.
The facts you presented are correct and undeniable. You are right in accusing the army of the mistakes it has made. You say that the army rule is the common link in the cases of corruption you have given. As far as I can tell, CORRUPTION in itself has been the common link throughout the HISTORY of Pakistan. In the past, democratic governments have not been any more successful than military governments. If I am wrong, please correct me. If we assume for the sake of argument that martial law will never work, then in comparison, democracy does not seem to be either better or worse!
Once again, your points on Kashmir are correct. However, while India has overtly declared that Kashmir is an integral part of it, Pakistan has been covert in making such statements, and the official stance of Pakistan is a demand for a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Your support of democracy is your personal opinion, which I respect, but when you wished to be an Indian rather than a Pakistani, it was an emotional statement said out of frustration, and if you try to justify it with some sort of logic, you can`t! We do not see eye to eye on this. Let us leave it at that.
After all is said and done, military rule is here to stay, at least for a while. One thing is for sure, if this time our leaders fail to deliver the goods, Pakistan will be in serious trouble. Let us hope for the best for Pakistan and South Asia as a whole.
On a side note, I would like to request the senior members of this board to enlighten me on the history of the Kashmir dispute. I believe both India and Pakistan are biased to an extent, and I would like to hear out both points of view and learn the truth.
Sincerely,
Hiba and Nehdia Sameen
Mr. Irfan Ahmed,
Thank you once again for your insightful post. It seems to me that you are quite well-informed about the issues of Pakistan.
The facts you presented are correct and undeniable. You are right in accusing the army of the mistakes it has made. You say that the army rule is the common link in the cases of corruption you have given. As far as I can tell, CORRUPTION in itself has been the common link throughout the HISTORY of Pakistan. In the past, democratic governments have not been any more successful than military governments. If I am wrong, please correct me. If we assume for the sake of argument that martial law will never work, then in comparison, democracy does not seem to be either better or worse!
Once again, your points on Kashmir are correct. However, while India has overtly declared that Kashmir is an integral part of it, Pakistan has been covert in making such statements, and the official stance of Pakistan is a demand for a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Your support of democracy is your personal opinion, which I respect, but when you wished to be an Indian rather than a Pakistani, it was an emotional statement said out of frustration, and if you try to justify it with some sort of logic, you can`t! We do not see eye to eye on this. Let us leave it at that.
After all is said and done, military rule is here to stay, at least for a while. One thing is for sure, if this time our leaders fail to deliver the goods, Pakistan will be in serious trouble. Let us hope for the best for Pakistan and South Asia as a whole.
On a side note, I would like to request the senior members of this board to enlighten me on the history of the Kashmir dispute. I believe both India and Pakistan are biased to an extent, and I would like to hear out both points of view and learn the truth.
Sincerely,
Hiba and Nehdia Sameen
#66 Posted by Muhammad Imran on October 22, 1999 6:43:41 am
I would be grateful to you if you provide me the e-mail address of Gen. Pervaiz Musharaf , Chief Executive of Pakistan.
Thank You
Thank You
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