Hegemony of the Ruling Elite in Pakistan

Sadhana and Bilal,

Are you suggesting that Pakistan should abandon the Kashmiris, accept the Indian army occupation, accept Indian hegemony in the region, become a vassal state like Bhutan, and essentially roll over and play dead? Living in ignominy and disgrace, is probably better than dying in a blaze of glory, but it will make Tipu Sultan turn in his grave. It will also prove that the Battalion Subedar Major was right when, upset at the listless march up that hill, his ruddy mountain cheeks quivering with emotion, he thundered: “ Shabash! Ye Pak fauj kay jawan a rahe hain ! Oye, mein toh samjha ke Calig ki larkian a rahee hain. Peechay Pher!``.... Not that I have anything against ``college girls``, having chased(courted) a few and finally married one, but I still think of that irascible BSM with fondness.

You asked if war had solved any problems in Africa and Southeast Asia. Let`s see. Do you, for a minute, think that the Vietnamese could have negotiated their freedom from the French and the Americans over Gâteau de Saumon and Dom Perignon or hamburgers and Budweiser. And what about the Algerians – I doubt very much that they could have convinced the French to leave by beating them in an haute gastronomy contest!

As for Bilal`s lamentation, that the Americans are somehow less than human because they believe that dropping the atomic bombs was necessary, conveniently ignores the fact that the bombs did end the war, which should be the objective of any blue-blood pacifist.

bahmad #128

Dear Bilal,

I agree with you that there is really no just war. I just didnot want to feed into the commonly held misconception in the Indo-Pak context that talking of peace is a sign of lack of valor or lack of moral fibre. Also I feel some posters do look for moral validations of their hatred from their perceived enemies.

Sadhana

In response to sadna (Reply # 127)

Dear Sadhana:

My statement that ``War is a failure of our intellect which we don`t believe to possess`` requires a little more thinking and understanding. I believe, there is no such thing as a ``just war`` because if their is justice there won`t be a war. Justifications of war are always constructed by those who want to engage in a war for one reason or another. Human beings have a tendency of least effort. It is relatively easy to engage in a war than to make peace.

In the United States there are a lot of people who have been indoctrinated to believe that the dropping of the Atomic bombs was necessary for saving human lives. This thinking, in my view, is unfortunate.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

hamidm #124

In talking of `just` causes, I had deliberately put quotes on `just` to emphasize that the justness of any cause can be very subjective.

``You do make a very compassionate and sincere case against war, and it difficult not to be moved by it, but it does not take into account geo-political realities.``

Instead of looking merely at the Western Hemisphere where decisive force settled the matter many times, and society survived in good enough shape to draw logically and analytically neat conclusions by hindsight, if you look at the African continent and parts of Southeast Asia, almost no geopolitical realities that dictated war could ever be resolved through war. In many parts of the world, the only surviving feature of a previously special and distinct ethnicity is the fact that they are now `locked in a death struggle` with another ethnic group. No ideological culmination has been reached in these wartorn parts of Asia and Africa even after decades of conflict. Noone writes of nobility of war in these parts. It might be revealing that not many writers from these parts are even known, let alone quoted on war, because its likely they never got a chance to contemplate writing, let alone be published.

In context of all this, I think India and Pakistan are special in that there are still links between them that may yet be revived(though personally, I am presently running just a little low on the enthusiasm).

You are still a little too eager to spill your military`s blood. It must be all the martial music you heard in childhood. In school, just the sound of the PT drum used to send our hearts racing and blood pumping(it was meant to, I guess). BTW, I am surprised noone has mentioned the very easy, though much more condemned way of releasing aggression or man`s base instincts these days : the whole range of combat video games including Doom?. Perhaps, someone can write one specific to the subcontinent and give players `religious` `ideological`, `moral` , `military` and `diplomatic` options. And no thanks, I don`t want any share in the profits.

Sadhana

PS: All arguments against war are not to be mistaken for a disinclination to fight if any `geopolitical realities` demand it. This misunderstanding has been common.

Reply #: 117 bahmad

Regarding Roedad Khan´s excellant article that you have quoted, I found the part containing his observations on role of Judiciary the most revealing, indeed shocking. I´ll reproduce it here :

[The question of political succession and legitimacy has plagued the Muslim world since the death of the Prophet (PBUH) in AD 632. The holy Qur`aan is silent beyond saying that Muslims should settle their affairs by mutual consultation. The Prophet had abstained from nominating a successor or laying down any rules of political succession. This has inevitably led to uncertainty, civil wars, wars of succession etc. In actual practice, the question of succession throughout Muslim history was decided not by the qazi but by the length of the contenders` sword and the sharpness of its blade.

