Would Devolution Empower “We the People”?

The 1973 War Powers Act can be found at :

http://www.cs.indiana.edu/statecraft/warpow.html

Please note section 5(b).

I also think

http://www.geocities.com/tthor.geo/idiotarguments.html

is food for thought. With a little search, I can find arguments on the web that the US has been a dictatorship since the Civil War and stuff like that.

-arun gupta

Re: ylh

``...conquerors. Pakistan is unique blend of various cultures ranging from, Aryan, Buddhist, Turkish, Arab, Iranian, Sindhi, Punjabi, etc etc ``

There is NOTHING Buddhist about Pakistan or its people. Don`t insult the one unscathed religion left in the world today by claiming that. As for Arab, you`ve got to be kidding me.

btw, wasn`t it hamidm who joked about people in Pakistan making their kids look like fools by trying to dress them up in Arab costumes?

Musharraf`s devolution plan is, on the face of it, an excellent plan.

Will it succeed ? For this, you have to define what success means, and define in what time frame you will measure success or failure.

Thinking about it some more, I see a basic underlying flaw in the whole plan.

An underlying assumption of the devolution plan, which I agree with, is that there are a bunch of powers that exist today that block actions or programs that would benefit the majority of common people.

The idea behind devolution is that new institutions and/or new rules will allow new actors to bring in changes in the face of opposition from the powers-that-be. I agree with this as well.

However, my reading yesterday leads me to believe that a certain stability of rules is required for the new actors to start defying the powers-that-be.

Why would a rational person antagonize the powers-that-be (and who will be around for a while) under the cover of rules that are going to almost certainly change ? Then you have created powerful enemies and your protection has been removed.

The rules will change after Musharraf steps down in three years or after the next set of politicians draft the next Constitution or after the next coup.

Because the rules of the game are not fixed, the advantage always remains with the powers-that-be.

Musharraf did not respect the Constitution, he can hardly guarantee constitutional stability. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here that people will not trust the ``system`` until it stops changing every three years; but the ``system`` will not stop changing as long as the time-period for the ``system`` to prove itself is just a few years.

The only answer is to produce the blue-print of a workable system (a workable Constitution), and then stick with it through thick-and-thin for a couple of decades -- no extra-Constitutional changes allowed. At the end of it, perhaps success or failure can be gauged.

-arun gupta

In response to scout (Reply # 52)
Dear scout:

I appreciate your thought behind going back to Pakistan and serve the people. With some reservations, I tend to agree with your position. However, could you explain why so many Pakistanis continuously choose to leave Pakistan? Are they all greedy nothing but greedy people? For some insights, please read Irfan Husains’s piece in Dawn (circa September 16, 1997). I don’t have the URL for the same, but I could send you a copy. My e-mail address is: bahmad@home.com

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

Chowkwallas:

Kindly read the first line of my previous post to Ferozk as follows:

In response to Ferozk (Replies # 48 and 83)
Dear Feroz:

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

P.S. Feroz, I am sorry for my sloppiness.

In response to Eerozk (Replies # 48 and 83)

Your statement: “I think that the plan has a serious flaw in the sense that it is counting, foolishly, on the bureaucracy to decentralize the powers it has enjoyed since we exchanged our imported colonial masters for the domestic kind.”

Comment: I fully agree with you about the centrality of (colonial/neocolonial style) bureaucracy in our country. I , however, am not sure that many (if not most) individual bureaucrats would ultimately be losers in a devolved system of governance. After all, the new plan is partly (if not essentially) a brain-child of our bureaucracy.

Your statement: “A reasonable question would be to ask whether the traditional Pakistani troika or the quartet wants to give up its power? Do the vested interests in Pakistan want to kill the goose that lays the golden egg?”

Comment: Nobody likes to give up power. The answer of your second question is: It most unlikely (if they have the capacity to save the goose).

Your statement: “Lets forget about noble intentions and utopian dreams and the oft repeated lie of ``serving the people of Pakistan`` for a second. Politics, in its most basic sense, is about power and the utilization [sic] of that power to make others do things they normally would not. This plan if implemented, a very big if, will change the traditional gravity of the power circles in Pakistan.”

