Who is Lyahus?

You dont know how accurately you have described my own feelings in the poem !

And I agree ... why is it Hip to attack someone who writes about the Hijab ????

-Yasser

Enjoyed this writing.

Ras

pard me for using this board for an unrelated matter.

Mithuna, here is the post you requested.

The Role of JI, JUI and JUP

I do not have much knowledge about the philosophical bent of Shias but most Sunni beliefs can be fitted into a scale of AB. The A end represent sub-continental cultures whereas B represent Arabic culture and traditions. Same scale can be used for the relative orthodoxy of various school of thoughts with A being the liberal and B being the orthodox end of the spectrum. The major Sunni groups will fit between point A and B in the following manner:

A---(sufis,pirs)-(barelvis)(deobandis)----(wahabis)---B

The people left of sufis would be secular and liberal and to the right of wahabis should be small extremist groups. The Jamiaat-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) is a party of the followers of barelvi school of thought and many pirs also support them. Their power bases are localized powerful pirs and mullah. The barelvis, although being the largest group is constantly losing power due to the military-favored JI and JUI since Zia’s era. They believe in Islamization but do not have a concrete plan about the nature of such state. Moreover they are not enthusiastically trying to achieve their goal. The Jamiaat Ulema-e-Islam(JUI) is a deobandi group and descended from Jamiaat-e-Ulema-e-Hind of Maulana Ahmad Saeed Madni of pre-partition India. Their power base has been the southern Pathans( Abdali Pathan) found in southern NWFP and Northern Balochistan. They believe that all Muslim majority countries and areas should be governed by “Islamic System” of government. Their Islamic state model is strictly based on shariah, fiqah and islamic penal code. They also actively support the spread of their brand of Islam beyond the largely Muslim areas. That is why Tablighi Jamaat is mostly a deobandi group. The Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) follows the philosophy of its founder, Maulana Maudoodi. On the scale of A to B, it fits somewhere in between deobandis and wahabis. They had very clear and well laid out plan for Islamic state, modeled after the rule of Muhammad’s friends (Khulfa-e-Rashidain) but they are open to ijtehad ( a sort of reform) according to the local conditions, e.g., they are not as strict about women’s role as JUI or Talibans are. They believe strongly about the political side of Islam and yearn to see a united Muslim Ummah on the matters of, for example, Kashmir, Palestine, Kosovo and Chechenya. They were supported by the Saudi royal family and that alone deterred them from taking any strong anti-western or anti US stand. Their Islamic state model was actually much closer to the present day Iranian model but due to past Saudi connection, they are not very supportive of Iran.

All three parties were originally outside the power troika of military-elite-beaurucracy during the earlier years of Pakistan’s History. The troika would throw a bone or two once in a while as a token to keep them passive and JI was even at odds with the military. But things started to change for JI when its student wing, IJT became the most organized and powerful force on campuses and many of their supporter were successfully commissioned into the military in addition to the rise of Saudi and middle eastern influence in Pakistan and JI’s active support of military in the 1971 war in Bangladesh where armed follower of JI (Shams and Al-Badr) were helping army to suppress rebellion and committed severe atrocities against anti-Pakistan Bengalis.

The JI practically won a lottery when one of their sympathizer, a junior Lt. General by the name of Zia-Ul-Haque, superseding several senior generals was appointed the COAS by Z. A. Bhutto upon the recommendation of his intelligence chief along with a recommendation from King Hussain of Jordan (it is quite possible that King Hussain was merely forwarding the recommendation of his masters at CIA). Zia’s family belonged to JI and moreover, he was a close relative of JI chief Mian Tufail Mohammad. The crowning moment for JI came when Zia overthrew Z. A. Bhutto in a coup d’tat following a bloody campaign by the opposition parties charging Z. A. Bhutto for rigging in the election. There are suggestions that Zia and Saudi money also played a significant role on behalf of combined oppositions ( PNA) movement. The JI chief (amir) Mian Tufail Mohammad sid, ”thank God, Pakistan is saved” while commenting on the coup of Zia. The JUI also got a boost during PNA’s agitation against Bhutto when an unknown mullah of JUI, named Yusuf Banori from Karachi was elected as the head of PNA and led the movement against Z. A. Bhutto. It is still unclear as to what transpired his ascension to the leading position.

Then came the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The military establishment and Zia gave preferential treatment in channeling arms and funds to a JI-Saudi supported Afghan Mujahideen group by the name of Harkat-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The JI returned this favor for openly supporting Zia’s regime till 1979 and played a double role later on by internally supporting Zia and externally supporting opposition to his rule, for political reason.