On the occasion of the deposition of Caliph Qahir, the qazi, who was sent to attest the documents declaring the former`s abdication, was very upset when the caliph refused to submit. The qazi said, ``What use was it to summon us to a man who had not been forced to submit?`` On hearing this, Ali ibn Isa remarked, ``His conduct is notorious, and therefore, he must be deposed``. To this the qazi replied, ``It is not for us to establish dynasties--that is accomplished by the men of swords. We are only suited and required for attestation.`` Therefore, when Munir validated martial law in 1958 or Anwar ul Haq sanctified Ziaul Haq`s military takeover and usurpation of power, they were both following well-established traditions of Muslim history and were not innovating.]

This raises a few questions. Is the role of Judiciary different in the public view from that of the Judiciary itself ? Did Ardeshir Cowasjee have a point when he said how could one be guilty of contempting an institution which is beneath contempt ? I would hate to believe that !

Rgds

A Question of Minorities: A Question of Humanity and Justice

I cannot forget December 25. On this day Jesus Christ and Mohammad Ali Jinnah were born, and more importantly on this day I celebrate the birthday of my older son (now 29; a smart computer scientist). One common element in Jesus Christ, Quaid-e-Azam, and my son (Omar) is their sense of humanity and justice for all. On June 11, 1999, I published the following letter in the Frontier Post. I dedicate this letter to everyone who believes in the protection of minorities in Pakistan. Following this letter, I want to share a piece written by another old resident of Karachi, Pakistan, who more or less belongs to my age cohort.

Protect minorities, ensure national unity

The Quid-e-Azam was very sensitive to the minority question. In pre-Partition India, particularly during the 1930s and the 1940s, the Muslim minority developed a sense of insecurity. It was this sense of economic, political, and cultural insecurity that eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.

Given the ethno-linguistic setup of Pakistan, the Baluchis, the Pukhtuns, and the Sindhis are some of the leading minority groups. Pakistan, however, is the home of numerous additional minority groups. Majority-minority relations exist in every province of Pakistan. Can we say with pride that the minorities in Pakistan are fully protected against the kind of alienation, oppression, and deprivation that the Indian Muslim minority felt some fifty-two odd years back?

The imagined community of the Indians was shattered in the late 1940s. Can we protect ours in this period of gradual and persistent decadence? If we, as a Pakistani nation, have some hope, then we must find ways to save ourselves from further disintegration. One major step would be to show real concern for our socially and geographically variable economic, political, and cultural insecurities.

Bilal Ahmad,

USA

Dawn Internet Edition

December 25, 1999

A column for Christmas

By Irfan Husain

VERY soon after he took over, General Musharraf spoke out in a refreshingly direct manner against religious extremism. This unambiguous statement was reinforced by his publicly stated admiration for modern secular Turkey`s founder, Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

While many rational Pakistanis here and abroad took some comfort from the general`s straightforward words and waited for action, the religious right immediately attacked these sentiments. Since then, the general and his spokesmen have maintained a discreet silence on the matter. When I mentioned this to a senior member of this government, he repeated the now-familiar plea for more time. But why does the general need more time to enunciate his policy on the status of the minorities, for example? Surely if he can make detailed pronouncements on the state of the economy, he can tell us how he will safeguard the rights of our minorities.

If he would like to hear the voice of a member of this threatened community, let me reproduce below excerpts of an e-mail I received last month from a Pakistani-American reader who now lives safely in the United States. His name is J. Philip, and he was a student at St Patrick`s School, General Musharraf`s alma mater:

``I understand the Chief Executive is from St Pat`s... In any case he wouldn`t be a fanatic like Zia and that`s the good part. I wonder though whether he would do away with divisive laws like the separate electorate laws, something very dear to the hearts of minorities. Also, other laws like the one on blasphemy is again a life and death issue for minorities... I sometimes feel the country has abandoned me with all these laws and I am scared to think about coming back for a visit. This is true for most other minorities I have talked to here. I sometimes wonder how the minorities in Kashmir - since about 25% of Kashmiris are Hindus or Buddhists - would feel about being in a state controlled by Pakistan.