Comment: Perhaps you are right. I have also raised the question of implementation. I don’t know about the noble intentions of the present dictatorial regime. I, however, cannot sever utopianism from my thinking. Utopian dreams, despite their surrealism or unrealism, provide a focus and a sense of direction for long-term achievement (if at all possible).

Your statement: “In real terms, the problem is not that the plan will fail, but what happens after it fails? The present system in Pakistan is dysfunctional and this devolution of power is intended to restructure it; but instead of restructuring, it is seeking to replace it.”

Comment: We cannot discard a plan because some people (even if rightly) believe that it would fail. Devolution is a need of our times. It is needed to restructure our neocolonial administrative structure at the level of experience. In my assessment, the new plan is simply restructuring the existing system. I doubt that “it is seeking to replace it.”

Your statement: “will the CE/COAS vacate power and leave the development of the plan to the intentions of the political set up which will replace the present interregum?

Comment: If the present regime maintains its (apparently successful) control as it expects, it will most probably find ways to deal with the problem of continuity in one form or another. What does the past history of Pakistan tell us? I don’t expect the basic processes to be very different, I expect a change in the form (to begin with).

Your statement: “How do we know that plan will be carried to its logical end or will it be reversed in mid stride by the next political fuhrer of Pakistan?

Comment: Only time will tell us (perhaps slowly and gradually).

Your statement: “If the second option is opted for, what organizational framework will govern Pakistan? The devolution plan or the plan it is supposed to replace? If both plans cancel themselves out in a political power play, what will replace the political vacuum in the Pakistani polity created as a result?

Comment: We often underestimate the power of history. History suggests that there is always a new beginning after a crisis. If our people cannot learn from our past mistakes, so be it. Only people can change their destiny.

Your statement: “This intention of devolution of power raises more questions than it answers!”

Comment: It is great that our people have at least started asking questions. This was rare in my early life (50s and 60s). The process has started, let’s keep the torch functioning.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to pullu (Reply # 48)
Dear Pullu:

Thank you for an informative post. Please provide more information whenever conveniently possible.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to ratiocinator (Reply # 47)

Dear Ratiocinator:

There is no doubt about the need for some sort of discipline and action on the part of professional politicians. But, what are the advantages and disadvantage of either politicizing the army and/or making a society in the image of the army? To develop some “insights” we need to look into the history of world politics. The world history provides all kinds of insights, though. Kindly inform us why the military rule is not an option in your country (be it India or the US or . . . .)?

I fully agree with your statement: “As far as I can tell, Musharraf has outlined a plan for economic growth. My feeling is that it is not workable as long as Pakistan spends so much on maintaining the armed forces.” This is my basic argument too. Pakistan army, in my view, is politicized (apparently occasionally) due to its imagined and/or constructed reproductive needs. Of course, the process is one of enhanced reproduction. I think, cutting military expenditure will become a popular choice when the poor people of ``Punjab`` will (if they do) join hands with the poor people of other smaller provinces. Otherwise, every attempt will be made to maintain the status quo. A relatively easy way to reduce Pakistan’s military expenditure is to engage in a no-war pact with India (and all other neighboring countries). This, however, may not ensure a relatively drastic cut in the military spending in India. Consequently, a threat to Pakistan’s security will always hang as a sword on the head of Pakistan (despite a no-war pact between the two countries).

I don’t view, a steering committee of representative from “all” political parties as a viable option. If Musharraf wants to remain in power, he may eventually do (with some modifications) what other regimes have done in the past. Such covert measures work best in the political arena of Pakistan (perhaps unfortunately). What the people can do in such a situation? They should raise their voice as much as possible for their betterment and the reform of the political system. If they don`t, their subjugation by the powerful will continue without much real concern for the same.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

OK, we failed to build democratic institutions in Pakistan, and there is certainly merit to building ``from the ground up`` as is being attempted now through devolution. But before we start building, do we have strong foundations? These foundations are in the form of a general agreement among a people on the vision and basic political structure in a country.