After Zia’s death and Soviet pull out of Afghanistan, The ISI and the military kept supporting Hekmatyar group even during the BB’s first term as prime minister. But the miserable failure of Jalalabad offensive and later on relentless bombing of Kabul by Hekmatyar forces forced the military to reevaluate the situation. Additionally it may have to do with the alliance of JUI with BB and BB’s detesting the JI for its role in her father’s downfall. Anyway, it was the creation of Talibans by the combined efforts of JUI, interior minister Nasir Ullah Babar and ISI. Rest is history as far as Talibans are concerned.

This was the end of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. But the Saudi connection of JI and their supporters in the military establishment, with JI now headed by a person with strong ISI connection, namely Qazi Hussain Ahmad, rescued their mutual relationship by creating Harkat-Ul-Ansar (later on HUM) from the leftovers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Harkat-e-Islami. They were mostly Pathans but in the dominance of Talibans era, have no use in Afghanistan. This group was later to be used in Kashmir and during Kargill crisis in particular.

In the meantime splinter radical anti-shia groups from JUI were emerging in Pakistan. It is not certain how deeply they are connected to any establishment in Pakistan but they certainly do the Saudi bidding in the geo-political game between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These groups have their sympathizers among JUI, Talibans and anti-shia clerics of Saudi Arabia.

It was during NS first term as prime minister when the gulf war erupted. There were strong anti-US and anti-Saudi Arabia feeling in Pakistan. This was the time when JI got carried away and supported anti-US and pro Saddam Hussain sentiments. It resulted in Saudis pulling the plug of JI support. The loss of Saudi support also meant the loss of Saudi support for Harkat-Ul-Ansar. With Saudi support gone it was easy for US to brand HUA a terrorist organization and HUA has to ultimately reorganize as Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen( HUM). The HUM was predominantly Pathan and now much less associated with JI. SO JI created another jehadi organization called Al-Badr. This jehadi group is as much in control of JI as their student wing (IJT) all across campuses in Pakistan. The Al-Badr group, still mostly Pathans, was also actively involved in the Kargill conflict because JI desires to remain a military ally.

The Saudis now looked for new partners. They helped in creation of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LT). This group is headed by one hafiz Mohammad Saeed and philosophically very close to wahabis. The LT is largely funded by rich Saudis and perhaps the royal family also. This is mostly a punjabi and mohajir organization and is well oiled with the Saudi money. Superficially they also support Islamic System of government but their real aim seems to be the proselytization to wahabiism and to safeguard the general Saudi interests.

So JI has transpired at least four different jehadi groups during the last 25 years, namely Harkat-e-Islami, Harkat-Ul-Ansar, Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen and Al-Badr. The JI is also trying to win back Saudi favor and this is where interests of JI and pervez Musharraf could be mutually beneficial. It is the urban support which counts in Pakistan in the absence of democracy. With most of the urban populace divided between, PML, PPP, PQM and JI and to a smaller extent ANP and BNP, it is only JI who could be relied upon by PM. In return JI would like PM to use his good offices to reconnect them to Saudi Arabia.

As one can conclude from this post, as I believe also that these groups are on the fringe of the Pakistani society and there is no serious threat of them taking over Pakistan anytime in the near future. They can only enter to the corridor of power through back door. They are doomed to failure in any democratic process.

There is little chance that the military regime will be interested in clamping down on the organization who are so beneficial to them, both internally by creating a major law and order situation through terrorism and sectarian violence if so desired by the military to weaken any civilian government and externally as in Kashmir. It is no fluke that Qazi Hussain Ahmad started spewing venom against NS few months before coup d’tat and coupled with a sudden surge in the sectarian violence which immediately stopped somehow on October 12, 1999 at about 7:00 pm. The best military could do is to keep them dormant for a certain period.

Moreover, military establishment needs them even more now because of the image of military establishments invincibility in the internal politics has severely been tarnished. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history where a civilian, NS was successful in officially dismissing the COAS, announcing it on TV, appointing a new COAS and taking his oath, before the completion of the coup. Things might have turned out differently, have NS succeeded in arresting PM in Nawab Shah. Nawaz Sharif did not put his head in the sand after hearing the news of 111 brigade coming out of Westridge, Rawalpindi. This is in sharp contrast to 1977 when Z. A. Bhutto was absolutely helpless after hearing the news. He could only tell his sons to run for safety. NS was even able to bring Punjab elite police force for the protection of TV station and prime minister house.

I have constructed this post only from my memory. So I will appreciate any additions, corrections, criticism and comments of any sort. I always learn something new from chowk replies.