I guess these questions would not be in the minds of anybody given the problems the country faces... For the past 50 years the Kashmir issue has been the issue of supreme importance for which half the country was lost and the rest [remains] mired in poverty. Isn`t it time for a change?``

I think all of us who belong to the majority Muslim population of this country should be ashamed that members of the minority should feel so unsafe in Pakistan that they fear returning to their homes. Even Pakistanis going to India for a visit don`t feel so insecure. This is a truly damning comment on what we have been reduced to as a nation. While we blame Zia for virtually disenfranchising the minorities through his separate electorate ordinance, the fact is that since his death eleven years ago, no civilian government has moved to undo this divisive law. To his credit, Farooq Leghari has included the repeal of separate electorates in his Millat Party`s manifesto, but apart from him, no mainstream politician - even a self-proclaimed liberal like Benazir Bhutto - has raised his or her voice against it.

What J. Philip has said about Kashmiri non-Muslims is also very relevant. While beating our pathetic little drum to raise support for our stance on Kashmir, we fail to consider the fact that given our terrible track record of dealing with our own minorities, the world is hardly likely to entrust the fate of millions of non-Muslims to us. If we can`t safeguard the rights of our Christian, Hindu and Ahmadi citizens, we are clearly incapable of guaranteeing the lives and property of Kashmiri non-Muslims. As it is, Kashmiri mujahideen groups are targeting innocent Hindus, apart from attacking Muslims who do not support them.

Fortunately, bigotry and intolerance are limited to a small number of highly vocal and well-armed fanatics whose influence far exceeds their numbers. After years of financial and administrative support from Zia throughout the Eighties, they have become accustomed to setting the national agenda. Unfortunately, a succession of supine civilian governments just could not summon the gumption to face them down, even though both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had a common interest in confronting and routing these enemies of democracy.

The question now before us is whether the present military government has the will to address this problem. I place this issue very high on any rational set of priorities. Currently, Pakistan is being viewed as a breeding ground of religious intolerance and an exporter of fanatical terrorists. Our image abroad is so awful that few foreigners are willing to risk coming here. When we talk about increasing tourism and foreign investment, we are totally out of touch with reality. As long as the perception in the international community is that Pakistan is a haven for terrorist gangs, only the foolhardy will invest here, or visit these shores for a holiday.

Scores of non-Muslims are currently languishing in jails across the country on trumped-up charges under the Blasphemy Act. Under this Act, it is easy for a couple of people to swear they heard or saw a non-Muslim blaspheme against the holy Prophet (PBUH). Since the automatic punishment for such a crime is death, this has become an easy way to settle old scores or acquire somebody`s property. Also, many Ahmadis have been sentenced for the simple ``crime`` of saying or writing ``Bismillah ir Rahman ir Rahim.`` And yet we take great pleasure if a foreigner manages to recite.

Under such circumstances, it comes as no surprise that J. Philip and his co-religionists should feel threatened in Pakistan. Growing up in Karachi, I, too studied at St Patrick`s around the same time General Musharraf did. Apart from Christians, Parsis and Hindus, we even had a couple of Jews studying with us. Nobody bothered about each other`s faith. We played and fought as boys do, and survived under the ministrations of tough disciplinarians like Father Tony Lobo. When I returned to the school a few years ago out of pure nostalgia, I was shocked to see that there were hardly any non-Muslim names in the class lists on the notice board.

So despite Mr Jinnah`s assurances to the minorities that they would be treated as equal citizens in Pakistan, the sad fact is that we have not kept faith with the founder of the nation. But can General Musharraf undo the harm his uniformed predecessor, General Zia, did not just to the minorities, but to the whole country? Only time will tell, but meanwhile, let me wish my Christian readers a very happy Christmas.

Sadhana

``War is a failure of our intellect which we don`t believe to possess. ``

I don`t know if that is entirely true. War, like diplomacy, is another instrument of settling issues betwen nation-states. Historical precedents stretch all the way back to Mycenea and Troy, and Mecca and Madina. If the Mednians had been content with their thirty seven date palms and a hundred and four camels, and had negotiated a peace with those dastardly Meccans, you can agrue that those poor people wouldn`t be stuck on an airplane in Kandahar! But then, if wishes were horses, beggars would be sipping champaigne with the Agha Khan in Lexington.

You do make a very compassionate and sincere case against war, and it difficult not to be moved by it, but it does not take into account geo-political realities.

``I am not against war for a so-called `just` cause.`` Now, who defines what is a just cause? In my view, myopic as it might be, having been shaped by a life of living in cantonments, Kashmir is a just cause for Pakistan ? If the British are willing to die for two hundred men and four thousand sheep, stuck on a rock in the middle of nowhere, isn`t Kashmir worth a war or two? It is also the root cause of tension with India, which once solved will lead to a thousandyears of peace in the sub-continent.