In this regard, the US had the Constitutional Congress and it`s ``We the People...`` Constitution. The UK has had the Parliament steadily beating a path towards the rule of law over the centuries. The UK Parliament was the mother of SOME Parliaments including the Lok Sabha (I use the term ``some``, and not ``all`` as is normally assumed. This is for accuracy: For example Iceland`s parliament, the Althingi, is older than the UK parliament - being formed in 930 AD - and given that the continued evolution of the British Parliament during the 19th century was itself undoubtedly influenced - like the 18th century French Revolution, as well as the 20th Chinese pro-democracy movement - by the ideas behind the American Revolution).

If the military government wishes to provide strong foundations to what it is trying to do, I would suggest as follows: Place the key principles, along with some reasonable options, before the people of Pakistan and have a referendum. Any such process will surely be better than what we have, which is essentially seen as the military government`s inititative, with no sense of ownership or participation among the people.

Such a referendum could include some basic questions: Should religion be seen as an personal matter or something for the state to decide? Do we need any intermediary government levels between the district and the national (i.e. get rid of provinces)? Should open elections be held within the established parties (PPP, PML) and let the people decide party leaders, or should the party leadership continue to be based on back-office politicking? Should the government seek peace with India even if it means forgetting about changing the status quo in Kashmir? and so forth.

This Referendum on National-Level Issues (to coin a phrase) could be held at the time of the local elections. This is common practice in the US where in addition to voting for political office-holders, voters are also asked to provide a referendum on different ``Propositions``, and it works quite well here.

In Asia, politics and politicians are a hopeless abyss and are no place to look for socio-economic improvement. Evolution or devolution ain`t gonna mean much.

Leaving aside Singapore and Japan, the rest of Asia`s leaders have suspect IQs and motivation levels of mules.

Until some professional corporate managers go take over their countries in Asia, nothing is going to change. But with up to half the population of many countries being illiterate/uneducated, there`s no chance in hell for these educated beings to come to power.

So my friends we will still be called third world citizens for another 50 years at least.

This devolution plan sounds well structured, but leaves a few questions unanswered:-

1) Will the 6 women out of 18 in the union council be governed by Shariat law or common law, I mean, will their vote or their opinion be equal to that of a male`s?

2) Will there be a limit to the tenure of the union council members and the nazims? Like maximum 2 tenures of, say, 4 years, in one lifetime?

3) Will there be a minimum educational or literacy marker for these posts?

4) Does this imply that if not all the people, at least the union council members will have the right to as much informaion as the civil servants?

5) What will these union council members get by way of legit salary and perks?

6) Will the union council be empowered to raise local taxes and duties?

The question is not whether devolution of power is good or bad for our countries. The question now is how soon can we put it into effect and what will be the quality therein?

`nuff said, I guess . . .

Hamsab

Eventhough I agree with all what you say but I ask you ... have you ever been to Pakistan? Maybe to express your opinion as an expert you should do that first.

We dont despise ourselves. Thats what you dont understand about conquerors. Pakistan is unique blend of various cultures ranging from, Aryan, Buddhist, Turkish, Arab, Iranian, Sindhi, Punjabi, etc etc Therefore conquerors from central Asia are sometimes hailed as our own and not as our conquerors... because we are all of the above and not single one of them ... this goes a long way in contributing to the UNIQUE Pakistani identity.

It is only logical that the worst plunderer depicted in your Indian History books, Mahmud of Ghazna is looked upon as a great Hero by us. This has little to do with religion ...

So dont tell us not to admire these great conquerors.. it is a matter of opinion. You have every right to disagree...

Mahmud of Ghazna did plunder India, I admit but your history books have a lot of exaggeration also. Like with the case of Muhammad Bin Qasim...

Muhammad Bin Qasim had actually become quite popular with the local natives after conquering Sindh ... and was able to raise up an army of 50,000 local soldiers... which was a considerable number. But in your history books he is maligned and slandered.

Personally I am sure you know of my views quite well ... You know that I am all for a secular Pakistan ... but I am also a nationalist and you cant expect me to promote the abandonment of National pride...