You said. ``the need for war must be grounded on more than the incompetance or unimaginativeness of those who influence events``. To that I ask : who was more incompetent and unimaginative - Chamberlain or Churchill! The terible carnage of WW-II cold have been avoided with timely military action.

``Its revealing that in the recent Kosovo conflict, public opinion forced Clinton to avoid risking to even a single Amercian life. When will India and Pakistan show as much value for its people`s lives?`` True, but on the flip side of the coin, the objective was to kill as many Serbs as possible - and that is generally the objective in any war. The US has the technology and the ability to depoly ``overwhelming force`` to do what every general dreams of. Pakistan, and India, have to prepare for an eventual military solution to the Kashmir issue. I am not completely ruling out a negotiated settlement if the Pakistanis start eating tofu and bacon, and the Indians stop making those terrible movies and start eating hamburgers, and of course if hell freezes over.

``My personal opinion is that the `sweatshops` of jihad in Pakistan are much more exploitative and more morally indefensible`` - on this I fully agree with you. These sweatshops, run by the fanatical mullahs, must be shut down because they are a tool for political advancement for the religious parties. The business of war should be conducted by the army ( once it gives up running its side-business ) and not by holy warriors looking for carer opportunities and/or houris.

Feudalism and Land Reforms in Pakistan:

Should Musharraf Miss the Oppotunityt?

Here is an excellent feature article on the need for a fresh land reform in Pakistan. Comments welcome.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Dawn Internet Edition

December 25, 1999

The need for fresh land reforms

By Sabih Mohsin

THE feudal system, as inherited by Pakistan at the time of independence, was essentially one of the relics of the British Raj. During the 19th century the British had made, in an attempt to create a class faithful to the Raj, generous grants of lands to local chieftains who had sided with them. Unlike the `jagirs` granted by the Mughals which were given in return for the maintenance of a specified number of troops and which could be withdrawn during the lifetime or after the death of the land-owner, the British had made a permanent settlement causing these holdings to become hereditary estates and the holders to behave like despotic rulers.

Besides collecting rent from the tenants, they extracted a number of taxes which were not legal such as `nazrana` on various occasions and also used them as `begar` or free labour. Men, women and children belonging to the `raiyat` class were given and taken by big landlords at the time of marriages as part of dowry.

Even after more than half a century of Independence, the situation has not changed much, and we often come across reports of bonded labour and private jails maintained by the waderas and molestation of peasant women by them. Neighbouring India abolished `zamindari` in the early years of independence. Even East Pakistan got rid of it in the 1950, as agriculture was a provincial subject. But in the area which is now Pakistan, jagirdars and big landlords so dominated the political scene that no change could be brought about until the country came under its first military rule.

One of the earliest steps taken by the Ayub administration was to set up a Land Reforms Commission. According to the recommendations of the Commission, a ceiling of 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land was fixed. However, a variety of exemptions was allowed, including those in respect of orchards, stud farms, hunting preserves and holdings of religious, charitable and educational societies and trusts. Thus ample loopholes were provided to big landholders to retain much of the land occupied by them. According to one study, the land resumed under those reforms constituted only five per cent of the total landholding in the country.

The second land reforms were promulgated through a Martial Law Regulation in 1972 by Z.A. Bhutto, the civilian Martial Law Administrator. Those reforms appeared to be more egalitarian, but on close examination, one arrives at a different conclusion. The ceiling for individual ownership was fixed at 150 acres of irrigated or 300 acres of unirrigated land or 15,000 produce index units (PIUs), whichever was greater. The limit was subsequently reduced to land equivalent to 12,000 PIUs plus an additional area equivalent to 2,000 PIUs if the landlord owned a tubewell or tractor or both, as of December 20, 1971. Thus the maximum permissible holding became land giving 14,000 PIUs.

Since the produce index unit depends on the productivity of land, the operative ceiling in acres was different for different areas. In the Punjab, a most fertile area, the operative ceiling was 318 acres, while in Sindh it was as high as 519 acres. According to an IBRD (World Bank) survey conducted in 1966, the size of a farm necessary to provide a minimum subsistence for an average family in an irrigated area was five acres. Those operative ceilings, which were for an individual and not for a family, could enable the feudal lord to retain thousands of acres in the names of his family members which would provide him the means for a highly lavish and luxurious living and also with a lot of surplus money to invest in politics from where he could reap further profits.

However, the `elected representatives of the people` who were in fact the big landholders of the country themselves manoeuvred to bypass even these generous ceilings. Consequently, soon after the announcement of reforms, the provincial assemblies of Sindh, the Punjab and the NWFP passed identical amendments to the effect that: (a) transfer of land from owners of land in excess of the ceilings to unmarried or widowed sisters, who did not receive any share in the ancestral land, was allowed if made between March 1, 1967 and December 20, 1971; (b) the provision of additional PIUs for the owners of tubewells and tractors was extended to those who had purchased those items any time after the enforcement date of the reforms; (c) a clause which restricted intra-family transfers of land in excess of the ceilings retroactively to March 1, 1967, was deleted and (d) another provision restricting any one `in the service of Pakistan` not to hold more than 100 acres under certain conditions, was re-worded so as to exempt non-CSP government officers and the members of the national and provincial assemblies from that ceiling.

With the adoption of this legislation, ways were found to keep large parts of land holdings either out of the sphere of application of the reforms or to manipulate the retention of large areas within the family with back-dated paper transfers to female members. Thus, the `representatives of the people` managed to prevent large parts of their huge holdings from being resumed and distributed among the landless peasantry whom they claimed to represent in the assemblies and whose interests they professed to protect.

The foregoing analysis shows how ineffective were the two land reforms in achieving the goal of an equitable distribution of land in the country. It also highlights another fact which is more important: the feudal lords who dominate the assemblies in this country will never allow any measure, howsoever essential for the overall good of the people, to take effect if it happens to be against their own interests.

Since the strength of the feudals has remained undiminished, all sections - the civil administration, the police, the legal system, education and all development work - are plagued by their interference, which is always motivated by self interest. The unmitigated power of the feudals has resulted not only in the prevention of the establishment of true democracy but also in holding back development in some of the sectors so vital for the overall economic uplift of the country.

The aversion of the feudal lords to the spread of education in their own areas is no secret. They fear that education would make the people living as serfs under them aware of their rights and bold enough to resist exploitation. As such they have made every effort to check education from making inroads into the rural areas. Even after 50 years of independence, these vast regions have been kept without adequate educational facilities and whatever do exist have been rendered inoperative through various means.

There are frequent reports of school buildings in villages being used as `autaqs` (visitors rooms) or used by landlords as cattle sheds. Ghost schools which exist only on official records for the purpose of misappropriating public funds as salaries drawn in the names of teachers are also very common. The worst part of the story is that usually no punitive or corrective action is taken in such cases.

Since a major part of Pakistan`s population lives in the rural area, the plight of education there has affected the overall status of the country in this field. A comparison with other countries shows that Pakistan is almost at the bottom. According to a World Bank study, primary school enrolment rate in Pakistan in 1991 was 46 per cent and the secondary school enrolment rate was 21 per cent while the average rate in South Asia was 89 and 39 per cent for the two levels respectively. In Pakistan, the dropout rate for primary schools was above 50 per cent. The adult literacy rate for Pakistan was 35 per cent while for India, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya, China and Sri Lanka it was 48, 54, 78, 69, 73 and 88 per cent respectively.

But it is not education alone to which the feudals are averse. They are against anything that would bring people from outside in contact with the people living on their lands and within their control, because they believe that such interaction would lead to a loosening of their grip. While the government itself is not truly committed because of various factors, including its own feudal connection, whatever effort is made in respect of programmes like rural health services, population planning, building of roads and other rural development schemes are thwarted by the landlords. The result is that Pakistan has a population growth rate much higher than those of many countries in South and South East Asia, and its place with regard to the health status of its population is close to the bottom line.

The situation in respect of elements of physical capital is also not much different. Pakistan has 73 km of road per 1000 persons, while Indonesia, Brazil and Malaysia have 86, 105 and 149 km respectively. Moreover, the road infrastructure in Pakistan consists mainly of ageing and obsolete roads, only 20 per cent of which are in good condition while in other countries, this ratio is above 50 per cent. Drinking water is available in Pakistan to only 75 per cent of the population, mostly urban, though such access in Bangladesh, India and Korea is 98, 81 and 93 per cent respectively.

In the field of economic progress, Pakistan has lagged behind many Asian countries, some of which were only a few decades earlier on the same level of economic development as this country. And the main factor behind this slow progress is the persistent domination of the feudal class. The two land reforms have not at all been able to weaken their power and liberate society from their hold. In fact, their control of government policies and machinery and their exploitation of various institutions to their own advantage has become greater and more visible with the passage of time. There is, therefore, an urgent need for further land reforms.