One last thing, and I dont say it as a boast but

I tell em as I see em... I am sure you can see how charged up Pakistanis are always ... about anything... How can you even blame us of being subservient in anyway. May I add that it is not always useful to take what happens in India and try to apply it to Pakistan...

Therefore I request you to go to Pakistan once.

-Pakistan Zindabad

-Quaid e Azam Zindabad

-Ataturk Zindabad

-Jiye Bhutto

-Imran Khan for PM

-Yasser Hamdani

I have only limited knowledge about the exact nature of the devolution plan, but I think it is fraught with many hidden dangers. Firstly I think that that the devolution package, by forcibly transferring powers from the provinces to the local bodies, may work to strengthen Islamabad at the cost of the provinces. The danger is that such ``decentralization`` may lead to even greater centralization of power than now. Secondly the package will inevitably weaken all national parties, and thereby reduce political resistance to the role of the army in the current and future regimes.

Under the current devolution plan most provincial powers including law and order, administration, and infrastructure development are being transferred to the local bodies. It is not clear what the future role of the provincial authorities is going to be, or how much managerial authority they will retain over these local bodies. This will certainly weaken them so that they may not be able to resist the usurpation of their responsibilites by the federal government. The local bodies in the best of cases are likely to be too small and self-absorbed to resist this centralization, and in the worst case may actually promote it by collaborating with the centre in getting more powers for themselves from their immediate bosses, i.e, the provinces. The implications of this for the federal structure of Pakistan need to be explored more deeply.

Secondly with non-partisan elections getting institutionalized at the local level, national parties will face an erosion of their local cadres. These are however the strength of any political party. With power for grab at the local level, how many people will really get motivated to work at the centre and from where will they derive their strength? And with weaker national parties, who will be able to fight the army if it wants a greater, maybe more direct role in government?

Apart from these implications, there are also grave problems that may arise from the way the devolution package is structured. Enough has been said about the harmful ``feudal influence`` in previous national democratic governments. How will devolution help remove these? In fact these influences are even stronger at the local level than they are at the national level.

Winning elections requires power and/or money. With elections being non-partisan, politcal power cannot be a factor in local elections. Therefore money will speak all the more. At the local levels, who has the money? It may also be noted that only one tier of elections are direct. The higher tehsil and district bodies are indirectly elected. Surely that is going to compound the ``feudal`` and money power?

And it is to these bodies that law and order and administration has been given! I think that there is a real danger that unless adequate checks and balances are built in, rural districts may become private fiefdoms of strong feudal influences. I read in a Pakistani newspaper some time back about a young Nawab who let his bloodhound loose on a little girl purely for the fun of it. The girl died, and last heard no action had been taken against the guy because his father was an influential landlord. How will devolution help prevent such incidents?

Some devolution is good no doubt, but the nature and extent of this devolution has to be worked out through a political process, through consensus, and with some give and take. In Pakistan however this process is being administered from outside the political framework. This not only raises doubts about how stable it is going to be, but also about what its aims are. Both serve to undermine the whole process, and raise pessimism about its future.

-narain

In response to macgupta (Reply # 46)
Dear Arun:

I fully agree. Life is a “process,” so is the state and society (and economy). Thanks for the URLs. Devolution is only the first step, indeed. We, therefore, need to take other steps as needed based on a clear vision of our national, subnational, and supranational goals and objectives.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to Layman (Reply # 45)
Dear Layman:

Pakistan has long been an authoritarian state. Danda is the most preferred means to deal with opposition. In present day Pakistan, how could we know who is corrupt and who is not? Aren’t there various degrees of corruption. How much corruption should we neglect? Is army a corruption free institution? How about the judiciary?

Is Musharraf a true dictator? Does he drive his dictatorial power from some quarters? If yes, which quarters? Finally, why Musharraf had failed to act upon the kind of suggestions provided by you in your post? Is Musharraf somewhat soft because he wants genuine reform or he is soft because the risks are too many?

Above all, why is he interested in his seven point agenda, particularly the one which calls for the devolution of political/administrative power? How would a die-hard bureaucrat answer this question?

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad

In response to mithuna (Reply # 43)
Dear Mithuana:

Good questions! I will reply ASAP.

Sincerely, Bilal Ahmad