While introducing fresh reforms, it would be advisable to take into consideration the new realities in agricultural productivity and also to eliminate loopholes that might reduce its effectiveness. For example, it has been observed that in countries like Pakistan, smaller farms give better productivity. The small land holder uses his land more intensively and maximises his returns by the use of more inputs and labour which is abundant. The optimum sizes may be worked out, which would definitely be much smaller than the size of the present holdings, and the new ceilings may be fixed accordingly. To prevent `benami` transfers, it would be prudent to prescribe the limit for a family and not for an individual.

Purposeful land reforms can be introduced and implemented only by a government which is free from the influence of the feudals and the present administration seems to be so. Thus, this is an opportunity which should not be missed.

A Christmas Day Wish

``Peace, Happiness, and Prosperity to Everyone on the Face of the Earth``

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to Zeemax (Reply # 117)

Dear Zeemax:

Pakistan is a mutlicultural society where people belonging to any particular identity are both tolerant and intolerant of the people of another identity. Tolerance creates a sense of belonging, while intolerance reproduces and reinforces a sense of otherness. Common people have often addressed these issues from their own narrow perspectives. A major part of this reason has been pre-existing ethnic identities and a lack of a sense of direction and vision for the nation as a whole.

My parents came to Karachi in 1947 from Delhi, India. My great-grand parents migrated from Gujranwala District to Delhi. My father was born in Delhi. My mother`s forefathers perhaps came to Delhi from Afghanistan some three hundred years ago. I came to Karachi when I was four years of age. My family is an interesting mixture of several cultural backgrounds. In my generation, the immigrants from India disliked to be called as Mohajirs. We always questioned: How long would we remain mohajir? I consider myself as a Pakistani first, and a Karachiite next. This is perhaps the case of a large number of other immigrants from India. In the early 1960s, we felt very proud of the fact Karachi was a true representative of Pakistan -- a cosmopolitan microcosm of Pakistan. We had friends who belonged to diverse ethno-linguistic and other cultural backgrounds.

On a national level, Pakistani society is not without some significant ethno-linguistic meanings and affects. The people in most parts of Pakistan have not yet discovered a formula to stress a true sense of solidarity and to deal with othernesses created as a result of their various ethno-linguistic backgrounds. In Pakistan, there is much room for the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtoons, or Baluchis but little room for the Pakistanis. In this environment, the so-called mohajirs have fallen in the trap of narrow ethno-linguistic identities under the belief that they will have no power unless they become sons/daughters of soil (by asking for a Karachi province) and by becoming hyphenated Pakistanis. Moreover, in the absence of an environment of citizenship and human rights, they have failed to demand their rights as the citizens of Pakistan. In my view, the demand of a separate Karachi province (basically) for the mohajirs is unwise and is grounded in prevailing territorial ethics in Pakistan. I believe, the future of the people of Karachi is tied fairly strongly with people of in other parts of Sindh as well as in other parts of Pakistan.

As the state of Pakistan has been a major employer and an actor in the allocation of national resources, ethno-linguistic differences have played an important role. Asaf Hussain (1979) writes: ``Ethnicity was . . . not a myth. Other studies also reinforce this ethnic bias of the BE [Bureaucratic Elites]. A recent survey revealed that some 49.1 percent of the bureaucrats agreed that they were subject to regional biases in their decision-making, 14.4 percent indicated that it had some influence and only 22.9 percent denied that there was any such bias`` (pp. 64-65). It is a sense of this ethnic bias, a perception of deprivation among the so-called mohajir youth, the role of the repressive state apparatus, and a host of other factors that gave birth and development of the MQM.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Hussain, A. (1979). Elite Politics in An Ideological State. Folkestone, England: Dawson.

There is no need to debate this issue of the elite ruling over Pakistan and their hegemony, because it will never change for the better. Those of us who think that the elite will willingly up their notions of timocracy, in Pakistan, are discussing an utopian nonsense. The present socio-political idiom will not change itself internally and external reforms will be resisted by the elites of the nation.

The dilemma is that Pakistan can not do without the elites for practical reasons, i.e. governing, agriculture etc. unless the army wants to run the country and it can not live with them, because the are a parasite, which is slowly going to bleed the nation dry. What needs to be done is to arrive at an understanding, which clearly and expressly advocates a ``compromise with the devil`` relationship between the people and the elite. In other words live and let live.

It is sheer non-sense to think that Pakistan will ever be free from the shadow of the timocrats who rule Pakistan as a personal fiefdom. Nothing is going to happen in Pakistan for the better, because Pakistanis are their own worst enemies and they are, it seems, determined to destroy this nation for their own petty myopic self-interests.

Nothing less than an inspired act of God can now save Pakistan from its own folly and it no coincidence that this nation has lasted so long. God must really shine his grace on this nation, because He refuses to let this nation be destroyed despite the avowed intentions of Pakistanis to seek it ruin from their delibrately short sighted polices.

Merry Christmas Everyone!!!

Interesting observation by Pervaiz Musharraf reported today in the papers :

In Lahore yesterday a journalist asked him why did he take on such a huge responsibility on Oct 12. He narrated an anecdote in response .. about a child who fell into a well and a man jumped after him and saved his life. When people commended that person for that brave act, he said .. but I want to know who pushed me into the well..

Pervaiz Musharraf added that in his case the exception was that he knew who pushed him !

By saying that, was he referring to the ex-government ? Or was he referring to Generals Aziz and Mehmood ?

I wish Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif a happy 50th birthday and many happy returns. Not a happy situation as of now but it will change Mian Saheb.

Sincerely,

Zeemax

In response to temporal (Reply #: 112)

Dear temporal:

Thank you for your comment and reference to Roedad Khan`s opinion piece, ``The Illusion of Power`` (The News International, December 22, 1999). Let me first say something about your comment. You seem to suggest that if the origins of wars are ideological then wars may (or may not be) evil. The question of ideology, however, is no less chaotic and Pakistan is currently passing through a crisis of ideology (see Najam Sethi`s famous speech).

Something about Roedad Khan, from the inside back cover page of his book ``Pakistan -- A Dream Gone Sour``(1997): ``Roedad Khan joined the civil service of Pakistan in 1949 and had held several important appointments including those of Chief Secretary, Sindh; Secretary, Ministry of Interior; Secretary General, Ministry of Interior; Federal Minister in charge of Accountability; and Advisor to the Prime Minister on Accountability. He served under five of the six presidents that he writes about and knew all six of them personally.`` Roedad Khan`s book needs careful reading. A careful reading needs to be informed by some sort of perspective.

In his long opinion piece, Khan draws eight conclusions. He writes (my brief comment interjected) :

1. `` That the army is a permanent reality in the politics of Pakistan and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. And the sooner we come to terms with this reality, the better.``

Comment: Nobody can deny this reality. Should we come to terms with this reality? If yes, why so? However, there are many other realities in Pakistan, such as corruption and unresponsive of the state officials. Should we come to terms with this reality too (in fact, this is exactly what a lot of people have so far done in Pakistan as a ``rational strategy``). What if Khan`s sense of reality is self-created by the army-bureaucracy alliance (as Hamza Alavi and Hasan Gardezi suggest fairly clearly). Khan is simply arguing for the hegemony of army-bureaucracy (hegemony = legitimization of domination through public consent and its institutionalization).

2. ``That the sword of martial law or political intervention by the army, by whatever name it is called, will continue to hang over all our democratic institutions as has been the case throughout our troubled political history.``

Comment: I agree with the statement. So, what do we need to do? Three main options: maintain status quo; do what Khan is suggesting; strengthen democratic institutions through mass empowerment (this would require an active participation of the people of Pakistan). The question remains: How to bring effective social change?

3. ``That Le pouvoir will continue to play its traditional role of a referee with a strong whistle in the political power game in Pakistan.``

Comment: The Le pouvoir (defacto source of power) playing the role of referee is an interesting idea. But, a referee without rules. Khan want the rules to be established. For Khan, the role of a referee would be acceptable as long as the rules are established through some constitutional provisions (here we need to know the history of the making and unmaking of Pakistani constitution to appreciate the nature of procedural justice in Pakistan). What if the referee (after legitimation) acts basically in his (its) own interest? What it means in terms of the social geography of Pakistan?

4. ``That the highest power over citizens, unrestrained by law, will continue to reside where the coercive power resides.``

Comment: A bureaucratic mind, despite being very intelligent, is evident here. Highest power over citizens? So, Rousseau is out of picture. One-sided decision made. What change will it bring once the power of the coercive state apparatus is legally established over the citizens of Pakistan?

5. ``That no political institution in the country is strong enough to confront the army and challenge its usurpation of power as it has solid popular support.``

Comment: If army has sold popular support, what is the problem? Let us declare the army rule as the Pakistani style of democracy by the people, for the people, of the people.

6. `` That it is unrealistic, naive and quite unfair to expect the judges alone to uphold the supremacy of the constitution and confront the state when nobody else is willing to do so. Who was there to defend the Supreme Court when it was assaulted by goondas organised and led by the government?``

Comment: I tend to agree, but he seems to limit the state to the executive branch and its goons. Who is included in ``nobody else``? The army, ISI, police, or the silent majority? How much the judiciary is responsible for the current state of affairs? All these matter need to be viewed in light of the notion of de facto power (and in the case of future, in terms of de jure power). Unfortunately, Khan unintendedly (or intendedly) wants to reinforce de facto power by confusing it with other form(s) of power through a constructed process of legitimation.



7. Ironically, it is the army and not any political institution which represents the ``general will``, and the hopes, aspirations and dreams of the people of Pakistan today, ``and yet this same day come four years``! But let the curtains of the future hang``.

Comment: It is a myth that the army represents the general will. This myth is a product of an ideology that has been imposed upon the people of Pakistan. The present chaos in Pakistan is partly due to the tension between those who support the imposed ideology and those who challenge the same. And, this myth is not entertained by a large number of people in every part of Pakistan. This myth has a limited geography.

8. And most important of all, that no political system--parliamentary, presidential or any other--has any chance of survival if the army has no role in it or is not its integral part.

Comment: Musharraf, being an army chief, has pledged for the depoliticization of state institutions. Isn`t the army a state institution? Khan seems to negate the wisdom of Musharraf`s pledge.

Comments welcome.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Hamidm # 110

Okay Hamid .. tell me about the manifesto of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). What´s Altaf Hussain´s agenda ? What do the Mohajirs of Karachi want after having called themselves Mohajirs for 52 years when no one else did ? That sounds a bit like the black americans caling themselves Niggers even though noone else calls them that .. !

Waiting ..

bahmad #106

Thanks for the interesting and illuminating quotations. Your own remark

``War is a failure of our intellect which we don`t believe to possess. ``

is the one I appreciate the most for its relevance to the India-Pakistan context.

hamidm #104

I am not against war for a so-called `just` cause. However, like any other political option, the need for war must be grounded on more than the incompetance or unimaginativeness of those who influence events. The quotations which Mr. Bilal Ahmad has kindly posted bear out this aspect of war. And I am against war imposed on a populace by an unresponsive, and unimaginative leadership. If the Pakistani people indeed want war, let them go to war. But let a general`s career graph not be the deciding factor.

Its revealing that in the recent Kosovo conflict, public opinion forced Clinton to avoid risking to even a single Amercian life. When will India and Pakistan show as much value for its people`s lives? About war leading to solutions of problems around the world, well, lets look at its relevance to the Indo-Pak context. Must we always look westward for solutions. Do we not have wisdom and innovativeness of our own?. Let us have a sense of history but also have a sense of the immediate and present. And if war is a natural state with us, I would rather not make this statement in the presence of all those in Southeast Asia and Angola who are still losing limbs on a daily basis because the world had no political options to avoid conflict in the past and in the present has neither the money nor the technology to get rid of all the landmines planted `naturally` in these areas. No problems ever got solved here, BTW. And how is it that Chowkwallahs(meaning no disrespect personally, though) are likely to be mailing 30year mortgage checks every month in between abetting war in theory? Basically, one is assuming that his life and livelihood will last some more years, one`s house will not be bombed out or destroyed by vandals wanting to smell his blood, or that the banks will not go bankrupt and call in all loans and continuity of peace will not be broken by war. Can anyone deny that this has been the result of finding innovative solutions over and above armed conflict to solve problems?

Returning to the relevancy of a military solution to Indo-Pak problems: let me make an analogy with the current currency of `jihad`. I don`t doubt in many regions of the world, Islamic jihad is a useful rallying cry for those whose identity and very existence is under threat. In the Indo-Pak context, does such an urgency exist, or is it merely expediency on the part of military and political leaders. My personal opinion is that the `sweatshops` of jihad in Pakistan are much more exploitative and more morally indefensible than those run by multinationals for pure commerce in other countries. Here, a poor person with limited options in life is indoctrinated, his life is almost certainly put at risk, and social and legal fabric of society destroyed, all because some leaders choose to use religion as a tool for personal advancement. No houris will compensate such leaders in the afterlife, I am pretty sure. By the same token, Pakistan`s political leaders, intellectuals and citizens owe it to their brave soldiers to find very good reasons to send them to their deaths in any war. It is a disrespect to these soldiers when they are sacrificed for their leaders` personal agendas or for the failures of their country`s thinkers and its political apparatus.

Sadhana